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**SOCIAL
INSTITUTIONS**

The Century Social Science Series

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

BY

LLOYD VERNOR BALLARD

PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY

BELOIT COLLEGE



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TO

A. M. B.

L. B. B.

E. B. B.

A. L. B.

M. A. B.

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

THE years since the World War have brought storms to considerable sections of humanity, and from the present angry aspect of the sky one might prognosticate that the next two or three decades will be even stormier. The point of this is that, when the revolutionary mood reigns, social institutions are liable to be tossed contemptuously into the melting pot, for no longer are they protected by the myth that they are sacred and changeless. Once an institution has been put to the question there is no foretelling what will happen to it; it may be its fate to be thrown on the ash heap within a few years. Therefore, now is a poor time to approach social institutions with a mystical or reverential attitude. They should be tackled by one who will look upon them as man-made contrivances for achieving certain collective human purposes, and not be shocked if in their later stages they prove to be extremely faulty.

The author of this book impresses me as well fitted to apply scientific method to the study of social institutions. As a seasoned sociologist he understands the nature of human society and its needs; so it is not difficult for him to "figure out" the purpose for which an institution was devised. But that an institution is so hoary that it has become sacrosanct in the eyes of the multitude does not in the least paralyze his critical faculty. He is not at all loath to point out wherein a revered institution fails to "deliver" as expected.

The type of mind called for nowadays in this section of sociology does not so venerate social institutions that it cannot perceive their shortcomings with reference to the strange new life the advanced segments of humanity are coming into, in consequence of the spread of the Machine, cheap Power, universal communication, radio, motion film, the airplane, the dissolving of local groups, the conquests of Science, the dissipating of ancient superstitions and time-hallowed dogmas. On the other hand, in view of the fact that some of the best intellects of all time have had to do with the shaping of our inherited institutions and that no institutions have been wholly pointless and futile—if they had been they would not have been allowed to survive—the last person fitted to interpret them to us is the self-confident "smart Aleck," the flip iconoclast who could have given the Creator himself helpful advice if he had been summoned in time.

It seems to me that Professor Ballard exhibits neither undue timidity nor over-assurance in his approach to social institutions, but, ripe scholar that he

is, inspects them in the "cool dry light" of science. Far from being swept about in cloudy spaces by the winds of doctrine, he is a realist who manages to keep his feet always on the ground. He is no mere library haunter but an alert and curious inquirer, who notices and catches the meaning of what is going on about him.

If I had children of an age to be inducted into the study of social institutions, I should count them fortunate if their induction were by way of this book.

EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS.

PREFACE

IN THE effort to make Sociology "scientific" sociologists have given much attention to the development of scientific techniques and their utilization in the measurement and description of social phenomena. As a result of this effort an impressive array of sociological data has now been assembled. The recent "depression-years" have made it increasingly evident, however, that a social order can be brought under effective social control only when the facts and principles uncovered by such analytical methods are organized and synthesized into bodies of tentative working hypotheses. This volume undertakes such a synthesis. In the following pages an attempt is made to deal realistically, yet constructively, with certain fundamental American social institutions, to lay bare the presumptions upon which they are founded, to reexamine their functions in the light of recent social change and to evaluate their adequacy to the present social order.

This book will serve its purpose, therefore, if it supplies the basic materials for the intelligent discussion of the institutions it treats. To this end *Questions* which raise fundamental issues and *Selected References* which cite authoritative texts and challenging books whose themes deserve consideration have been added to each chapter. Throughout the author has tried to assemble, coordinate and integrate the significant social thought of the time with respect to these institutions rather than to advance new theories.

It is obvious that the author of such a volume is heavily indebted to the many writers whose works have been cited either in the body of the text or in the *Selected References* as well as to others not specifically mentioned. The author is also under obligation to the several publishers who have given generous consent to the use of copyrighted material. Much, too, has been contributed to the making of this book by colleagues and by students who, during the past twelve years, have vigorously challenged the points of view and conclusions presented here.

Certain more specific acknowledgments should also be made, namely, to Robert Coit Chapin, Horace White Professor of Economics at Beloit College during the author's undergraduate years, for arousing an abiding interest in social institutions and for an early training in the scholarly but human approach to the social sciences; to Mrs. Robert Coit Chapin, Mrs. Anna Lytle Brannon and Dr. Edward J. Howard for reading the manuscript and offer-

ing many helpful suggestions with respect to its form and content; to the Library of Congress and to Miss Julia Wright Merrill of the American Library Association for reviewing and correcting the chapter on the Public Library, to the Reverend E. E. Voelkel of the First Congregational Church of Beloit, Dr. M. R. Brandt of the West Congregational Church of Akron, and especially to Dr. von Ogden Vogt of the First Unitarian Church of Chicago, for many stimulating discussions of the material presented in the chapters on Religion and the Church, and above all to Edward Alsworth Ross, Editor of the Century Social Science Series, for devoting many hours to the patient, thoughtful consideration of each chapter of this book. The author can not adequately express here his appreciation of the kindly interest, the penetrating criticism and the constant encouragement which Dr. Ross gave unstintedly throughout the preparation of the manuscript. The author alone, however, is responsible for the conclusions set forth in these pages.

It will be noted that this volume contains no discussion of *Industry* as a social institution. A. J. Todd's *Industry and Society; a Sociological Appraisal of Modern Industry* (New York, 1933), indicates so fully the contribution which the sociologist may make to the economist's treatment of this basic social institution that restatement seemed unwise and unnecessary.

L. V. B.

Beloit, Wisconsin

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SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

CHAPTER I

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS: THE SPECIES

THE term *social institution* is at present applied with little discrimination to a variety of social forms. It is used by some writers to describe such complete social orders as slavery, feudalism and caste, or such social procedures as marriage, blood-vengeance, and vocational guidance. More frequently it is used to designate such bits of social machinery as the divine right of kings, oligarchy, coast-guards, fire-fighters, orphanages, police, civil service, the jury system, and language. Still others employ the term when reference is made to such social customs as duelling, ancestor-worship, "fagging," "treating," widow-burning and foot-binding, with the implication that these customary procedures are essentially institutions. And at least one sociologist regards all human achievements as institutions.¹ Obviously, clear thinking is impossible when terms are used with so great a variety of meaning. The first prerequisites to scientific analysis are a definition of terms and a precise delimitation of the scope of the inquiry. Before proceeding to the study of specific institutions, therefore, an analysis of the species is in order.

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

(*Social institutions are sets of organized human relationships purposively established by the common will.* As such, they may be regarded as the end-products of social processes, since it is their specific function to canalize the conduct of the group in action. Group behavior is thus not only charted and compassed but also held within the limits of what the group believes to be consistent with its well-being. Social institutions are forms of social organization, for the relationships they comprehend have been definitely systematized and approved.) They are unique, however, in that they have been specifically designated as organizations which perform a group function so vital as to necessitate social sanction and social control.

(*Social institutions are to be distinguished from other social forms in that they are established by some common will.*) They are therefore something more than social habits; they are "meeting points of wills"² seeking to realize

¹ L. F. Ward, *Pure Sociology* (New York, 1903), p. 31.

² H. J. W. Hetherington and J. H. Muirhead, *Social Purpose* (London, 1918), pp. 119-120.

some social purpose. This purpose is objectified in the external forms which social institutions assume; the institution, however, is not to be identified with this external form, nor thought to be embodied in it. (Rather social institutions are to be conceived of as "forms of order established within social life."³ As such, they possess a social entity analogous in nature to legal entity but not identical with it. They may similarly be said to possess a social personality just as certain legal forms are said to possess a legal personality. Such entities have meaning only as expressions of a collective effort to describe collective activity.)

(Social institutions, then, are to be regarded neither as philosophical abstractions nor as disembodied, impersonal entities for they do not exist apart from the individuals who compose them. A college, for example, consists in reality of its faculty, its student body, its board of trustees and its alumni; these at any given moment of time, embody concretely the functions of the institution.) Again, a church is something more than a mythical, spiritual body, a set of doctrines, or an edifice. It is essentially a group of individuals who function collectively with respect to certain specific relationships. The state, likewise, is not to be thought of as merely a framework of political procedure, a body of statute law, or an ideal of political organization. It also is a group of persons banded together for certain definite purposes. Laws, courts, political parties, and governmental machinery are merely the agencies which the group utilizes to secure well-defined ends. And finally, the family is to be considered as something vastly more human than a social concept, a ceremony, or a legalized arrangement for perpetuating the human species. It is, in truth, comprised of a number of persons whose purpose it is to perform certain social functions and who enter into certain relationships with such an end in view.

X If such is the true nature of social institutions, it follows that these institutions are precisely what humans make them, no more and no less. Likewise their quality and the effectiveness of their functioning is dependent upon the quality and ability of the individuals who compose them. To be sure, institutions gather about themselves an accumulation of customs, conventions and traditions which give them a permanence they would not otherwise possess. But these things *per se* do not make the institutions either sacred or secular, progressive or regressive, significant or lacking in significance. Institutions may live for a time on reputation or prestige, it is true; but unless the quality of the personalities which compose them is such as to support this reputation or prestige, they sink into insignificance as soon as they are exposed.)

(These traditions, customs and conventions are not essential to the existence

³ R. M. MacIver, *Community* (London, 1924), p. 154.

of the institutions about which they gather. Institutions, especially in their infancy, exist for some time without these accretions. They accumulate inevitably, however, as the institutions mature and eventually aid materially in institutional functioning by virtue of the fact that they set standards for the performance of the personalities who compose them. These standards represent mores, codes and ideals which have developed as the end-products of group experience and which become the guiding principles for the present functioning of the institutions concerned. But these traditions, customs and conventions are no more the institutions themselves than statute law is the state, theology the church, or pedagogy the school.)

✓ ATTRIBUTES OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

As social entities, social institutions are characterized by certain essential attributes which distinguish them from other social forms.

1. *Ideation.* A social institution always germinates in and centers about some concept, belief or idea with respect to a social need or social interest which is commonly recognized as having intimate connection with the survival or achievement of the group.) The idea of the relation of human reproduction to the continuance of the group, for example, is the germ of the institution of the family. No such connection is believed to exist between customs or traditions and group survival or perpetuation.

2. *Structure.* A framework is necessary "to hold the concept and to furnish instrumentalities for bringing it into the world of facts and action in such a way as to serve the interests of men in society." ⁴ "The structures embody the idea of the institution and furnish the instrumentalities through which it is put into action." ⁵ Social apparatus, procedures, buildings and equipment are evidences of such institutional structure. Marriage rites, political parties, cathedrals, and school buildings are also structural elements. ⁶ It is common to regard these as *de facto* institutions; it should be evident that these constitute merely the framework of the institution.)

3. *Purpose.* The purpose develops, of course, out of the idea or concept in which the institution originates. The common will which authorizes the institution specifies the purpose of the institution; it also defines the interests which shall be served and sets the objectives toward which institutional activity shall be directed. Institutions are justified only to the extent to which these purposes are fulfilled as a result of such activity.)

⁴ W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston, 1907), pp. 53-54.

⁵ R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to Study of Society* (Chicago, 1921), pp. 796-797.

⁶ F. S. Chapin, *Cultural Change* (New York, 1928), pp. 44-50, "Social Institutions."

4. *Relative permanence.* Inasmuch as social institutions are forms of order, and since they are established by the common will to meet certain vital human needs, they endure as long as the need remains.) "So long as children must be trained, there will be schools; so long as men and women fall in love, there will be families; so long as common safety and existence demand protection there will be states; and so long as thoughtful men ponder as to the nature of the universe and speculate as to its meaning, there will be churches." (The particular form which any of these institutions takes, however, changes with conditions and human achievement.)

(5. *Authority.* Every social institution is the result of a "public judgment lodged in the popular mind" ⁸ with respect to a given social relation, which is thereby permitted or established.) The authority which institutions exercise springs from such a judgment.) Institutions do not establish their own authority; it has always been conferred.) Those who have been charged with the administration of institutions have often assumed an authority which the collective will has never granted, but only such social organizations or social relationships as secure the recognition and sanction of the group become institutions. (Thus, it can be said that "an institution is simply a definite and established phase of the public mind, not different in its ultimate nature from public opinion, often seeming, on account of the visible customs and symbols, in which it is clothed, to have a somewhat distinct and independent existence." ⁹)

(6. *Social control.* Since institutions are products of the "social mind" they are necessarily under the control of the "social mind." Individuals may profoundly influence institutions, but unless their ideas are accepted by the group, the institutions remain unchanged. It is only the common will which creates; it is only the common will which controls.) When institutions appear to be unresponsive to common needs, it is probable that those needs have not yet been recognized by the common will. This recognition often appears to be very tardy. But since institutions are the slowly precipitated products of vast accumulations of human experience, such slowness of movement is inevitable. (Institutions cannot, should not, change quickly.) Given adequate time, however, the normal group will perceive basic human needs and will establish the mechanism which affords their satisfaction. Necessarily, therefore, the group not only possesses the means of controlling its institutions but also actually strives to make them effective. Legislative bodies, commissions, courts, public opinion, the press—all these exercise a potent influence upon the various phases of institutional activity.

⁷ C. Kelsey, *The Physical Basis of Society* (New York, 1923), p. 362.

⁸ E. C. Hayes, *Introduction to Study of Sociology* (New York, 1924), p. 405.

⁹ C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization* (New York, 1911), p. 313.

7. *Personnel.* Social institutions differ from all other social forms except social organizations in that they possess a specialized personnel. It is impossible to conceive of social institutions except as manned by a given number of persons with specific functions, who carry the purpose of the institution into effect. Teachers, clergymen, holders of public office, secretaries, entrepreneurs, husbands, wives, constitute the personnel of the various basic institutions. Traditions, customs, conventions, mores have no such specialized functionaries.

THE GENESIS OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Like all other forms of social organization, social institutions develop from great human needs more or less universally recognized. Institutions are not the products of caprice or of authority. Industry, for example, has developed out of the necessity for adaptation to a physical environment which supplied humans insufficiently with food, clothing and shelter. Through the ages, religion has been man's attempt to bring himself into adjustment with unfathomed natural forces. This was at first essayed through the dance, magic, totems and idols. Later, more elaborate devices were used, but essentially the problem has remained precisely that with which the savage struggled. The need for care of offspring and for control over the sexual appetites of men, which, unrestrained, jeopardized with over-population the survival of the group, led to the development of the family. Similarly, the need for the conservation of the social heritage found issue in the institutions of the school and the library.

In each of these cases, it is likely that after much trial and rejection, certain procedures became customary. The collective action of the group, in other words, set up certain action patterns which were accepted as those most consistent with the tradition of the group. After a time, these action patterns were conventionalized; later still, a certain amount of organization developed about these sets of procedures. In this manner the group became definite in its aim or purpose with respect to given situations or conditions. To this organization, a ritual was often added to give it prestige. This is accomplished when the individual is subordinated to the group by means of ceremonies which break down his personality and give him a new set of habits, or even, as in conversion, a new personality.

The ritual was then made a sacred thing. As it was handed down from generation to generation, it was thought to have had a supernatural origin or to have been produced by supermen under the influence of some greater-than-human power. Note how Moses was believed to have obtained the Commandments. Note also the prestige which attaches to the makers of the Constitution of the United States. In time this ritual was written down, thereby becoming fixed in form rather than spontaneous. The less spontaneous, the more sacred

it became. Later, it was necessary to elaborate the ritual in order that it might retain novelty sufficient to insure its preservation. Otherwise it would have lost its prestige and been abandoned.

Festivals are also developed as an integral part of institutional activity. Such celebrations are a means of periodic relief from the tension of the sustained institutional regimen. Collective action, when maintained for a period of time, develops an unrest which eventually necessitates catharsis. Release in the form of celebrations and festivals did not, however, change the basis of the collective action of the group. Additional traditional forms and activities, customary procedures and practices adhere to the institution as it matures until at last it becomes an intricate, complicated, and often powerful social organization.

Inquiry into the genetics of institutions, therefore, inevitably leads to the conclusion that social institutions are the products of human will and human experience. Developed to meet basic human needs, institutions have been changed in form and organization as those needs have taken on new aspects. The family, for example, has taken on different characteristics, and different relationships have been established between its constituent elements as the familial problem has differed from one region to another, or from one historical period to another. These changes have been traced in detail among certain pastoral, agricultural and higher-agricultural peoples.¹⁰ A close relationship has also been shown to exist between the economic condition of a people, its innate disposition and its familial organization.¹¹ Similar influences are to be noted in the history of religion;¹² and it has long been admitted that industrial and political organization has been reshaped with changes in cultural complex.¹³ Such changes throw institutions out of adjustment. The great human need remains, but the mechanism for the satisfaction of that need is outgrown. Note the modification of the patriarchal family of an agricultural people when its cultural complex becomes industrial. Note the passing of magic, totemism and the worship of idols with the development of rationalism and science. Note the transition from exploitive absolutism to representative democracy with the expansion of trade, commerce and intercommunication.

Social institutions, however, are neither predetermined in the natural process, nor are they self-determined. They are neither sentient nor rational. In the

¹⁰ E. Grosse, *Die Formen der Familie und die Formen der Wirtschaft* (Freiburg, 1896), Chs. 2-9.

¹¹ W. Goodsell, *A History of the Family as a Social and Educational Institution* (New York, 1926).

¹² L. Browne, *This Believing World* (New York, 1926); C. F. Keary, *Outlines of Primitive Belief* (New York, 1882), p. 325.

¹³ N. S. B. Gras, *An Introduction to Economic History* (New York, 1922); R. Mukerjee, *Regional Sociology* (New York, 1926).

beginning social institutions are projections of the human mind and the human will as they grope for the means of adjustment to a merciless environment. In the end, when institutions have become rigid or obsolescent, it is the human mind and the human will which often, at great cost, modifies or transforms them into agencies of human welfare and progress. If the modern family is superior to primitive pairing as a solution of the social problems of human reproduction, this superiority is achieved when humans are able to conceive of the marriage relationship as serving other than passionate ends. And if the religions of the present day compass the Unknown more adequately than ancient animism, this, too, is accomplished when men eschew untruth and make of religion a thing of reason, of beauty and of inspiration. With long life, institutions are likely, it is true, to develop tendencies of their own; yet, human instruments, utilized by human beings to secure human objectives, they have been, are and will remain.

THE BASES UPON WHICH SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS REST

The roots of social institutions penetrate deeply into human nature. Since they arise out of definite, permanent desires which demand satisfaction, social institutions are rooted in the fundamental human interests, economic, sexual and social. These interests or predispositions are passed on from generation to generation as a part of the socio-biological inheritance. Institutions, in other words, represent a formal organization of conduct which emanates from the terrific urge of fundamental desires. The family originally was an institutionalization of behavior, proceeding from human reproductive propensities and the necessity of child care; the state, from the survival-interest; and religion, socially considered, from curiosity concerning, or desire for security from, Unseen Powers. Industry, of course, developed out of desires for concrete goods. Sociologically, nothing is more deep-seated than are these interests.

Social institutions are also an essential part of the purely social heritage. The experiences and convictions of each generation, as it faces the great issues of collective living, are embodied in the institutions it transmits to the succeeding generation. As a result of additional experience, later generations modify or enlarge these institutions until in time they represent the accumulated wisdom of unnumbered human beings, and acquire a prestige which belittles the wisdom of a single group and renders insignificant the experience of the individual. By this process, institutions become parts, integral parts, of the social order. To eliminate a matured institution, therefore, is a compound major operation, usually fatal, since release from institutional direction and control, in any case, leaves a significant phase of human conduct without chart and compass. Such

uprooting⁸ also tears at the vitals of human nature and destroys a part of the foundation upon which the social superstructure is built.

THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Naturally, specific functions have been assigned to the separate social institutions, since, in each case, they have been designed to meet a certain persistent human need. It is also natural that, as a group of social forms, institutions should develop a set of common functions. These they perform collectively for the whole of society.

1. *Conservation.* Because they embody in articulate form what each generation has judged to be the best of its experience, institutions have given continuity to tradition, law, art and science. Succeeding generations can hence begin their achievement where their forefathers left off. By maintaining the achievement of each generation, institutions give stability to the social order and to culture; and this, in turn, makes progress possible.

Only after liberal institutions have been established for the purpose of comparing the experiences, the beliefs, the knowledge, and the practice of different societies, can science grow into critical and positive philosophy; can religion develop from tribal worship into a deep and reverent consciousness of the transcendent relations of personality; or can ethics grow out of morals, or fine art out of the arts of recreation.¹⁴

2. *Moral education.* Mecklin holds that "social institutions are the great educators because they supply the settled modes of behavior, the relatively fixed forms of social evaluation so necessary for that disciplining of the individual with which all education begins."¹⁵ This follows necessarily from the fact that social institutions are the conservators of the social heritage. As such, they hold the accumulation of the culture complexes and the culture patterns which differentiate one group from another or one civilization from another. It is these complexes and patterns which standardize individual and collective behavior and produce social order.)

Social institutions are especially the conservators of the non-material elements of culture, namely, the collective habits, laws, traditions, customs and social values which cannot be expressed in brick and mortar. The process by which the individual is conditioned to the "habits of his group's civilization," therefore, is largely circumscribed by institutional functioning. "Most of what is called education is the process of becoming acculturated, of learning how to

¹⁴ F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1921), p. 396.

¹⁵ J. M. Mecklin, *Introduction to Social Ethics* (New York, 1920), pp. 203-204.

adjust to surrounding culture.”¹⁶ The inculcation of tested and sanctioned behavior patterns hence proceeds directly from social institutions. Particularly should they produce a “thoroughly organized and socially efficient conscience.”

3. *Creation of social machinery.* David Snedden explains this function of social institutions as follows:

Institutions represent the numberless efforts of society or particular societies to create adequate machinery for the easy discharge of various social functions. There is imposed, among other things, specialization of service. Something heretofore performed on a voluntary basis is placed in the hands of paid servants, the conduct of schools, the care of orphans, the defense of the country, the inspection of food. There grows up a long series of customs, regulations and laws. In ages when people can readily be made to believe in divine intervention in the affairs of men, the belief is established that institutions have divine sanction. . . . Institutions often come to possess buildings, expensive equipment and capital investments. These usually contribute greatly to the stability of such institutions and also to their unresponsiveness to influences of change. These externals become powerful means of control and adjustment of younger members to institutional life. A fraternal hall, a dimly lighted church, old and vast school buildings, and the like strongly impress young and plastic minds, and help shape them to loyalties toward the institutions. Social science finds numberless methods by which political parties, industrial organizations, social sets, and the like, gradually initiate and habituate their young and responsive members through sheer pressure of institutional suggestion.¹⁷

4. *Canalization of conduct.* Social institutions are the most effective means society possesses of inhibiting behavior which it believes to be prejudicial to its welfare or interest and of assuring conduct which past experience seems to have indicated as desirable. Fear of ridicule, the force of public sentiment, appeal to the predisposition to imitate, and even force, are utilized to secure accommodation to approved types of behavior. This implies that social institutions are positive and powerful disciplinary agencies. A social conduct, like disease, places the entire social body in peril; group life becomes futile if the accepted norms of conduct are not generally practised. Institutions, hence, offer the only guarantee society possesses that social objectives will be realized and that the culture patterns will be maintained.

The value of an institution depends upon the service which it performs. The justification of a social institution, therefore, is found in its purpose and the manner of its functioning. “The ultimate right of an institution to exist is its efficient performance of a desirable or needed social function.”¹⁸

¹⁶ J. Davis and H. E. Barnes, *Introduction to Sociology* (New York, 1927), pp. 551-553.

¹⁷ David Snedden, *Educational Sociology* (New York, 1923), p. 224.

¹⁸ W. G. Beach, *An Introduction to Sociology and Social Problems* (Boston, 1925), p. 181.

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

KINDS OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Every institution aims to supply "a mould to which the relations, attitudes and behavior of the individual"¹⁹ should conform. Some institutions, of course, have a social import which is so completely recognized by society that conformity of the individual to the institutional action-patterns is required. Such canalization is characteristic of all *basic* institutions; namely, industry, the family, the church, the school and the state. Here the individual exercises little choice and sets no standards of his own. Moreover, society either compels or strongly urges participation in the activities of these institutions which are designed to satisfy fundamental human needs universally experienced. They are also basic in that they are necessarily essential to the maintenance of the social order. These have been called "regulative"²⁰ or "primary"²¹ social institutions. [Other institutions differ from the basic institutions primarily in that the functions they are designed to perform are not yet conceived to be of sufficient significance to require full social control. Conformity to the standards set by these institutions and participation in their activity is still a matter of individual choice.

These institutions are sanctioned by the public which they serve; in some cases society finances the institution even when it does not require individual participation, as in the clinic or the public library. In time these institutions may become basic; in fact, they are likely to be so considered as social relationships become more complex and of a higher order. At present, they are "valued and supported by the public and controlled by public opinion." Such institutions may be designated *sanctioned* institutions. In this group should be included recreation centers, health clinics, public libraries, social settlements. Some of these have been called "operative" institutions.²²

This classification cannot be applied rigorously. Account must be taken of the fact that particular institutions differ in content and significance as social orders develop. There is much evidence, for example, that the church is rapidly losing its power to command conformity; hence, in time it may, if it has not already, become merely a sanctioned institution. It should also be noted that large numbers of people are still greatly limited in the property they possess, while wealth continues to concentrate in the hands of the privileged. Industry, then, is an institution which promises to take on a very different meaning and content as its social implications are more completely recognized. The increase

¹⁹ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1920), p. 485.

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 485.

²¹ L. F. Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

²² E. A. Ross, *op. cit.*, pp. 485-486.

of divorce and the possible approval of trial marriage indicates the possibility of similar metamorphosis in the family. Finally, it must not be forgotten that significant groups of individuals may at present decline to assume institutional responsibilities in the establishment of families of their own, in the acquisition of wealth, in securing an adequate education, or in the maintenance of law and order. With reasonable qualification, therefore, the above classification of institutions meets the requirements of this analysis.

THE COST OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

As communities become more populous, social relationships grow more complex. Less and less can the group depend upon the looser forms of social organization and the simpler means of social control to conserve group interests; for considerations of commonweal assume increasing significance with social growth. The simple social machinery becomes more and more inadequate as the field of social control widens and intensifies; institutions are elaborated and specialized to meet the requirements of the expanding social complex. The lines of social evolution here run parallel to those in the economic order which produced the corporation and the integrated industrial unit. It is as impossible to conceive of the modern social order based upon the New England town meeting type of social organization as it is to imagine a modern industrial system organized on a partnership basis. Complexity in organization necessitates complexity in control.

Social institutions, like the more complex forms of economic organization, possess the advantages which inhere in division of labor, specialization and large-scale functioning, namely, economy of energy, systematic procedure, effective organization of effort, and the steady and continuous service of a specialized and professionalized personnel. Gains such as these justify the great investment which society has made in its institutions and also the generous assignment of power given them as bulwarks of the social order. Otherwise, the simpler social forms would not have given place to the more intricate institutional procedures. The law of comparative effectiveness has been as operative here as in the economic order.

These are not net gains, however. Here, as in the field of economic organization, certain significant costs have to be reckoned with. Institutions, when mature, display not only the virtues but also the weaknesses of age. They have a "seemingly inevitable tendency" to become fixed, ultra-conservative, backward-looking, and exploitive. They "develop tendencies of their own," become rigid and arbitrary, tend to become ends in themselves. Eventually, inelasticity and inability to meet new situations result; the institution then finds itself in "wrong relations with its environment," for it can no longer adapt itself to

changing conditions and needs. The end is stagnation and atrophy. Such seems to be the especial fate of institutions which assume a divine origin, nature, or sanction. This assumption removes the institutions from all criticism, however constructive, and bathes it continuously in its own conceit, until it "falls out with positive experience." Rigid, dogmatic, atrophied institutions have little to commend them socially; they may actually block progress by rendering achievement extremely difficult or impossible and can be saved by nothing short of rejuvenation.

Again, social institutions may entail social cost in that its "specialized personnel is liable to drift into a perfunctory and mechanical way of doing its work."²³ When rituals have been written down, organization perfected and procedures standardized, then institutional functioning becomes formalistic, and red tape gradually accumulates to clutter up institutional machinery. Uncritical of itself, the mature institution is likewise uncritical of its personnel. Casuistry and opportunism then come to characterize the methods employed by those to whom the administration of the institution is entrusted. "Resort to means external to the end pursued," patronage, and corruption follow until the institution is entirely perverted. Such has often been the history of political institutions. The remedy here is a generous dose of personality.

Finally, it is often claimed that institutions thwart the development of personality by insistence upon conformity to set standards of conduct. Spontaneity, initiative, creativeness are throttled and freedom becomes a restricted, sickly thing. Conscience is institutionalized, and morality loses its positive attributes. Woman in the patriarchal family, Russia under absolute monarchy of the Czar, religion in days of the inquisition and witchcraft, education in Germany under the Kaiser, industry under exclusive monopolies—all illustrate the institutional thwarting of personality. Personality grows anemic when institutions penalize and punish the individual who attempts to blaze new moral, social trails.

It must be remembered, however, that specialization in the social, as in the economic, order increases the dependence of the individual; hence social institutions can serve the interests of the single personality only as his interests are common to the group. (It is the first duty of institutions to preserve the social heritage for the aggregate of personalities.) Since institutions provide the social organization and social service necessary to a well-organized communal life, it is essential that individuals meet the requirements which the close and frequent contacts of social life entail. These institutions seek to guarantee when they set metes and bounds to collective behavior.

The individual, moreover, is given the largest possible freedom for self-

²³ E. A. Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 489.

development only when institutions endow him with the accumulated wisdom of the race. Otherwise, he experiments needlessly. Lacking the orderly arrangement of social relationships, the fruit of institutional control, the resulting chaos would yield the barest minimum of opportunity for the exploitation of the higher faculties. The realization of social gains from institutional control therefore necessarily involves an incurrence of social costs. Only the exceptionally gifted individual can set his wisdom against that of myriad generations of men. For the vast majority of mankind, the experience and wisdom of the race already far outstrips what the individual could summon. In fact, never have institutions so adequately served individual interests, notwithstanding their diversity, as at present; never have institutions been so completely organized and equipped for the functions they are designed to perform as now.

Yet, withal, institutional bonds grow steadily weaker. The individual feels less and less loyalty to his institutions; rather he is increasingly irritated by the bounds which they set. These restrictions are, necessarily, the minimum requirements of achievement in an increasingly complex social order in which the individual occupies an increasingly insignificant position. Nevertheless, he demands freer divorce, trial marriage, free love, royal roads to culture, moral license, dissolution of the church, a state with no laws or constitutional amendments which interfere with his personal liberty, and the administration of institutions by the untalented, untaught groups, provided only they secure sufficient votes.

These he demands as his right, race experience to the contrary, notwithstanding. Nevertheless, social institutions are means to an end; that end is social welfare. Social welfare, however, implies individual well-being. "Society realizes its logical end, not by the suppression of individuality, but by the fullest possible fostering of its development."²⁴

SOCIAL CONTROL OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

To keep social institutions in right relations to the environment and to the individuals they serve and to hold individuals in proper relations to their institutions—this is the great social task. If institutions are man-made (and no other hypothesis can be posited scientifically, it seems), it follows that man and man alone must assume responsibility for the adequacy, effectiveness and progressiveness of his creations: If the state, the school, industry, the family, yes, even the church fail, neither God nor the inscrutable forces of Nature can be blamed. Man creates his institutions; he administers them. He must answer for their success or failure.

²⁴ R. MacDougall, "The Social Basis of Individuality," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 18-20.

In discharging this responsibility, man has devised means for the social control of his institutions. In the state he has developed a specific institution for the regulation of the activity of other social institutions. This it accomplishes through legislative restriction, through administration by boards and commissions, or through support of the institution by financial appropriation. The family, the public schools, recreation centers, health clinics and the public library are thus controlled. Institutions which derive financial support from the public treasury are, of course, completely socialized. Where none of the above-mentioned agencies of social control are utilized, but where the nature of the service rendered is such as meets a permanent human need, control is secured through group sanctions and public opinion. The church, privately endowed educational institutions and social settlements are cases in point.

But, whatever the means employed, the objective of such controls remains the conservation and utilization of the social heritage in such a manner as to insure social progress. Some institutions, it is true, "survive, not because of their inherent value, but because they occupy a protected position in the social order."²⁵ But those institutions which amass a great body of tradition, custom and convention from the past experience of the race, and embody them in vital procedures are in the line of progress, especially if those traditions, customs, and conventions express the finest which past generations have achieved. Ossification, deterioration, and decadence set in when such is not the case. But if each succeeding generation seeks to add to the achievement of the preceding generations and does not insist upon learning certain well-tested lessons over again, the institution moves forward.

If, however, each generation casts aside the experience of previous generations as of no present value and learns again by difficult and costly experience of its own the lessons which the race has already learned, it can never hope to rear a social superstructure, and institutions will be forever tearing out old foundations and laying new. Any social edifice which such a generation might construct could be nothing more than a temporary makeshift.

Institutional upbuilding, then, requires that each succeeding generation shall proceed upon the supposition:

- (1) that preceding generations possessed—relatively, at least—as much intelligence and wisdom as it possesses;
- (2) that the experience of previous generations, hence, has value for present generations. It is frequently difficult for oncoming generations to admit the validity of this requirement, yet any adequate analysis of the long, weary struggles of human evolution abundantly substantiates the proposition that

²⁵ J. M. Mecklin, *op. cit.*, p. 214-215.

progress is secured when people strive diligently to improve upon the achievements of their forebears rather than to lay anew foundations which previous experience has demonstrated to be inadequate.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. Distinguish social institutions from other forms of social organization; from customs; from traditions; from culture-complexes.
2. Are the following social institutions? Give reasons for your answer in each case.

a. The Republican Party	i. The American Legion
b. The Masonic Order	j. The Young Men's Christian Association
c. A Country Club	k. Daughters of the American Revolution
d. The United States Chamber of Commerce	l. Private Property
e. The Theatre	m. Social Service Agencies
f. The Boy Scouts	n. Medicine
g. The Press	
h. United Charities	
3. Comment: "Institutions represent the mechanisms which men have devised to bring about adaptations to a Universe which is not man-made."
4. "The chief importance of primary groups (family, etc.) in our social life is that they furnish the 'patterns' which we attempt to realize in our social life in general." Explain.
5. Do institutions thwart or facilitate the development of personality? Explain.
6. Do institutions have "intrinsic" value? Why? Or why not?
7. To what extent do economic influences determine the development of institutions?
8. Do institutions have an "instinctive basis"? If so, what "instincts" are involved?
9. Read the article by Lloyd (*see* Selected References) and give additional examples of "the original sins of institutions."
10. What virtues do institutions possess? Do these atone for the "sins of institutions"?
11. What degree of perfections can be reasonably expected of institutions which are man-made?
12. "All institutions are to be judged according² as they fulfill this one supreme purpose, namely, to carry the race toward perfection by bringing the youth of each generation to a higher degree of perfection than the one which preceded." Do you agree? Give your reasons. How would this purpose be fulfilled?
13. Comment: "Institutions are justified by the authority of group experience. This authority is final and complete."

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CHAPTER II

THE FAMILY: A SOCIAL INSTITUTION

ORIGINALLY, the family was the all-inclusive institution. All human activity centered in the blood-bound group; hence all human relationships were comprehended by it. It is only within comparatively recent times that the social order expanded beyond the control of the familial group. Throughout the pre-literate millenniums, religious rites and ceremonies were family practices. Indeed, they remained such far into the historic eras when religion was carried into temples. Among all patronymic peoples the family was not only a religious unit but also a political unit as well. In fact, political organization ceases to have essential family aspects only with the development of the *ethnos* which marks the beginning of civil associations.¹)

(Again, it is only with the rise of the school in Oriental civilization that the family surrenders any substantial portion of its educational activities; and it is not until the last half century that it has released the large burden of such training to the various specialized institutions. Lastly, be it noted that it is the rise of modern capitalism, as a result of the Industrial Revolution, that brings about the decline of the family as the basic economic unit in the economic order.)

(With increases in population the scope of human activities widened so immeasurably that the familial institution was no longer equal to the task of inclusive control of social relationships. Specialized institutions were then developed by a process of differentiation in order that the various phases of collective activity might still be constrained toward group objectives. The family was thus the parent institution; it remains the chief conditioning institution. What the group, as well as the individual, achieves is largely conditioned by the family, for it determines both the quantity and the quality of the human material which makes up the group. In the end, the family produces a population which is either well- or ill-born and either well- or ill-bred. Group life cannot reveal greater capacity or finer quality than is possessed by the individuals who comprise it. The virtues and the vices cultivated in the home necessarily

¹ F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1896), Book III, Ch. 3.

characterize the associations of the individuals produced there. Human beings do not become supermen by mere aggregation; rather aggregation compounds human frailty as well as human talent. So it is that the character of society is determined by the character of the family.² The familial institution is hence basic to all others; it is the foundation of the social order.)

7 From the sociological point of view, (the family is a unity of interacting personalities, each of whom plays a rôle set by his status.³ It comprises a group of actual relationships in which wishes, attitudes and impulses are socially defined.) Sexual and parental urges are merely the *raison d'être* of the intercommunication and interaction of the various personalities which compose the family group.) The content of familial life is a product not of these impulses *per se* but of the interplay of individuals as they develop and exploit the common interests and objectives which response to these impulses occasions. Family life also exists in the nurture of the particular interests and capacities of the separate individualities in so far as these are consistent with the enlargement and enrichment of personality in the family experience.⁵ Each personality in the family group, therefore, plays a distinctive rôle and possesses an especial status, both mutual- and self-recognition of which is essential to the maintenance of familial *rapprochement*. Failure to give such recognition results in conflict and disorganization here as in other groups.)

In fact, association within this limited, intimate group involves the same adjustments as association in extra-familial groups, namely, those commonly designated as accommodation, individuation, integration, organization and sublimation. Socially successful family life, like all socially successful group life, is characterized by toleration, compromise, coöperation, stimulation and liberation; otherwise the relationships of its members will be marked by conflict, antagonism, estrangement and, perchance, exploitation. Association in the familial group is more intense, more intimate and more sustained than in the life of other groups.) This means that in the absence of positive and constructive organization of effort, will and thought with respect to familial relationships by the participants, the interaction and intercommunication inevitably degenerate into domination, contentiousness or open conflict. (The family, hence, must be regarded not as a supernatural but as a distinctly human group. The actions and reactions of its members do not elicit laws of association different from those applicable to other groups; rather they reveal a greater intimacy and intensity

² A. Fairbanks, *Introduction to Sociology* (New York, 1896), p. 149.

³ E. W. Burgess, "The Family as a Unity of Interacting Personalities," *The Family*, Vol. VII (March, 1926), pp. 3-9.

⁴ E. R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization* (Chicago, 1927), p. 25.

⁵ L. G. Brown, "The Development of Diverse Patterns of Behavior Among Children in the Same Family," *The Family*, Vol. IX (April, 1928), pp. 35-39.

of association. Belief in the peculiar sanctity of familial relationships is, therefore, no substitute for the ability and the will to achieve the exacting adaptations which the intimacy of these relationships entails.

(The family exists, however, not only in the interaction of the personalities within the blood-bound group but also in the interaction of the family and its members with others in the neighborhood and the community. In these larger groups each family acquires a status by virtue of its achievements or misdeeds, just as the individual acquires a status within the familial group. Likewise, each family plays a rôle in the life of the environing society. This rôle is recognized both by the family itself and by others in the neighborhood or community; it is also defined in the mores, the public opinion and even in the law of these larger groups.)

It is precisely such definition of the rôle of the family in the life of the larger social groups which establishes the family as a social institution. E. W. Burgess has very aptly described this process.

When this conception of familial relations is recognized by the community, the family acquires an institutional character. . . . This is what is meant by the family as a social institution. (A family that had no conception of its rôle in the community, or of the responsibilities of its members would not be an institution, perhaps not even a family. It is just these natural relationships of family life, the obligations and responsibilities spontaneously assumed in family interaction, which the community seeks first through custom and then through law to define, to make contractual, and to enforce.)

He notes, however, that "the family as a reality exists in the interaction of its members and not in the formalities of the law with its stipulations of rights and duties."

To define the family merely as a unity of interacting personalities does not, however, differentiate it either from other permanent social groupings or from other social institutions. And, in a sense, even such temporary groups as crowds or mobs may be thus described. Interaction in these other groups is less intimate and less sustained than in the family; their unity develops out of other relationships than those of consanguinity and hence is less permanent, less pervasive and less powerful than the unity of kinship. But all group life comes into the realm of reality in the interaction and intercommunication of the personalities which constitute it, irrespective of the degree of unity which it possesses. Differentiation occurs, therefore, neither in the fact nor in the degree of unity in such interplay, but in the purpose which gives it focus.

⁶ Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

THE PURPOSE OF THE FAMILY

(Specifically, then, *the family exists in the interaction and intercommunication (intra-group and inter-group) of specific personalities; namely, a man, a woman, and a child, set in the specific relationships of parenthood for the specific purpose of perpetuating the human species and of preserving the human order.*

(The continuance of the human species is the especial function of reproduction.) In our present mores, this function is definitely related to the fecundity and fertility of those who assume the marriage relationship. Reproduction could be accomplished, of course, without the institution of the family. It is significant, however, that the experience of the race through thousands of generations has eventually issued in the institutionalization of sex relationships as the most effective means of perpetuating the species. Apparently this experience has indicated the social value of the canalization of sex conduct; otherwise, it has no meaning.

(It should also be observed that the perpetuation of the race cannot be achieved by the childless family; for the childless family makes no contribution to the onflowing human stream. In the main, families must produce offspring or the species becomes extinct. This law is as inexorable in the human as in the lower animal order. The childless marriage, hence, has little, if any, social significance for the reason that it is usually, if not always, an arrangement by which purely personal ends are gained.

The preservation of the human order, however, implies other than biological considerations. The human order has proceeded to a degree of complexity and of social import infinitely greater than that of the lower animals. To maintain this higher order, human parenthood must do more than produce offspring; it must bring offspring to a degree of social maturity which will enable it first to carry on in this complex human order, and secondly, to maintain the order itself. Among the lower animals the offspring is easily and quickly equipped for independent existence, as little more than physical maturity is necessary. Not so with human offspring. Competency in social life requires first a physical development which will produce a body fit for the labor and strain of economic life; and secondly, a development of capacity which will give the individual knowledge of the forces and processes of his total environment and ability to direct and control them. Otherwise the individual will be unable to play his part effectively.

Social maturity of this sort is achieved in the interaction of the various elements of the blood-bound group and of the neighborhood and community. It is further developed by the discipline of extra-familial group life. In particular,

From the time of the establishment of the family, the unit of selection is changed. Hitherto, natural selection was directed toward the preservation of the best-fitted individuals. From now on the struggle for existence is directed toward the preservation of that combination of individuals which forms the best family unit. This change in the center of evolution has been the basis of all modern advance. Even at the present time the family is, in a large measure, the unit toward which the great law of nature is directed—the law of natural selection and the survival of the fittest.¹⁸

The history of this evolution has been so adequately treated by others¹⁹ that only those lines of development which make possible an understanding of the modern family, and an evaluation of the currents of modern thought with respect to it, will be sketched here. Perhaps this will be accomplished most satisfactorily by a brief discussion of the four chief types of familial organization which have appeared in the course of human evolution; namely, the metronymic, the patronymic, the romantic and the modern.

THE METRONYMIC FAMILY

The distinctive characteristic of the metronymic family is, of course, the superior position which it accorded woman. From her dominance all other traits were derived. Descent was always traced through the mother; inheritance was from her. The woman exercised complete freedom of choice in the selection of a mate; the marriage relationship endured at her pleasure. The children belonged to her; she was their main support. A slight increase in the sexual division of labor may have brought more support from the father than in the primitive family; but the mother was the center of both the familial and the social life of the preliterate group.

It is in this primitive metronymic system that the relation of the individual to the group is for the first time explicitly defined in the large, loose family organization which develops about the mother or the maternal uncle. The recognition of kinship with uncles, aunts and cousins greatly increased the size of the familial unit. Deference to the wisdom and experience of uncles and grandmothers similarly increased the prestige of the group. The development of the family concept of property and of the joint responsibility of the group for the misdemeanors of its members also evinces the subordination of the individual to the group.

This subordination, however, was by no means complete. The marriage relationship remained a matter over which the individual exercised considerable

¹⁸ Conn, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

¹⁹ See the Selected References at the end of the chapter.

control.¹ The woman was free not only to choose her mate but also to dismiss him when it pleased her, and the man was free to desert the woman at his pleasure. The relationship was hence based upon mere sex desire, and its duration was uncertain. Divorce was unrestricted; but the children were rarely deserted. The metronymic family functioned as a child-caring institution in spite of the instability of the marriage relationship.

Notwithstanding this instability, definite advance toward social order is made first in the further development of the sexual division of labor and secondly in the appearance of well-defined family organization. Nevertheless, these do not constitute an adequate foundation for civilization. An orderly and an achieving society can emerge only when there is an effective centralization of authority and control and a close integration of positive and relatively permanent relationships. The metronymic family was too loosely organized and too decentralized to support civilization;²⁰ it is the patronymic system which provides the high road to further evolution.

THE PATRONYMIC FAMILY

The development of higher agriculture completed the transition from primitive society to civilization which had begun with the domestication of animals. This development brought about a further refinement of the sexual division of labor and exactly reversed the position of the sexes. Property in land and herds gave men purchasing power and economic superiority; the separation of the husband and wife from the kindred of either gave men authority over wives and children. These became economic assets necessary to the economic project which was, for a time, almost identical with the familial function. In fact, the family became an economic unit in which the labor of every member had positive relation to the welfare of the group and in which the father assumed the rôle of administrator. The recognition of his function in generation, his superior strength, and his wider experience further increased his power over his family group.

The patronymic family, then, was characterized by the headship of the eldest male, the centralization of property and authority in the father, agnatic inheritance, the tracing of descent through the father, the adoption of the wife into the clan of her husband, and a low status of woman. These all combine to give the man a position of great power, which ~~was~~ still further augmented by the development of ancestor worship. To his position as head of the family was added the prerogatives of high priest; for he, and he alone, could properly perform the rites at the ancestral tomb. He alone could interpret the custom

²⁰ Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, pp. 1989-1997.

and the tradition of his progenitors, for to him his forebears transmitted the wisdom which they had accumulated through experience. Thus he became also a supreme judge with power of life and death over his wife and children. With such supreme authority reinforced by the sanctions of religion, the head of the family readily established the solidarity of the household group. The development of the principle of inheritance and its application not only to the headship of the family but also to chieftainships and clan headships gave permanence to this solidarity.

The patronymic system naturally developed a stricter morality in order to maintain its integrity; for the preservation of the solidarity and continuity of the family was definitely involved in the conduct of its members.

Marriage is arranged with reference to the transmission of property and priestly office to sons. . . . Adultery, which might have been condoned in the metronymic family, has now become an offense, not only against the husband, but also against the entire family community, living and dead, against the social order, and the gods—a crime and a sin. Barrenness, which might have been regarded as a blessing in a half-famished polyandrian horde, has become the most terrible of misfortunes, since it brings to an end not only the family, but also the religious rites. The faithless conduct of a son also may be fatal to all the household interests.²¹

The basis of the marriage relationship in the patronymic family was both economic and religious. Sex desire was the prime consideration neither in the establishment of the relationship nor in the determination of its duration. Marriage was regarded as a permanent and monogamous relationship to be dissolved only upon established grounds: namely, adultery, barrenness and failure to produce male offspring. And while divorce was the husband's prerogative alone, so much was at stake that he rarely exercised it.

Complete and permanent stability was achieved in the patronymic family as a development of these religious and proprietary interests. Concentration and integration marked the purposive social order which it ushered in. Specifically, this achievement resulted from (a) the economic integrity of the family, (b) single clanship, (c) the religious unity of the household group, (d) the practical absence of divorce, (e) the isolation of the familial group, (f) a permanent abode on propertied land, (g) the stricter morality of the members of the family, (h) the single and powerful administration of the family community, (i) the group concept of property and destiny, (j) the continuity of custom and tradition, (k) the practice of adoption which guaranteed absolutely the permanence of name and property, (l) the development of betrothal and mar-

²¹ F. H. Giddings, *op. cit.*, pp. 291-292.

riage ceremonials which emphasized the sanctity and significance of the marriage relationship, and (m) the uniform standards in sex relations which the stricter morality entailed. Orderliness in collective as well as in individual human behavior was thus achieved and an adequate basis laid for a social order of complex and intricate relationships and adjustments.

In competition with the highly integrated patronymic order, the loosely bound metronymic system failed to survive the processes of selection. In fact, the mother-family had always been inadequate to crisis situations because it lacked the concentration of effort and organization necessary to the satisfactory solution of such situations. Hence, it had always been abandoned temporarily in times of war. For similar reasons, it was inadequate to the economic situation which developed with settled agriculture. But this situation was a permanent one; as a result, the maternal organization passed completely wherever the new economic order developed.

However ancient may have been the origin of man, it is certain that the period of his greatest development does not antedate ten millenniums. Civilization, it should be noted, has developed within a period identical with that which marks the prevalence of the patronymic family. Indeed, civilization is the product of patriarchal societies organized and directed by the masculine intellect.²²

THE ROMANTIC FAMILY

So completely did the patronymic régime meet the need of the economic and social order of settled agriculture and of early industrialism that it is still the form of familial organization under which three fourths of mankind live. Because of its concentration of authority and its integration of relationships, it made a profound, perhaps permanent, impress upon the familial institution. The romantic family, hence, must be considered not as a distinctly new type of familial organization but rather as a significant modification of the paternal form. Although characterized by marked change in the relationship of the sexes and an utterly new concept of marriage, the romantic family was governed by the masculine mind and the masculine will. It, therefore, continued the patronymic order but altered the relation of the sexes by elevating the position of woman and by evolving the idea of romantic affection.

The development of chivalry in the twelfth century provided the conditions requisite to the romantic family. Through the conceptions of knightly honor, fidelity and respect for womankind, came some apparent appreciation of the finer possibilities of the relationship of the sexes. As ideally conceived, chivalry promised to lift these from the purely sensual plane and to make them affairs of

²² R. Briffault, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, Ch. 30.

the heart and brain. Love was regarded as a spiritual union; it was²⁸ ever the reward for valor and service rather than a property right. Brave devotion, courteous and willing consideration of womanhood were its stipulation. Love-making became the important business of those gifted personalities, the knights and the ladies, who exemplified the finer values of the times. The romantic ideal was thus given a prestige which fastened it securely in the behavior pattern of the time. In its ideal conception, therefore, it gave men a vision of the meaning and worth of ideal love; it marked the elevation of brute lust to the rarer atmosphere of devotion and service.

But this was the silver lining. The chivalrous foundation of the romantic family proved faulty. The considerations of greatest importance in determining the character and function of the patronymic family were those concerned with the continuity of paternal organization. Individual preferences were given little or no consideration. "The supreme object of every union was to perpetuate a family, a patrimony and a faith."²⁸ In the romantic family, however, individual preferences became the all-important consideration, for the object of marriage was individual pleasure and advantage. "The duty of transmitting an unimpaired estate and of maintaining the integrity of the family" ceased to be the dominant motive. The family also lost its religious significance. Marriage became a legal contract entered into by persons exercising individual freedom and choice. The authority of parents and family was relaxed; the individual was liberated; and the action patterns of the romantic family were determined by romantic love rather than by paternal authority, and by personal desire rather than by group will.

This release from the rigidity of the patronymic order was readily abused. In overt action, the romantic family fell far short of its fine idealism. The romantic ideal furnished a justification for the indulgence of mere passing fancy or uncontrolled passion. Love was regarded as a free gift, a joyous, estatic state whose delights were bestowed upon those whom the fates decreed rather than upon those joined in wedlock. In fact, love was thought of as opposed to marriage. Unhappy and lonely wives with uncongenial mates claimed the right to love. Marriage was considered a duty, a means of securing "a permanent housekeeper" or a social position. Husbands believed that they would find "true love" not in the affections of their wives but in the amour of "some lady to whom they owed no irksome marriage duty." Husbands and wives were frequently changed several times in the hope of finding the "true love." Paramours and mistresses were maintained where the marriage bonds could not be readily severed. Loose sex conduct and love service became the attributes of those circles where the romancers held sway. Ardent verse and amorous music

²⁸ Giddings, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

were often used to accentuate the charm of surreptitious delights of love. Knightly honor, fidelity and respect for womanhood degenerated into artificiality, insincerity and lasciviousness.

THE MODERN FAMILY

The type of familial organization which has developed in the more advanced modern nations represents a further modification of the patronymic order. In it the father is still the legal head of the family and the chief economic factor in its organization. In theory, at least, he still possesses a remnant of paternal authority. The group over which he exercises authority has, however, been greatly reduced from that over which the ancient patriarch presided. Slaves are no longer attached to it, and the few relatives who are included in it have no functional relation to the family organization. The monogamic ideal also persists; but the romantic notion has brought an emotional aspect to what was, in its original form, primarily an economic arrangement. The father still passes on his name and property to his offspring, but descent is traced through both ancestral lines. The religious aspects of familial life have almost entirely disappeared and its educational functions have been reduced to a minimum. As a result, the modern family is vastly simpler in organization than any of its patronymic predecessors.

The characteristics which distinguish the modern family from previous forms are:

1. *The high position given to women.* To the modicum of spiritual equality given woman by chivalry and the romantic family has been added a political and a social equality with man which have greatly improved her status. In the social life of the family, as a matter of fact, woman now predominates. She determines what social contacts the family and its members shall make and what social activities shall be pursued. Again, in the more advanced nations, woman is steadily gaining a legal and an economic equality with man that is replete with possibilities.

2. *The independence of its members.* The modern family has greatly declined in significance as a social unit. Increasingly it is organized on the principle that each individual should have the largest possible freedom to pursue his own interests. Interference by the familia¹ group in the destinies of its members is hence frowned upon. Complete economic independence is accorded every member of the family even before he assumes an income-yielding position. Little effort is made to hold him to parental pursuits, interests or standards. He is allowed to develop his capacities as he desires. In other words the group concept has given way materially to individual interest so far as the

family is concerned. This means that the modern family essays to be markedly individualistic.

3. *Its heightened instability.* Probably no familial organization, excepting only the most primitive, exceeds the modern family in instability. This is due to the following factors: (a) easy and frequent divorce (it is estimated that the ratio of divorce to marriage is now one to seven); ²⁴ (b) desertion by those who cannot afford the cost of legal divorce; (c) the relaxation of parental authority and group restraint; (d) the lack of common endeavor which would give unity to the family project; (e) the urbanization of large numbers of families who are forced to abandon the hope of home ownership because they must live in rented houses or apartments; (f) the new freedom of woman which has brought homemaking into disrepute as a career worthy of the "new woman"; (g) the decay of the religious and educational functions of the home which gave additional content and significance to home life; (h) disharmony resulting from conflicting individual interests which are not subordinated to group objectives; (i) the frantic and futile search for happiness as a direct product of pleasant personal relationships; (j) the exaggeration of the rôle of sex in successful marriage; and (k) indifference with respect to any project or relationship which cannot be commuted directly into personal pleasure or gain.

These factors explain not only the instability of the modern family but also the deterioration of that highly integrated patronymic order which made possible the achievements of modern civilization.

If the above analysis approximates accuracy, it is obvious that the modern family is, at the same time, a modification of the patronymic order and an epitome of all antecedent forms. It is, to be specific, characterized by the sentimentalism of the romantic family, the nominal headship of the patriarchate, the sex equality of the metronymic system and the instability of the primitive order. The only distinctly new element in modern familial organization is its emphasis upon the value of the individual and his interests. This, it is maintained, constitutes the embryo of a new type of familial development: namely, the equalitarian family which will be adequate to the conditions of the present complicated social order. An analysis of the fundamental concepts which underlie the equalitarian institution follows.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. In what important respects does the human family differ from the animal family out of which it developed?

²⁴ *Marriage and Divorce*, 1925, U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1927.

2. Which of the following statements is more completely substantiated by research? Review the evidence.
 - a. "The family is merely a passing phase in the development of civilization."
 - b. "The family is an essential condition of all stages of human progress."
3. Why should the prolongation of the period of infancy give permanence to the human family?
4. Show how the social organization of certain primitive peoples centers in the fact of kinship. (See Malinowski reference.)
5. What factors explain the development of the following practices:
 - a. wife capture
 - b. wife purchase
 - c. exogamy
 - d. polygyny
 - e. polyandry
6. Examine the validity of the following theories of the origin of marriage:
 - a. Sons and daughters were regarded as property which could not be taken away without consent. Marriage is an evidence of such consent.
 - b. Some strong man imposed his dominating habit as a general law for all men of his tribe in their dealings with women.
 - c. Marriage is the fruit of male jealousy.
 - d. Marriage arose "to prevent incessant strife among men for the possession and retention of women."
7. Trace the changes which the evolution of the family brought in (a) the position of woman, and (b) in divorce procedures.
8. Study the family life of the Iroquois Indians as a typical metronymic system. (See Goldenweiser, Ch. 3.)
9. Study the family life of the Hebrews, the Greeks, and the Romans as significant forms of the patronymic family. (See Goodsell, *History of the Family*.)
10. What causes brought about the transition from
 - a. the preliterate to the metronymic family organization;
 - b. the metronymic to the patronymic family organization;
 - c. the patronymic to the modern family organization.
11. What survivals of earlier systems are found in each of the historic types of family organization?
12. What influence has each of the following had upon the modern conception of the family?
 - a. Christianity
 - b. The Renaissance
 - c. The Industrial Revolution
 - d. Protestant Reformation
 - e. Science
13. Explain the instability of the modern family.
14. Make a comparative study of the ideas underlying the present family organization in such countries as England, France, Germany, China, Japan, Italy, Sweden and Norway.

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CHAPTER III

THE FAMILY: ITS SOCIAL CONSTITUTION

THE position of the family in the social order is unique; in a sense, it cannot be placed in the same category with other social institutions. The family is a microcosm, a society in miniature, since it possesses all the essential relationships of the larger social organization of which it is the progenitor. It is, hence, not the product of other institutions; on the contrary, other institutions develop from it. Because of its consanguineous unity, it becomes a form of association with very distinctive traits but nevertheless a form of association fundamental to all others.

The state, for example, developed out of the *patria potestas* of the patronymic family.

From it as in concentric circles have been successively evolved all the higher forms of political organization. Everywhere, as at Rome, the aggregation of families form the gens or house. The aggregation of houses makes the tribe. The aggregation of tribes constitutes the commonwealth.¹

'As an institution for defense and as an organ for securing order and welfare, the state still exercises the authority which formerly resided in the patriarch, and it still acts *in loco parentis* wherever the family has become inadequate to the complexities of the social situation.

Again private property was evolved by and in the family as the group held together by the strongest and most enduring motives, particularly with respect to the care of offspring. Property rights, especially as they concern estates, are still resident in, and have preponderant significance for, the familial group.

The patronymic family was also the earliest form of business undertaking "in the original sense of an organization to secure a competence rather than a surplus."² In early agriculture, early commerce, and even in early industry, the family constituted the essential economic unit not only in the distribution of wealth but also in the production of goods and services. To the present day it remains the productive unit in all agricultural regions as well as the distribu-

¹ G. E. Howard, *A History of Matrimonial Institutions* (Chicago, 1904), Vol. I, p. 13.

² E. R. A. Seligman, *Principles of Economics* (New York, 1912), pp. 87-89.

tive unit for all forms of economic activity. Moreover, it supplies industry in general with its human material and inculcates the economic virtues and vices resident in the current mores.

Throughout the ages the family has provided the moral patterns which the church has struggled to transfer to successively larger and larger groups of men. The family, as Ellwood expresses it, "is the chief generator of altruism in society," since it is there that "the child learns to love, to be of service, to sacrifice for others, and to respect another's rights."³ As our social order grows in complexity, more of this altruism is required for survival in the higher coöperation which such complexity implies. This is the essential condition of moral progress; for social ideals are merely an expansion of family ideals, the realization of which depends upon the quantity of unselfish service rendered. Thus familial idealism and altruism have been, and are, the undergirth of religion and of civilization.

Finally, it should be observed that the school, the library, the settlement and the recreation center are simply specialized institutions developed to aid and supplement the family in its task of conserving the social heritage and of bringing the child to social maturity.

It is obvious, then, that the family is not the product but the progenitor of other institutions. As such, it becomes in fact the foundation of the social order itself. On this point Dealey says:

. . . the family with its members should be, in very truth, an economic band, a body politic, a nursery for religious aspiration, a school for the broader life of the world and a home of coöperative activity. In being so, it shows itself to be the real social unit, the germ of society, the fundamental social institution on the welfare of which depends the hope of continued social progress.⁴

From it must issue each succeeding generation; in it, hence, are developed the qualities, capacities and attitudes which characterize the later generation and which necessarily condition their achievement


And if it be true that there is and can be no other institution which so nearly satisfies all the essential desires and affections of men as the domestic group,⁵ then it also follows that the family is the institution, the effectiveness of which becomes the concern, directly or indirectly, of every other social element. It is, at once, the source and the objective of the individual's life and living. It is evident, then, that the position of the family among institutions is both foundational and unique.

³ C. A. Ellwood, *Reconstruction of Religion* (New York, 1922), pp. 192-195.

⁴ J. Q. Dealey, *The Family in its Sociological Aspects* (Boston, 1912), p. 9.

⁵ C. R. Henderson, *Social Elements* (New York, 1898), pp. 68-70.

Development of Social Institutions



BASES OF THE FAMILY

It is important, therefore, that we examine the bases upon which the family itself rests, since it is the institution which sustains the social order and fructifies the life of the individuals who compose it. For, unless the family is set upon stable and substantial foundations, the whole social superstructure is likely to collapse and individuals are likely to become social derelicts. It is significant that the decadence of previous civilizations has usually been preceded by a disintegration of familial organization. This appears to be valid evidence of its foundational position.

1. *The biological basis of the family.* If it be granted, then, that the bases upon which the family rests must be substantial and enduring, it follows that the sex impulse does not constitute an adequate foundation for the familial institution. Sex interest is merely an urge to mate. The satisfaction of sex desires has no necessary conclusion in the production of offspring especially when sex life is held to have other functions,⁶ or when contraceptive measures are socially sanctioned. And obviously, the satisfaction of sex desire by means of the prostitute, the mistress, or the paramour, results in the impairment rather than in the establishment of family life. No more can the sex life of the legitimately wed be regarded as the basis of the family. It has long been noted that human beings tend to be promiscuous in their sexual relations, men more than women. Moreover, sexual desire, like all physical urges, is fitful and fleeting. Even "conjugal love is no guarantee that a union will not end in the divorce court."⁷

Again it must be remembered that passion plays a diminishing rôle as conjugal life ripens into parenthood, and parenthood into family life. Eventually, of course, the reproductive organs lose their vigor and the sex urge declines, perhaps disappears. If conjugal relationships have no other basis than the satisfaction of sex appetites, family life is left without foundation when passion dies. (In the normal marriage relationship, sexual desires approximate satiety; in parenthood they achieve the sublimation which relieves the fever of passion and makes of family life the thing "which satisfies all the essential desires and affections of men." With no objectives in the conjugal relationship beyond the satisfaction of sex desires, the intimacy of the marriage situation brings such complete sex gratification that often the wedded mate early ceases to stimulate passion; sex interest in individuals outside the marriage bond develops, and conjugal life becomes a hollow, intolerable experience. No enduring relationship can be based upon passion alone. No such union is equal to the exigencies and adaptations which successful family life entails.)

⁶ T. W. Galloway, *The Sex Factor in Human Life* (American Social Hygiene Association, New York, 1921).

⁷ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1920), p. 402.

The biological basis of the family, hence, is found, not only in the sex impulse but also in the prolonged period of human infancy. The human offspring comes into the world less adequately equipped for life than the offspring of any of the lower animal species. During the long period of its helplessness and dependence, much parental care, protection and nurture are necessary if the child is to survive its infancy and be equipped for a highly specialized life in a complex environment surcharged with conflict and tension. This period of dependence upon parental support and training cannot be compassed in less than fifteen years; it may continue for as many as thirty. The task of bringing offspring to social competency, therefore, provides the family with objectives more substantial and more permanent than the indulgence of personal passion.

2. *The economic basis of the family.* If the family is to function fundamentally, it is obvious that it must also have an adequate economic foundation. Where the family is a producing as well as a consuming unit, the industrial project which it undertakes provides its economic basis. The rural family, for example, has such a project. To the development of its enterprise, land, buildings, tools, machinery and stock are necessary. These may be either owned or rented. Division of labor, specialization, and assignment of function are likewise essential to the success of the rural group. Such a project not only supplies the means of subsistence and enrichment, but it also integrates the group by providing it with enduring objectives and possessions.

The urban family, on the other hand, is primarily a distributive unit; its roots do not penetrate a substantial substratum of property. It lives in apartments or rented "homes": it has no common economic project. Its economic basis is a purely financial one: namely, the income of the father, supplemented perhaps by the earnings of wife or children. To these may be added property in form of real estate, household goods, and an automobile to enrich familial experience. But, however limited its institutional activity may be, the family income must be sufficient to maintain an appropriate standard of living.

3. *The emotional basis of the family.* The propagation of the race and the social maturation of offspring require all the finer sentiments of human affection. The emotional basis of the family appears first in the *conjugal love* of husband and wife. This, in turn, must be "linked with respect founded upon a judgment of esteem" to give it longevity. Moonlight, music, cosmetics, "necking," adventure may intensify and temporarily prolong "amorous intoxication," "passing sex spells," and infatuation. But these cannot be substituted for the abiding affection upon which alone a permanent relationship can be established. No other basis is adequate for the whole-hearted companionship which assures marital stability.

In addition to conjugal love tempered with judgment, the emotional basis of

which might easily have submerged them in the struggle for survival. Accordingly, the aged and infirm were often put to death by the most humane methods known to these early cultures, that the group might survive.

Among all advanced peoples, however, the development of a highly efficient mechanical technique has relieved economic pressure to such an extent that this economic burden can be more easily carried. Moreover, the aged contribute more to the functioning of the modern family than under the more vigorous régime of primitive life. Some of the declining generation have been able to accumulate a competence which renders them relatively independent in their later years; but, for the most part, the old must depend upon their offspring for the care which the declining years require. To secure such care "the peaceful nook in the chimney-corner in an atmosphere created by the grateful love of well-nurtured children is the best solution thus far devised."¹⁸

In specific situations (rural, for example), the family may perform social functions other than those described above; but in each of the functions noted, the familial institution renders a service which is distinctive either in content or in method and entirely basic to the social superstructure. Indeed, the functioning of other social institutions and the greater social order is conditioned at every point by the competency of the blood-bound group. Thus the family perpetuates the human species and preserves the human order.

CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF THE FAMILY

The effective functioning of the family is, in turn, conditioned by the effectiveness with which each of its constituent elements plays its rôle in the familial group. The family comprises at least three such elements: namely, the man, the woman and the child. To these may be added, in specific instances, the grandparent, the aunt, and, infrequently, the uncle or the cousin. The patriarchal family, of course, regularly included all of these elements. In it the relationship of each element to every other was not only specifically defined but also carefully integrated. The modern family, however, tends more and more to exclude all except the essential elements, each of which plays an important rôle in this particular unity of interacting personalities.

It is in the mores to regard the family as a set relationship of serious import. To describe these relationships in terms of function, however, is insufficient. They are adequately presented only as rôles played by persons possessed of definite status and recognized by other persons in the group and in the environing society—persons also possessed of status and playing rôles which others recognize.

¹⁸ E. C. Hayes, *op. cit.*, pp. 671-672.

A. *The Man in the Family*

The rôle of the father in the patriarchal family was that of an administrator, a judge, and a high priest. As a result of individuation and democratization, the present ideal has become "two heads in council, two beside the hearth, two in the tangled business of the world." This means that the historic position of the man has been greatly modified; it also implies that this position has taken on new aspects. His present status may be described in terms of the following rôles:

1. *Head of the family.* In rural sections, the father still retains a generous remnant of his historic headship. His control of the lives and property of his family has been greatly modified; but he remains the administrator of an economic enterprise in which the various members of his family play subordinate rôles. In the mores of the urban community also, his leadership is still recognized. He gives his name to the family; he is the chief property-holder; he assumes responsibility for the "proper maintenance, conduct and upbringing" of the family; he represents the family in the larger life of the community. It is his employment usually which determines where the family will reside and what prestige it has in the community.

2. *Chief economic agent.* The man in the family always has been, and always will be, the main source of the family income. In the past, sons and, more recently, wives and daughters, have contributed their earnings to the family treasury; but the father remains the chief and often the sole bread-winner. Since the establishment of the patriarchal order, he has assumed complete financial responsibility for those dependent upon him. His economic competency has determined the standard of living which his family maintained and hence its status in the community.

From his earliest years, the son is trained for the economic rôle he must assume with maturity. His vocation is given much consideration in the family conferences; he is made thoroughly conscious of what his family and his community expect, indeed, require of him; he learns that shame, dishonor, and even disgrace are accorded the man who fails to support his family in the approved manner.

So completely are these group attitudes inculcated that men resist any sharing of this rôle as an implication of incapacity or as a surrender of independence. By thus unqualifiedly fixing financial responsibility, the mores operate powerfully to assure the members of the family provision for economic needs, adequate to the development and maintenance of full familial functioning.

3. *The agent of sexual selection.* The long ages of male supremacy in the

family have brought certain significant developments in the established type of womanhood. Although man's idealization of woman did not prevent him from appropriating her person and her property, it nevertheless gave to the race some moral values which it might not otherwise have possessed: namely, the "habit of service to others and the power of adaptability to changing and often difficult conditions."¹⁴ Men required these qualities of the women they married until a "womanly" type was established: namely, one characterized by "physical beauty, charm of manner, general rather than specific ability, affectionate and competent response to family, easy adaptability to whatever social system her marriage might give entrance, and unswerving loyalty to the ethical traditions and religious sanctions of her day and generation."¹⁵

It is possible, therefore, that "the ages of woman's subjection to man was not too great a price to pay for the gift to the race of feminine beauty and charm,"¹⁶ and when it is remembered that this sort of sexual selection also gave to the race greater adaptability, there is still less ground for complete condemnation of male dominance.

In these latter days, however, woman is increasingly setting her own standards of what is womanly. The rôle of the male is hence being steadily modified, yet women are still powerfully influenced by what men desire in them. The man in the family, therefore, continues to be an agent of sexual selection.

4. *The husband.* The historic headship of the father gave him abundant opportunity to advance his interests. In fact, his personal achievement was usually secured by the exploitation of the person and services of the other members of his family. The recognition of the right of these subservient members of the family, especially the women, to self-determination has forced a reconstruction of the man's rôle of husband. No longer is the wife the docile servant of his desire; she is rather a self-respecting partner in a bit of human endeavor of paramount significance.

The strictly sexual element in the marriage relationship is, of course, its distinctive feature. The love life of husband and wife affords each a superb opportunity for sharing an enriching experience. Mutuality in this experience is achieved only when the husband plays the rôle of mate with tenderness, strength and devotion. Lacking mutuality on this plane, conjugal love degenerates into a fevered debauch of brute passion.

Of greater significance is the rôle which the husband plays with the wife as partner in the common enterprise of homemaking and family building. In this enterprise he coöperates fully in the organization of the project and in the

¹⁴ A. G. Spencer, *The Family and its Members* (Philadelphia, 1923), p. 83.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

solution of the problems which its realization encounters; he participates in the setting up and maintenance of standards in the development of attitudes and in the definition of objectives. Such a rôle requires complete rapport between husband and wife and also persistent stimuli to high endeavor and worthy achievement.

5. *The father.* It is obvious that the man in the family is more than the biological father of his offspring. In a very real sense, he is the father of their attitudes, their opinions, their beliefs, their points of view, their virtues and their vices. He contributes a full share to the fixation of their habitual responses and to the determination of their behavior patterns. Mere contact with him in the intimacy of the home is heavy with consequence, although he assumes his rôle with passivity. If it is played vigorously, greater effects are produced, as when the father assists in the discipline of the children or when he becomes their comrade in play, the hero whom they worship and imitate, the friend who shares their aspirations and their problems, the counsellor who gives them contact with the outside world and assists them in making their adjustments to each other and to the wider life of the community.

The father, hence, plays a leading rôle in the family situation—a rôle vastly more dynamic than that of a financial administrator, or a court of last resort in matters of discipline.

6. *Co-creator of home atmosphere.* Because of much absence from the home, the man has usually regarded the content of family life as primarily, if not entirely, the responsibility of the woman. She alone determines the quality of the home environment and of home relationships in most families. Often she must accomplish this not only without help from the man but with him as an additional handicap. After a busy day, with perplexing business problems and irritating customers or clients, he returns home to vent upon those who bear him a deep affection, the ill-humor he dared not heap upon his patrons. Petty fault-finding, bitter and undeserved criticism, quarrels, destroy the benignant atmosphere of the home by the introduction of conflict and tension. In such situations the man forgets that the woman may have had a trying day with sick, cross, or refractory children in addition to the exacting duties of the housewife.

If the home is to produce an environment which interests, rests and inspires, the man in the family must contribute positively to its content. He must assist in the adjustment of personality to personality, in the accommodation to new and difficult factors in the home situation and in the accumulation of vital and stimulating familial experience. His homecoming should be an event looked forward to eagerly rather than apprehensively. Harmonious, helpful relationships, pleasant and restful surroundings, interesting and delightful family life

must be products of the endeavor of both the man and the woman. These ^{can} not be achieved by either unaided.

B. *The Woman in the Family*

The rôle of the woman in the family has long been regarded as either inferior or supplementary to that of the man. The ages of woman's subjection to man attest his conviction of the superiority of his own position and the consequent primacy of his own rôle. During the last half-century, however, woman has won for herself a status of at least nominal educational, political and economic equality with man which is rapidly becoming actual. In familial relationships she has also freed herself from much of the subordination which the patriarchal organization imposed upon her. Her increased and increasing economic power and independence has thus brought to woman a recognition that her rôle in the family is not the supplement but the *complement* of the man's.

This complementary position is revealed by the following analysis of the rôles assumed by the woman in the family:

1. *The wife.* Woman's status in the family is no longer that of a *Hausfrau*, a household drudge or a servant to the man's personal comfort. Increasingly she shares with her husband the headship of the family; she is rapidly gaining recognition as a partner with him in an enterprise of serious personal and social import. To this enterprise she devotes her time, her labor and her thought; for it she sacrifices personal pleasures and ambitions. Her energies, her capacities, are almost completely drafted for its activities.

In the administration of the household and in motherhood the woman makes a contribution to the family life which is the necessary complement to the contribution of the man. While he contributes chiefly to the material aspects of familial organization, she contributes primarily to the content, quality and spirit of the institution. For this unity of interacting personalities he provides the temple; she the ceremonies and the atmosphere.

The wife, therefore, is the man's helpmeet, partner, comrade. She creates the immediate situation in which the various members of the family interact; she sets standards, relieves tensions, maintains peace and order in the household to which the man devotes his economic capacities. She is his companion in the love life that deepens and enriches the personalities of both; she challenges him to high endeavor and worthy achievement; she stands with him in all the crises which their common life experiences; she shares with him their successes and attainments. In short, she is ever the personality to whom he turns for sympathy, understanding and recognition.

2. *Administrator of the household.* A well-ordered household is essential to

normal family life. In no other way can the welfare of the family group and each of its members be assured adequate attention. Disorderly procedures in the home preclude normal fixation of response, and hence the establishment of the usual behavior patterns. They may even disintegrate the adult personalities or lead to abnormal complexes. The careful organization and administration of household activities is therefore of vital importance.

Obviously, the woman in the family must assume this function, since the man is disqualified both because of lack of training and because of absence from home during the larger part of the day. In this rôle she is the chief executive of an enterprise calling for organization of effort, assignment of duties, direction of servants or service and purchase of equipment and materials. In fact, the administration of the domestic enterprise bears all the earmarks of the management of a business enterprise. Laundering, the preparation and serving of meals, the selection and care of clothing, the furnishing and maintenance of the house, the keeping of furniture and rugs in condition—all these are processes (production processes) scarcely different from those of the business enterprise.

The development of the commercial processes has either wholly or in part carried some of these tasks out of the home. In the great majority of homes, however, all the processes are carried on completely by the woman or under her direction.

As administrator of the household it is also the woman's part to organize the social life of the family. It is she who acts as social director of the group. In this capacity she arranges and executes social functions appropriate, in number and nature, to the status and income of the family. In this capacity she represents the family in the social life of the community just as her husband represents the family in the political and economic life of the community.

Finally, it should be added that in the administration of the household, the woman acts as a director of recreation. It is she who plans such recreation as meets the needs of the various members of the family group. This involves provision for play adapted not only to vigorous youth but to senescent adults as well. These activities may be pursued separately by the young and old, but group participation in a part of them contributes markedly to family unity.

3. *Disburser of family income.* This rôle is the complement to that which the man in the family plays as chief economic agent. The division of economic function is, of course, not rigid at this point; but it is essentially true that the man earns and the woman spends the family income. The amount of the income is not usually determined by her; it is her responsibility to see that the maximum return is secured for the expenditure of what income is available. She must spend for the entire group as well as for herself; she must decide what

needs shall be met first; she must judge what amounts shall be spent for necessities, for comforts and for luxuries. She must have in mind not only her own needs and desires but also those of each other member of the family. When she thus apportions the income among various members of the family she acts as an economic agent in an economic process, namely, distribution.

To play this rôle effectively when the income is limited requires as rigorous a training as is demanded of the man who earns. Indeed it is possible that it is more difficult to spend judiciously than it is to earn.

In this connection it should be noted that the woman in the family actually contributes to the family income. This she may do through her own earnings either within or without the home. She cannot, however, share equally with the man in such activity; for, if she rears children (and in the sociological family she must), her energies will be devoted for a number of years almost exclusively to the home and her offspring. This will leave her little time or energy which can be given to income-yielding activities unless a mother or an unmarried sister assume the responsibilities of the home.

But the woman who confines herself to the rôles of motherhood and home-making still makes positive contributions to the family income by the work she herself performs in the home. This has great economic value; indeed, love alone can purchase some of the services she renders.

Again, the woman contributes very materially to the family treasury in the economies she institutes in the administration of the household. These result in savings and constitute an actual addition to future income as well as a safeguard against current contingencies.

4. *The mother.* The whole burden of child-bearing is laid upon the woman in the family. Nature, to be sure, has prepared her physiologically for this biological rôle. Nevertheless, she plays it quite alone. The man can only stand by reverently while the creation of new life proceeds. He can assist with tender care and constant consideration; but further participation is denied him.

Upon the woman also falls the greater part of the task of rearing the child. The absence of the father from the home during so many hours of the day leaves the mother largely unaided. At best, he can merely carry on or supplement what she has undertaken. She is therefore the chief disciplinarian. It is she who is primarily responsible for the child's habits of self-control, orderliness, industry, thrift and honesty. Her daily and at times hourly contact with the child during the most plastic period of his development sets up either desirable behavior patterns or their opposite. In the later years the father's influence will be more potent; but the fundamental fixations are made under the mother's influence.

Again it is the mother's function to give the child that informal education

which constitutes "the subjective transmission of the social heritage." It is from his mother that the child learns the lore of the race and the manners of men. These give him an understanding of the ways of his group and make his environment intelligible to him. In her answers to his whys and whats and hows, she helps him create his world, his moral codes, his ideals. Upon this informal education the school, the church and the state rely for the fixation of the modes of response which condition their effectiveness as social institutions.

The mother, because of her intimate and sustained contact with the child, is also advantageously placed to discover his peculiar traits and special aptitudes. She is also favorably situated to give the particular sort of attention needed for the development of exceptional abilities. She should know the individual as no other person can know him. Certainly she is in a better position to discover and nurture traits than the teacher in the school, who must function for at least thirty pupils set in the rigid toils of prescribed discipline. It is the teacher's primary task to transmit these specialized phases of the social heritage which are regarded as necessary to all. It is the mother, therefore, who possesses the maximum opportunity for discovering the capacities of the individual child and for developing the traits, aptitudes and attitudes which give distinction to his personality.

Again, the mother is the family health officer. As such she is concerned with the physical well-being of every member of her group—the helpless infant, the sickly child, the adolescent youth, the senescent parent. She organizes the home and its activities so that each member of the family has proper food, adequate sleep, and sufficient recreation. She must also give especial attention to those who temporarily or permanently present problems from the point of view of health.

The mother also creates the home environment. Although at times the father may share this rôle with her, it is chiefly her talent which makes the home a place of quiet comfort—an appropriate setting for the achievement and the companionship which it shelters. She cultivates taste in interior decoration, in the arrangement of the furniture and in the selection of draperies, so that the home may be an inviting, restful, cheering place in which to spend the hours of leisure and recreation.

The atmosphere of the home is likewise the creation of the wife and mother. It is especially her part to relieve the tensions and conflicts which arise from the interaction of the various personalities in the family since she understands each more fully than the man. It is her province, too, to modify or eliminate irritating environmental situations which induce maladjustments in the family relationships.

Finally, the mother is the center of the home and the familial group, es-

pecially in its emotional life. She is the personality to whom all others turn for sympathy, understanding and recognition. About her cluster the fond memories and the cherished traditions associated with the concept *home*. Because it thus elicits the most refined emotions which humans experience, motherhood has been given the highest recognition of which humans are capable. In the emotional life of the family, therefore, the mother is, in a very real sense, a queen.

In all, then, the woman in the family is at the same time wife, partner, organizer of the household, administrator, social director, director of recreation, disburser of family income, economist, mother, disciplinarian, teacher, health-officer, artist and queen. It would seem that further evidence is unnecessary to demonstrate that woman's familial rôle constitutes a career of the first order. Certainly no other requires more varied talent or greater skill; no other completely involves the whole personality.

It follows, therefore, that it is decidedly illogical to contend that ability rather than sex should determine the person's duties in the house as well as in the world. Rather it must be argued that ability determines whether the woman's career shall be found in the home or in the world. It must be freely granted, at the outset, that those women who are better qualified for extra-familial careers than for careers in the home should not only be permitted but indeed urged to enter business or the professions. No other position can be maintained on logical, economic or ethical grounds. If the extra-familial career does not afford sufficient sublimation of sex desires, these may find complete and sanctioned satisfaction in a companionate marriage.¹⁷ The modern apartment and the vendor of delicatessen will usually meet the domestic needs in such instances.

But those women who marry with the expectation of bearing children must choose the family as a career and devote their full powers to home and children if the relationships they establish there are to be socially or personally effective. Few persons, men or women, have either the talent or the energy to pursue with success two careers simultaneously. The high degree of specialization in our present economic system makes it impossible for most persons to qualify in more than one profession. Indeed, modern competition is so keen that it is increasingly difficult to succeed in a single career. This means that the individual who attempts two careers simultaneously either pursues one to the neglect of the other or both are mediocratized. Often, in fact, both are failures.

When the mother seeks a career outside the home, it is necessary for some other woman to assume most of her responsibilities in the family. A grand-

¹⁷ Companionate marriage is used here and elsewhere in this book to designate a childless but permanent union.

mother, an unmarried sister or "some thoroughly competent person" is secured to play the rôles which the mother must abandon: namely, those which have specifically to do with homekeeping and child-training. Any such arrangement, it must be noted, usually gives the child a foster-mother when he needs and is entitled to his real mother. Often, too, a conflict-situation is produced by such arrangements when the child is forced to make frequent choices between two mother-personalities in matters of loyalty, obedience, attitudes and standards. The situation thus created is not unlike that which develops when the child's father and mother openly disagree in matters concerning his discipline and training. The presence of the foster-mother may further complicate the situation by bringing three heads into the council, two of whom (the mothers) are likely to have different notions of child-rearing. The mother who follows a career outside the home finds it difficult to know the needs of the growing child as the foster-mother may know them; nevertheless, it is the former who must render final decisions as to policies and procedures in dealing with his unfolding personality. Hence these important judgments are frequently made without the understanding which intimate contact with an absorbing interest in the child makes possible.

It seems reasonable, therefore, to conclude that understudies or hirelings assume the mother's rôle in the family only at the expense of the child. Yet the child is both the justification for, and the promise of, the family. Thus the mother who successfully pursues a career outside the home may become derelict in her duty to the child for whose body and soul she, primarily, is socially responsible. From the biological, sociological, or merely humanitarian point of view, neglect of such duties is criminal. For it must be remembered that women are no longer forced to choose the family as a career; a wide range of vocations is now freely open to them. Nor must they bear children in order to secure the normal satisfaction of sexual desires. The sanction given to the companionate marriage, together with knowledge of contraceptives, now make possible a sex life which need not involve motherhood. Under such conditions, the woman who chooses the career of motherhood should not expect to escape its responsibilities, at least, not until some new type of child-caring agency offering specialized services has been developed; for when choice can be exercised, its costs can be avoided only by recourse to the specialist. Social order can be maintained on no other principle.

The rôle of the woman in the family, nowadays, is rarely that of a household drudge. Scientific improvements in household appliances and procedures have greatly lightened woman's physical load, especially in the urban home. To be sure, there are routine duties which mechanical devices do not eliminate; but the home is not unique in this respect. Every vocation has its routin-

ary aspects. It is human to imagine that other vocations are less routinized than one's own, especially when fatigue has exaggerated its purely repetitive processes. Attitudes are immediately thrown into wrong relations with values, because the latter are less clearly defined. Physical fatigue thus brings mental and emotional confusion; then all tasks become drudgery. The individual who permits himself to envy the vocations of others, quickly destroys the integration of his own tasks, attitudes and values. The discouragement which inevitably results merely demands a reconstruction of attitudes, for the values involved are durable.

It is true, of course, that all work is drudgery to the individual who is vocationally misplaced. In the home, as elsewhere, women should find a career for which their talents qualify them. The decision to pursue a career in the home must be accompanied by readiness to meet the costs which such a career entails. There is no vocation which brings only compensations; all involve costs. And the more substantial the compensation which a given career renders those who follow it, the greater are the investments which must precede. Certain it is that the home cannot, for either the man or the woman in the family, be regarded as a bit of background to a career. Rather, it is for many the achievement toward which all activity is directed since it embodies many of those enduring values which humans cherish deeply.

Many of the rôles described above cannot be assigned exclusively to either the man or the woman in the family. As a matter of fact, the two primary elements of the family function in a complex of co-relationships in which the activity of each is closely integrated with that of the other. This is natural, since the rôles of each are complementary to those of the other. The maintenance of these co-relationships, therefore, is assured only when both are equally qualified to play their rôles. If either is lacking in capacity, efficiency, or in attitude, the other bears a double load. Each owes the other, therefore, as adequate a performance as he requires of the other. Many domestic ships founder on this rock.

C. *The Child*

The rôle of the child in the family is unique because of his prolonged dependence upon his parents. The child is not brought into being by his own volition; he cannot possibly avoid a long period of complete helplessness; he achieves an independent status only as a result of much careful and patient nurture. In every situation, he is conditioned by the inheritance (biological) and environment (physical and social) which his parents have provided. Nature, not society, endows man with the appetites, the satisfaction of which constitutes procreation. Man himself determines what indulgence shall be given these sex

desires. Parents, therefore, must accept major social responsibility for "the seed of their loins."

Parenthood, hence, can rarely be taken too seriously. Together, the man and the woman in the family are responsible for:

1. A wholesome environment in which the unfolding personality shall be fully developed This implies
 - a. Adequate physical equipment for home and family life;
 - b. Absence of tension in the home atmosphere;
 - c. Wholesome social and recreational life.
2. The physical inheritance of the child and its maintenance through physical care and nurture
3. The subjective transmission of the social heritage that the child may more accurately create his world. This involves training given the child under parental supervision through
 - a. Discipline which sets behavior patterns;
 - b. Instruction—informal education;
 - c. Example—imitation of adult behavior;
 - d. Experience—which develops judgments by the trial and error method.
4. The setting up of moral standards for the child by a similar use of a discipline, instruction, example and experience.
5. The development of the child's capacities and his personality by individual attention to his psychic needs and peculiarities.

The effectiveness with which parents discharge these responsibilities determines the quality of the succeeding generation. It is here that the quality of the family conditions the quality of the human stock and, hence, the whole social order.

The status of the child in the pre-modern family was frequently that of a bond servant or liegeman. Throughout patronymic organization he was regarded as a sort of vassal under the obligation of great service to his father and entitled to protection from him. He was often sternly disciplined that he might render more obedient service to the head of the family and thus more completely justify his existence. "From St. Augustine to Jonathan Edwards the doctrine of child depravity was held and practised, leading to insidious cruelty or abnormal repression or indifference at best, in spite of the lofty conception of childhood proclaimed by the Great Galilean." Filial subordination usually lasted throughout the lifetime of the parent in order that the cohesion of the familial group might be maintained. The rôle which the son or daughter played in such a family, therefore, was primarily that of an economic asset.¹⁸ Indeed,

¹⁸ W I Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (New York, 1927), Vol. I, pp. 91-95. They indicate a superior status for the child in the Polish family.

in all the relations between parents and children pre-modern familial organization left "no place for merely personal affection."

The modern humanitarian movement and the development of science have brought a profound change in the status of the child and with the changed status, new rôles. In the modern family the child is desired for his own sake. At maturity he becomes independent of his parents and is free to pursue his own personal interests. Each child is recognized as a unique personality, to be developed by the parents for the child's own ends and those of society in general. In return, the child owes his parents affection, respect, consideration.

The rôles which the child with such a status plays are those which can be assigned to an element whose social significance is certainly not inferior to that of the adult members of this unity of interacting personalities. These rôles are:

1. *Stabilizer of familial relationships.* The prolonged infancy of human offspring gives the family relationship a permanence which the childless family often lacks. Provision for his care and affection for him hold the father and mother to the marriage bond often when all other interests have atrophied. Statistics show that divorce is less frequent when children are involved. The extent to which children act as a deterrent in breaking up the home is revealed by the fact that in 57 per cent of the total number of divorces no children were affected by the decree.¹⁹

2. *Unifier of the family group.* The infant gives unity to the family because his helplessness makes him a common concern to the adult members of the group. He is also an emotional center for the personalities which comprise the familial group. The affection, solicitude and sympathy of his elders are focused upon him. As he grows older his simple trust, his staunch confidence, his pure affection for the older members of his family give additional potency to his unifying influence. In all, he supplies an objective rather than a subjective basis for the psychic life of the familial group. Self-interest wanes in the consideration accorded the child's interests. Personal rights and needs are forgotten in recognition of the child's dues and wants.

3. *Parental disciplinarian.* The child is society's most effective deputy in the discipline of the adult members of the family. His discipline is positive rather than negative in character and provocative rather than repressive in method. That is, the child does not punish certain kinds of parental behavior; rather, he elicits certain other types of adult conduct. This the child accomplishes when he:

¹⁹ *Marriage and Divorce*, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1925, p. 38.

1. Provides parents with powerful incentives to save, to acquire and accumulate property, to increase income and to spend wisely;
2. Expects adults to possess or acquire the knowledge necessary to answer the questions of his eager mind and to supply him with the information necessary for the construction of his world;
3. Places his elders in a set of relationships which require the practice of such virtues as patience, sympathy, self-control, tolerance and poise;
4. Forces the older generation to exemplify in their own conduct the moral patterns they set up for the younger generation.

Discipline of this sort can be imposed upon the mature most effectively by the young. Their dependent relationship gives especial cogency to their expectations of adult behavior.

4. *An economic tyro.* In many families the child is still a significant economic factor. He may contribute to the familial enterprise either by the performance of assigned tasks in the home or by his earnings outside the home. In any case, however, he becomes an economic factor by virtue of the fact that he offers his parents an inducement to save in order that he may be given an advantaged position in the economic order.

The child's economic rôle has been steadily curtailed as mechanical invention and urbanization have altered the economic aspects of family life, and humanitarianism has given him a status superior to that of an economic asset. But this has not been a pure gain. The child who is denied an economic rôle is actually handicapped in the wider relations of the business world. Valuable lessons in economics are learned by the child who contributes to the family income or shares in the family's economic activity. The value of money, its wise expenditure, thrift, are more effectively taught by experience than by precept.²⁰ These lessons are learned later, if at all, only at a great personal cost.

5. *Socializer.* The interaction of the youth personality and the adult personality in the family group breaks down self-centeredness and forces regard for others. Parents cannot be absorbed in their own comforts and pleasures; neither can they be engrossed in their own interests. "Nothing socializes adults so much as children,"²¹ for the child unclogs the springs of purest altruism and calls forth all the virtues and responses which parenthood implies.

The child also assists materially in the socialization of the brothers and sisters who must accommodate themselves to each other. The give-and-take of "experience in a system of selves" is usually learned in the intimate association

²⁰ S. M. and B. C. Gruenberg, *Parents, Children and Money; Learning to Spend, Save and Earn* (New York, 1933).

²¹ E. R. Groves, *Social Problems of the Family* (Philadelphia, 1926), p. 63.

of family life. The only child is handicapped here because this associative prerequisite has, in his case, to be acquired artificially.

The interaction of the personalities in the family group thus inculcates the social habits and manners which make possible facile adjustment to persons and situations in extra-familial contacts. Since the childless marriage has no group significance, but only personal meaning, the presence of the child establishes the family as a social institution, and hence gives its relationships social recognition.

6. *Contributor to quality of family life.* The treatment of the child as one to be desired for his own sake has resulted in the discovery that he has significant contributions to make to the content of family life. He brings objectivity into the adult relationships of the family; his unstudied reactions to situations, his exuberance, his eagerness, his enthusiasm freshen and normalize all familial relationships. The child's happiness and his abundant affection are final values in the home situation. Homes with children are, in fact, likely to miss strain because of these contributions.

7. *Sublimator of parental achievement.* In the present economic order, the life and labor of most adults is spent in the production, exchange or distribution of goods produced on the farm or in the factory. Such effort contributes chiefly to the material welfare of present generations. The average person, the common man, achieves little that affects significantly the life and thought of unborn generations.

The child affords every parent, however humble, an opportunity to make a creative contribution to his race and his civilization. What can be more creative than to call a human soul into being and to nurture it until it becomes a vital part of a dynamic social order! Mature civilizations usually die off at the top; hence, leadership for such populations must often be recruited from the lower ranks. And although there is little likelihood that a railsplitter will ever again occupy the White House, it is still possible for many parents of the wage-earning class to place their offspring in higher social strata. Nor does genius scorn lowly birth. In an age when the machine has stifled man's creative impulses, the child constitutes his chief opportunity for creative effort outside the arts.

If children are to play the various rôles described above, they must not only be well-born but must also be reared according to standards appropriate to their status in the familial organization. This implies that the following conditions must somehow be provided:

In the Home

Homes in which both parents are participating in the function of child-rearing;

- 'Competent mothers, that the early years of the child's life may be years of health and happiness;
- Competent fathers, that the home may be assured at least a minimum of the necessities and comforts of life.

In the Community

- Environments which will make possible the performance of parental functions;
- Adequate vital and social statistics that the child may be accounted for in social relationships;
- Protection by the state against industrial exploitation, commercialized recreation, disease and unwholesome conditions;
- Education commensurate with talent that the child may not be unnecessarily handicapped in the struggle of life;
- General participation in the social heritage of the time, that the child may have the largest possible opportunity to realize his life possibilities.²²

Only provision for these conditions assures the adequate development of child life through normal childhood.

This analysis of the rôles played by the child in the modern family makes it clear that he need be neither a handicap to a career, a necessary burden in social contacts, nor an unmitigated economic and moral liability. He can rightly demand that he be desired for his own sake, since he takes a significant part in the present as well as the future functioning of the basic social institution. In this unity of interacting personalities he plays a full rôle, especially if he has experienced a normal childhood in which he has been adequately equipped for child life. That the child plays a major rôle in the familial group is evidenced negatively by the sense of irreparable loss experienced by parents upon the breaking of home ties when the child assumes an independent status. It is evidenced positively by the willing and eager self-sacrifice of the parent for the child.

D. Grandparents

Since the family is the chief social institution which society has devised for the care of the aged, it is probable that even in the simple modern family, grandparents will be found. In fact, the marked increase of late in the proportion of the old indicates that they are likely to become an increasingly important factor in familial organization. Under present economic conditions few of the departing generation are able to rear children and also to accumulate a competence for their later years. During this period they, of necessity, become an element in the families of their own children. As such, they may play the

²² A. G. Spencer, *The Family and its Members* (New York, 1923).

rôle of advisor to the succeeding generation. If it is true that progress occurs more rapidly when succeeding generations begin where their predecessors left off, the wisdom and experience of the older generation may be used to great advantage by the younger. To be sure, new methods, new mechanisms, and new relationships confront each generation, but the basic elements of any social situation are relatively unchanging. In fact, social changes are rarely cataclysmic. They come so gradually and so slowly that the experience of elders is never entirely inapplicable to present relations. At least their wisdom and experience constitutes a valuable point of departure for those who must meet changing situations.

Grandparents may, therefore, play a significant rôle in the transmission of wisdom gained from personal experience. This conserves the energy and resources of the younger generation. Such wisdom and experience should also make it possible for them to contribute vitally to the content of their childrens' family life when they are allowed to participate in the interaction of the personalities within the blood-bound group.

Distinctive rôles cannot be assigned other kindred who may be included in a given modern family. When aunts, uncles or cousins are members of the immediate group, they either assume some of the minor rôles of the mother or father or assist the parents in their rôles.

FAMILIAL ORGANIZATION

As a unity of interacting personalities, therefore, the family is a composite of its constituent elements, each of whom possesses a status defined in the mores; each plays a series of rôles determined by his status. The primary elements of the family are set in the specific relationships of parenthood and constitute the nucleus of the group. As such, they occupy complementary positions. Other elements are adjunctive and supplementary; in the modern family these tend to be incidental.

Familial organization, hence, consists essentially in such an ordering of familial activities as shall give each constituent element, first, the maximum opportunity and inducement to play his rôles effectively; and second, full recognition of his rôles and his status. This implies that each personality in the group shall be conscious of his own rôle and of its relation to the rôles of others; for the activities of the family group constitute the field in which this interaction of personalities takes place and in which status is acquired by virtue of the rôles played.

In successful family life these activities are organized about definite group objectives. The behavior of each personality is in other words so integrated with the behavior of others that individual as well as concerted response to

family situations stimulates each to the realization of his life possibilities.

Conversely, family disorganization results from lack of integration in familial relationships. The failure of adults to play their familial rôles effectively or to give due recognition to the rôles and status of other familial elements necessarily brings personalities into conflict or thwarts the development of the life possibilities of other elements. Such maladjustments normally result in frustration, psychoses, divorces, broken homes, problem children and delinquents. Effective organization of the interactions of personalities becomes hence an essential condition to successful family life.

It should be noted in this connection that the central problem of family organization is the adjustment of personalities, *not* the reconstruction of the institution. Those who hold that the present disorganization of the family is due to the attempt to hold urban groups to a type of familial organization designed for rural situations miss the real issue. The essential rôles played by the constituent elements of the family do not differ in nature from one situation to another. Certain rôles will vary somewhat in content with different environments. The environment, however, conditions the playing of the rôle rather than the rôle played. Familial objectives are identical in any situation. The familial drama may be staged with various settings and with different properties; but, except in minor details, the plot remains unaltered.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. Precisely what is the position of the family in the human order?
2. Discuss the adequacy of the following as bases of the family:
 - a. The sex impulse
 - b. Satisfaction of desire for wealth and leisure
 - c. Attainment of social position and distinction
 - d. Infatuation
 - e. Economic interdependence
3. Describe the processes by which the family assists in passing on to succeeding generations an accumulating social heritage.
4. What functions of the family could be effectively performed by other institutions? Present factual evidence in each case. What conclusions may be drawn from your analysis?
5. To what extent does the wisdom and experience acquired outside of the home by the man qualify him for headship in the family?
6. Specifically, what may the man contribute to the quality of family life? And how?
7. List the personality attributes required (a) of the man, (b) of the woman, who would play all the familial rôles ascribed to them. To what extent do the man and the woman who assume family obligations possess these qualities?

8. What specific training would you suggest for the woman who would play her familial rôles effectively?
9. Indicate the full significance of woman's economic equality with man.
10. Is the modern nursery school an adequate substitute for early home training by the mother? Give reasons.
11. Are men and women equals? If not, how can the modern family be maintained upon a basis of inequality; that is, of superiority and inferiority?
12. With respect to what matters ought husbands and wives to be in agreement in order to assure successful family life? Why in each case?
13. Present the arguments for and against careers for young mothers.
14. Specifically what would be gained *socially* if children were reared in great state institutions instead of in homes? What would be lost *socially*? What is the evidence?
15. Certain psychologists have designated "adulthood" as the greatest wrong committed against children by the older generation. Others hold that the child must always be preparing for a world which is very different from his present one. Which position is correct?
16. To what extent is the character of children determined by heredity? To what extent by environment?
17. What have children a right to expect of parents? What have parents a right to expect of children?

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CHAPTER IV

THE FAMILY: ITS INSTITUTION

THE effectiveness of the family as a social institution is determined by the sort of interaction experienced by the personalities which constitute it. This interaction is, in turn, conditioned by the quality of the relationship between the man and the woman who establish the particular familial group. When this relationship is such as to bring personalities into unresolved conflict, familial disorganization inevitably results and the group wastes its energy in contention rather than invests it in achievement. But where such an integration of personalities as makes possible the attainment of the life possibilities of each member of the group occurs, the familial institution can be held to have performed its functions with reasonable adequacy.

This does not mean that successful family life is evidenced by lack of conflict. Indeed, conflict is necessary to the development of personality. "Never a cross word" may indicate complete integration of personalities, or it may indicate a static, passive relationship in which there is no urge to achievement. Conversely, excessive opposition may result either in an obdurate clashing of personalities or in an unmitigated exploitation of the weaker by the dominant personality. The hen-pecked husband, or the servile wife are notorious products of such one-sided conflict. If family relationships are to be socially dynamic, they must be characterized by mutual stimulation, emulation and attainment; at the same time there must be sympathetic response and rapport between the primary personalities in the familial group.

Such family relationships involve, first, wholesome, balanced *attitudes* expressive of a normal life lived under reasonably healthy conditions; secondly, comprehensive and tested *values* which set objectives for the familial group and its members; and thirdly, disciplined *volition* sufficient to carry the individual personalities into overt action consonant with group and personal values. In familial, as in other relationships, attitudes without values, volition, and action are the symptoms of diseased personality. Similarly, action without attitudes, values, and volition is either hazardous or meaningless. Effective group activity, therefore, issues from a proper correlation of attitudes, values, volition and overt action. In the family, this correlation is predetermined in the marriage relationship.

What, then is the nature of this relationship which either vitalizes or vitiates familial functioning?

THE NATURE OF MARRIAGE

Throughout the ages marriage has been a relationship upon which men and women enter with eager expectation and often thereafter endure in disillusioned realization. Its adjustments, problems and responsibilities were but dimly foreseen; its real nature was completely obscured by the superstition, taboo and ceremonial which enshrouded it in deep mystery. Even in these modern times, a conspiracy of silence is generally maintained with respect to it, not because the initiated desire to withhold marital delights from the uninitiated but because of ignorance of its essence or import.

The sociologist is just beginning to perceive the nature of the marriage relationship and to comprehend the possibilities that lie hidden in the intimate interaction of the personalities concerned. Research in this field is still largely confined to a study of unsuccessful marriages, because these have afforded him available source material. The study of the successful marriage is now in its inception; what it will eventually reveal can only be conjectured. In the meantime, valid working hypotheses must be secured from the study of homes broken by divorce. Such an hypothesis has recently been advanced by Hornell and Ella Hart.

Marriage is a functional relationship between a male and female organism, involving normally sexual intercourse and the bearing of children. "The twain shall become one flesh." But it is more than this; it is a functional relationship between two personalities, made up of habits, friendships, aversions, property, ideals, attitudes, purposes, possibilities. Love is the emotion which arises when two personalities stimulate, facilitate and reinforce each other—when they function together in progressive integration. But if they thwart each other—in physical functioning, in spiritual aspiration, or even in trivial tastes and wishes; if they hamper, or coerce, or defraud, or enslave one another, then marriage becomes a disaster. No man and woman perfectly inspires or supplements each other. Marriage is a creative undertaking—progressively to eliminate the thwartings and increase the points of mutual release and joint attainment. To that end love is not merely an emotion, but also a method—the method which must underlie all permanently creative social relationships.¹

This hypothesis reveals at once the inadequacy of the biological concept of marriage as consisting essentially in the cohabitation of males and females

¹ Hornell and Ella Hart, "Unsuccessful Marriages—Why?", *The World Tomorrow*, Vol. X (June, 1927), p. 261.

for the purposes of reproduction and care of offspring. Marriage is vastly more significant than breeding. It also exposes the superficiality of the romantic notion that marriage is an enduring state of amorous intoxication. Again it discloses the utter sordidness of the marriage entered into for purely mercenary reasons. Those who regard marriage merely as the source of sensuous delights or of life-long meal-tickets miss completely the spiritual significance of this relationship.

Sociologically conceived, marriage is a contract freely entered into by legally competent persons which seeks to guarantee:

To the state

- a. Economic and social responsibility for the family, especially for children;
- b. Physical and mental competency of those who are likely to become parents;
- c. Voluntary assumption of obligations involved in marriage state;
- d. Legitimacy of sexual intercourse.

To the individual

- a. Economic support of wife and children;
- b. Reasonable performance of wifely duties.

The marriage contract, it is to be noted, guarantees nothing so far as the quality of the relationship is concerned. Love, respect and achievement in marital relations can never be guaranteed by law. These must always be won. As a contract, therefore, marriage is primarily an agreement between the contracting parties and the state. It has little, if any, significance as an agreement between the contracting parties themselves.

Again, marriage, sociologically conceived, involves an assumption of status; that is, it involves a change of positional relationships more or less marked in nature; namely:

1. Financial, legal, social and emotional relationships to parents are either greatly modified or completely altered in the establishment of the independent home.
2. Status in the community is transformed from that of a son or daughter in the parental family to that of adults who play rôles comparable to those of the parents; this means that the newlyweds are no longer bound or sheltered by the status of their parents.
3. The man and the woman concerned assume new positions with respect to each other. With marriage they are no longer merely sweetheart and lover but husband and wife—partners with new and greater responsibilities as well as privileges. They stand in different positions with respect to each other economically and socially.

No change in emotional status is involved here except as it may be modified or intensified by situational factors. Again it is to be noted that change in status accomplishes nothing with respect to the quality or content of the marriage relationship.

Finally, marriage, sociologically conceived, is a sacrament; that is, it is an outward or visible sign or act having for the participants an inner and spiritual significance. The inward state of being or condition which the sacrament attests is compatibility. This state of being may be said to exist when the two personalities concerned demonstrate the capacity "progressively to eliminate thwartings and increase points of mutual release and joint attainment." In other words, compatibility implies that the two personalities "stimulate, facilitate and reinforce each other," that they "function together in progressive integration."

Essentially, then, the marriage relationship is an achievement. The thing achieved is an integration of personalities; that is, a situation of reciprocal psychic response in which each personality secures complete adjustment to the psychic make-up of the other. This brings the sense of completeness which is sought in marriage. In this sense the relationship is creative; for it is attained only when complete accommodation of personalities is revealed in mutual stimulation with creative response.

The law does not bring to pass this integration of personalities when it insists upon a license and a ceremony performed by an authorized representative of the state in the presence of witnesses. The community does not establish this reciprocal psychic response when it assigns a new status to those who enter the marriage relationship. It is achieved only when "habits, friendships, aversions, property, ideals, attitudes, purposes, possibilities" and values have been carefully integrated in a functional relationship where "love is not merely an emotion but also a method" of adjustment.

Marriages, hence, are not made in heaven but on earth. They are not the product of amorous intoxication or emotional tumult, but of prolonged and patient effort to eliminate thwartings "in physical functioning, in spiritual aspiration and even in seemingly trivial tastes and wishes," and "to increase points of mutual release and joint attainment." As a rule, affinities are made, not found.

It follows, therefore, that marriage, since it makes demands upon the whole personality, is an *inclusive* relationship. It is also an *exclusive* relationship, for full integration of personality with several of the opposite sex seems obviously impossible. Again it is a *purposive* relationship in that some objective is sought by the union. It is an *intimate* relationship because "marriage strips personality to the core" and "is unrivalled among human experiences in its power to re-

veal inner substance.”² It is a relationship of *continuous achievement* because personalities grow and develop in interaction one with another in a changing situation. Marriage is seldom a static relationship even when it is merely companionate; it is always dynamic when children are included. And finally, marriage must be a *permanent* relationship if it is to achieve an integration of the personalities concerned.

WHY PEOPLE MARRY

Biologically marriage is the arrangement which affords sanctioned catharsis to psychic desire and physical tumescence—the necessary preliminaries to sexual union and conjugation. The purpose of human marriage, thus, becomes the legitimation and canalization of sexual intercourse so that it will be restrained within bounds consistent with the perpetuation of the species. Biologically, therefore, people marry to satisfy sex desire.

It is patent, however, that integration of personality is not accomplished in the satisfaction of sex desire. Sex life may contribute to this integration, but it often continues with increased vigor when the marriage relationship is in the process of disintegration. Moreover, the biological theorem does not adequately account for marriage among rural peoples where economic qualifications are important considerations in consummating a union. Farmers marry women “who are smart on their feet” rather than those who merely stimulate sex desire. Neither does the biological statement fully explain marriage after the decline of sex impulse as in the:

1. Remarriage of those who have lost a mate to whom they have been happily married for a considerable period of time;
2. Second marriage of those who have been long and unhappily married;
3. Marriage late in life of those who, for various reasons, may have been unable to marry earlier.

In all such cases the sex urge has greatly declined, yet desire for a home and a family continues.

Sociologically, at least, individual life possibilities are never fully realized until the relationships of marriage and parenthood are experienced. Through long ages of natural selection there has been established a human nature that deeply craves those experiences and is never comfortably content without them. A sense of lack, of inadequacy, of incompleteness goads humans to the experiences which bring a consciousness of profound fulfillment. Because marriage

² E. R. and G. H. Groves, “Before Marriage—What?”, *The World Tomorrow*, Vol. X (June, 1927), p. 266.

and parenthood call out every resource which individuals possess, they complete the development of personality as few if any other relationships can.

In this desire for completeness is found an explanation for remarriage, second marriage, or unusually late marriage after the sex urge has subsided. Here also is revealed a cause for the sense of frustration which haunts most childless unions. Here again is given a further reason why wild young people settle down after marriage and particularly after the birth of the first child. The sex urge, moreover, cannot be the only or perhaps the chief factor in the situation, since marriage and parenthood are no longer, if indeed they ever have been, necessary to satiate passion. The satisfaction of sex desire in extra-marital relations, however, does not bring this consciousness of profound fulfillment because it does not usually result in parenthood.

Generally speaking, social relationships gratify to the extent to which they provide for the wholesome satisfaction of the fundamental wishes. If unnecessary frustrations are lacking, family relationships are especially rich in such satisfactions. The desire for new experience is satisfied by such experiences as the setting-up of the new home, the construction of new quarters, the birth and rearing of children, the discovery of new friends, the establishment of new relationships to each other, and to the community. The desire for security is fulfilled in the establishment of rapport between husband and wife, the accumulation of property and in provision for old age or the education of children. The desire for recognition is gratified when the members of the family accord each other status, and when, because of personal achievement, the community gives recognition to the family or its members. Indeed, few, if any, relationships offer the range of wish fulfillment that is secured in the normal family. Hence it surpasses all others in affording its members the sense of completeness so universally and so eagerly sought by every personality.

PROPER BASES OF MARRIAGE

If marriage is to result in the progressive integration of personalities by virtue of experiences which bring a sense of completeness to the man and the woman concerned, the relationship must rest upon bases which are adequate to intimate and stimulating functional interaction and intercommunication. These bases are:

1. *Romantic love.* In the successful relationship romantic love is the progenitor of affections of a higher order, namely: conjugal and parental love. In comparison with these, romantic love is a fevered, undisciplined emotional state. Nevertheless it is the necessary precursor of the higher order of affectional experience.

2. *Common interests.* Joint attainment in the marriage relationship is pos-

sible only when the personalities concerned have common ideals, common points of view, common standards, and common desires. Conflict at any of these points is hazardous. A union permanent enough to make achievement possible can only be established on the basis of common interests and objectives. Comradeship is brief and limited in any other situation; for disintegration, rather than integration, is the inevitable result of the tensions which develop when interests are in conflict.

3. *Physical fitness; mental sanity.* Any physical or mental incompetence imposes a heavy burden upon the other party to the marriage relationship. Those who marry doctors' bills or expense accounts are unnecessarily and unfairly handicapped in the achievement of their life possibilities. Moreover, when such incompetence is passed on to offspring, the child is unjustly encumbered—he has a right to be well-born. Few marriages can endure the strain of prolonged illness and invalidism except at the sacrifice of achievement.

4. *Rational thought.* Romantic and conjugal love are rarely blind. They are frequently blinded temporarily by the surging of emotion. The responsibilities which must be met in the marriage relationship early uncover weaknesses, eccentricities, sets. Account should be taken of all these personality defects and inadequacies before the marriage is celebrated; for such peculiarities and traits are likely to be emphasized rather than eliminated in the intimate interaction of the love-relation. At least it is a safe generalization that those who do not face the whole situation frankly and rationally before the wedding ceremony, will have abundant opportunity to do so later. The foolish exercise only hindsight.

5. *Respect.* Love is not enough. No permanent marriage relationship can be based upon emotion alone; for we cannot long love those whom we cannot respect or esteem. Love may be kind, generous, forgiving; but when respect leaves, love soon follows. Respect sometimes endures after love is gone; but love cannot survive the absence or loss of esteem. Therefore, to love is not sufficient; to be and to achieve what will win the esteem of the other personality is essential to the successful marriage relationship.

6. *Economic qualification.* Once more, love is not enough. If there is to be a progressive elimination of thwartings and continual increase in points of mutual release and joint attainment, the man must be competent, especially in the earning of the income, and the woman must be competent as a homemaker and an efficient disbursing officer of the family budget. The marriage relationship will survive much economic hardship and much severe adjustment if both persons are economically competent. Love alone will not assure success here if either bears all or an undue share of the economic burden. Inadequate

preparation for the responsibilities of the marriage relationship is a fraud, perpetrated under the cover of affection.

Obviously it is highly desirable that those contemplating marriage should discover whether their relationship will rest upon these bases. This can be accomplished provided emotion is suspended for a period sufficient to afford the individuals concerned an opportunity to analyze their situation deliberately and candidly. Too much is at stake to risk marriage on insufficient consideration of fitness to assume its responsibilities. The whole situation will be starkly revealed when the two meet the sharp adjustments for which marriage inevitably calls. Surely the compensations of a successful marriage are worth this cost. At least, nothing is more certain than the absence of these compensations if the relationship lacks its proper and necessary bases.

COURTSHIP

The purpose of courtship, it would seem, is wholly manifest. It is association in which two personalities, a man and a woman, not only woo but *discover* each other. That is, the companionship of the days of courtship should reveal their compatibility or incompatibility; their ability to give each other the sense of completeness which marriage should bring; their capacity for progressive integration of personality; their personality quirks, their physical, mental and spiritual limitations; their adaptability; the bases upon which their relationship rests; their preparation and willingness to assume the responsibilities of the marriage relationship and their talent for joint attainment. *Betrothal*, then, discloses a situation in which these discoveries have been made and the prognosis found to be favorable.

To define courtship, therefore, as the "process whereby both male and female are brought to the state of psychic desire and physical tumescence which is a necessary preliminary to sexual union and conjugation," is to limit it to its biological aspects entirely and to disregard its wider social import.

That courtship does not, under modern conditions, serve these purposes is also manifest. At present it is usually a period of concealment rather than of discovery. The lovers see each other only under the most favorable circumstances possible. Cosmetics, moonlight and music are used to deceive each with respect to the other. Each sees the other in situations of leisure; neither, in situations comparable to those of sustained domestic and workaday life. Indeed each often exercises great care to avoid revealing to the other the weaknesses or the inadequacies of his personality to meet the standards and the tests of rigorous normal living. Each is lured on by the fervent hope that the relationship will, by some fortuitous means, survive the dénouement of matrimony. By such strange maneuvering, love-making has thus become either

a process of studied deceit or of "the desultory pursuit of mere physical stimulation" of a delightful sort.

MARITAL ADJUSTMENT

At best, however, courtship can reveal only the attributes of the personalities concerned. It cannot achieve the adjustments which the marital relation requires for the integration of those personalities. Marriage normally involves a transplantation of those two personalities from environments to which each has been more or less successfully adapted to a situation more or less strange to both. The life in the parental home differs radically from the life of the new home because the establishment of the latter necessitates a deliberate uprooting of former behavior patterns and the setting up of new modes of thought and action with respect to a different personality in a different setting. Indeed, few aspects of life continue unchanged in the new rôles which are assumed and the new status which is acquired by marriage.

That adjustments must be made by those who enter the marriage relationship is a matter of common experience. The specific nature of these accommodations, however, is usually but vaguely perceived. The following enumeration may be suggestive and, perhaps, illuminating. Specifically, accommodation in the marriage relationship involves four sets of adjustments; namely,

1. *Economic adaptations.* The newly married are immediately faced with all the economic problems which go with the setting up of an independent establishment on a curtailed income. The young woman previous to her marriage has been accustomed to the scale of living which parental income has afforded; and in many cases, the young man has been spending most of his income upon himself. In the new home, however, his income must eventually cover not only the current needs of both but must also provide for saving and for the acquisition of property. This means a sharp curtailment of expenditures and a greatly modified scale of living for both, especially after children are born.

New tasks, new duties, new responsibilities are also assumed with the establishment of the new home. The husband assumes new economic responsibilities, new relationships in the community and new rôles as the head of a household. These call for a new series of judgments and new standards of performance. The wife, who has gaily assumed responsibilities in her parental home during her mother's brief absences, must now assume full responsibility for at least a thousand meals annually and for the care and conduct of the new home with all its repetitive requirements. In short, she must accommodate herself to the rôle of home administrator, the creator of the home environment and atmos-

phers. She must acquire proficiency in the budgeting and expenditure of the major part of the family income.

Adjustments of an economic nature are involved, too, in the organization of the activities of the new home. Decisions must be made first as to what social and intellectual interests shall be pursued jointly or individually; secondly, what civic, philanthropic and religious movements shall be participated in; and thirdly, what friends shall be continued in the circle of intimates. Seldom will it be possible for the new home to carry the combined schedules of the interests and contacts which the man and the woman have maintained separately before marriage. Limited financial and physical resources will force a selection at this point.

2. *Social adjustments.* Choice of a mate is usually made with little consideration of the other personalities of his family; yet marriage brings both the husband and the wife into intimate relations with in-laws. Often these new relationships are the product of sudden contacts; at least, in-laws are not chosen as other intimates are selected but are acquired as byproducts of mate-selection. Accommodation to the in-laws is hence sharp and labored. Adjustment to the personalities in the parental home was made slowly as the child grew to maturity. In-laws, by contrast, enter the personality situation artificially at maturity and with little opportunity for pre-adjustment. The in-law relationships are further complicated by the probability that eagerness or interest is likely to be interpreted as meddling or as intrusion. Historically, the in-law status, because of its anomaly, has been the object of scorn, ridicule and jest. Both husband and wife must strive diligently to establish rapport between the in-laws. Failure in accommodation at this point invites marital disaster.

Social adjustments are necessitated, again, by the assumption of new rôles in the life of a community; these the marriage thrusts upon those who acquire its status. Both the man and the woman move out from the protection and the prestige of the parental home; they are placed in independent and adult positional relationships. The young man secures recognition as a mature and competent member of the community when he becomes financially, politically, and morally responsible for those who take his name. The young woman becomes a matron endowed with all the prerogatives of the adult feminine personality and takes her place in the work and life of the neighborhood and community.

These social adjustments, moreover, throw the newlywed into further untried relations to each other. Previous to marriage they were exclusively sweetheart and lover. No other relationships required attention. With marriage both assume new rôles and new responsibilities in the community as well as in

the home. Their relationship to each other becomes that of man-of-affairs to woman-of-affairs. The sweetheart-lover relation is thus forced to make room for these other relationships if the new home is to maintain its status and effect its integration into the activity of its environment.

3. *Sex adjustments.* Popenoe,³ Exner,⁴ Galloway,⁵ Van de Velde⁶ and others have so adequately set forth the adjustments which characterize the sex life of the married that no further analysis is required. It is sufficient to state that the task of achieving mutual satisfaction in sexual relations constitutes a significant series of adaptations for those who have entered the marital relationship. Barring physical malformation and personality defect, however, these adjustments can be made successfully by those who can idealize cohabitation. Complete reciprocity in sexual life is a continuous achievement; it is the product only of much patient and affectionate endeavor to meet the other's psyche. Ignorance of sex and its proper functions, selfishness and excess here, are fraught with terrible hazard; for sexual adjustments are not merely physical; they are momentarily spiritual.

It must also be borne in mind that pregnancy and parenthood often occasion radical readjustments in the sexual life of husband and wife. Both personalities, but especially the woman's, are frequently recast by these experiences. Adaptation has to be achieved anew and repeatedly as parenthood develops. If the earlier sexual adjustments were reasonably satisfactory, however, these new adaptations are usually made with facility. Nevertheless, this cannot be guaranteed. It is possible that the marital relationship may be utterly disintegrated by mother fixations or by resentment of transferred mother love.

4. *Personality adjustments.* Although the economic, social, and sexual adaptations are important and often critical, marital accommodation comes to its climax in the adjustments which integration of personality entails. It is at this point, of course, that transplantation assumes its acute aspects. Adjustment to the parental home implies accommodation to personal peculiarities and idiosyncracies. These project, however, like sore thumbs in the new situation where personality is stripped to the core by the intimacies of the marital relationship. And, since the individuals concerned are relatively mature, adaptation is made less easily in the new home than it was in the parental establishment. Under these conditions the personalities of the marital neophytes experience something akin to psychic metamorphosis.

³ P. Popenoe, *Modern Marriage, A Handbook* (New York, 1925).

⁴ M. J. Exner, *The Sexual Side of Marriage* (New York, 1932).

⁵ T. W. Galloway, *The Biology of Sex* (New York, 1913).

⁶ T. H. Van de Velde, *Ideal Marriage, Its Physiology and Technique* (New York, 1930).

In the marriage relationship accommodation of personality involves:

- a. Change in behavior patterns;
- b. Habit re-formation;
- c. Modification, and (if possible) elimination of personality quirks and peculiarities;
- d. Modulation of beliefs and convictions;
- e. Revision of concepts and opinions;
- f. Transposition of tastes and preferences;
- g. Transformation of standards;
- h. Re-computation of values;
- i. Alteration of attitudes.

In fact, personality is reconstituted when a series of *new* rôles are assumed in the *new* status acquired in the *new* situation involved in marriage. Hence the marital relationship not only brings about a transplantation of personality but it also requires its rebuilding, if an integration of personality is to be accomplished. Thwartings, suppressions and paralyzing inhibitions are avoided only when the persons concerned possess psychic flexibility. Indeed most, if not all, of the economic, social and sexual adjustments are contingent upon personality accommodation.

This cursory survey of marital adjustments reveals the bias and inadequacy of the psychoanalytic thesis that sexual adjustments play the dominant if not the exclusive rôle in successful marriage. The study of hundreds of cases of homes broken by divorce demonstrates clearly that sex adjustments are readily over-emphasized. Penetrating analysis of cases of apparent sex maladjustment usually uncovers deeper causes of disintegration in personality defects or peculiarities which prevent accommodation in sexual experience. Dr. and Mrs. Groves also have found that the adjustments of married life are primarily social rather than sexual. On the basis of a wide experience, they conclude, "Sex problems will usually be found secondary, the product of social maladjustment in other relationships than sex itself."⁷ Further research in this particular field promises to be most significant. Correct emphasis upon sex is as sorely needed in the treatment of marital *adjustments* as in the analysis of marital maladjustments.

Perhaps it is unnecessary to add that ideally marital adjustments should be mutual, since adaptability in both the man and the woman will assure a fuller accommodation than if either is forced to assume the entire burden of adjustment. In the patronymic family, practically all accommodation was made by the woman. During the ages of male dominance she acquired an

⁷ E. R. and G. H. Groves, *Wholesome Marriage* (Boston, 1927), p. 6.

adaptability which still characterizes her approach to the marital relationship. It is hence the male, chiefly, who must acquire facility in marital adjustment. In the case of the hen-pecked husband, of course, the tables have been completely turned. The marriage relationship should never be maintained at the sole expense of either personality but at the joint cost of mutual adjustment.

At any rate, marriage involves so much adjustment that the wise use of a period of courtship in which the principals discover each other is supremely imperative. It is obvious that marital accommodation will be made with greater facility and less risk if differences and peculiarities are uncovered and frankly faced before the marital relationship is undertaken.

TRIAL MARRIAGE

If the essence of the marital relationship is compatibility achieved by the integration of personalities involved in a series of economic, social, sexual, and psychic adjustments, the nature and purpose of trial marriage immediately become clear. Since marital adjustments cannot be made in pre-marital relationships, it is proposed that a period of trial marriage be allowed in order to ascertain the mutual adaptability of the man and the woman concerned. Upon the expiration of this period, the relationship is then either made permanent or is dissolved at the wish of either or both parties. It is usually granted that full marriage responsibility must be assumed should offspring result from this temporary union. Trial marriage thus becomes, for the time being, *companionate*, for the purpose of disclosing compatibility.

The term *companionate*, however, designates a deliberately childless union irrespective of its purpose or duration. In fact, it should be applied even to marriages in which sterility is the cause of childlessness; for in such cases this condition could be readily altered by adoption. Conceivably, then, three types of companionates may be distinguished; namely,

1. A permanent union deliberately childless because of infecundity or of birth control,
2. A temporary union dissolved only after some delay but conformable to regulations;
3. A temporary union terminated by common consent of the parties to the relationship (trial marriage).

The permanent companionate is, at present, fully legal and increasingly sanctioned. Although it has little, if any, sociological import it is a relationship allowed and approved. As for the second type of companionate, it is obvious that the present freedom of divorce has virtually established a temporary

union, conformable to regulations but dissolvable after some delay. The frequency and ease with which those who have been married but a few months secure decrees is sufficient evidence that this type of companionate is actually practised notwithstanding the fact that it is neither specifically legalized nor socially sanctioned. It is the third type of companionate, therefore, which presents a new situation.

Yet, an examination of historical and anthropological sources yields abundant evidence that trial marriage is no new species. Westermarck⁸ and Keller⁹ list an abundance of material which shows that this temporary form of marriage constitutes a significant part of the social heritage of many unlettered peoples. The purpose of primitive trial marriage, however, is either the determination of the fecundity or the domestic competency of both husband and wife rather than their compatibility. In any case, full marriage is concluded with the birth of a child or the appearance of signs of pregnancy.

Again, *handfasting*, particularly as practised in medieval Scotland, Ireland and Wales, was a form of betrothal which developed into trial marriage. Rogers¹⁰ thus describes it:

At the public fairs men selected female companions with whom to cohabit for a year. At the expiry of this period, both parties were accounted free; they might either unite in marriage or live singly.

Sir Walter Scott¹¹ depicts it thus:

When we (Bordermen) are handfasted, we are man and wife for a year and a day; that space gone by, each may choose another mate, or at their pleasure, may call a priest to marry them for life.

The Puritan custom of *bundling* or *tarrying* which has been aligned with trial marriage is "really a species of courtship imposed by conditions of climate and housing."¹² Nevertheless, as Keller observes, this alignment "hints at the kinship between courtship and trial marriage." Indeed, it might indicate the similarity, if not the identity of objective in courtship and in trial marriage. It is possible that the contention for trial marriage signifies a recognition of the failure to utilize courtship for its designated ends and a per-

⁸ E. Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, 5th ed. (New York, 1922), Vol. I, p. 135.

⁹ Sumner and Keller, *The Science of Society*, Vol. III, Ch. 48.

¹⁰ C. Rogers, *Social Life in Scotland from Early to Recent Times* (Edinburgh, 1884-1886), p. 109.

¹¹ Walter Scott, *Monastery* (Boston, 1834), Ch. 15.

¹² Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 1648.

suation of desire to substitute trial marriage as a means of disclosing adaptability.

At any rate, its advocates propose the temporary companionate, terminable at the wish of either party, not only as a feasible but also as a desirable social procedure for the following reasons:

1. Compatibility cannot be determined in present pre-marital relations since these afford no opportunity to make the adjustments which marriage necessarily entails and upon which the success of the relationship entirely depends. Trial marriage makes possible the ascertainment of compatibility in advance of permanent marriage.

2. Permanent marriage was developed to assure care of children. Modern methods of birth control relieve lovers from the burden of fortuitous parenthood until the capacity for complete personality adaptation has been demonstrated.

3. When a permanent union is established after a trial marriage, it is more likely to endure because compatibility has been definitely proved and an enriching marital experience has already been achieved.

4. Trial marriage has actually been established by collusive divorce. Refusal frankly to recognize this situation forces the unfortunates to resort to divorce proceedings in order to secure relief from intolerable relationships. Such proceedings give a cheap publicity to intimate personal affairs and breed bitterness and disrespect for law and the courts.

5. The present taboos, conventions, and customs with respect to sex and marriage are the products of religious bigotry and fanatical conceit. The intellectual tolerance of the present age demands the recognition of new sex standards and of new ideals of marriage.

The proponents of trial marriage also advocate a greater sex freedom than the present mores allow. They affirm that "sex expression is more natural, more wholesome, physically, socially and morally, than attempts at control or sublimation during the pre-marriage period of waiting."¹³ They maintain that such sex expression "harms no one and gives, through experience, a basis for maturity of understanding and judgment which makes later marriage more likely to succeed."¹⁴ Some people, they hold, will be content only in a permanently monogamous union; others will be satisfied with nothing less than polygamous relations. Natural endowments account for these differences; hence it is unjust, they believe, to caste all relations in the same mold. "We need all kinds of relations for all kinds of people,"¹⁵ they conclude.

¹³ E. R. and G. H. Groves, "Before Marriage—What?", *The World Tomorrow*, Vol. X (July, 1928), p. 269.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 269.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 269.

In the analysis of the social validity of the temporary companionate it is interesting to note that none of the peoples who now practise trial marriage have ever come out of their primitive culture or developed a significant civilization. Indeed, the practice seems always to be abandoned with progress. The institution upon which the improved social order is built takes on positive integration as social relationships become increasingly complex. It is probable, therefore, that a stable and achieving social order can be reared only upon a closely knit unitary group of substantial duration. At least, this seems to be the explanation for the decline of the metronymic and the rise of the patronymic system.

It is also significant that the more advanced peoples who have perhaps returned to looser marital practices, discard these as they again take the high road of group achievement. Indeed, there appears to be at present no evidence of groups who have achieved significant civilization while practising relaxed forms of marital sex relations. On the contrary, there are many data to indicate that lax marital and sexual standards have characterized both the preliterate and the decadent periods of the great civilizations which have preceded the present. Firm, permanent marriage arrangements have been attributes of the achieving periods in the history of vigorous groups. This is a natural correlation if it is correct to regard the family as the institution basic to the whole social order.

It is distinctly in order, therefore, to examine carefully the contentions of the proponents of trial marriage and then to present opposing considerations.

With respect to the assertions of those who advocate a temporary companionate with divorce by common consent, the following refutations should be made:

1. It is admitted that courtship under present conditions does not allow for marital adjustments. When properly and intelligently used, however, courtship will readily reveal adaptability; it will also disclose the presence of causes of incompatibility.¹⁶ If rational consideration is given these in pre-marriage relations, the likelihood that compatibility will be achieved can be as adequately compassed as in trial marriage, especially when it is borne in mind that compatibility is as much a product of the will to achieve it as it is of the capacity to accomplish it.

2. Birth control makes possible only the pre-parental sex adjustments under highly artificial conditions; it unveils nothing with respect to parental sex adjustments. Moreover, it must be remembered that complete freedom from risk of parenthood cannot be guaranteed. Confidence in contraceptives is still

¹⁶ *Infra*, pp. 94-100.

excessive. It has already been demonstrated that sex adjustments are a secondary set of adaptations contingent upon situations and personality traits which can be completely unearthed during courtship, provided rational thought is given the problem.

3. As will be noted subsequently,¹⁷ trial marriage, because of the artificial situation it sets up, tests little that is significant for the permanent union which may be established later. Tests of pre-parental sex compatibility are made under the most favorable circumstances possible. The situation of those making trial of marriage is more like that of an extended honeymoon than that of sustained marital experience. As such it is characterized by exotic emotion, high romanticism, and excessive novelty rather than tempered affection, established esteem, and gradual unfolding of hidden potentialities. Tests made under such conditions reveal little of what appears under the sterner disciplines of parenthood, prolonged illness, financial strain or family tension. Final tests of compatibility can only be made after the assumption of parental responsibilities and the adult rôles of full community status.

4. Social validity is not usually indicated by current variations from a standard practice set deep in the social heritage. Indeed, the social policies which most effectively promote group welfare generally require the rigorous restraint of much current behavior. That divorce results so unfortunately to the persons concerned, probably indicates that more wisdom should be employed in the selection of a mate and that more intelligent use should be made of means now available for the determination of compatibility. Before present procedures are discarded as inadequate, conclusive evidence should be presented that marriages fail to achieve compatibility under present arrangements when:

- a. Mates are rationally selected.
- b. Intelligence is used in consideration of possible causes of incompatibility.
- c. The will to achieve compatibility is in proportion to capacity to achieve it.

It is doubtful if any procedure short of complete license will be adequate to relationships based upon fleeting emotion or Saturaalian passion.

5. Many of the present marital and sexual restraints may have been conceived in ignorant intolerance and born of religious and fanatical fervor; but the ultimate social authority, here as elsewhere, is race experience. What the group believes to be consonant with its welfare should prevail until *its* experience and *its* horizon have broadened enough to comprehend the truer objective

¹⁷ *Infra*, p. 83.

and the more effectual way to proceed. Certainly the experience of the human race with trial marriage does not point in the long run in the direction either of its feasibility or of its contribution to human well-being.

This refutation of the contentions of those who advocate trial marriage does not complete the analysis of its social invalidity. Certain additional considerations are needed to present the full social import of the temporary companionship with divorce by common consent. These follow.

1. Compatibility is a result of the integration of personalities through a series of adjustments made in a relationship more intimate than any other. It is therefore an achievement which requires effort, thought and time—more effort, thought and time than can possibly be given it in the periods usually assigned to trial marriages. As such, it involves a personality-mutation which is as much dependent upon the will to adjust as it is upon the capacity to adapt. Like any other achievement, it implies self-discipline, self-control, self-direction. The number of divorces secured after two, five and ten years of married life indicates that no period of trial could be set for the revelation of compatibility or for the measurement of will to achieve marital integration. Such achievement cannot be circumscribed by temporal limits nor can it be guaranteed by particular sets of experiences.

2. The psychology of the trial marriage tends to invalidate it as a test of genuine compatibility. Throughout the trial period there exists the possibility of easy release from the union if the experiment works badly. Hence it is less likely that earnest effort will be made to achieve compatibility than if the relationship were entered with the knowledge that it must be final rather than with the mere expectation or hope that it may prove to be permanent. Trial marriage usually proceeds upon the assumption that compatibility is happened upon ready made; instead, marriage should rest upon the conviction that integration of personality is progressively achieved by mutual striving.

Again, the sexual life of those temporarily married is motivated chiefly by the desire to secure pleasurable satisfaction of physical passion. Such motivation robs the experience of its stability, its idealization, and its socialization. Because of this, the plane of sex behavior sinks toward degradation rather than lifts toward sublimation.

Moreover, trial marriage continues a competitive psychology which retards greatly the integration of personality. As Ross has so well said:

Young people vie eagerly for the favor of the other sex, but marriage should put an end to such rivalry. Love is subject to competition with other interests in life, so it is still worth while for spouse to woo spouse, but neither should be exposed to the competition of younger and more attractive members of the same sex. Trial marriage by reintroducing competition, would subject the mated, or

at least one of them, to a tormenting uncertainty and take away the blessed sense of security matrimony ought to bring¹⁸

Certainly compatibility cannot be readily achieved under the conditions of tension and strain which such uncertainty would inevitably create.

3. Trial marriage tests little that is really significant for the permanent union. In the abandon of a companionship involving a minimum of responsibility and strain, trial marriage presents only the less difficult problems of adjustment. No test of compatibility or adaptability in more trying situations which are the lot of all who enter the marriage relationship is or can be made in a temporary union dissolvable at the wish of the parties thereto. Indeed, the trial marriage affords no opportunity to ascertain the nature of the interaction of the personalities concerned in such situations as are involved in:

- a. The increasing economic burden entailed in the care of children; as the family increases often the income either remains constant or increases more slowly than the burden;
- b. Prolonged illness of either husband or wife with all the burden and disturbance involved;
- c. Presence of relatives-in-law as permanent members of the family group;
- d. Personality-mutations of wife to mother;
- e. Responsibilities of child care and child training;
- f. Conflicts with respect to discipline of children and independence of husband and wife;
- g. Personality-adjustments incident to parenthood.

Yet a normal family situation is as certain to bring these experiences as it is to produce romantic thrills.

4. Since the only adjustments which can be made in trial marriage are the pre-parenthood sex adjustments, an over-emphasis of the rôle of sex in marital relations is almost inevitable in trial marriage. Yet not only are sex adjustments secondary in importance, but the pleasure philosophy upon which they rest is also entirely inadequate to successful married life. Consideration must be given to other values, to other orders of satisfaction, each of which is fully as enriching as sex gratification. Sociologists are just beginning to discover how much that is creative and valuable in human relations lies beyond the satiation of passion. It is possible that the Freudian hypothesis has side-tracked scientific thought as significantly as did the old patriarchal morality. Intellectual balance requires freedom not only from patriarchal concepts but from psychoanalytic bias. Creative achievement in marital relation involves vastly more than pleasure in sex intercourse. When it is borne in mind that

¹⁸ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1935), p. 191.

sex plays a declining rôle in the marriage relationship, it must be apparent that the sense of completeness is not assured by sex adjustment alone.

5. The adjustments made in trial marriage, hence, are adaptations to a highly artificial situation. In this temporary union no status is acquired, for the positional relationships of the persons concerned are entirely anomalous not only as respects their relationship to each other but also as respects the neighborhood and the community. Of the rôles which the marriage status requires, only those of husband and wife are actually assumed by those who are making a trial of compatibility. Moreover, these rôles are assumed only in part, since the relationship is set up in a definitely restricted situation implied in the lack of a status carrying full responsibility. Any adjustments made under these conditions, therefore, are adaptations to an artificial situation. As such, they are as likely to handicap as to facilitate the integration of personality in a permanent relationship. No amount of social sanction would materially alter this counterfeit of marital relations.

6. The pleasure philosophy which has been developed as a rationalization of companionate behavior is, of course, inadequate even to the procedure in question. Pleasure is not always consonant with either individual welfare or group interests. Many pleasures are denied the individual by the group in his own interests as well as for the welfare of the group, namely: narcotics, intoxicants, unbroken leisure, speeding, gambling, rape, and incest. It is likely, too, that pleasures which are inconsistent merely with group welfare are inhibited or restricted in order that the aggregate, as well as the individual, may flourish. Domination, exploitation, subjection and subordination are cases in point.

Especially is it necessary that the group limit the freedom of the individual to seek his own pleasure until he is in a position to assume full responsibility for his behavior. Sex gratification, apart from considerations of possible parenthood, is an experience reserved for adulthood for the same reasons that the exercise of the rights of franchise, inheritance, and contract are withheld until qualification is established. In no other instance has group, and consequently individual, welfare been secured by the development of "all kinds of relations for all kinds of people," but rather by definite and even coercive canalization of conduct.

7. Those who argue for greater freedom in sex expression regard the sex impulse as man's most powerful "instinct" and maintain that it cannot be modified or brought to heel as other desires and appetites can be. Consequently they advocate trial marriage with divorce by common consent so that those who make mistakes under the drive of this potent and insistent sex urge can be relieved of the sequel, should it be unfortunate. Yet these same writers

admit of such phenomenon as homosexuality and sexual frigidity, which are unquestionably the products of a conditioning of the sex impulse by some sort of fixation. Further scientific knowledge may demonstrate that animal appetites do not constitute a different order of desires and that they, therefore, are entirely amenable to control and direction.

Sex control, like all social control, is the group's method of safeguarding both its welfare and that of the individuals who compose it. If the individual is to be free in his sex life to follow unrestrainedly the urge of physical desire, this will be the only phase of his social life in which he possesses such freedom. Social relationships in an increasingly complex social order require more and more, rather than less and less, prescription and discipline. Civilization, culture, and progress are possible only when increasingly vigorous disciplines are generally undertaken. Catharsis, in such a social order, is found in play and recreational activities which give release in contrasting behavior. This means that tension developed in one channel of controlled behavior will be relieved by the diversion of energies to another channel of directed behavior. For, after all, maximum freedom is realized in conduct aligned with law and order. License has no social guarantee.

MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY

The discussion of trial marriage indicates clearly the need for clear-cut distinction between *marriage* relationships and *family* relationships. The marriage relationship is, necessarily, a prelude to family relationships, but it cannot be identified with them. Marriage is a private, personal matter; it is a subjective relationship motivated by the desire for response, for sexual gratification, for social prestige and for economic support or economic advantage. It is exemplified in the husband-wife behavior patterns. The family relationship, on the other hand, is a group relationship involving the interests of a third person, the child, who does not participate in the marriage relationship but is a product of it. The family relationship, therefore, is an objective relationship actuated by the desire to prepare the child for successful participation in adult relationships. Marriage and family relationships are often confused because husbands and wives also function as fathers and mothers.

The metronymic family, especially the Nair type of polyandry, illustrates this distinction between marriage relationships and family relationships. In the Nair family, the husband attaches himself to the clan of his wife whose family relationships are controlled by her elder brother. This elder brother holds title to the family property; he provides protection to his sister and her children; his family name and inheritance are passed on to his nephews and nieces. His sister's husband is her mate only; he does not participate in

her family relationships. With certain exceptions, notably the higher class Greek family, the patronymic family has sought to identify marriage relationships and family relationships. It has succeeded, however, merely in including them in the same culture complex, for these relationships involve mutually exclusive behavior patterns.

Trial marriage, pre-marital sexual relations, and careers for women are advanced as correctives for frustrations and maladjustments occasioned by family organization. As a matter of fact these frustrations and maladjustments are caused by a defective marriage relationship rather than a defective family organization, especially where the motives which led to the marriage relationship took no account of the necessity for the establishment of a family relationship upon the appearance of the child. Careers for married, but childless women, for example, are one thing; careers for mothers, quite another—especially if the psychologist is right in his emphasis upon the necessity for intelligent and constructive parenthood to the normal development of the child.

SOCIAL CONTROL OF MARRIAGE

Anthropological data are replete with evidence that marriage¹⁹ and even sex practices within and without marital bonds²⁰ have been subject to the will of the group from very early periods.²¹ The development of such control has been very carefully traced by Howard in his *History of Matrimonial Institutions*.²² The facts of social control of the marriage relationship have, it would seem, been sufficiently established. For purposes of later discussion it is necessary, however, to recount the purposes of such control. This can be effectively accomplished by an enumeration of the points at which control is now exercised.

The state usually restricts marriage by requiring:

1. A minimum age in order to ensure physical and economic maturity. In most states men must be 21 and women 18 years of age.
2. Consent of parties to guarantee that responsibilities of the relationship are voluntarily assumed. Consent of parents is required to marriage of minors for the protection of parents against economic and legal liabilities which such unions devolve upon them.
3. A monogamous union, while it endures, to give maximum protection to the legal and social rights of *all* those involved.
4. Physical and mental fitness, to assure that offspring will be well-born and that

¹⁹ E. Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, 5th ed. (New York, 1922), Vol. II.

²⁰ C. W. Margold, *Sex Freedom and Sex Control* (Chicago, 1926).

²¹ B. Malinowski, *Sex and Repression in Savage Society* (London, 1927).

²² Especially Volumes I and II.

the state may diminish the number of charges who must be supported at public expense.

5. Distance in consanguinity, to reduce physical and mental weaknesses in offspring.
6. A license secured from the state to guarantee and protect the moral integrity of the parties concerned.
7. A ceremony performed by an authorized representative of the state to furnish the social sanctions which facilitate the acquisition of social status.
8. Dissolution by the state to give full protection to all interests involved in the relationship.
9. Remarriage only after the lapse of specified periods of time to safeguard against hasty and ill-considered divorces and second unions.

In all of these restrictions, the state acts primarily to protect the individuals concerned and to safeguard the group against unnecessary confusion and exploitation. It is difficult to see how a semblance of order in human relations could be maintained without such requirements.

The group also circumscribes the marriage relationship through its customs, conventions, and taboos. These limitations are racial, religious or political in nature and express the prejudices, biases or preferences of the group. They represent collective efforts to standardize or canalize conduct by the projection of approved behavior patterns. Individuals often feel repressed or inhibited by such circumscription; but freedom is not curtailed so far as any of its essential phases are concerned. Compliance with custom, convention and taboo is a concession to the group will, which always yields a larger quantum of freedom than defiance of them exhibits. Here as elsewhere the greatest liberty is secured through obedience to rather than defiance of collective volition.

Furthermore it must be remembered that mating, as well as marriage, vitally affects the welfare of the group which is interested in its own vigor and survival. In such a group the pleasure of the individual cannot be the prime consideration. Rather, the interests of the individual will have to give way to group considerations whenever these come into conflict. Especially is the group justified in restricting the activity of the pleasure-seeking individual when it must pay the bill or when the individual lacks the maturity, the judgment or the foresight to act for his own interests. The hedonist is concerned only with immediate enjoyment, while the group, if it is to endure, must consider more remote objectives.

It is entirely probable, therefore, that the group is fully justified in exercising its will not only with respect to marriage but also with respect to mating, since:

1. Venereal disease is spread by the amateur as well as professional prostitute.
2. Contraceptive devices are only 98 per cent effective *when carefully used by the most intelligent persons.*
3. Sex experience outside of marriage differs markedly from marital intercourse in that:
 - a. It is actuated solely by the desire for pleasant experience; it is not permeated by conjugal love, hence it rarely results in personality development but often in the passionate indulgence of animal appetites in which idealism plays no part;
 - b. Personalities do not bring to it the maturity, and hence, the attitudes and the values which make the marital experience an enriching one.
4. Sex desires are subject to the law of diminishing returns; the marital relation is robbed of important satisfactions when vital energy is spent for a cheap substitute in pre-marriage intercourse.
5. The energy and vital resource which is expended in mating is diverted from channels devoted to preparation for the vigorous disciplines of economic and domestic careers. This becomes greatly significant when it is increasingly difficult to secure and maintain the desired economic status. Indeed, many married persons find it necessary rigorously to limit sexual intercourse if they are to have the energy necessary to the adequate performance of income-yielding tasks.

For these reasons it cannot be held that "mating is a solely private matter with which no one but the parties involved have any concern."²⁸ The sexual act is, in fact, of more concern to the community than is any other private physiological act. If its expression can be left to Nature's "gracious equilibrium," it is the only instinct which can be allowed its "natural expression" without injury both to individuals and the group.

Authorities agree that the sexual life, especially in marriage, may be an enriching experience which develops personality significantly. With knowledge of contraception, therefore, marriage may be entered into primarily for the purpose of establishing a relationship which will yield such satisfactions. Marriage has always been an arrangement for the canalization of sex conduct within approved channels. At present, the sanction given to the childless union constitutes social recognition of the marriage which involves only companionship with one of the opposite sex. Since it is largely a purely personal relationship, such a marriage is, of course, one in which the group has little concern.

The group, however, has a very vital interest in the marriage which involves not only companionship but parenthood, for such a union involves

²⁸ H. Ellis, *Sex in Relation to Society, Studies in Psychology of Sex* (Philadelphia, 1919), Vol. VI, p. 417.

children. Enough knowledge has already accumulated to indicate that the family's chief function now lies in the organization of the personalities of those who constitute the next generation. Experience with delinquency and with problem children in home and school has demonstrated that a normal home situation is necessary if the normal child is to become a normal adult. As civilization matures and social relationships grow more complex, it is obvious that a more fully organized personality is required of the individual who is to be successful in his social relationships. Those who contemplate parenthood, therefore, must assume the responsibility for producing a generation whose personalities are adequate to the relationships of the increasingly intricate social order in which they must function.

From the sociological standpoint, therefore, a sharp differentiation is to be made between the childless companionate marriage and the family marriage which produces offspring. Since the former is primarily a personal relationship, it should be subject only to such social control as is usually given to such relationships. But the latter must be even more carefully supervised if the group is to escape an increasing, and eventually an overwhelming, burden of unadjusted, maladjusted, psychopathic and psychotic personalities.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. How may a passing sex spell be distinguished from genuine love?
2. What is an affinity? Is successful marriage assured in such a relationship? Reasons.
3. Are marriages ever "made in heaven"? Explain.
4. What is the social significance of a marriage rate? The marriage age?
5. Sociologically speaking can mating and parenthood be separated? Give reasons.
6. Precisely what makes marriage a "sacred" or "holy" relationship?
7. To what extent do modern American marriages have proper and adequate bases? Explain.
8. Is the absence of proper bases in given marriages due to institutional inadequacy or to the failure of the individuals concerned to provide insurance against marital disaster? Analyze specific cases.
9. To what extent is courtship used, at present, to discover compatibility or incompatibility? Where is the responsibility to be placed for deficiency in this matter? Explain.
10. What limitations do economic conditions place upon marriage? Explain. To what extent may these limitations be removed?
11. Compare and contrast the English and the American attitudes toward marriage? How may the differences be accounted for? Which attitude is sounder? Why?
12. Precisely what do men owe women because they are women?
13. On what grounds may the state control the family more rigorously than it controls other institutions?

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CHAPTER V

FAMILY DISORGANIZATION

FAMILY disruption is a social phenomenon of very ancient origin. In fact, divorce, in some form, is as primordial as marriage. It is natural, therefore, that divorce should always reflect the prevalent conception of marriage to which it holds definite and intimate connection. And, since early human societies developed a variety of marriage forms, it is to be expected that they also had a diversity of divorce practices. Post, in the summary of his researches in this field, lists six forms of divorce-right found among primitive peoples. These range from divorce by mutual consent to the absolute prohibition of marriage dissolution.¹ Family disorganization, hence, is no new process; it is even doubtful if it presents any new aspects after these thousands of years of human experience.

Sumner's contention that "no society has ever existed or ever will exist in which no divorce is allowed"² is abundantly attested in ancient family organization. In the matriarchal system the temporary nature of the marriage relation is sufficient evidence of freedom in this respect. In the patriarchal family the husband might divorce his wife if she were barren or if she should fail to provide him with a male heir; and the wife of her own volition might leave her husband and return to her own kin. And it is doubtless true that often husbands and wives divorced themselves whenever the laws under which they lived positively forbade such procedure.

Moreover, certain grounds for divorce have apparently always been recognized in the mores of the group, irrespective of specific regulations to the contrary. Adultery is a case in point. Physical incapacity, leprosy, desertion, captivity, incompetence, and crime have usually been sufficient, even under canon law, to secure breaking of the marriage bond. It is, of course, granted that these causes were frequently held to be adequate for the dismissal of the wife when a similar offense would not be regarded as adequate for the dismissal of the husband. But in either case remarriage of the innocent party was usually permitted. The mores determine finally what causes shall be regarded as

¹ A. H. Post, *Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Familienrechts* (Oldenburg und Leipzig, 1889), pp. 249-255.

² W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston, 1907), p. 380.

sufficient. Laws, canon or statute, can never be generally enforced if they contradict the mores. "When the law of the state or of ecclesiastical bodies goes with the mores, it prevails; when it departs from the mores, it fails."³ Especially do the mores defend the pursuit of happiness, either in the acquisition of property or in the enjoyment of family life. They will hence insist upon the modification of a procedure which seems to be so stringent as to impose misery and shame upon individuals. Codes are thus adjusted to popular judgment as to what best conserves the interests of the group as well as of the individual. Hence, the notion that the medieval church, under the influence of asceticism, put marriage under such strict regulation as to prohibit and eliminate divorce, is entirely erroneous. It made divorce more and more difficult, to be sure, but it could not deny divorce on grounds permitted in the Scriptures, and concessions were made to human weakness by the Church Fathers of the Middle Ages. The granting of dispensations is adequate evidence of the willingness of the church to admit that its doctrine of perfection and ideality for marriage did not work inerrantly. It is to be noted, however, that the state could not grant such dispensations; only the church could. Yet the mores were constantly revising and readjusting the rules of institutions so that the social situation would promote self-realization.

The modern idea of divorce is likewise conditioned by the modern conception of marriage. With the decline in the sacramental notion of marriage and the rise of the contractual theory, it was inevitable that the doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage should give way to the contractual idea that failure of either party to fulfill his part of the agreement, expressed or implied, was sufficient to void the contract. Application of the injured party is usually the only procedure insisted upon by the state which grants the decree. As woman's status is continuously improved, greater freedom is granted both parties to dissolve the marriage bond—the state being merely notified of the event. "Further progress," it is held, "will bring us back to the primitive practice of conceding the freest individual initiative in the whole realm of sexual choice and relations."⁴ At any rate, whatever is established in the mores with respect to marriage will be reflected in those respecting divorce.

Authorities generally agree, however, that human progress has been accompanied by an increase in the permanence of marriage and in restraint with respect to divorce. Thus Westermarck concludes that there is abundant evidence that marriage has, on the whole, become more durable in proportion as the human race has risen to higher degrees of cultivation and that a certain

³ Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

⁴ J. P. Lichtenberger, *Divorce, A Study in Social Causation* (New York, 1909), p. 63.

amount of civilization is an essential condition of the formation of life-long unions.⁵ More recently Lichtenberger asserts:

. . . as society arrives at a state of greater stability, the relation of the family to that stability is perceived, and an intelligent conservatism in respect to divorce makes its appearance in many places. Property interests become an increasing factor in the stability of society and marriage comes to rest less upon sexual instincts, more upon economic conditions. Thus powerful influences are exerted to check freedom of divorce and to increase the stability of the family.⁶

THE NATURE OF DIVORCE

In the law marriage is a contract based upon the free consent of an unmarried man and an unmarried woman to the creation of the relationship. The object of this relationship, in the eyes of the law, is procreation under legal sanction. Any condition which negatives the legal principles involved in marriage is, therefore, recognized by the law as grounds for the dissolution of the marriage tie. Although the statutes of the various states vary greatly in the enumeration of these grounds, the following may be regarded as sufficiently inclusive:

1. Coercion to the relationship
2. Incompetence of either party because of
 - a. Insufficient age
 - b. Insanity or venereal disease
 - c. Closeness of kinship
3. False impersonation
4. Impotence of either party
5. Adultery
6. Habitual and intolerable cruelty; incompatibility
7. Conviction of crime
8. Voluntary desertion for a stated period
9. Habitual drunkenness
10. Neglect to provide
11. Ungovernable temper

Of these, desertion, cruelty, adultery, intemperance, and neglect to provide are generally recognized as the most frequent causes for divorce.

Whatever the grounds upon which divorce is granted, let it be remembered that the law does not create the condition which destroys the relationship.

⁵ E. Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage* (New York, 1903), 3rd ed., p. 535.

⁶ Lichtenberger, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

Such a condition develops from the interaction of the personalities concerned. As has been previously noted, neither the law nor ceremonies establish the marriage relationship; this is accomplished by the parties themselves. Marital compatibility, the essence of the marriage relationship, is achieved not by legal decree but by the integration of personality. The law merely confers the sanction of the state upon the efforts to achieve marital compatibility. In divorce, likewise, the law does not create the estrangement; it steps in to define the legal status of the estranged parties with respect to each other. The law recognizes two distinct positional relationships of divorced persons; namely, *divortium a vinculo matrimonii*, or absolute divorce, which restores both parties to pre-marital legal status so far as remarriage is concerned, and *divortium a mensa et thoro*, or separation, which retains the legal status of married persons and does not allow remarriage.

Sociologically, however, divorce involves more than the dissolution of the marriage bond. It evinces failure to achieve the integration of personality which assures functioning marital and familial relationships. It requires the breaking up of a vital and integral social unit and the severance of the ties which bind the individuals to each other, to other families, and to the community. In other words, it signifies the disintegration and disorganization of the familial group with the loss of status and rôles. It sets human beings adrift in a sea of anomalous social relationships. In rendering a decree of divorce or separation, the courts merely recognize an existing situation and attempt to define the changed positional relationships of the persons concerned.

Krueger, in his treatment of marriage incompatibility, has analyzed with great clarity this process of disintegration and disorganization. He first describes "the stabilized family as a unity of interacting personalities" possessing the following characteristics: ⁷

1. The subordination of the members to a common objective. This common objective may be chiefly economic, it may center about the education of the children, if these exist, it may concern the realization of a social ideal of mutuality of attitudes between its members, it may be conceived as service to the state or to the deity, or it may be directed toward the preservation of family traditions and social status.
2. The conscious co-operation of its members to realize the common objective.
3. A reciprocity of personal services by which each member becomes dependent upon the other members, the entire group representing an interdependence of activities of an intimate and mutual character.
4. A co-ordination of the rôles of the members of the family in terms of

⁷ E. T. Krueger, "A Study of Marriage Incompatibility," *The Family*, Vol. IX (April, 1928), pp. 53-54.

obligations and privileges, such that each member assumes a positional relationship or status to every other member which defines his duties and permits, within limits, the personal satisfaction of wishes.

5. Participation of the family in a social or communal world by which the family plays a rôle and secures a positional or status relationship of prestige in reference to other families.
6. A consensus of emotional attitudes in which each individual member more or less harmoniously relates his life to that of every other member and to the group as a whole. In relation to other members the attitudes are those of affection, sympathy, and respect; to the group as a whole the attitudes are those of loyalty, pride, and responsibility.

The disorganization of a family is a process which destroys its unity. It takes the form of a conflict in attitudes, constituting a condition of tension and strain in the relationships between the members, and more especially between husband and wife. The effect is partial or complete. If complete, the family disintegrates. Family disorganization as a process involves, at one or more points, the following aspects:

1. The common objective disappears and individual aims are substituted, by choice or necessity.
2. Coöperation ceases.
3. Mutual services tend to be withheld.
4. The rôles of the members are no longer coördinated and defined.
5. The status of the family in its social world undergoes a change.
6. Emotional attitudes become antagonistic or are replaced by attitudes of indifference.

The causative factors in family disorganization, Krueger holds, are "tensions or conflict situations which breed certain attitudes between persons in the group." These tensions eventually disrupt the unity of interacting personalities by setting in motion a series of events which result in a loss of family consciousness and an individualization of behavior in the marriage relations.

These family tensions have been variously classified by Meroney,⁸ Mowrer,⁹ and Krueger¹⁰ upon the thesis that family disorganization is a process implying an organic relationship between the several elements in the process. The basis of each of these classifications, however, is primarily situational; that is, "The disintegration of the familial attitudes which make up the family

⁸ W. P. Meroney, *The Town Church and the Modern Family* (M. A. thesis, University of Chicago), p. 77, cited by E. R. Mowrer, pp. 195-196.

⁹ E. R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization* (Chicago, 1927), pp. 204-215.

¹⁰ E. T. Krueger, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

'complex' " is found in a "series of events which create tensions."¹¹ These tensions then set in motion a second series of events (behavior sequences), which complete the process of disorganization and result in a termination of the family relationship.

Mowrer's study of one hundred cases of family disorganization presents a four-fold classification of such family tensions; namely;

1. *Incompatibility of response*, or "sexual incompatibility" when sex is regarded as including not only physiological aspects but also the traditional attitudes and sentiments of "love" which may explain differences in sex impulse and in sex response such as:

- a. Differences in health, temperament, or culture
- b. Desires for direct as against indirect sex contacts or vice versa
- c. Interference with established sex habits by pregnancy of wife or absence of husband;
- d. Fear of pregnancy and refusal to have intimate relations; or unsatisfied desire for pregnancy and children
- e. Sexual anæsthesia; or sexual excess
- f. Transference of response to children
- g. Absorption in other interests

2. *Economic individualization* arising out of interests in security or status, which produce differences in attitudes on such economic matters as standard of living to be maintained, scale of expenditures to be made, vocational employment of wife, economic independence of wife, the rôle each should play in the economic situation.

3. *Cultural differentiation* revealed in differences in religious, racial, and educational background which produce conflicting conceptions of right and wrong, of proper and improper conduct, of desirable and undesirable social contacts and preferences, of cultural and recreational values.

4. *Individuation of life-patterns* involving differences in age and experience, in philosophy of life, in habits, points of view, and interests.

Such conflict situations develop in the successful, as well as the unsuccessful, family. In fact, normal, intimate relationships are characterized not by an absence of conflict but rather by an accommodation of elements such as resolves conflict and relieves tension. Unless it is assumed, therefore, that conflict situations develop only in unsuccessful family relationships, it is necessary to account for the fact that many *persons* do not succumb to tensions but, instead, find some means of changing attitudes and of removing or surmounting the differences which have created conflict and strain.

¹¹ E. T. Krueger, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

Institutions, like all forms of social organization, it must be remembered, are groups of *persons* whose relations have been given an orderly arrangement with respect to given *situations*. When these relations are thrown out of adjustment, the causative factors may be either *situational* or *personal*. In other words, relational tension may develop not only from differences in attitudes with respect to a conflict situation but also from lack of volition, of will to resolve the conflict. Since attitudes are amenable to the conditioning process, incompatibility in response, economic individualization, cultural differentiation, and even individuation of life-patterns may be surmounted by the family where integration of personality has been achieved by means of an effective determination to adjust differences. It is proposed, therefore, that recognition be given not only to causative situational factors but also to factors which condition the will, or volition of the persons involved in family disorganization. These factors forestall or preclude the adjustment of conflict through the integration of differences by producing in the person an anesthesia of the *will to achieve* compatibility. Six such factors may be enumerated; namely:

1. *Egocentricity*. This involves extreme self-centeredness, unwillingness to give as well as take, and the refusal to recognize any except personal interests. It is expressed in familial relations by hardness and even brutality in the treatment of others whenever there is conflict of desires or intentions; by the assumption of superiority and insistence upon unrestrained exercise of personal prerogatives; by exploitation of the interest and affection of those who stand in intimate relationship with the egocentric person; and by the denial of the validity of values other than those established by himself. Adaptations in marital relations where egocentric personality is involved are always unilateral; mutual adjustment of differences in such a situation is impossible as long as the egocentricity persists.

2. *Emotional psychosis*. Whenever the baser emotions are allowed to develop under sharp stimulations, they quickly acquire a potency which excludes counteracting emotions, thwarts rational correction, and so paralyzes volition. In such a situation the individual is powerless to restore emotional balance. Those who deal with broken homes know that it is often possible to effect a reconciliation by the forceful injection of considerations which have been stifled by anger, resentment, or self-pity. Normally the individual can summon counteractants; but in such a situation his will has been unseated. "The bitterest conflict comes between those who have been mated,"¹² because the sense of betrayal, of injustice, of neglect, strikes deeper when it issues from the behavior of those who have been loved and served with abandon

¹² E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1921), p. 161.

Thus love, when profaned, instantly becomes virulent hate; and hate not only paralyzes the willingness to adjust differences but it also produces a potent determination to secure revenge and exact indemnities. Jealousy also produces emotional psychosis because of an actual or imminent loss of status. Either the fact or the fear of supplantation as the supreme recipient of the other's affection will produce vigorous reactions in the displaced, especially when the position held is deemed a right rather than a reward. The deflation of the ego which results from loss of prestige is resisted, of course, with all the vitality which the person possesses. The intensity of the reactions begotten of jealousy will again bring an emotional disorder which will preclude volitional correction.

3. *Positional duplicity.* Frequently in marital relations, either the man or the woman attempts to play conflicting rôles. The compensations and satisfactions of marital and familial relationships are sincerely desired; but the individual is either indisposed or incompetent to meet the requirements of rapport in the intimate interaction of personalities within the family group. Artifice and deceit are necessary in order to maintain the opposing positional relationships and to secure the compensations of both. Accordingly there is pretense to affection which is not genuinely felt, simulation of virtues which are not practised, and feint of exploits which have never been adventured. A flimsy compatibility is temporarily sustained by flattery, cajolery, and insipid adulation. The roué who marries a pure woman practises such positional duplicity. In such cases the will has been diverted from its wholesome objective to serve the interests of a diseased personality. The result is volitional perversion.

4. *Incompetency.* Lack of preparation for the responsibilities of family life and of interest in, or enthusiasm for, familial activities and familial values deprives the incompetent person first of the respect and then of the affection of the more efficient members of the group. Especially is this likely to occur when others have to assume the rôles and perform the duties which the unqualified person undertook with the assumption of the marriage status. In such a situation the individual loses confidence in himself, becomes discouraged, develops a sense of inferiority and disadvantage which eventuates in hopelessness or in malice. These, in the end, stultify the will, and no further attempts are made to increase efficiency. Adaptation fails because volition is dead.

5. *Disillusionment.* When romantic sentimentalism or unrestrained passion has characterized the mating process, marriage brings intimate revelations of the:

- a. Complete personality of the mate
- b. Lack of relief from irritating manners and personality traits
- c. Wide differences in values, standards, tastes, and interests which have been concealed during courtship
- d. Full burden of responsibilities entailed in family activity
- e. Role of sex and the quality of the sex life which is established
- f. Expectations of relatives-in-law
- g. Nature of happiness: namely, that it is product of achievement, not of chance

Often disillusionment is so profound that complete emotional as well as volitional paralysis results. Dénouement is greatly minimized by a rational utilization of the period of courtship. To ignore its opportunities for discovery merely postpones the time of reckoning. To hope that "things will be different" after marriage usually presages bitter disappointment; for such "things" will generally be accentuated rather than metamorphosed in the marital relationship.

6. *Ambition.* Marriage is sometimes embraced, not as an opportunity for personality completion by intimate reciprocity, but as an arrangement which will give advantage in the pursuance of social contacts, money, leisure, social position, and social prestige. The basis upon which such a relationship rests, of course, is primarily ambition, and its success will be measured by the degree to which aspirations are fulfilled. Often either the husband or the wife becomes an obstacle rather than an assistance to the realization of ambitions. Disruption of the man's plans by premature marriage, deterioration of the personality of either husband or wife, failure or inability to play the rôles necessary to secure the coveted position will bring such unions to a reckoning. Especially is this likely when more is attempted than physical or financial resource will support. When ambition is blocked or thwarted, a sense of injustice, of being wronged, develops, and again the will to adjust atrophies or, more likely, reverses. Release is found here, as in the frustration of fundamental wishes, in embittered behavior.

The ultimate causes for family disorganization, then, lie far beyond the reach of the statistician and law-giver. They are buried deep in the *personality* of the individuals joined in marriage and in the *situation* which environs them. Incompatibility is not merely a question of *attitudes* developed in a conflict situation; it is also a problem of *values* set by the personality and of *volition* exercised in their achievement. Obviously legislation cannot penetrate to these sources which constitute the very fabric of personality; nor can statistics disclose or measure them. Moreover, it is to be noted that these hidden conditioners of action offer vigorous resistance to alteration even by experience.

The process by which standards and values are inculcated so ingrains them that opposing considerations are rejected as erroneous. The experience of marital incompatibility, therefore, rarely profits the participants, and remarriage secures little, if any, additional guarantee of success.

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE

Reliable studies of the social consequences of family disorganization have been undertaken only recently.¹³ When further and more exhaustive researches in this field have been completed, more authoritative statements with respect to the results of divorce can be made. Some tentative conclusions, however, can be advanced upon the basis of data that are now available.¹⁴ The following effects of divorce have been noted.

1. *Disorganizes social relationships.* The sharp truncation of the reciprocal relationships of husband and wife in divorce disrupts every normal interaction. A new status and new rôles are suddenly thrust upon the divorcees, often they are forced to resume a sort of pre-marital status distasteful to everyone concerned. This in turn involves the breaking of many well-established habits. Friends frequently take sides with the result that both of the divorced persons are arbitrarily cut off from many former connections; sometimes one of the divorcees is left friendless. Rumor, gossip, scandal and public disapproval may result in the loss of good-will and respect. Under such conditions divorced persons resort to sophistication, bohemianism and promiscuity in an effort to secure habitual responses and regain shattered self-respect.¹⁵ Relationships to children and in-laws also become uncertain and embarrassing. In short, every normal relationship is unsettled or completely altered and the entire program of life has to be reconstructed. All personal, economic and social adaptations have to be re-made, even when divorce is secured in order to marry other mates.¹⁶

2. *Warps personalities.* Except where divorce is secured by collusion, bitterness, regret, resentments, hatreds and more or less permanent anti-social attitudes develop in one or both of the parties to the divorce. This is natural since the experience gives a terrific wrench and cheap publicity to the most intimate and most cherished human relationship. It is probably true, moreover, that most divorces are sought without serious deliberation, in momentary moods

¹³ J. C. Colcord, *Broken Homes* (New York, 1919); also E. E. Eubank, *A Study of Family Desertion* (Chicago, 1916)

¹⁴ J. W. Bidges, "Results of Divorce," *Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. XXXIV (June, 1927), pp. 187-204.

¹⁵ M. A. Elliott and F. E. Merrill, *Social Disorganization* (New York, 1934), Ch. 24.

¹⁶ E. R. Groves, *The American Family* (Philadelphia, 1934), pp. 267-269.

and for superficial reasons. When the full meaning of what has been done under these conditions dawns upon the divorcees, their whole outlook on life is often discolored and their personalities scarred and warped.

3. *Handicaps children.* Divorce involves entanglement of parental relations, since temporarily, at least, the child has but one parent at a time. Yet it is generally agreed that the normal child needs both parents all of the time, if he is to experience a normal development in a normal environment. In case of the remarriage of the parent given his custody, the child acquires a step-parent with all the difficult and often impossible adjustments entailed by this relationship. Usually foster-parentage presents less of a conflict situation than such step-parentage. In addition to all this, children often share with their parents the social stigmas which the latter's pre-divorce behavior invited. Moreover, while divorce often frees children from a jarring home, feelings of inferiority or injustice are likely to develop when such children are mature enough to compare their status with that of children in stabilized families. Divorce, at any rate, completely unsettles the status of children—a situation fraught with much danger because they often adapt themselves to changes in positional relationships less readily than adults.

4. *Increases juvenile delinquency.* It has been estimated that 50 per cent of juvenile delinquents come from broken homes. Of these a larger number probably come from homes broken by divorce rather than death since the latter creates only a deficiency while the former is the product of conflict.¹⁷

5. *Overburdens women.* Particularly in rural districts, the divorced woman is ostracized or regarded with suspicion and disfavor even if she is the defrauded party. Treatment of this sort isolates and further embitters, especially when it is undeserved. In both rural and urban communities, divorce increases the woman's family responsibility, since she must assume all the duties of parenthood with the handicap of her husband's determined efforts to maintain his hold upon his children's affections. Her economic burden is also increased because alimony is usually insufficient to the needs of growing children. The man's income must now maintain what approximates two establishments—at least, many items of expense are necessarily duplicated when he separates himself from his family. Unless substantial income is forthcoming from other sources, this division of income works genuine hardship for both the man and the woman.

6. *Increases the instability of the basic social institution and hence of the whole social order.* Reference to the opening paragraphs of Chapter II will disclose the evidence upon which this conclusion is based.

¹⁷ W. C. Reckless and M. Smith, *Juvenile Delinquency* (New York, 1932), pp. 117-121; E. H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (Philadelphia, 1934), pp. 144-146.

THE ARGUMENT CONCERNING DIVORCE

That family disorganization is increasing steadily cannot be denied. The data with respect to divorce present conclusive evidence of the shorter duration and the increased instability of the modern family. Radical changes in the economic order, in philosophy of life, in institutional control, in position of woman, in morality, inevitably bring changes in social relationships and in social concepts. Such changes will naturally be reflected in a marked increase in the ratio of divorces to marriages.¹⁸ The decline of religion, the relaxation of law, the decline of the economic functions of the family, urbanization, the emancipation of woman, higher standards of living and comfort, revised ethical concepts—all are factors of dynamic potency. It can hardly be doubted, therefore, that this is a period of transition. Indeed it is possible either that the present social order is disintegrating or that a new social order is forming.

The decline of the group concept in modern social thought is especially significant of thorough change in social objective. Increasingly the interests of the group are neglected by a paternalistic individualism which insists that the person be given prime consideration in the formation of social policy and that social institutions be utilized as means of promoting the welfare of the individual. Group welfare, it is held, is adequately assured by attention to the interests of the persons who make up the social aggregate. Applied to the family, this philosophy contends that the happiness of its individual members is the first desideratum of familial functioning. Accordingly, when incompatibility develops in the marital relationship, severance of the marital bond and disintegration of the familial group is advanced as the solution of the conflict situation. In other words, liberal and complete divorce is urged on the following grounds:

1. It brings to an end this conflict situation where the personalities concerned have not achieved, perhaps cannot or, at least, seem likely not to achieve, integration. If continued, such a situation provides a bad environment for children, prevents the full development of the adult personalities, and is likely to create clandestine relations.

2. Such divorce allows remarriage with a proper mate, because the experience in first case tends to result in a more rational selection of the second mate and thus leads to "a substitution of a superior for an inferior mate." This would increase the number of happy and successful families.

3. It promotes morality by placing the two parties in a position of equality as respects status, morals, and rights. Knowledge that complete divorce can be readily secured will result in a single and a higher moral standard because it

¹⁸ Lichtenberger, *op. cit.*, Chs. 9, 10, 11, 12,

removes the basis of sex exploitation and the occasion for extra-marital relations in cases of sex maladjustment.

4. It releases the fit from an intolerable bondage to the unfit (criminals, insane, syphilitics, etc.) and thus not only promotes individual happiness and welfare but also conserves human energies for the group.

5. It increases progeny, since those who marry more than once are likely, under modern conditions, to have more children than in the single permanent union. This is a definite service to the race.

6. It improves the environment for the children by removing them from a situation characterized by quarreling, hatred, strain and hence surcharged with tension.

When attention is given to particular cases of marital incompatibility, a policy of liberal divorce (complete) appears to possess veritable validity; but adequate social policy must also consider the welfare of numbers over long periods of time. Too much attention to particular cases, therefore, may eventually result in the actual abandonment of the principles upon which policies are based. Without principles to guide, collective behavior becomes chaotic. The weight of the arguments for freedom of divorce, therefore, should be adjusted to certain counter considerations:

1. Complete divorce is not the only means of terminating a conflict situation. Courts of Domestic Relations have been notably successful in relieving both adults and children from situations of tension and in reestablishing homes which were more or less thoroughly disorganized. It is probable, therefore, that the reference of *all* cases of domestic infelicity to such courts, as a step preliminary to the institution of divorce proceedings, would, through the resolution of many conflict-situations by those skilled in such matters, accomplish much in stabilizing the families concerned.

2. Since the ultimate causes of family disorganization are usually to be found in volitional deficiencies or defects, it has yet to be demonstrated that divorce promotes a more rational selection of mates. Logically it is valid to assert that experience with incompatibility develops wisdom in the choice of a subsequent mate; but this claim is at present unsupported by data. Indeed, logic, with a bolster from psychology, can be advanced in opposition to this assertion as well as in its defense.¹⁹

3. To argue that divorce must be freely granted in order to preserve marital morality is to disregard the fact that incompatibility may result in an accentuation rather than a frustration of the sexual life.²⁰ This increase of the sex factor appears to be a sort of frantic effort to re-secure the integration which

¹⁹ *Infra*, pp. 99-100.

²⁰ Krueger, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-58.

has been lost.²¹ No evidence has yet been presented which demonstrates conclusively that marital maladjustment usually issues in extra-marital sex relations which are terminated with divorce. Incompatibility, it must be noted, is often trumped up as an excuse for extra-marital exploits by those who have a proclivity for promiscuity or who are easily tired by sustained marital relations. Hence, the contention that divorce promotes morality is little more than an ardent claim. It is, as yet, without scientific substantiation. Experience has also shown that, where attempt has been made to establish the equality of the sexes by the extrinsic adoption of a single standard for both, it is the looser norm which finally prevails. In other than moral fields, at least, the equality of women with men has not meant that men were held to the more rigorous standards they had set for women, but that women were granted the license formerly enjoyed exclusively by men. The sources of sex exploitation are not revealed in external situation; they lie hidden in volition. It is difficult to establish any substantial connection between divorce and morality.

4. Complete separation releases the fit from bondage to the unfit but bars them, of course, from mating with the fit. If courtship is rationally employed, however, fitness can be readily determined before marriage; then no occasion for release would arise except where unfitness is caused by accident, illness, or personal disaster. And only an ingrate will desert his mate under such conditions.

5. So inexorably has population increased that authorities²² are now substantially agreed that public interest need no longer be stimulated in the direction of the quantity of population. Rather they are a unit in their emphasis upon the qualitative aspects of the problem. Any social policy which merely increases numbers is, therefore, both inexpedient and unwise. Genuine service to the race demands a quantitative contribution to its quality.

6. Again, the resolution of the conflict between the incompatible husband and wife in courts of Domestic Relations will improve the environment for their children quite as effectively as divorce. It does more—it guarantees them against the probable conflict situations and tensions which step-parentage usually involves.

It must be readily granted that certain personalities are entirely and irremediably incompatible. The integration of two egocentrics, for example, is certainly improbable even in a favorable situation. The importance of the wise use of the pre-marital period for the discovery and exploration not only of the dimensions of romantic emotion but also of its handicaps and perils cannot be

²¹ Colcord, J. C., *Broken Homes* (New York, 1919), p. 36.

²² E. R. East, *Mankind at the Crossroads* (New York, 1923); E. A. Ross, *Standing Room Only?* (New York, 1927); M. F. Guyer, *Being Well-born* (Indianapolis, 1927).

easily overstated. The futility of this procedure cannot be urged on the grounds that, since young people *do* not, they *will* not make rational use of courtship. Experience indicates the exact contrary when young people really comprehend the full import of the marital relationship. The difficulty lies in the fact that so few of them have the opportunity to grasp the nature and meaning of marriage.

✓ SOCIAL POLICY RESPECTING DIVORCE

It is obvious that no permanent social policy with respect to family disorganization could be built upon a principle which refused release from unfortunate and impossible unions. Modern humanitarianism would permit no such manhandling of human nature. Human beings are prone to mistakes in judgment, especially when they are rendered under emotional stress. It must be granted, therefore, that marriages are frequently hasty and ill-considered; but it must also be conceded that most divorces are sought in the heat of passion and resentment. In developing an effective social policy with respect to family disorganization and disintegration, therefore, some procedure must be devised which will guarantee the maximum rational pre-nuptial consideration of all that marriage involves and the maximum rational precedent measurement of the personal and social consequences of its dissolution. It should be observed that a social policy which is actually effective for the maximum number of cases will probably work hardship in some. Such seems to be the nature of all group procedures. In fact, no effective social policy which will work to the satisfaction of all can be devised by imperfect human beings. Even complete *laissez-faire* with respect to the dissolution of the marriage bonds will bring hardship to the one less eager for divorce. And, since an effective social policy which works for the largest number over long periods of time involves hardship to some, it is socially more expedient that this hardship fall on the foolish, the impatient, the undisciplined, rather than on the intelligent, the long-suffering, the disciplined.

The social policy which appears to take the fullest account of all these factors is one which emphasizes courtship as a period of personality exploration and discovery and marriage as a permanent relationship of profound satisfaction achieved through personality-integration and terminated only with the development of an unresolvable conflict situation. Separation, it seems, will relieve the tensions developed by conflict and restore a reasonably normal, but mateless, situation. Complete and easy divorce with full privilege of remarriage, on the other hand, tempts to the hasty and ill-considered breaking of marriage bonds and gives no adequate guarantee against repetitions of the original blunder. At least, more studies of the remarriages of divorced persons are needed

before any valid conclusions can be drawn with respect to the extent to which these results in the substitution of a superior mate for an inferior mate.

Divorce, for those who have entered a companionate relationship, involves little that the group needs to safeguard, especially when the parties thereto have deliberately chosen such a marriage. In this, as in other relationships, the group should protect the individual against exploitation either of his property or his person. The group should also guarantee proper settlements where common property or dependence is involved. While it is demonstrable that social order is probably best conserved by the permanent monogamic marriage, it is probable that the group cannot longer enforce divorce regulations which apply to the companionate and to the family marriage alike. When children are born to those who planned merely for a companionate relationship, the marriage relationship must then be controlled as if it had been a family marriage in the beginning. Under such conditions, consideration of the rights of a child who did not choose to be born, take precedence, sociologically speaking, of those of the parents who planned that he should not be born.

A careful analysis of the underlying causes of conjugal incompatibility shows that these can in most, if not all, instances be disclosed and roughly tested before marriage, provided the individuals concerned give rational thought to the problem. It follows, therefore, that familial disorganization is a pathological condition usually induced by serious personality defects. The remedy, it would seem, lies not so much in social surgery as in preventive treatment. Certainly greater freedom of divorce will not restrain hasty and ill-considered unions until human nature has been more effectively conditioned with respect to courtship. Sociologically, the perfect marriage relationship is one in which "purposes are fitted together so that they shall stimulate, reinforce, and develop each other instead of thwarting and defeating each other."²³ Such a relationship is creative and achieving because disintegrative conflict has been eliminated. Without such conflict and its attendant phenomena there will be no incompatibility; without incompatibility, the wedded lack both the cause and the occasion for breaking marriage bonds. The requisites for such a relationship would be, first, a rational selection of mates in which emotions are brought to heel; second, an intelligent use of courtship for the discovery of traits, particularly of adaptability; and third, earnest, persistent, effort to attain compatibility when once wedded life has begun.

It is likely, however, that human nature, conditioned as it is at present, is ill adapted to sustained functioning with such behavior patterns. An effective social policy with respect to divorce, therefore, will take account of human imperfection as well as of social ideals. Nevertheless, concession to human

²³ H. Hart, *The Science of Social Relations* (New York, 1927), p. 194.

weakness must not lead to the abandonment of significant group standards in the hope of relieving a few unhappy married couples. If the family is to be conserved as the basic social institution, it follows that any adequate social policy with respect to divorce will:

1. Encourage pre-marital and rational consideration of compatibilities and responsibilities; it will give pause to the assumption of the marriage relationship.

2. Promote earnest striving to achieve compatibility through the successive resolution of conflict by the elimination of the causes of incompatibility.

3. Provide children with a guarantee against the unfavorable environment which broken homes and step-parentage usually entail.

4. Relieve the group concerned as far as possible from the unfavorable social consequences of divorce.

5. Recognize the secondary rôle played by sex in conjugal maladjustment. It must not over-emphasize passion as an element in the familial complex. A policy of liberal divorce with the privilege of remarriage, for example, greatly magnifies the rôle of sex. Indeed, such a policy may imply that marriage is entered into only to secure a sanctioned satisfaction of sex desire.

6. Conserve the conjugal and familial relationships for those who demonstrate their capacity for them. As a matter of fact, if the causes of incompatibility have been accurately analyzed, failure in one marriage relationship implies doubt of ability to achieve success in other unions.

7. Take definite account of interests other than those of the husband and wife, that is, of children, and of society.

It is obvious that a social policy which meets these requirements adequately must treat this basic human relationship more comprehensively than it is treated at present by safeguarding both marriage and divorce. Much must be done, first of all, to educate and prepare individuals for the marriage relationship. Certainly in such a vital relationship, ignorance is criminal and a little knowledge a dangerous thing. Preparation for marriage might well begin with preliminary courses in the higher grades of the secondary schools as well as in the night and vocational schools. More advanced courses should then be given in high schools, colleges and universities. The entire subject matter could also be given through extension courses and by members of the clergy who are properly qualified to give such instruction. It should be noted in this connection that these courses should not be identified with sex education; they should be courses which cover the whole range of familial relationships, economic, psychological, biological and social. Such instruction would acquaint large numbers of people with the social as well as the personal values resident in familial relationships. And, if it be true that the character of the family de-

termines the character of society, then such instruction is as essential as any, or all, of the formal educational disciplines now pursued in our educational institutions.

Instruction with respect to familial relationships should make men and women intelligent with respect to the functions which the familial institution performs, the bases upon which the relationships rest, the rôles of the constituent elements, the qualifications necessary to the successful playing of those rôles, the marital adjustments and the manner of making them. Especially should such instruction reveal the period of courtship not merely as a period of solicitation and love-making but also as an opportunity for the mutual discovery of personality traits and quirks, of adaptability, of objectives, of values. At present this disclosure is usually attempted by means of prohibitions and frustrations, proceeding from parents who are alarmed by the liberties which their untaught offspring take with ardent emotion and passionate desire. Such thwartings, however, usually result in conflict between parents and children; often they precipitate the very catastrophe which is feared. Social values cannot be inculcated by a belated and hurried exercise of authority. They must be established in the earlier training of the child, if they are to be firmly imbedded in the behavior patterns of the adult.

Marriage should be further safeguarded by procedures designed especially to preclude the hasty and ill-considered assumption of this relationship. In all but eight States of the United States it is possible to secure, upon application, a license to marry. In these eight States only five days need elapse between the application for, and the issuance of, a license; and in three of these eight the law applies only to non-residents.²⁴ In at least forty-three States, it is possible for a couple to secure their license and to solemnize their marriage within the brief period of an hour or two as a bit of exciting adventure. The law requires no certificates of economic proficiency, of mental health, of compatibility, of physical vigor (except in the few States which have "eugenic" laws). The State therefore is guaranteed, at best, merely that the persons are of legal age and not consanguineous; the more important qualifications are practically ignored. Yet, if any social relationship should be assumed with deliberation and preparation, surely marriage falls within this category. Failure here is rarely, if ever, surmounted. Notice of intention to marry should be published at least a fortnight in advance of the wedding. This would constitute a minimum guarantee against unsuitable and bigamous unions.

Again marriage should be safeguarded by measures which guarantee the

²⁴ F. S. Hall and Elisabeth W. Brooke, *American Marriage Laws in Their Social Aspects* (New York, 1919), p. 14.

fitness of the persons concerned to function in marital and familial relationships.

1. A thorough physical examination to demonstrate the positive physical vigor of the man and the woman as well as the absence of venereal and degenerative diseases is essential. A union in which both or either is physically or neurologically bankrupt is foreordained to failure because marital and parental relationships are surcharged with strains and tensions. Ability to surmount these is necessary to the successful family. These examinations, of course, should be given in clinics maintained by the state in order that the disservices of the quack doctor may be avoided. It is admitted that eugenics laws, for example, are often impotent because medical scalawags can be found who will issue certificates to the diseased provided the fee is forthcoming. Clinics maintained by State Boards of Health should be able to maintain standards. Companionate marriage should be permitted those denied certificates of health. If children are desired, adoption will give offspring to the adults and safeguard the physical inheritance of the children.

2. A complete mental examination and history by competent psychiatrists and psychologists to attest the mental health and vigor of the intending persons should be required. Obviously, mental health is as necessary as physical vigor to normal and successful family life. Marital aberrations, psychoses, neuroses, and temperamental complications should all be unearthed and corrected before the state gives its sanction to the union, since the burdens of mental defect and disease fatally handicap the integration of personalities which is prerequisite to successful family life—an achievement sufficiently difficult for those in mental health. At least, marriage is more likely to succeed when it is possible to guarantee the fitness of both the man and the woman to meet the sustained responsibilities involved.

3. Specific evidence of the economic proficiency of the man and the domestic competency of the woman should be supplied. The latter, of course, could be waived when the wealth and income of either husband or wife is sufficient to provide servants. But in all other cases, the marriage relationship is undertaken with deadly disadvantage if either the man or the woman must assume a disproportionate share of the economic or managerial responsibility of the home. Successful family life cannot be built upon a parasitic marital relationship. The willingness of either the husband or the wife to assume such full responsibility gives no adequate insurance against a later disaffection. Both should be prepared and eager for their respective and mutual functions as constituent elements in the family. The wife should be jointly responsible with her husband for the support of the family—her contribution, as well as his,

to be made either in work or in money. At present no attempt is made to secure evidence of the economic competency of those who propose to undertake family responsibilities; yet it is self-evident that a substantial economic basis is essential to successful family life. Moreover, evidence of this sort is not difficult to obtain. It need not, in fact it should not, be assumed that all applicants for marriage licenses are economically competent.

4. Ability and disposition to achieve an integration of personality should be certified. The science of social relations has now developed a body of principles and procedures sufficiently tested to permit of their application not only to the analysis of the interactions of persons in groups but also to the diagnosis and prognosis of personal maladjustments to groups. The work of the reconciliation departments of courts of domestic relations especially illustrate with what effectiveness the principles of sociology and social psychology may be employed in situations of tension and crises. Such departments, however, perform a remedial rather than a preventive function. They treat only cases of discord which have arisen *in* the intimate relations of marital life; they make no attempt to determine the capacity or the inclination to meet the requirements of such intimate interaction *before* marital relations are assumed.

The establishment of domestic relations clinics for the specific purpose of determining the degree of compatibility of those intending marriage is essential, it would seem, if marriage is reasonably to be safeguarded against unions predestined to failure because of clashing personality traits. Such clinics should be in the charge of those fully trained in psychology, psychiatry and sociology. Experienced specialists in human relations who have themselves achieved success in familial interaction should be able to give an illuminating prognosis of compatibility when account has been taken first, of all the quirks, sets, complexes and eccentricities of personalities concerned, particularly of those productive of tension and conflict and secondly, of the attitudes and behavior patterns necessary to the avoidance of strain and discord. This penetrating analysis of personality traits, especially of volitional bent, should give a coefficient of compatibility which would indicate significantly the probability of successful marital and familial relationships. It is obvious that such clinics should be maintained by the state that the disservices of the charlatan may be avoided. Marriage will not be safeguarded unless certification of compatibility is made by competent persons. State clinics should guarantee this to a maximum degree.

Reasonable beings will not resent requirements such as these, especially when the foundational position of the family as a social institution is fully recognized. Reasonable beings will also submit to regulations which are designed to protect their own, as well as others' interests in successful and con-

genial marital and familial relationships. It is believed, therefore, that these provisions for physical, marital, economic and spiritual competency, will, if faithfully administered, do much to prevent hasty and ill-considered marriages as well as to educate and prepare for the adjustments and responsibilities which marriage involves. Such provisions should greatly strengthen the institution which not only supports the whole social order but also determines its quality, especially if companionate marriage and knowledge of contraceptives is allowed those who are incompetent to the familial situation.

Ideally young men and young women should prepare for marriage so carefully and so completely that divorce would be unnecessary. *Practically* human nature cannot yet be so thoroughly conditioned and disciplined that mistakes will not be made. Until we have achieved a perfect social order, therefore, divorce must be allowed. But it, like marriage, needs safeguards to prevent hasty and ill-considered action. Present divorce laws allow the fundamental human relationship to be severed by intrigue, by collusion and, not infrequently, by perjury. Or, it must be endured, however intolerable, it may have become, because present procedures involve pitiless publicity to the most intimate affairs of men and women. Moreover, mates are required to attack each other in courts open to reporters and the public; they are forced to prove adultery or some other indecent behavior in order to secure release from a relationship which has become exquisite torture.

To increase the ease with which divorce may be secured is a makeshift, not a solution, of the problem of domestic discord. Present practices only emphasize the sordidness, the ugliness of familial disorganization. Little effort is made to penetrate the superficial aspects of the situation; rarely are the underlying causes of incompatibility revealed. Since "conflict is sharpest and most passionate when it comes between those who have been united,"²⁵ it is obvious that divorce should be safeguarded against precipitate action taken in the heat of rage or exasperation. Especially is it important in each case that an effort be made to discover the real cause of the conflict and to resolve it, if possible. The following procedures should supply the necessary safeguards:

1. *The court should give no consideration to applications for divorce until the husband and wife have discussed their difficulties with a domestic relations clinic.* Here specialists in psychiatry and in marital relations would be given an opportunity to remove the misconceptions, misunderstandings and deficiencies which have caused the maladjustment and prevented the integration of personalities. The achievements of the reconciliation departments of some of our courts of domestic relations speak eloquently of what can be accomplished in mending broken homes. "Such departments employ experts in human rela-

²⁵ E. A. Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

tionships to cheat the grasping lawyer, interested neighbors, prejudiced relatives and the court itself of the sorry end results of families gone wrong." ²⁶ When such clinics cannot effect a reconciliation which gives promise of success, it is evident that the marriage must be regarded as a failure. It remains only for the court to be assured that all interests are properly protected in the dissolution.

2. *All divorce proceedings should be private.* Only the parties to the action and necessary witnesses shall be allowed to attend the hearings which should, if possible, occur in the judge's private court chambers. Nothing is gained socially by newspaper publicity of divorce proceedings; indeed, much unwarranted damage is done to reputation, character and status because the journals play up the lurid details of these ugly marital conflicts. Publicity humiliates both the innocent and the guilty parties and at times grossly exposes the intimate relations of husband and wife. It is fatuous to urge that such exposure acts as a deterrent except to those respectable persons who will endure an intolerable union rather than run a gamut of indecent exposure.

3. *A full account of all divorce proceedings should be entered in the records of the court which grants the decree.* Judges as well as the divorced persons are entitled to this protection. These records, however, should not be accessible to publicity agents but only to those whose interests are involved in the separation.

4. *Representation of parties to the divorce by legal talent or counsel should be eliminated.* If the domestic relations clinic has failed to effect a reconciliation, it is obvious that the lawyer can make no contribution to the solution of this conflict situation. Indeed, it usually profits him greatly to aggravate the conflict. The judge is competent to handle all legal matters involved in the dissolution of marriage bond, the division of property, and the provision for the children. Judges may be as safely entrusted with this authority as with undivided jurisdiction over juvenile delinquents. Thus another perfidious and expensive factor would be eliminated from present divorce procedures.

5. *Any condition indicating deep and lasting incompatibility should be regarded as sufficient grounds for divorce.* Trivial causes should be excluded from any consideration of relationships which are as fundamental and as significant as those of the family. Perfection cannot be expected in human nature as it is at present conditioned. Divorce may properly be taken under advisement only when the domestic situation is characterized by unresolvable antagonism.

6. *Legal separation for one year should be granted by the state provided the*

²⁶ Neva R. Deardoff, "Marriages at the Breaking Point," *Survey*, Vol. 59 (December, 1917), p. 331.

applicants for the divorce cannot be reconciled. The decree of separation should be withheld until the applicants have reached an agreement on the division of their income and, if they are parents, until adequate provision has been made for the children.

7. *Decree of absolute divorce should be issued without further ado at the end of one year if the man and the woman have consistently remained apart during the intervening period and if full separation is still desired by both parties.* In cases where divorce is desired by only one party, the final decree should not be granted until two years of legal separation have demonstrated that the marital bonds have been irreparably broken.

With such safeguards it would never become necessary for husbands and wives to attack or vilify each other in open court in order to gain their freedom from an intolerable domestic relationship. It would also become possible to avoid the humiliating publicity and the payment of large legal fees characteristic of much present procedure. These safeguards for divorce are, however, fully defensible only when the marriage is planfully and deliberately made; otherwise they do not insure against hasty and ill-considered unions easily severed. When the assumption of marital relations is also safeguarded, the procedures outlined above are not likely to result in increased divorce. This, at least, has not been the experience of those Scandinavian countries which established similar procedures in 1918.²⁷

Two lines of arguments have been advanced against any social policy which materially restricts either marriage or divorce. First, it is claimed that stringent inhibitions will increase illicit sex relations. The sex urge, it is held, will not be denied full and complete expression: hence restriction only drives it into illegitimate channels. This argument might be urged against any restriction whatever on marriage, such as eugenics laws, laws restricting consanguinity, age, etc. It is advanced on logical rather than factual grounds. Certainly the argument secures no substantiation from the experience of the Scandinavian countries or of Roman Catholics and Lutherans with such restrictions. It is also to be noted that the reasoning of this argument proceeds upon the assumption that the purpose of marriage is primarily the gratification of sex hunger—an assumption which has already been refuted. Secondly, it is maintained that refusal freely to grant complete divorce entails injustice and imposes unwarranted hardship upon the innocent party who has a right to the comradeship and happiness which a successful union provides. It is forgotten that complete divorce itself often results in injustice and hardship. The hardship seems to be concerned more or less completely with the satisfaction of

²⁷ Stephen Wing, "The Mockery of American Divorce," *Harper's*, Vol. 157 (July, 1928), pp. 154-156.

sex appetites. Sexual intercourse, however, is but one means of securing catharsis for sex urges. This may also be accomplished by diversion of energy to other sources, by transference of response to children, by sublimation, or by positive conditioning of the sex impulse. The sense of completion sought in the marriage relation may thus be measurably attained by other means than sexual intercourse. And, in so far as restriction of divorce imposes economic hardship upon the persons involved, this burden is greatly modified in these days when occupations and professions are freely opened to women. Vocation, it is to be noted, bids almost as high as the family for the energy and devotion of adults. Also, it must not be forgotten that all effective social policies involved hardship for some. Nothing of value is obtained without price either in the realm of economics or in the sphere of human relations.

The experience of peoples seems to have settled rather conclusively the question of the social expediency of the permanently monogamous family. Any reconsideration of this type of familial organization must review its expedience from the point of view of all the interests involved; namely:

1. *Interests of the two contracting parties*—the man and the woman being equally regarded as persons possessed of complementary capacities, rôles, status, and with equal rights and responsibilities;

2. *Interests of the children* for whose bodies and souls these two persons alone are responsible and upon whom the race depends for its stability and its continuity;

3. *Interests of society* conserved only by a stable social order built upon a stabilized family life, the quality of which determines the quality of society. It must be evident therefore, that the social expediency of the permanently monogamous family cannot be reëxamined from the point of view of "two merely cheerful animals," ignorant of larger social values and indifferent to weightier social responsibilities; rather it must be re-viewed from the standpoint of the familial group and the long experience of the race.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. It has been said that the granting of a divorce does not break up a family, but merely recognizes a condition of rupture which already exists. Do you agree? How would you explain the work of a court of domestic relations upon this theory?
2. Explain fully:
 - a. The high rate of divorce in the United States as compared with other countries;
 - b. The difference in the divorce rate in urban and in rural districts;
 - c. The greater number of divorces in some occupations than in others. Can any "trends" be discovered here?

- d. The effect of presence of children upon frequency of divorce;
- e. Why divorces are granted more frequently to women than to men;
- f. Why men are less faithful to marriage than women.

(For the statistical statement of these conditions see Lichtenberger, Chs. V, VI.)

3. Why are fewer divorces secured by Roman Catholics and Lutherans than by the adherents of other religious faiths? Are Catholic and Lutheran families less successful or less happy than others?
4. What is the influence upon divorce rates of race? of nativity? of education?
5. Enumerate descriptively the influences which tend to restrain persons from securing divorce. Discuss the potency of these influences.
6. Account for the effect upon family disorganization of:
 - a. The opening of occupations to women;
 - b. Higher standards of living and the increased cost of living;
 - c. Popularization of law and education;
 - d. Individualism.

Give reasons in each instance.

7. To what extent may the causes which later produce marital maladjustment be discovered before marriage by the intelligent use of the period of courtship? Analyze specific cases, if possible.
8. Is it an adequate defense of divorce to say that there are some "whom God hath not joined together"? Give reasons.
9. Present the arguments for and against the following social policies with respect to divorce:
 - a. Divorce granted by state upon free consent of both parties registered with the appropriate public official (as in Russia, at present);
 - b. Legal separation of incompatible persons with no remarriage, the grounds for separation to be determined by the court;
 - c. Liberal divorce with privilege of remarriage for the innocent party;
 - d. No divorce whatever (as in South Carolina, at present).
10. Investigate the social consequences of divorce. Use case studies as data.
11. Comment: "It is not a divorce evil that we have, but a marriage evil."

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CHAPTER VI

THE FAMILY: ITS DISINTEGRATION

It is obvious that a new type of familial organization is forming as the disintegration of the patriarchal order proceeds. The decline of paternal authority, the freedom accorded woman, the new status given the child, the open advocacy and practice of birth control, trial marriage, and pre-marital coition constitute sufficient evidence that "the old order changèth." Much familial adaptation has been occasioned by the recent changes in the social *milieu*, particularly by the revolutions in industry and thought which had their beginnings in the eighteenth century. The Industrial Revolution has given all institutions a new social environment; the Intellectual Revolution and science have broken down the patriarchal mores, set new objectives for and established new attitudes toward social institutions. Such fundamental changes, it is patent, have metamorphic import for the familial institution.

ADAPTIVE LAG

The patriarchal family, it will be remembered, was developed to meet the needs in a rural situation. To these needs it had been very completely adjusted. In fact, the patriarchal family eventually constituted an organization which integrated and controlled every aspect of human behavior. It was the all inclusive institution which functioned not only as a social but also as a political, religious, educational and industrial unit. Long after specialized institutions had taken over these latter functions, the family remained the focus of social organization because these institutions were developed to take over activities which had outgrown familial administration.

As the social order increased in complexity, however, the state, the church, the school, and industry became independent institutions. As the scope of their functioning has enlarged, the family no longer holds the center of the stage upon which the drama of human life is played. On the contrary, in many of its overt activities, the blood-bound group increasingly finds itself in competition with well-financed commercial organizations. Especially is this true of the home in the urban environment where bakery, restaurant, steam laundry, nursery schools, moving pictures, commercialized recreation and the organized playground provide specialized service with which the home cannot compete,

particularly when it must combat the urban appeal to individual interest and personal pleasure.

For the skilled worker, the tradesman, and the professional man, urbanization has resulted in a pronounced standardization of the material equipment of living. The modern flat on a small city lot, or the great apartment building with sewerage, electricity, gas, and perhaps municipal heat, has taken from the home many of the responsibilities which formerly gave unity and content to the life of the blood-bound group and has distributed them among landlords, agents, and the officials of public service corporations and municipal administrations. The urban family, therefore, sinks no roots into a firm substratum of property or possessions, and no integration is secured by participation in a common economic project or in other associative functions. So many facilities provide the urban home with expert service that life in the urban family has ceased to be intensely productive; it is, rather, a matter of pushing buttons and of placing orders over the telephone. Urban family life is thus chiefly concerned with consumption; it lacks the substantial economic basis (production) which unified and stabilized the patronymic family.

The rural family, on the other hand, still retains much of its unity and its centralization of authority—an authority based increasingly upon loyalty rather than upon domination. Here property and production still sustain the group concept in familial relations. Improved transportation and communication are, however, likely to bring marked modification of the integrity of the rural family, for which the urban family has become a pattern. And when it is remembered that *for more than half a century*, the family of the city has been attempting to function in a social situation radically different from that to which the salient lines of its organization were adjusted, namely, *an agricultural life in a rural environment*, it is inevitable that the patriarchal, and even the semi-patriarchal, familial organization should eventually break down in the urban situation where it must function for a group with varied industrial interests and pursuits.

Modern industrialism has, in fact, completely shattered the economic organization of the historic family. It has taken the worker from the home and divorced him from his tools; it has crowded him into congested, noisy cities; it has domiciled him in sunless, stuffy tenements; it has removed him from contact with Nature and the soil; it has put him to work under conditions characterized by frequent unemployment, underpayment, impersonality, forced mobility and uncertainty. It is obvious that a familial organization which is to function in such an environment must differ radically from the patriarchal form of the rural situation; for "certainly the landless, houseless, tool-less, skill-less, religion-less, root-less, get-rich-quick-if-possible urban

worker of to-day is a different specimen from the peasant and the artisan who have made up the bulk of the population in civilized lands since the dawn of history.”¹

Again, the utilization of the devices which modern invention has provided for the home not only relieves its function of drudgery and gives more leisure to woman but also raises the standard of living for the entire family. The urge to maintain this higher standard of living sharpens the intensity of the economic struggle. It is necessary for the man of the household to work harder and longer. Processes are speeded up at the instance of the employer; tension, strain, fatigue, and irritability are increased notwithstanding the shorter working day. Often the wife and mother must also work outside the home in order to secure an income which will support the standard of living established when these mechanical devices are utilized. Such work, in turn, involves neglect of the home and children or, at least, dependence upon other agencies for child-care. Therefore, while children share in the higher scale of consumption thus secured, the emphasis in familial functioning is upon present, physical standards rather than upon adequate preparation for effective participation in the social relations of adulthood.

Indeed, this struggle to maintain higher standards of living has altered materially both the qualitative and the quantitative aspects of the familial institution. Dr. L. I. Dublin, statistician of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, has estimated that it costs \$7,238 to rear a child to the age of eighteen on a standard of living which would be maintained by a family with an annual income of \$2,500. This is exclusive of the \$1,100 which the public contributes to the education of the child. The man with five children must, therefore, invest at least \$36,000 in his family. This sum the childless may not only save but also profitably invest for a significant period. Hence Dublin draws the conclusion that the poor do not have children because they are poor; they are poor because they have children. Similarly the rich are not childless because they are rich; they are rich because they are childless.² It is obvious that here is much dynamic for the family.

The economic problems of the urban family are further complicated by the rapid introduction of labor-saving machinery into the industries which cluster in urban areas. The irregularly increasing army of the unemployed seems to indicate that the introduction of such machines does not provide employment for men at the rate that its installation displaces them. Such unemployment again increases the difficulty of maintaining the higher standards of living

¹ A. J. Muste, "The Tug of Industry," *Survey Graphic*, Vol. 59 (December, 1927), p. 281.

² C. Stewart, "A Family Wage-Rate vs. a Family Social Endowment Fund," *Social Forces*, Vol. VI (September, 1927), pp. 121-122.

which are especially characteristic of these same urban areas. Under these conditions, increases in the number of women entering the various trades and occupations will increase *pari passu* the competition for employment and hence further add to the economic burden of the man in the family. Eventually this will bring a further decline in the birth rate. But it is obvious that these changes will involve other adjustments in familial relationships.

Adaptation to this change in environment is now in process. The development of the small family system, the freedom with which divorce is granted, the provision for extra-familial careers for wives and mothers, the establishment of day nurseries and pre-kindergarten schools, represent, in part, the efforts which are being made to meet the needs of the urban situation. Yet the steady and rapid advance in familial disorganization continues. In spite of these adjustments, it seems that the family is still unable to meet the needs of industrial and professional life in the city. Indeed, the urban situation may require a new order in domestic relations.

INDIVIDUATION

The net result of these economic transmutations appears in the individuation of the members of the family. In fact, so thoroughly has the patriarchal, social lump been pulverized that its constituent elements are increasingly liberated from its restraints. Such individuation has released woman from the dominance of man and established her as a coördinate element in social arrangements. Legal and economic status has been given her, and a variety of extra-familial careers have been opened to her. The child has also been given social independence. He is no longer regarded as the property of his father nor as an economic asset to be exploited in service to his parents. On the contrary, he is now respected as one who himself has rights even as regards his parents. But while the individuation of the family has given recognition and status to all familial elements, it has also brought decentralization in familial organization, loss of group unity, decline in collective activity and a relaxation of institutional bonds. Insistence upon "the rights of all men," "the rights of woman," and "the rights of the child" has constantly broken down paternal authority with the result that the family has declined as an institution. More and more it has become a group of unique personalities, each pursuing its own interests. Indeed, it appears that the urban family is no longer united by any significant common project in which all members participate; rather each cherishes separate interests which he develops independently of other members of his family.³ And increasingly the rural family may be similarly character-

³ P. Sorokin and C. C. Zimmerman, *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology* (New York, 1929), Ch. 15.

ized. "Yet the solidarity of the family is seriously disrupted as parents fulfill their obligations, seek their pleasures, and exercise their loyalties in one set of connections, their daughters in another, and their sons in still another."⁴

Since group solidarity can neither be established nor maintained when interests and attitudes are so diverse, the family surrenders both its unity and its stability. If the family is still the basic group, if it still determines the character of the social order by reason of the quality of the human material which it produces, then its individuation constitutes another pathological condition of critical import. For as the individual gains greater freedom from institutional disciplines the social *milieu* becomes increasingly ungovernable since the complexity of social interactions requires a tightening rather than a relaxation of institutional restraint if orderly relations are to be maintained. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a social order composed of socially undisciplined individuals seeking merely personal ends.

THE NEW MORALITY

Yet this new social order is not only a possible prospect; it is an imminent achievement. The educated classes have already served notice on every prevalent moral code which has been instituted by authority. They are insisting that morality must be based solidly upon the observation of the *results* of conduct scientifically and, so far as possible, experimentally determined. Contemporary morals in the fields of economics, politics and social relations are to be judged, they hold, by their effects upon human welfare rather than by the dogma of self-constituted authority. In other words, the new morality consciously aims to secure the maximum of attainable happiness for mankind; it renounces categorically all other objectives.⁵

To such a challenge the socially minded cannot fail to respond. Applied science, particularly in the field of mechanical invention, has created a new economic situation. This, in turn, has set groups and persons in new social relationships. These cannot be rigidly circumscribed by the older codes devised for markedly different social complexes. The need for a revision of the older codes is too obvious to admit of argument. But when a wealthy, pleasure-loving and undisciplined generation interprets human welfare in terms of personal happiness alone, the socially minded must pause. Personal happiness secured through the gratification of sensuous and sensual desire is ephemeral, erratic, transitory. Social order cannot be maintained on a substructure so unsubstantial, so temporary, so multiform. And although the removal of the inhibitions

⁴ Arneson, Barnes, Coulter, and Hubbert, *Gateway to the Social Sciences* (New York, 1926), p. 135.

⁵ Durant Drake, *The New Morality* (New York, 1928).

which restrain the satisfaction of personal desire may increase the present happiness of the individual, such felicity may be obtained at the expense of future and more permanent gratifications. To provide merely for the immediate pleasure of the individual assures neither his continued well-being nor the welfare of the group upon which it is contingent. Such a provision posits a simplicity in social arrangements that disappeared with the frontier community.

As applied to familial relationships, the new morality proposes specifically: (1) pre-nuptial sexual conjunction whenever mutually desired (for youth this is likely to result in an early surfeiting of erotic impulses with respect to a given sex-mate and an increase in the desire for variety in the sex-mate); (2) a new type of sex association, the companionate, for those who intend to leave children out of their program (this means an increase in the number of "childless families" who need a new set of interests as a substitute for the child-interest); (3) licenses and social approval for women who desire children of their own but who recoil from continued association with a husband (this deprives the child of one parent and assumes that the woman who would be bored by the unbroken society of a husband will not weary of association with a child—it must also be remembered that motherliness is not innate); (4) easy divorce for married persons who have no children (of no significance so far as the sociological family is concerned); and (5) immediate dissolution of the family where the parents are unhappy or incompatible, with state care of the children if necessary (this gives consideration only to the interests of the parents who have voluntarily assumed the relationship and its responsibilities and takes little account of the interests of the children, or of the community).

In all of these proposals it is taken for granted that the individual has a right to be happy irrespective of his capacity, judgment or volition. Upon him the new morality, as applied by the pleasure-loving and undisciplined, bestows every relationship which he imagines will bring him happiness. Not only does it sanction any conduct which he believes would give him pleasure without interfering with the happiness of others, but it also allows him easy exit from any relationships or resulting responsibilities which appear to him to interfere with his continued happiness. It is further assumed frequently that the state or some other agency will take over and successfully discharge the responsibilities which the individual thus lays down. It is obvious that such arrangements render orderliness in social relationships infinitely more difficult because the administration of a social order which grows daily more intricate by reason of purely natural factors is required to make provision for the pleasure-seeking conduct of numberless individuals, each of whom is following his capricious judgment as to what behavior will result in his own happiness. The new morality, in other words, divorces personal behavior from personal responsi-

bility therefor. The latter it seeks to transfer to a state already burdened with more functions than it can efficiently perform, at least so far as care of unwanted children is concerned.

But even when it is granted that the happiness of the individual is a legitimate social objective, it is still necessary to determine the positive elements of a program for its realization. An abstract principle has no social significance unless it can be made the basis of social action. When, however, the maker of social programs attempts to put this hedonistic principle into practice, he is immediately confronted with many perplexing questions. What, as a matter of fact, is happiness? How is it secured? Do all persons obtain it by the same means or methods? Who is to determine what means and methods are to be utilized? Is he competent? Shall long or short time considerations predominate? If so, in what proportion? And when? When long and short time considerations conflict, which should prevail? To what extent, specifically, can the happiness of a given individual be secured without imposing burdens upon or causing unhappiness to others who have an equal right to be happy? *Do* individuals have a right to be happy? Is not this right, like all others, socially limited? With great diversity of desire, with multiplicity of standards, and with varying volitional control and directions, how can an individual pursue his own happiness without infringing upon the prerogatives of other individuals?

It is apparent, it would seem, that the new morality as applied by the pleasure-loving and undisciplined, results in more, rather than less, confusion. To adopt its principles as the determinants of personal behavior decanalizes conduct and reverses the procedure by which orderly relations have been secured as social cross currents have multiplied and intensified. And when applied to the family, the new morality at its best guarantees only a fuller consideration of the wishes of the husband or the wife who is, or thinks he is, unhappily mated. This places the wishes of an individual above the interests of a group and is hence anti-social. A truly social morality requires an integration rather than a juxtaposition of individual and group interests.

CONTENDING IDEALS OF MARRIAGE

The new morality proposes to apply the democratic doctrines of Locke and Rousseau to domestic relations. The effort to establish the equalitarian ideal in the relations of husband and wife spiritedly challenges the older tradition of male superiority. And since America has been the especial arena for contests between the democratic and aristocratic ideas, it is natural that "among Americans two ideals of the family struggle for mastery—the semi-patriarchal family, of Roman origin and ecclesiastical sanction based upon the authority

of the husband and merging the wife's legal personality in his,—and the democratic family of Germanic origin, based upon the consenting and harmonious wills of two equals.”⁶

This clash of ideals, as Ross indicated, has developed as women have acquired a status which has given them a larger measure of freedom from male dominance and which has placed in their own hands the means of maintaining their independence of men even in the marriage relation. Women increasingly resist any action or attitude which betokens inferiority to men.⁷ In family councils they insist upon recognition as man's equal. On the other hand, men still regard themselves as essentially different from, if not superior to, women. They look with a sort of amused tolerance upon woman's efforts to demonstrate and establish parity of the sexes. They persist in the belief that the headship of the family is, and always should be, a male prerogative for the exercise of which men are especially qualified. In many marriages, if not in most, these contending ideals are ill concealed; they frequently become the source of acute maladjustment.

The struggle between these conflicting ideals is not a mere surface phenomenon; it is, in fact, deep-seated. “The family has always been the domain of personal rights,”⁸ especially after the decline of the patriarchal order greatly modified the power of the husband and father. Then courts took over his judicial authority, priests relieved him of his religious offices, kings and governments assumed his political functions. In domestic affairs alone he retained his supremacy. Recognition of his dominant position here became his sole compensation for the socialization of his former functions. For this reason even the primary groups have been slow to interfere with his control over the members of his family. Although religion and law have conceded much to women and children, men have stubbornly opposed the socialization of their familial functions, and women have secured the right of self-determination and self-exploitation only after much struggle and at great personal cost.

Economic and situational factors have intensified this conflict. Woman's work in the home has never been recognized as a gainful occupation. Whenever she has chosen the familial career,⁹ she has surrendered her economic independence. Budgets, allowances, and accounts were not reckoned as legitimate procedures in domestic economy. The husband and father held the purse strings, while the wife was required to devote herself to homemaking and child rearing. This dependence was, and is, accentuated in the rural environment where every member of the family is an integral part of a common economic

⁶ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1921), p. 585.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 585.

⁸ Sumner and Keller, *The Science of Society* (New Haven, 1927), Vol. III, p. 1946.

project which the husband and father manages and controls. In the rural family therefore, opposing ideals of marriage are submerged by the exigencies of the rural economy.

In the urban environment, however, the contending ideals are given a free field. Family life in the city is characterized by an economic individuation of the familial group which is the natural result of extra-familial economic opportunity, a longer educational period, and a higher standard of living. Under such conditions the costs and compensations of different types of familial organization can be carefully and deliberately compared, not only with each other but with celibacy. With furnished rooms, prepared meals, and steam laundries to assume the more arduous tasks of home life, and with theaters, moving pictures, lectures, sport contests, and social gatherings to provide for recreational and social interests, the disadvantages of celibate life have largely disappeared in the city. Only sanctioned sexual relations for the unmarried have been unprovided for in the urban environment—and the new morality aims to supply this lack.

CHANGING STATUS OF FAMILIAL ELEMENTS

Further analysis of the present status of woman is uncalled for; enough evidence has already been presented to demonstrate that her position in the social order is changing. She no longer regards herself as the property of man. She will continue to command increased recognition in her own right as she acquires material possessions, economic independence, professional skill and political acumen. In this enlarged sphere of activity, she will be increasingly free to devote herself to other than familial interests and to enter the world of affairs on her own terms. Her familial functioning is likely to decline still further even when she elects the career of home-making since abundant opportunities for supplementary self-expression are open to her in the arts, in letters, in club life, in civic affairs, in philanthropic movements, and in part-time industrial or professional employment.

Woman enters this larger field of activity, of course, with definite handicaps. In the patriarchal system, woman was so completely subordinated to her male kindred that she could accomplish her own ends only by management, finesse, deception, and ruse. Since matrimony was her only vocation, her whole nature was shaped to please man. Initiative, sincerity, straightforwardness, and self-respect were shunned as immodest. Man required of her purity of body and constancy of devotion to him, yet it amused him to allow her this mental immorality. Woman has so recently gained her freedom from the necessity of such a distortion of her personal nature that she is still unadjusted to a life of public morality and personal integrity. She still resorts to former methods of gaining

her ends in a sphere of activity where very different standards have long prevailed.

A second handicap with which women must reckon as they enter the wider fields of economic and professional opportunity is their inadequate disciplinary background. Women have never been trained as men have been trained to routinized work. The latter are, therefore, inured to the exactions which such incessant manipulative effort makes upon mind and body. Women, on the other hand, brought up in no such regimen, frequently find themselves unequal to the discipline which successful careers in economic and political activities require. To such, marriage appeals as a shady spot where they may lie down and rest. Such marriages, however, produce a high percentage of failures because they are a substitute for, rather than a consummation of, vitalizing life interests.⁹

The familial situation is still further complicated by the dynamic status of woman, because participation in extra-familial careers is likely, it now appears, to modify the affectional relations of the sexes. Hart holds that individuals build up strong attachments for one another when they function with and through each other.¹⁰ If this is true, it follows that any arrangement which decreases the amount of such functioning will diminish or penalize the attachment of each to the other. Certainly the pursuit of separate extra-familial careers *restricts the field of joint functioning*, further divides interests and loyalties, and may develop competitive, if not opposing, interests. Therefore, unless the career of the married woman lies within the same vocational field as her husband's, the amount of separate functioning is markedly increased; on the contrary, the home and the child increase the opportunities for individuals to function with and through each other. If Ogburn is correct in asserting that the development of personality through affectional ties remains the only unique function of the family,¹¹ then another pathological condition develops as woman assumes the rôles of her new status.

Man's status is also changing. The processes which have released woman to a wider range of activity have circumscribed the vocational field for men. "The same inventive genius which has provided her (woman) with labor-saving devices in the home has provided man with automatic machines of all sorts in office, factory, shop and farm. But there is a difference. In her case they seem to have released leisure (for an extra-familial career). In his case, they have

⁹ G. B. Watson, "Weakness of Women in Careers," *Nation*, Vol. CXXV (1927), p. 9-10.

¹⁰ H. Hart, *Science of Social Relations* (New York, 1927), p. 106.

¹¹ W. F. Ogburn, "Social Heritage and the Family," in M. E. Rich (ed.), *Family Life Today* (Boston, 1928), p. 36.

sped up his work and given him less income."¹² Mechanical improvements have brought men into increased competition with each other and with machines, have thrown him out of employment in large numbers, required of him greater production and a higher standard of living. As a result he is no longer the powerful head of the familial group; he is rapidly becoming its chief economic servant. Mechanical inventions have at least placed him in a radically different social status from that of his grandsires.

Finally, the status of the child is necessarily altered by changes in the status of his parents. The improvement which the twentieth century has brought in the social position of the child has already been described.¹³ But another tendency must now be noted. "Two things, at least," says Miss Taft, "every child must have. . . . These are a fundamental security and freedom to grow up, which are provided, in the last analysis, only by the love and understanding of a mature adult who assumes the parental attitude toward him."¹⁴ Changes in the status of his parents, therefore, increase the insecurity of the status of the child and jeopardize his freedom to grow up. Especially is this likely to result if the child must be given some parental substitute in order that his mother or his father may have full opportunity in the new order. But, when children are born because they are desired by their parents, social justice requires that the child's life and personality shall not be sacrificed on an altar of parental ambition. And since we have discovered that there is no adequate substitute for parental affection, full parental responsibility for the child remains an imperative function even under the new individualism.

THE DOMESTIC REVOLUTION

Applied science has not only unsettled the status of each of the constituent elements of the family; it has also revolutionized the mechanics of housekeeping. In the first place, mechanical inventions have removed from the home most of its basically productive activities. Spinning, weaving, tailoring, sewing, laundering, baking, canning and preserving have all become machine processes carried on in factories. In the second place, applied science has mechanized many of the processes which still remain in the home. Washing machines, mangles, electric irons, vacuum cleaners, dishwashers, gas and electric stoves with oven regulators, running water, automatic water-softeners and heaters, oil and electric furnaces, electric and gas refrigeration have transformed an-

¹² Gillin, Dittmer, and Colbert, *Social Problems* (New York, 1932), p. 277.

¹³ *Infra.*, Ch. III, pp. 56-57.

¹⁴ Jessie Taft, "Has the Home Lost its Halo?", *Survey Graphic* (December, 1927), p. 287.

other group of domestic activities into machine processes. Indeed, in many respects, a modern urban house or apartment is a veritable machine shop. In the third place, the modern urban home is rapidly relinquishing many of its more personal functions. It is revealing to note, for instance, that a large percentage of the children in orphanages are still possessed of parents. In fact, the child caring agency has become a profitable commercial enterprise. This is an indication of a growing tendency to give over the rearing of children to nurseries, schools, religious, civic, philanthropic, and commercial organizations. These give the child his formal and informal education, his ethical training, examine his physical condition, treat him when he is nervous, sick or undernourished, supervise his play and recreation, organize and direct his social life, advise and guide him in the problems of adjustment to vocation and adult life. The demands of children upon the urban mother who can afford to employ these agencies are thus greatly diminished. Moreover, this is precisely the social situation in which the small family system is developing.

The conclusion is therefore drawn (and not without reason) that "the occupation of home-making and housekeeping is not a full-time job for the woman of average health and energy. Especially in our urban communities housekeeping has been reduced to as a matter of at most, half-time work."¹⁵ Or that "social and economic evolution have so changed our manner of life and living that her (woman's) former function within the home is largely gone."¹⁶ And that even when children are reared "this occupies but a third or a half of a woman's life."¹⁷ At any rate it is obvious that women now find themselves possessed of abundant leisure which they devote to club, civic, religious, philanthropic movements, to bridge-playing, to personal interests, or, if they are equipped, to business and professional careers.

Moreover, when the functions which formerly constituted the core of familial organization are removed, except for a mere remnant, from the home, and when self-expression is afforded woman in many activities which have no connection with her former rôles, housekeeping, by comparison, is increasingly regarded as a task to be avoided if possible, since it involves deadening routine, absence of frequent and pleasant contacts with business associates or the public, loss of independent economic status, and a restricted field of activity. Marriage, especially for those in the lower wage scales, also means economic hardship for both the man and the woman since it involves a diminished income for both, while it increases economic burdens and often actually de-

¹⁵ Emilie Hutchinson, "The Economics of Marriage," *World Tomorrow*, Vol. X (June, 1927), pp 271-272.

¹⁶ Gillin, Dittmer, and Colbert, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 270.

creases earning capacity. Under such conditions the career of homemaking offers little, if any, inducement to the assumption of familial rôles.

IRRATIONAL MATING

Notwithstanding the intricacy and delicacy of the adjustments which successful marriage necessitates, the mating process still proceeds upon an instinctive basis. That is, physical attraction and emotional upset are ordinarily the determining factors in the selection of the husband or the wife. It has already been noted that, at present, little use is made of courtship for the discovery of personality traits and quirks, of fitness to assume familial rôles, of capacity for adjustment to marital functions, or of willingness to coöperate in affectional achievement. Romanticism, dripping with emotionalism, and the new morality, scorning all sentiment, alike reject rational considerations in the choice of a mate. The former regards these as profanity, the latter as objectionable restrictions upon natural freedom. As a result, modern mating usually follows a spree of amorous intoxication during which the parties concerned surrender rather completely to passion. Moonlight trysts, abandoned "necking," orgiastic dancing, extreme exposure, direct or indirect sexual stimulation, and often actual copulation mark the process of mate selection. Each expects of the other neither competence nor qualification but thrills, adventure and vivid emotional experience. "The all important question is, Do they love each other, not, have they the qualities, physical and mental, which make them suited to each other and so make possible the continuance of romantic love? Romantic love's young dream will fade. Is the basis there for love between the mature man and woman after the romance has vanished?"¹⁸

Unless such considerations have substantially influenced the choice of a mate, it is evident that the union is foreordained to failure. Especially is this true of hasty and premature unions. An astonishing number of marriages, it appears, are incidents of gay parties at metropolitan night clubs;¹⁹ of flip-pant dares, of temporary spite, and of the failure of contraceptive devices used by youngsters who have "gone the limit" in their amours. In all such cases, it is patent that rational considerations are scouted when the young men and young women concerned enter a series of delicate and responsible relations with no conception of what they involve. Divorce, or some more tragic ending, is the early issue of those thus joined. Marital relations of this sort are pathological from the moment of their inception and any familial organization which is established upon them, short-lived.

¹⁸ Blackmar and Gillin, *Outlines of Sociology* (New York, 1923), p. 155.

¹⁹ Stephen Ewing, "The Mockery of American Divorce," *Harper's*, Vol. 157 (July, 1928), p. 162.

DISAPPEARANCE OF AUTOMATIC CONTROLS

Historically the patronymic family developed a variety of organizational forms. In certain periods and in certain regions it was patriarchal in structure, in others, semi-democratic; in some endogamous, in others exogamous; in some monogamous, in others polygynous. But whatever the form which the patronymic family assumed, general conformity to established behavior-patterns was secured by means of impersonal and inflexible controls. Custom, tradition, religion, codes of morals, systems of law and public opinion held the members of earlier groups to practices which were thought to be essential to the welfare of the individual and the survival of the group.

So much authority was vested in these controls that individuals whose conduct varied from approved standards were immediately and effectively ostracized by the group. These impersonal controls thus operated automatically and gave a fair uniformity to familial procedures. Behavior patterns were not only deeply set in the mores, but they were also sanctioned by an authority which was automatic and effectual. No consideration was given to extenuating circumstances or to individual cases. The behavior patterns thus enforced were inflexible and sometimes, inequitable; but injustice to the individual was compensated for, it was believed, in conduct which safeguarded the group.

In recent times, however, the scientific spirit has challenged the validity of these automatic, inflexible controls. Both the methods and the objectives of such controls have been called into question. The authority of social experience has been replaced by the authority of reason, and the freedom of the individual has become the chief social consideration. This means that the individual sets his own norms of conduct according to the dictates of reason. And since the individual can usually find good reasons for doing what he wants to do, especially in sexual and marital relations, the socially approved behavior patterns are emasculated. The appeal to the authority of reason, especially when it proceeds from those of limited reasonable capacity, seems likely to result in "an enslavement to unrestraint" rather than "an enfranchisement of the human soul."²⁰

Specifically, the disappearance of these automatic controls has meant, first, that marriage is now regarded as an arrangement "designed, or to be used, for the satisfaction of the man and the woman who begin it,"²¹ and secondly, that automatic controls are respected only as the superstitious relics of an ancient order. In other words, the modern family has discarded the social

²⁰ F. J. Bruno, "The Meaning of the (Buffalo) Conference," *The Family*, Vol. VIII (1927-1928), p. 266.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 267.

mechanisms which formerly guaranteed social direction. Until modern equivalents for these automatic controls have been developed, the family will continue to drift rudderless upon an uncharted sea.

SCIENTIFIC CHARLATANRY

Human impulses are so continuously and profoundly conditioned by current opinion, superstition, bias, prejudice, fashion, and interest that it is difficult to know to what extent desires, sexual and otherwise, are natural and fundamental and to what extent they are the products of artificial stimulation. It is certain, however, that the individual is prone to interpret phenomena in terms of his wants, his ambitions, his aspirations, especially if these bring the attention and approval of those who pose as modern. Bizarre conduct is usually, in fact, purely contagious behavior caught from those who regard themselves as "advanced." In a period of such marked transition as the present, therefore, the individual is greatly confused with respect to the validity of the established norms of behavior. This confusion is worse confounded by the artificial and deliberate excitation of erotic impulses so characteristic of modern "sex" literature.

In this situation reaction from established norms is induced because the mores interject restraints and taboos which thwart and delay the satisfaction of desires thus stimulated. The frustration which results merely generates an accumulation of surplus energy which seeks release in the desired but tabooed channel. Whenever resistance intervenes between the individual's wants and their fulfillment, he casts about either for other means of relief or for approval of the forbidden behavior. The individual's surcharged suspense is frequently relieved when he finds an "authority" who, by a process of rationalization, derives a sanction for the conduct which runs counter to the current mores of the group. The qualifications of such "authorities" are rarely scrutinized lest they be discredited and the individual be denied the release he so passionately craves. Because they approve the desired, but socially inhibited conduct in sexual and marital matters, men are ready to act upon the pronouncements of disillusioned bachelors, disappointed spinsters, "realistic" novelists and playwrights, errant mathematicians, sentimental judges, vivid feature writers, medical men without practice, bland arm-chair philosophers and their ilk. Yet such are scarcely qualified to set themselves up as authorities in these matters. At best their conclusions reflect the particular bias which their interests and training represent; at their worst, such "authorities" are charlatans who speak boldly and profusely in the name of science, when those who are making an earnest effort to apply the methods of scientific research

to the study of sexual and marital relations find it difficult to advance any final conclusions on the basis of available data of a reliable sort.

It is the pseudo-scientist and the charlatan rather than the social scientist who is, at present, molding public thought with respect to the fundamental relations of the basic social institutions. What this augurs for the future of the family need not be a matter of conjecture. It is obvious that, in sexual and marital relations, as in all vital issues, free range cannot be given to the individual's inclination to accept what seems to substantiate his prejudices and interests and to disregard all evidence, however sound, which tends to discredit these prejudices and interests. Under such direction, social relations in a complex social order become chaotic.

FAULTY EDUCATION FOR FAMILY LIFE

The strategic position of the family as an institution basic to the social order requires that those who undertake to participate in its functioning be prepared to assume the responsibilities involved. Yet it is a well known fact that an ever-increasing number of young women come to maturity without adequate homemaking experience. Formerly this was secured when the young woman "went out to service" or when, in the home, she shared her mother's responsibilities. With the exception of those who take courses in domestic science and household administration in high schools or colleges, the number of young women who receive such training is almost negligible. In fact, many mothers assume all the homemaking functions that their daughters may be spared any household drudgery. Indeed it is believed that home-keeping experience is a handicap in the competition for desirable husbands. Clerkship, secretarial work, and teaching positions are early sought as avenues of approach to marriageable young men and matrimony.

The result is, of course, that young women generally are disqualified for creative homemaking. Housekeeping is so rapidly becoming a series of machine processes that incompetence in its mechanics is readily overcome after young women marry. But it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to remove the handicap of perverted preparation for the more significant functions of administering the household of creating a purposive home atmosphere, of adjusting the various familial personalities to each other, of child rearing and training, in short, of controlling and directing familial interactions so that a satisfying, stimulating, and successful domestic life is secured for every member. The present lack is most apparent when one contemplates the manner in which modern young women are prepared to meet the problems of modern motherhood. Most young women, it seems, hope to marry husbands who are

able to hire competent service to make good their wife's deficiency. It is taken for granted that pretty faces, filmy gowns, and seductive manners are sufficient to meet responsibilities which require eager, disciplined minds and skillful hands.

The present informal preparation for marriage and parenthood is also defective in that the younger generation rarely profits by the experience of the older. For various reasons, parents avoid the discussion of sexual and marital problems. What wisdom they have gathered from their own familial life perishes with them. Moreover, sons and daughters frequently consider parental experience inapplicable because the "times have changed" or because parental conclusions are gravely biased by conservative prejudices. The younger generation, therefore, approaches marriage with attitudes, purposes and standards based upon ignorance or misinformation secured from the uninitiated or the perverted. Notwithstanding a vaunted objectivism, marriage is still environed with sentimental repressions on the one hand and with a determined libertinism on the other. Even in the intimacy of familial interaction, marital relations are usually matters for whispered conversations in the dark, for timorous and hastily repressed questioning, or for bucolic jeremiads. Sane, practical, and objective preparation for these relations is impossible under such conditions.

Finally, it should be noted that formal education provides no correctives for this situation. While it has given full recognition to the analysis of religious, political, industrial, financial, recreational, professional, vocational, educational, and spiritual relations, it has tardily and niggardly sanctioned the discussion of familial and marital interactions, especially those developing in the spheres of sex and marriage. It is true, of course, that there are few to whom the treatment of such topics could be entrusted; however, little effort has been made to develop instructional competency in these fields. Since these relationships ultimately determine the quantity and the quality of all others, it is logical to require that they should be given at least as adequate curricular treatment as is accorded other sets of interactions. It is possible that the problems developing out of these other relationships might have been more effectively handled if education had more adequately treated the familial relationships which profoundly condition other social interactions. At any rate, no intelligent and experienced person in these days can fail to be impressed with the incompetency and lack of insight and preparation with which brides and grooms now approach familial responsibilities.

It has been held that "it is the social culture itself that is primarily responsible for the widespread disorganization in American family life. Our machine culture has made the way of the family hard by creating rivaling interests and

by diminishing the attraction of the home. Only as far as the family wins back its former place in social routine can we expect any noticeable decrease in family disorganization."²² This contention must be readily granted, because machine culture has produced an environment to which the older familial forms are maladjusted. But it is possible that the family may never regain its former position in the social order. Accommodation to the changed situation may result both in a new type of familial organization and in an altered position in the social order. The situation is at least metamorphic and dynamic, if not pathological.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. List the significant changes which have taken place in the American family during the past century.
2. Comment: "Modern industrial society has no place for the family in its scheme of organization." (Thompson)
3. a. Indicate the significance of the situation discussed in "Missing Rooms," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 139 (February, 1927), pp. 251-257.
 b. Draw up a columnar comparison of the characteristics of the old order of family life and the new order as described in this article.
 c. List the economic factors which have brought about this transition.
 d. What consequences are likely to develop in the new order?
 e. Has the writer overstated the situation? If so, at what point, or points?
4. What illustrations may be given to demonstrate that "although the removal of inhibitions which restrain the satisfaction of personal desire may increase the present happiness of the individual, such felicity may be obtained at the expense of future and more permanent gratifications"? Select cases if possible.
5. Attempt answers to the questions detailed on page 123.
6. a. Secure statistical tables which show the number and percentage of children in orphanages who have one or both parents living.
 b. How many child-caring agencies are there in your state? How many children do they care for?
 c. What social significance do you find in the situation revealed by these figures?
7. a. Upon which hypothesis should social procedure be based:
 1. That the individual has a right to be happy.
 2. That the familial group has a right to survival.
 b. Which assumption has greater validity? Explain.
8. Describe the genuinely democratic familial organization. To what extent is such an organization of the family possible?

²² E. R. Groves and W. F. Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships* (New York, 1928), p. 121.

9. What social meaning attaches to the development of the small family system in the urban environment where the burdens of motherhood and housekeeping are minimized by nurseries, and electric devices?
10. Assuming that present trends continue, prognosticate the eventual status of each of the constituent elements of the family, especially the man and the child.
11. What domestic and familial functions, if any, can not be mechanized?
12. It has been said that "the whole body of a living being is nothing more than a tool or a factory produced by an egg to see that another egg is produced; "a hen is merely an egg's way of producing another egg. Sex is of the whole body." Is this statement complete? Explain. What point of view does it represent? Can human behavior be thus circumscribed?
13. a. Enumerate the emotionally conditioned thought processes which center about sex, marriage and the family.
b. To what extent are these the product of rationalization, of fantasy?
14. What modern equivalents can you propose for the older automatic controls which are disappearing under the new morality?
15. How may the true scientist be distinguished from the charlatan?
16. If "it is the social culture itself which is responsible for the widespread disorganization in American family life" is the situation not a hopeless one?

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CHAPTER VII

THE FAMILY: ITS REORIENTATION

CHANGES in the social *milieu* eventually bring changes in the domestic *milieu* and in the social attitudes which cluster about the family. But, as Duprat ¹ has so convincingly demonstrated, two sets of influences appear always to have been powerful factors in determining the relations of the sexes: namely,

1. The erotic impulse, the desire for novelty, the appetites
2. The desire for security, for the active sympathy of conjugal life, for confidence, for complete and continuous companionship, and for home and children

The familial organization which meets the needs of the new social order must, it would appear, take account of both sets of influences. To assert that permanent monogamy is contrary to nature, therefore, is to stress the factors of novelty and change and to discount those which favor the social organization of conjugal life. Similarly, trial and companionate marriages give attention chiefly to the erotic impulses; they fail to assuage the desires for security, conjugal rapport, home and children. The permanent union and its counterpart, the home, have survived, it appears, because it has accomplished an effective resolution of these two more or less divergent sets of influences; that is, in the long run and for most people, it seems to have afforded the maximum satisfaction to the erotic impulses and the desire for novelty on the one hand and to the desire for security, for sustained companionship with mate and children on the other hand. And since no other type of union provides a more efficacious integration of these influences, it is likely that permanent monogamic marriage and the home will continue as the dominant type of familial organization.

The rôle which this type of familial organization plays in the affairs of men is revealed in the character and behavior of homeless groups, namely, the institutional child, the spinster, and the hobo. In spite of the claims made for the efficiency of modern substitutes for the home, the child reared in an

¹ G. L. Duprat, *Les Aspects Psychologiques de la Monogamie*, *Revue Internationale de Sociologie* (November-December, 1926), pp 629 ff.

orphanage is now generally conceded to be socially deficient. Of course he is less deficient with than without such care; but it is apparent that "the child in the institution leads an artificial life under artificial conditions, and his 'hot-house' development does not prepare for the environment into which he passes after he leaves the institution."² Nurses, psychiatrists, physicians, dieticians, and teachers cannot possibly give the informal training, the sustained attention to aptitudes and attitudes, or the knowledge of the ways of men by which parents in the normal home develop the personality of each child and facilitate its contacts with the outside world. For this reason the institutional child is often helpless and easily submerged when the problems of adult life confront him.

Homelessness among adults also produces socially deficient individuals. Notwithstanding the new freedom which has recently been accorded to women, the unmarried woman is still significantly limited in her social rôles. She misses the development of personality which matehood and motherhood make possible; frequently she finds it possible to function only in secondary or subordinate rôles. Her status is sometimes precarious, often indeterminate, and usually lacking in compensation. As a result, her social position involves more frustration and requires more sublimation than that of her married sister. She is more likely, hence, to be either morbidly self-centered or morbidly self-effacing than is the woman who functions as a major element in a dynamic, yet intimate, family group. Case studies of widowed and divorced women reveal similar restrictions of social rôles with a consequent thwarting of personality development when the home is incomplete.

Homelessness among men, however, results in graver social deficiencies. The gay bachelor who maintains his own establishment or who lives at the club has apparently adjusted himself to his homeless condition; but it is obvious that he experiences none of the development that comes from matehood or fatherhood. Similarly the divorced or widowed husband frequently, if not usually, finds himself deprived of the satisfactions that proceed from functioning in the familial unity of interacting personalities. In the homeless man of lower economic status, however, homelessness inevitably creates a situation of acute maladjustment. The hobo, Anderson finds,³ experiences an uncertainty of occupation and possession which issues in a life singularly lacking in the relations which give content to the life of the family man; namely, property, sentiments, objectives, ideals, standards, organizational activities, friends. Because of these lacks the homeless man's personality is starved,

² G. B. Mangold, *Problems of Child Welfare* (New York, 1918), p. 469.

³ Anderson, Nels, *The Hobo, The Sociology of the Homeless Man* (Chicago, 1923). See also, Hathaway, M., *The Migratory Worker and Family Life* (Chicago, 1934).

gaunt and unsocial. Anderson also discovered that the homeless man is prone to social diseases. Venereal infections, mental disorder, alcoholism, bad sex practices and sexual perversions are more prevalent among homeless men than among family men; for the hobo must satisfy his hunger for intimacy and affection either in homosexual practices or in association with the lowest class of prostitutes. Free unions are sometimes established by these homeless men; but most of them never experience wholesome relations with women and children. As a citizen, the hobo is a complete liability since he has no residence, no vote and no interest in public affairs. As an economic factor, he is an indefinite and indeterminate item.

Such contrasts clearly reveal the essential contribution which familial interactions make to the personality of the socially normal individual. The permanent union and the home are, it seems, integral parts of the social milieu—so integral, in fact, that it is impossible to conceive of a future social order to which they are not basic. The problem presented by the modern family with its disorganization and its disintegration, therefore, is the problem, not of the elimination but of the reconstitution of monogamic marriage and permanent marital and familial relations. No other solution of the problem takes account both of the factors which center in the erotic impulses and those which arise out of the desire for security and for sustained domestic interactions. To disregard either set of influences would merely hasten the disintegration which has already brought the familial institution to a serious pathological state. The rebuilding suggested here, then, proceeds upon two assumptions, namely, that the permanent union is indispensable to social order and that it can be reestablished in the social routine only by having regard for all factors which determine sexual relations within the domestic milieu.

ELIMINATION OF LAG

By nature, institutions lag in their adaptations to changing situations. Since they embody only what the experience of the group is believed to have demonstrated to be sound procedure, it is inevitable that they should fall behind current practice. Moreover, changes in institutional set-up can be effected only after subsequent group experiences have indicated a more satisfactory procedure. Those whom the institution serves frequently chafe at this deliberate delay; yet the stability of the social order can be guaranteed only on the assumption that institutions conserve, as norms of behavior, the practices which group experience has tested. Kaleidoscopic change of action patterns affords the group no adequate opportunity to test the validity of new

practices. Yet improvement is secured only when the more effective is substituted for the less effective arrangement.

It follows necessarily that passivity and conservatism are inherent in the family as in other social institutions since it must take on the form and content imposed by the general living conditions to which human groups have been subjected.⁴ But, as general living conditions change, as new relations and interactions develop, as personality expands and alters its characteristics, as new social forces appear, or as older influences atrophy, the family must adjust itself to such changes as appear fundamental and permanent. It cannot be denied, for example, that the familial institution must adapt itself to the urban environment with its multiple housing, abbreviation of familial activities, and loss of familial identity,⁵ to the new status of woman, to mechanical technique, and to the relaxation of religious control. Group experience has not accumulated sufficiently, as yet, to reveal in detail the specific adjustment required; but the principles which should guide appear to be entirely patent.

THE FAMILY A DYNAMIC FORM

While it "tends to perpetuate archaic forms and relations long after the original conditions which evoked them have been supplanted," nevertheless the family "has not been dead in its conservatism."⁶ Familial relationships are primarily conduct relationships, more intimate, more sustained, more intense than any other set of interactions. As such they are subject to continual change as the various personalities react to such dynamic environmental factors as (a) increasing or decreasing wealth or income with consequent revisions of the standard of living, (b) changes in residence which involve the formation of new contact groups, (c) the gradual urbanization of rural or semi-rural communities, or to such metamorphic personal factors as mutations in personality inherent in parenthood or in an unfolding sex life. Each family is unique, therefore, since no two sets of familial relationships can be identical. As Mowrer has clearly shown, there is no one form of familial organization which can be regarded as fixed or standard.⁷

The familial organization of the future, then, is likely to appear as a multi-form adaptation to the changed and changing social and economic orders. Recently the familial institution has been adjusted to the changing economic situation by radical modifications of paternal authority, by simpler familial

⁴ A. F. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress* (New York, 1918), p. 333.

⁵ N. Carpenter, *The Sociology of Urban Life* (New York, 1931), pp. 230-238

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 334-335.

⁷ E. R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization* (Chicago, 1927), Ch. I.

organization, by increased female celibacy, by enlarging woman's sphere, and by the assignment of functions to specialized organizations. Adjustment to changing social situations has been attempted by raising the standard of living, by the elimination of double standards in sex behavior, by the relaxation of institutional bonds, by the growth of the small family system, by the increase in the number of childless families, by freer divorce, by the democratization of familial life, by the development of the pre-nursery schools, and by improving the status of women and of children. These adaptations, however, do not represent unqualified gains. The phenomenal growth of the apartment and the rented home, the rapid increase in the number of parasitic women, and the rate of divorce are indications that many of these adaptations require further testing before their validity can be finally determined. Yet here is sufficient evidence that the familial institution is still pliant.

DUAL CAUSATION IN FAMILIAL SITUATIONS

It is not only *possible* to improve institutions; *they require it*. Since they are projections of the human mind, and products of human volition, institutions are subject to all the limitations, imperfections and errancies of the human set-up. Creations do not usually surpass their creators. Moreover, institutions can be misused, particularly by those who are ignorant of their nature and functions. Social mechanisms do not differ from physical mechanisms in this respect. It follows, therefore, that every institutional situation must be approached from the point of view (a) of the efficiency of the social mechanism itself, (b) the value of the service required of the mechanism, and (c) the competence of the persons who are utilizing the mechanism. In other words, institutions may be failing to function effectively either because they are obsolete, because they are expected to accomplish some impossible thing, or because those who use them are incompetent.

Applied to the familial institution this means that disorganization and disintegration may be due to the misuse and abuse of an intricate social mechanism as well as to its obsolescence; for it is obvious that even if an institution could be brought to a condition of perfection, it could function perfectly only for persons intelligent enough and competent enough to use it properly. Small, years ago, sharply called attention to this fact when he said:

my dictum is that the thing on trial is not the American family but every condition which interferes with the general realization of the American family in the full fruit of its spirit. The prevalence of evils does not constitute an indictment against the American family as an institution. Because the family is sinned against

it does not follow that it is the sinner. Nothing that has been put in evidence proves anything very important against the American family. It merely proves that a large fraction of our population is more or less unfit for membership in it ⁸

That the fault does not lie entirely with the familial institution is shown by the manner in which the Jewish family has been adapted to the urban situation. Originally a country folk, their various captivities forced the Jewish people to break its relation to the soil and to become primarily an urban group. Indeed "it was trade, crafts, and emigration that selected the forebears of the European and American Jew, so that they are a selection of those adapted to city life." ⁹ Such were the familial mores and traditions that this adaptation neither individuated the Jewish family nor destroyed its fecundity. Up to the present time the Jewish family has resisted the destructiveness of the city because those who utilized the institution adjusted themselves as well as their social mechanism to the changed *milieu*. In fact, a patriarchal family developed in a rural environment has retained its essential features in the urban situation because the Jewish people regarded the institution as a mechanism rather than a sentient entity.

THE FAMILY A SET OF SPIRITUAL RELATIONSHIPS

In the reconstitution of the family, account must be taken not only of the dual causation of familial situations but also of the fundamental nature of familial relationships. The metamorphoses of recent decades has either unsettled or removed much that has given content and unity to the familial interactions of the past. The Industrial Revolution has radically altered the economic character of these interactions and substituted individual objectives for group purposes. The common economic project has largely disappeared from the domestic order, and with it has gone the substantial interactions which developed therefrom. Similarly the relaxation of ecclesiastical control of familial events and relations has withdrawn from familial interactions the religious conception of familial functions. It was inevitable, therefore, that familial relationships should now be conceived primarily in terms of their physical or sexual attributes and objectives. Yet such conceptions of the nature of intimate interactions are disintegrative.

No group can long persist unless it has the sort of objectives which give unity to its activity and quality to the contact and interaction of its members. Since

⁸ A W Small, "Individualization of Members of the Family," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol 14 (May, 1909), p 807

⁹ R H Johnson, "The Eugenics of the City," in E. W. Burgess, *The Urban Community* (Chicago, 1926), p. 82.

the family has lost its original collective activities and discarded its religious attributes and since the satisfaction of erotic and companionship desires involves purposes which are usually fragile, ephemeral and divisive, a new basis for familial unity can be found only in the conception of the spiritual objectives of the family, namely, the transmission of the cultural heritages, the development of social quality in personality and environment, and the embodiment of enduring social values in persons and things. If personality consists not merely of intangible psychic responses but also of such tangible entities as property, tools, places, products, tasks, persons, familial interactions will develop through functioning together on an expanding scale with these common elements. Each personality thus becomes increasingly a part of the personality of others. In other words, the institutional character of the family must be found in attitudes, interactions, and integrations which in essence are cultural and spiritual rather than material or physical.

THE FAMILY AND THE QUALITY OF SOCIETY

Again, it is necessary, if the family is to be reestablished, that full consideration be given the fact that, throughout human history the quality of the family has determined the quality of the social order. In the pioneer period of every civilization the *sterner* virtues have necessarily prevailed, because survival was contingent upon courage, persistence, thrift, industry, social-mindedness, cooperation. These virtues were inculcated through the family and came to fruition in group achievements which commanded recognition. Similarly, when peoples have come to a condition where consumption rather than production ideals dominate their philosophies of life, groups decline because the objectives set in family life appeal to appetite rather than to the spirit of achievement. A morality, old or new, which sanctions the unrestrained indulgence of elemental desires, therefore, reduces the social order to the plane of the lower animals.

It is granted that our changing morality is to be a *social* morality but not in the sense that men and women are given equal license in sexual behavior. The new morality must be social in that it preserves tested and successful behavior patterns. It will hence be a morality which both conserves the achievement of the past and guarantees achievement in the future. The precise form which this morality will assume will be determined in the end by the experience of the group and not by arm-chair speculation. The road upward or onward, it seems, has been so far, at least, a path of greater discipline, greater self-restraint, and increased freedom through fuller adjustment to the great regularities which human experience has uncovered. Indeed this principle it-

self is a great social verity. Such principles cannot be reversed by mere rationalization. It is probable, therefore, that a better social order will be the result of disciplined behavior of a more, rather, than a less vigorous sort. This means that an improved social order will develop chiefly from the further refinement of family life. And this, in turn, will proceed from sexual and familial interactions organized not primarily for the gratification of erotic desires but for the enlargement of personality. For it must be remembered that the family produces and conditions the raw material out of which the group, and ultimately, the social order is constituted.

RE-DEFINITION OF FAMILIAL OBJECTIVES

Social institutions are designed to promote *group welfare* conceived in terms of common well-being and maximum satisfactions. In a vigorous social order the various institutions are developed as specialized agencies, each devoting itself to a particular aspect of the group. To illustrate: the health clinic seeks to safeguard the physical well-being of the individual members of the group; industry provides for their material needs; the state regulates their behavior in order that their interactions may be orderly and hence yield maximum returns; the school develops their capacities and gives content to their relationships; religion supplies purpose and motivation by the delineation of ultimate ends.

It is to be noted that social institutions do *not* concern themselves *directly* with the happiness or pleasure of the individual. Instead they strive to place him in a condition and a situation where he may function effectively, that is, achieve in his relations with others. Happiness appears as a by-product of such functioning, of such achievement. It follows, therefore, that pleasure or happiness *cannot* be the *direct* object of familial relations; familial purposes must also be conceived in terms of group welfare. To regard the family merely as a means of quenching lust or of affording pleasure is nothing less than a prostitution of its larger social functions. Historically it has developed that the family is the social institution whose special function it is not merely to produce offspring but also, and primarily, to bring offspring to physical and social maturity. In so far as such maturity enables individuals to function effectively, to achieve in the physical and social environment, in so far does the family secure happiness for the individuals. In other words, the familial institution makes its largest contribution to the sustained "happiness" of individuals when it is used as a means to larger social ends. The companionate marriage, it will be remembered, meets the needs of those who seek only pleasurable, personal ends in the marital relationship. Those who seek such

ends should refrain from assuming the rôles and relationships of parenthood for the satisfactions of family marriage differ radically from those of the companionate. It is obvious, hence, that the satisfactions of both types of relationship cannot be secured from either form of marriage. Recognition of this principle is basic to the further orientation of the domestic institution to a changed and changing social order.

To recognize thus frankly the function of companionate marriage does not necessarily jeopardize the continuance of family marriage. Persons choosing the childless union perpetuate neither their kind nor their creed. Indeed, if the companionate should be practised so generally as to bring about a decline in population, this need occasion no particular concern for the quality of the population is now the important consideration. At any rate, the future of the family marriage is positively assured by the fact that the demand for adoptive children has for years now far exceeded the supply. This is sufficient evidence that children are still desired by most married persons.

LIMITATION OF FAMILIAL INDIVIDUALISM

It has long been recognized that "the individual is an abstraction"; that is, "something which can be thought of by itself, but cannot exist by itself."¹⁰ Says Hayes, "We cannot think of the individual apart from society but that which we know as individual life is in, and of, the larger life of society. When once produced it might for a time continue in isolation but it never could have been produced in isolation and it cannot be understood if thought of by itself."¹¹ Cooley also holds that "self and society are twin-born, the notion of separate and independent ego is an illusion."¹² It is obvious, therefore, that a philosophy which proceeds at once and directly to the consideration of individual well-being completely disregards the social nature of the relations involved. And since social institutions are products of *group* experience and are designed to conserve *group* objectives, they must be evaluated in terms of a *group* philosophy.

Specifically this means, as Miss Richmond has indicated,¹³ that marriage must be regarded from at least four aspects, first, its strictly *personal* aspect "ranging through body, mind, and spirit to join two unique personalities in the most intimate relationship known to us; second, its *family* aspect dealing with the varied and sometimes diverse interests and problems of at least two,

¹⁰ E. C. Hayes, *Introduction to the Study of Society* (New York, 1917), p. 443.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 443.

¹² C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization* (New York, 1905), p. 5.

¹³ Mary E. Richmond, "The Concern of the Community with Marriage," *The Family*, Vol. VIII (December, 1927), p. 244.

and sometimes more, generations; third, its *community* aspect concerning itself with the re-distribution of services and functions so as to guarantee maximum welfare; and fourth, its *public* aspect requiring attention to the efficiency of the methods and procedures of the community in achieving what it believes to be its welfare."

The social nature of familial interactions must also be recognized in the rôles played by the various constituent elements of the family. If the family is to be reconstituted as an essential part of the social order, the familial drama cannot be played as a series of syncopated monologues. Each familial element must interpret his rôles in terms of the others; he must acknowledge the limitations set for him and his rôles in the familial situation; and then he must play his rôles as effectively as his talents permit. Especially is it necessary that rôles be precisely determined and adequately compensated. Provision must also be made for the child's active and constructive participation in familial functioning. And finally, the man in the family should be induced to make a larger contribution to the familial activities which give content to home life than is now his custom.

The inadequacy of the equalitarian family is now apparent. Recognizing as it does the complementary nature of the functions of its constituent elements, the equalitarian ideal fails to give due consideration to the welfare of the familial group when the woman is a better manager than her husband or when he may excel his wife in the ability to integrate familial elements. Capacities are not distributed sexually. Not only should the reconstituted family, therefore, be organized upon the principle that rôles are complementary rather than supplementary, but, so far as possible, it should also assign functions on the basis of ability irrespective of sex. This alone will assure effective performance.

It follows, then, that the individualistic philosophy will have to be radically modified so far as it relates to the family. Since social institutions are designed to facilitate the achievement of group objectives, their routine must be characterized by *discipline*, that is, by the canalization of individual conduct toward the purposes set up by the group. The family, like other social institutions, seeks to conserve what the experience of the group seems to indicate as beneficial. It cannot give every eccentric individual what he imagines he desires at the moment. Rather it must insist that he conform to tested behavior patterns until the experience of the group reveals their inadequacy. It must not be forgotten that, in the long run, the well-being of the individual is best conserved when the welfare of the group is carefully safeguarded.

Those who argue that the individual has a "right to be happy" which takes precedence over the mores of the group and those who hold that individual

purposes are paramount to the objectives of the group disregard the fact that such rights and purposes are necessarily socially conditioned. And what is more, it appears likely that they always will be circumscribed by the group.

So long as we are social beings having all sorts of relations with others like ourselves, and each relation involving its own obligations, determination of what those objectives involve will never be left to single individual judgments. The necessity of living together in some sort of harmony will force rules, constraints, laws, and duties which may not be very careful of the individual.¹⁴

The reconstituted family, therefore, must be established upon a *socialized* individualism.

PROPER RÔLE OF SEX IN MARRIAGE

The reestablishment of the family as a basic social institution will also involve a modification of the present individualistic attitude toward the sexual aspect of marriage. A new psychology and a new morality are breaking down the controls which have, in the past, provided for the regulation and sublimation of the sexual impulse but which are now, it is insisted, tending to frustrate, disorganize, and disintegrate personality. It is held, therefore, that, as with the lower animals, reliance may safely be placed upon the natural urge toward erotic experience, especially since contraceptive devices now assure escape from the responsibility for offspring when such escape is desired.

Unlike the lower animals, however, human beings are involved in a series of intricate interrelationships which necessitate the intelligent direction and sublimation of their sexual life, if the individual is to secure a social status and a personal efficiency which will bring him satisfaction in his social relations.

We are not flowers or bees, or birds, or domestic animals; we are human beings. Our deeper impulses are the raw material out of which we can create the artistic structure of our experience. The biological needs of our bodies, for example, require food to meet them; but man, at his best, does not gorge like the animals. We have expended much effort to make eating attractive. Even the homely ham sandwich is high art compared with a tiger's meal. Hunger is a basis for the enrichment of experience. The sexual impulse lies ready for such use.¹⁵

Marital sexual life presents an exceptional but not the sole opportunity for the personalities concerned to share enriching experience. It is not the physical

¹⁴ F. J. Bruno, "The Dynamic Aspects of Liberty and Control," in M. E. Rich (ed.), *Family Life Today* (Boston, 1928), p. 221.

¹⁵ Harris, F., "Possibilities of Marriage," *World Tomorrow*, Vol. X (June, 1927), p. 265.

aspect of sexual relations that gives the experience significance apart from its reproductive function. If this were not so, casual relations with prostitutes would be as satisfying as any other. Normally *sexual* relations expand and develop personality because they involve challenging as well as satisfying interaction between personalities set in specific *social* relationships. If it can be entered into neither as a means of an assuaging animal passion nor as a disgusting yet necessary element of conjugality, nor even as a purely biological function, but as a tryst to which each personality contributes the whole of its finer attributes, then marital sexual life becomes a sequence of stimulating, educative, integrative experiences socially purposive and the familial relationships which develop out of such experiences will be wholesome, vigorous and enduring. They will also be characterized by an artistry which gives quality and character to all marital interactions. Unity, stability and satisfaction may thus result from a relationship which bristles with potential maladjustments.

WOMAN IN THE RECONSTRUCTED FAMILY

The position of woman is critical to the reorientation of the family. Religiously, legally, industrially, politically, professionally, woman has secured recognition by reason of what she has accomplished in the various fields of human endeavor when the opportunity has presented itself. This recognition has not been given her voluntarily on the basis of abstract rights, philosophically or logically conceived, but reluctantly, when her talents and her energy could force concession by reason of achievement. Further recognition will probably be accorded her on similar grounds and for similar reasons. In other words, the struggle for full status will be successful in proportion to woman's ability to demonstrate the economic and social value of the services she renders. This ability is quickly revealed in the rural environment; but the wife in the metamorphic urban situation has been rapidly acquiring the position of a parasite. As such she is in danger of losing the qualified status which she has so hardly won. What further is required?

Plainly, many women are not domestic. It should be equally self-evident that such women should avoid familial careers, because they will either neglect their homes or else impose slavery upon themselves. In neither situation can a family thrive. In the selection of a career, women should not violate their inherited capacities; that is, women, like men, should choose the career for which their talents qualify them. This principle can be more rigidly applied as occupations, trades and professions are increasingly open to women on equal terms with men. So far as her sexual life is concerned, it may be re-

membered that women are, for the most part, not so highly sexed as men.¹⁶ At least woman's sexual desire has usually to be aroused. She differs markedly from man in this regard; she is therefore freer than he to choose a career which does not involve marriage. If her sexual desires are aroused, however, she may enter a companionate marriage which will entail, for her, a minimum of domestic responsibilities.

Women who attempt to carry on two careers simultaneously (one in the home, the other outside of it) usually marry for one or more of the following reasons:

1. To be an inspiration to the husband in his career. (Such a marriage is likely to end either in disillusionment or in conflict, because the husband has married for other reasons.)
2. To secure economic support for her extra-familial career. (This is a form of economic parasitism that self-respecting persons abhor.)
3. To secure a sexual life which will be socially sanctioned. (This constitutes an inadequate if not a false basis for a successful marriage, especially in the absence of children since the sexual interest wanes.)

Children born of such unions are denied their right to a mother's love and care. Often they are given life in an orphanage as a substitute.¹⁷ With limited time and resource, few women can successfully pursue two careers simultaneously.

Penetrating analysis of the rôles of the woman in the family appears to substantiate the claim that home-making for a husband and two children is a career adequate to the talents of most women. Even in the modern urban family the wife and mother must be help-meet, household-administrator, dietician, nurse, psychologist, expert in social relations, teacher and priest. Moreover, the artificial environment and the divisive influences of the urban situation surround the familial group with difficulties which are surmounted only by discerning minds employing intelligently devised procedures. With limited economic resources, therefore, *the successful pursuit of the domestic career will require not only versatile talents but also a preparation as thorough as that required by the successful pursuit of any other career.* Women cannot, after indifferent success or actual failure in other careers, resort to marriage and home-making with reasonable expectation of creating a significant familial enterprise. Under present conditions, successful home life is the product

¹⁶ A. J. Rosanoff, *Manual of Psychiatry* (New York, 1927), p. 206.

¹⁷ Note again the number of children in orphanages who have one or both parents living.

of capacities thoroughly trained and intelligently applied' to the familial situation.

Again, it has been noted that the removal of many domestic processes from the home and the mechanization of most of those that remain have greatly increased leisure for woman, especially in the urban community. That a part of this increased leisure should be given to the pursuit of special interests which develop and enrich her personality is readily granted. The wife and mother should consider this a debt which she owes not only to herself but to her family as well. And, if the situation has been accurately described, it is obvious that she is also under obligation to devote a part of her increased leisure to the critical problems of the home and the family in which she is a vital element. *Housekeeping* in the urban situation may no longer be a full-time job; but it does not follow that *home-making* requires only a fraction of a woman's time and talent. If life in the home, especially in the city, is to have content, if familial relationships are to be stimulating and constructive, if domestic interactions are to build and enrich personality, then should not the wife and mother devote a part of her increased leisure to these projects?

Assiduous attention to the details of housekeeping will not, of itself, guarantee a vigorous home life. Background is an important but not the sole requisite of successful familial interactions. Moreover, neither the school nor the church and certainly neither the moving picture nor the public dance hall can be relied upon to produce enriched, disciplined, efficient personalities. Personalities fashioned by extra-familial organizations resemble nothing so much as standardized, factory-made articles produced for an indefinite market by the methods of large-scale production. Personalities of quality are necessarily hand-made. If the social order, therefore, is to have quality beyond that of the factory-made product, the wife and mother in the home must devote time and talent to the project of personality building. The man in the family must, of course, participate in this project. A vitally constructive family life is not usually achieved without his coöperation. But such home life remains primarily the woman's career, since she has both the capacity for it and the time necessary to it. Her mate is increasingly occupied in the task of maintaining the high standard of living which a mechanical age has imposed upon the family. This, however, should not preclude his participation as a collaborator in familial organization and activity. Home-making is a coöperative undertaking, and men who shirk their responsibility in it deserve the cheap home life and the nondescript personality which results.

It is true that the home cannot compete with commercialized recreation. But need it? Recreation is neither the sole nor the chief familial activity. If the family is to be appraised merely in terms of the pleasure it affords its

members, then an individualistic hedonism has given a sordid twist to the conception of the basic social needs which the family must serve. But even as respects this function, may not the simply organized recreational activities in the home meet all requirements, if appropriate standards and tastes have been developed? May not an evening spent in the home with good books or good music, or interesting companions, for example, be quite as satisfying as one at the public dance hall, provided someone has given intelligent thought and plan to the event? And who should be more competent in this field than the wife and mother?

It has yet to be demonstrated that mothers can simultaneously and successfully pursue a familial as well as an extra-familial career. The studies made of wives who work, have, so far at least, been concerned with the question, "Are married women successful in careers outside the home?" No attempt has yet been made to answer the question, "Have these women created pleasant home atmospheres and children who were not problems?" And yet the latter is *the important question*. Obviously where premature death of her husband or financial necessity forces the woman to work outside the home, the situation must be met by substitutes in or for the home. On the other hand, it is easy for idle, self-indulgent wives to exaggerate their need for self-expression or for economic independence. Pre-marital trial careers would readily disillusion such women with respect to their actual endowment for extra-familial careers—endowments which they regard as wasted in the familial situation.

In the present social order the father's career makes possible a home with children and hence a career for a woman in that home, whereas the mother's employment, for the most part, gives her a career which provides for such personal development as her financial independence will permit. If her employment does not penalize her husband's career, it is likely to handicap her children for whom a mother substitute must be secured. From the sociological standpoint, the nursery school provides no such substitute; first, because it gives children an institutional environment; secondly, because relatively few parents can afford, even with their combined incomes, the services of such schools when they are privately organized; and lastly, because it is doubtful if the state, already burdened with more social functions than it can efficiently discharge, would or could assume the costs of public provision of nursery schools. It must be remembered, also, that the present economic order has become so mechanized that it is difficult to provide adequate careers for men and for those women who are not mothers. A return to primitive Samoan practices, moreover, seems impossible. Perhaps a different social and economic order will make careers for mothers possible—careers which will not penalize children. It is difficult to envision such an order.

To summarize: society has too much at stake to allow the mothers of any social group to neglect their children, not only with respect to food, clothing, or care, but also with respect to the development of their personalities. It is precisely in this latter respect that the quality of the family determines the quality of the social order. Women should not be forced into the familial career, rather they should be urged to select the life work for which their talents and their interests qualify them. But, having voluntarily chosen the familial career, they should be expected to bring to it the preparation and devotion which they would give to any extra-familial career: for, under modern conditions, especially, home-making is no residual occupation to which anyone, irrespective of qualifications, may resort.

PREPARATION FOR FAMILIAL LIFE

While home-making is the woman's especial function for which she should be especially equipped, she is not the only familial element whose qualifications are significant in successful family life. The man in the family also should equip himself for the effective performance of his non-economic as well as for his economic familial functions. Home life is never successful simply because an adequate income has been provided, nor because some talented wife and mother is devoting herself to her family. Skill in supplying the family with income sufficient for its needs is, of course, the man's basic function; but success in family life is not contingent upon external excellences of resources but upon inherent integration, that is, upon the skill with which he plays the rôle of husband, father, and co-creator of the home atmosphere. It is these latter rôles, especially, which give content to family life. It is a bold assumption that the man in the family, merely because he has been a member of his parental family group, is adequately prepared for these functions. Man is inherently a father only in the biological meaning of the term. Integration of personalities is a product of nurture. Intelligent fatherhood is, therefore, no more instinctive than intelligent motherhood. The child should also be prepared for participation in family life, not merely as a consumer or beneficiary, but as an active producer. As a stabilizer of familial relationships, as a unifier of the familial group, as a parental disciplinarian and a sublimator of parental achievement, he unconsciously contributes to the quality of familial interactions. As an economic tyro, as a socializer, and a personality, he may consciously contribute to the content and character of familial relationships. Indeed, to function thus is not only his privilege but also his due; for, as he matures, he is by this means preparing for effective participation in the familial relationships which he will later establish on his own account.

In a complex social order it is necessary that individuals specifically and

painstakingly prepare for participation in the highly organized activities of other-than-familial institutions. Skill, special abilities, and attitudes must be nurtured and defects corrected by training so that the individual may function successfully in his social relations. Basic institutions are never greatly or frequently modified to meet the deficiencies of the untutored, indolent, or undisciplined. Rather, the full force of the agencies of social control is directed towards the discipline of individuals by and for participation in institutional activity; and, what is more, those who do not or cannot qualify for effective institutional functioning are, for the most part, denied such participation. This is especially true of industry, the school and the state. That it is not equally true of the church is probably not so much the fault of religion as of those who administer ecclesiastical organizations.

If capacity and special training are necessary in order that individuals may function successfully in the economic, political and cultural processes, it follows that ability and preparation are also essential to successful participation in the domestic process, because the family produces the personalities who must function in these other processes. If, therefore, home-making and personality building are to be successfully pursued they require, like business, teaching or politics, especial talent, professional interest and thorough preparation. Consequently many individuals never qualify for familial achievement because they lack either the special abilities or the training which makes them effective. To encourage such to establish familial relationships and responsibilities is to invite familial discord and failure. Rather, these should be induced to enter companionate unions.

It has been noted that the family was once the all-inclusive institution and that, as the social order increased in complexity, it became inadequate to the tasks of social control. This required that certain specialized institutions with an especially trained personnel be developed to take over the functions which had outgrown familial organization with its casual personnel. This, in turn, has resulted in the family being regarded as an institutional remnant of uncertain value. But if home-making and personality building are still requisite to a social order of quality, *then the family itself must become a specialized institution with an especially trained personnel*. Nothing less than this will continue the domestic process in its production of human stuff with quality enough to perpetuate the human order.

To provide familial organization with an adequately equipped personnel will involve:

1. Preparation of the young for marriage by
 - (a) The impartation of accurate sex information so that wholesome attitudes toward love and marriage may be developed;

- (b) The inculcation of control of the emotions which are deeply stirred by those of the opposite sex so that young men and young women may always command their emotional situations;
 - (c) Parental assistance of the child in making social contacts so that suitable candidates for life partnership are available;
 - (d) Experience in discharging duties in the home, especially in the management of finances, so that the young may gain a knowledge of the responsibilities which marriage entails.
2. Education and training such as will equip fathers and mothers with the knowledge and technique which successful parenthood requires in the fuller development of the child's capacities and personality.
 3. Social experience of the proper quality and quantity which will enable the younger members of the family to learn the give-and-take of adult familial interactions.
 4. Spiritual insight into the relationships established in marriage and in parenthood imparted by competent persons who have achieved successful familial relationships.
 5. Evaluation of social as well as individual *objectives* of long-time, as well as of short-time policies, and of final as well as of immediate *values*, in marital familial relationships.
 6. Integration (conscious and planned) of the dominant, indeed of all, personalities included in the familial group.

These specifications describe minimum requirements. Without them the family is not likely to survive the disintegration which now besets it.

The family, like other social institutions, now rests primarily upon a cultural rather than an instinctive basis. Predispositions are increasingly pushed into the familial background, and culture complexes assume the predominant rôle. Moreover, the family is now in the throes of a radical adaptation to an urban situation which places it in competition with extra-familial interests. But, most significantly of all, the family is, at present, enveloped by a hedonistic individualism which renounces social obligation. Only those who are cognizant of the total familial situation and who are adequately equipped to cope with it, can save the domestic institution.

For the hedonistic individualist society must not only sanction companionate marriage but the control of births which it contemplates, or it must undertake the infinitely more difficult task of conditioning this individualist so that he will prefer the unmarried status.

PRECAUTIONS AGAINST MARITAL DISASTER

Preparation for marriage and familial responsibilities, however, does not sufficiently guarantee successful familial interactions. The marital partners

may have both capacity and training and yet lack the volition necessary to achieve an integration of personalities, or their volition may be paralyzed by marital *dénouement*. Certain precautions against marital failure and disaster should therefore be taken by those who are about to enter the marriage relationship, namely:

1. Rationalization of emotional situations to eliminate possible delusion
2. Contacts with love-mate in situations of normal, dutiful living
3. Attention to unromantic considerations to test the depth of emotional attachment
4. Projection of the personalities concerned into the stern realities of parenthood, illness, and economic stress
5. Critical analysis of personality traits and anticipation of difficulties likely to arise therefrom
6. Projection of the mate into future situations when youth has passed and each has increased in weight and waist-line

Such procedures should reveal the basis of the proposed relationship and the adjustments which will be involved. If lovers give no pre-marital consideration to the realities which their marriage will inevitably bring, it is certain that they will be forced to give them anxious consideration afterwards. Because some marital adjustments cannot be foreseen or made in advance is no reason for foregoing as complete a rationalization of the specific relationship as is possible. To plunge blindly here invites marital bankruptcy.

To escape marital disaster it will also be necessary that the husband and wife keep in mind the underlying causes of incompatibility. Since compatibility is a product of deliberate integration of personalities, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that incompatibility is a condition for which the mates themselves are primarily responsible. Marital maladjustment, therefore, is usually due either to failure to utilize courtship for the discovery of the other's personality or to the unwillingness to make the adjustments which marriage necessarily entails. Interested persons are prone to wax sentimental concerning incompatibility and to advance external causes in explanation of it. It must be recognized that marital attitudes and situations are still largely in control of those who undertake the marital relationship. Especially will this be true when a selective process shall determine who may marry and when the educational process shall equip these for familial rôles.

Finally, marriage may be materially safeguarded by laws which (if enforced) would lift the standards of matrimonial alliance. The effectiveness of law in private matters is easily exaggerated; yet the law and the judiciary have accomplished much when they have provided machinery which will bring

the services of specialists to bear upon particular problems and specific cases. Applied to the domestic situation, this would mean that no marriage would receive the sanction of the state without reliable certification of (a) freedom from venereal and degenerative diseases, (b) adequate economic qualification for familial responsibility, and (c) compatibility. Such certification should be required with respect to both the man and the woman and should be made by domestic relations clinics operating under the jurisdiction of the state.

DIVORCE AS PERSONAL FAILURE

Any effective solution of the marriage problem, moreover, must induce a greater and a more consistent effort to achieve marital compatibility. Present thought fails dismally at this point when it searches merely for means of relieving the irritation or oppression experienced by individuals who find themselves unwilling to make the adjustments necessary to the integration of personalities. Freer divorce is urged because it breaks the tension which develops in such situations and gives the individuals opportunity to establish a more successful union. It is believed that, given sufficient number of such opportunities, persons will eventually stumble into a satisfactory union or happen upon an affinity. This, of course, in rare instances actually occurs; but, for the most part, this relationship, like most others, is neither an accident nor a heaven-sent gift.

It is probable that most, if not all, of those who have experienced a successful marriage will testify, when the data is assembled, that such a relationship is an *achievement*. Successful marriage, it appears, is a product of much common experience of struggle, of work as well as of pleasure, of much mutual adaptation, of much earnest effort to develop a personality which satisfies both and challenges the other. Such a relationship *grows slowly*, tediously, perhaps painfully. It follows, therefore, that divorce merely evidences either unwillingness or incapacity (or both) to adjust, to coöperate, to integrate; it offers no guarantee that subsequent marital ventures will elicit greater efforts to achieve compatibility. On the contrary, each of the divorced partners is usually convinced that the other is responsible for the marital failure. Such a situation, it is obvious, does not induce either a wiser second choice or greater integrative effort.

Increase in the rate of divorce, therefore, cannot be regarded as evidence of the failure of the familial institution. It is primarily an indication of the extent of the failure of husbands and wives to achieve the significant relationship which the institution provides. The familial institution should, of course, not call for more than the ordinary person can deliver; but it must be remembered that freer divorce is no solution of marital problems: it merely

facilitates withdrawal from a situation characterized by personal failure, tension, and lack of rapport. Divorce is usually the resort of those who are the victims of amorous intoxication, of the will-o'-the-wisp search for affinities, of romantic delusion, or of erotic weakness. Like great friendship, marriage is a continuous achievement which challenges every capacity of the persons concerned. It is a dynamic relationship which demands ability, preparation, and devotion. Ready release from marital bonds forestalls or precludes such achievement.

THE CHALLENGE OF DURABLE MONOGAMY

History, it is claimed, shows that cultural changes parallel changes in marital organization. Monogamic restrictions or limitations upon the expenditure of vital energies in the purely physical and erotic functions forces human beings to express these energies in increasing man's knowledge and control of his environment, in the building of a culture, and in the creation of art. Civilization, therefore, is contemporaneous with permanent monogamy because it is a period of compulsory sublimation. Conversely, cultural decrepitude is held to be coincident with modified monogamy.¹⁸ At any rate, the experience of the race through a thousand generations appears to indicate that its future, as its past, is best conserved by the familial order which develops out of the permanent, monogamic marriage.

If this conclusion is valid, it follows that those who accept the obligations and responsibilities of the permanent monogamic union will carry on the race and civilization. But what will be their compensation? And will it be adequate to command the capable? Those who choose other types of marital union will receive compensation in the form of the personal pleasure and sensual gratification which these types insure. But the permanent, monogamic union is the type which is socially desirable. Its rewards, however, are primarily spiritual and its requirements, disciplinary. Is it possible, to-day, to challenge young people to institutional behavior on the grounds that it is socially desirable?

The positive answer falters. But it will be granted that whenever possible the compensations of the permanent monogamic relation should be increased so that its high challenge will not fall upon unwilling participants. Emphasis upon *home-making* rather than housekeeping, relief from economic distress in family support, and conditioning toward social, as well as hedonistic, values should establish familial functioning on the plane of appealing challenge for:

. . . so long as it (the family) is regarded primarily as a device for extinguishing lust or satisfying it cheaply; so long as children are born largely as the uncal-

¹⁸ J. D. Unwin, "Monogamy and Social Development," *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XXV (July, 1927), pp. 662-677.

culated aftermath of passion or in response to artful social suggestion; and so long as home life is the sphere of unlimited monarchy, of despotism, physical, mental, and spiritual; so long can little be expected of the family by way of serious contributions to social advance. If we want to utilize the inherent power for social discipline for affection, for altruism which resides in the family institution, we must see to it that conditions are maintained in which decent, rational home life can thrive. This means, in the concrete adequate family income, education for domestic life, real equality between parents, a decent house (domestic morality is said to be a matter of square feet), and leisure to devote to the business of home life and parenthood: all of which means, in turn, shortening of the working day, education for leisure and the application of scientific management to home-keeping. The family will serve progressive ends, then, if it is not called upon to do things for which it is inherently unfitted and if it is given means and conditions appropriate to its highest functioning.¹⁹

Ultimately, therefore, the continuance of the family as an integral part of the social order will depend not so much upon the form of its organization as upon the quality of its relationships. With respect to rational mating, wholesome childhood and normal parent-child interaction, modern psychology and sociology have developed a body of scientific information which removes success in familial relationships from the fields of conjecture, accident and wishful thinking.²⁰ Supported by sound and adequate legislation the specific principles developed by these social sciences and applied through the techniques of eugenics, mental hygiene and family counseling²¹ can bring family relationships under effective social control. Before these principles can be generally applied, however, the public must be convinced first, of the importance of biological inheritance in human mating; secondly, of the physical, psychological, economic, and social hazards of irrational mating, hasty marriage and incompetent parenthood; and thirdly, of the limitations of legislation in effecting improvement in family life. Moreover, until the social values inherent in successful familial functioning have been thoroughly established in the mores, and until the techniques for securing these values have been made generally available, constructive social policies with respect to the familial institution must wait.

CONCLUSION

Institutions should always function for, and serve, people; for institutions are means to group ends. As such they should never be regarded as of greater

¹⁹ A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress* (New York, 1918), p. 335. (By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.)

²⁰ E. R. Groves, *The American Family* (Philadelphia, 1934), Part IV.

²¹ Hart, *op. cit.*, Ch. 15.

importance than the group they serve. But they are of more importance than *some* people and *some* people's happiness. The institution should, if possible, serve the interests of all; but the welfare of the larger group over long periods of time is always paramount to the present, personal happiness of certain individuals when these interests conflict. Of course, there is no general agreement as to what makes for the welfare of the group. The long ages of human experience and human struggle should give much light on this point. But, again, there is difference of opinion as to what these ages of human experience really indicate. There is, however, no other source of authority.

That remedies for the ills which beset the family lie, for the most part, beyond the law-maker and the court is certain. Familial relationships, like those of friendship and religion, are spiritual in nature, and their quality can be guaranteed neither by education nor legislation. Uniform marriage laws are desirable, of course; but it must be apparent that statutes seldom reach the mainsprings of human behavior. Integrative familial interaction, like morality, can never be coerced. The reconstitution of the family, therefore, requires nothing less than a quickening of social conscience.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. (a) Why does homelessness produce socially defective individuals?
(b) Analyze the personality of the institutional child.
2. Outline a procedure for discovering *adaptive lag* and the measures for correcting it.
3. Enumerate the specific *adaptive lags* in the urban familial situation and indicate the specific means by which they may be remedied.
4. Is it likely that the family will ever become a static or inflexible institution? Give reasons.
5. What evidence is there that the familial institution has been misused?
6. (a) Specifically what are the familial mores and traditions which have thus far preserved the integrity of the Jewish family in the urban environment?
(b) To what extent could these mores and traditions be used to preserve the integrity of the modern forms of the patriarchal family? Explain.
7. Precisely what is meant when it is said that "the family represents a set of *spiritual* relationships"?
8. Illustrate the proposition "the quality of the family determines the quality of society (the social order)."
9. Why is the recognition of the social objectives of the family necessary to its reconstruction as a vital social institution?
10. What specific means can be employed to limit familial individualism?
11. Present the arguments for and against the assertion that "the individual has a right to be happy."

12. Herbert Spencer long ago showed that as we ascend the animal scale there is a decrease in fecundity. Is this evidence that sex plays a decreasing rôle as life offers the individual freer and fuller satisfactions in other-than-sexual achievement? Explain.
13. Beach (*Introduction to the Study of Society*, Ch. 3) has noted that as man has progressed he has increased his control over his instinctive impulses. Does this indicate what emphasis may properly be placed upon sex? Explain.
14. Can women have all of the freedoms and all of the old privileges? Give reasons.
15. Point out the fallacy in the argument of those who would abolish the family, if necessary, in order to emancipate woman from economic dependence upon man.
16. Distinguish *home-making* from housekeeping.
17. Can it be demonstrated that home-making is a career? If so, why is it not so regarded?
18. To what extent may the school prepare individuals for marriage? for familial responsibility? May the church also function here? Specifically how?
19. Is a domestic relations clinic practicable? Give reasons.
20. Can you disprove the statement "Divorce is in most cases evidence of personal failure"?
21. "How may the young people of to-day be challenged to want to do that which is socially desirable?"
22. To what extent should past generations be considered in treating the family as a basic institution? To what extent should future generations be considered?
23. Analyze articles on marriage and the family in such magazines as *The Atlantic Monthly*, *Harper's*, *Scribner's*, etc., for the years since 1928 to determine recent trends of American thought with respect to the familial situation.

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CHAPTER VIII

EDUCATION: A SOCIAL PROCESS

It has been posited that the family was at one time the all-inclusive social institution and that specialized social institutions were developed as social relations became so complex as to require the services of a specialized personnel.¹ To trace this process of differentiation here would be interesting but irrelevant. It is sufficient for the present purpose to note that education very early became the function of certain persons or groups when the social heritage had expanded until it exceeded the capacity of familial experience. The conservation of racial wisdom and its transmission to succeeding generations had then to be entrusted to those who could give especial talent to the task.

To a certain extent every institution educates those who participate in its activities. The differentiation of the school as a specialized educational institution therefore is due primarily to the accumulation of culture materials to a point where it is necessary for a specialized group to devote itself to the evaluation, organization, conservation and transmission of these materials. As social life expanded, this cultural heritage included elements which developed out of extra-familial activities and which were, hence, increasingly dissociated from familial interests.² Teaching and learning then became processes which could no longer be compassed by merely causing the young to take part in the institutional procedures to be mastered. The gradual growth of such learning eventually brought about the complete differentiation of the school as an educational institution which affords the individual "that culture which seems best calculated to secure his personal welfare."³ But education was desired not only because it promoted the interests of the individual but also because it strengthened the group in its struggle for self-preservation or because it was an effective means by which the group, or those in control of it, might carry out some cherished idea or ideas.⁴ The school, therefore, became a special agency for the expansion and enrichment of the cultural heritage as well as for its conservation and transmission.

¹ *Infra*, pp. 36-38.

² A. Inglis, *Principles of Secondary Education* (Boston, 1918), pp. 354-355.

³ E. N. Henderson, *Principles of Education* (New York, 1928), p. 45.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 124.

SOCIAL NATURE OF EDUCATION

Viewed sociologically, *education is the process by which the individual is prepared for successful participation in social relations, broadly conceived.* That is, education facilitates the functioning of the individual in his economic, political, religious and recreational relationships in such a manner as to give him the maximum satisfaction in living. The educational process, therefore, requires the progressive unfolding of "those habits, skills, attitudes, knowledges, appreciations and ideals which will enable (individuals) to achieve an even more integrated personality and to live competent and satisfying lives in their physical environment and as coöperative members of an ongoing and improving human society."⁵ The essence of this educational process is the discipline of the mind, the emotions and the volition of the individual so that he develops and directs his capacities and activities toward approved ends.

Through the formal and informal transmission of the social heritage, the individual is first made intelligent with respect to his complex physical and social environment. When he has acquired sufficient knowledge and tools, his social facility is then developed by means of experience, vicarious or otherwise, in successful adjustment to specific situations. Education seeks to socialize all that is social and individualize all that is individual (variable) in personality. Thus education assures the group that the individual will both share in its purposes and interests and at the same time contribute to group life through his especial aptitudes and abilities. Education involves growth; growth implies plasticity or the capacity to learn from experience. Plasticity results in the formation of habits which "give control over environment and the power to utilize it for human purposes."⁶

But such growth must be controlled. Learning must concern itself with established standards if the individual is to secure a satisfactory adjustment to his total environment or to participate creatively in social interaction. In a very real sense, therefore, education is directed experience⁷ since the capacity for successful participation in social relationships cannot be effectively developed without actual experience. Education cannot be regarded as a process of forcible feeding, nor the school as a sort of academic cannery. Principles and precepts learned in the classroom become really significant only when the student discovers their experiential meaning as he ranges through his extra-school relationships or explores the materials of his larger environment. If the student does not acquire proficiency in his school relationships, therefore, he

⁵ T. J. Soares, *Religious Education* (Chicago, 1928), pp. 14.

⁶ John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, 1916), p. 62.

⁷ John Dewey, *op. cit.*, pp. 89 ff.

has not only missed a genuine opportunity for social adjustment, but he may also have incurred a social handicap.⁸

EDUCATION AND THE INDIVIDUAL

Since it is impossible to "abstract the individual from the society which produces and nourishes him, or a society from the individuals of which *it is composed*,"⁹ the end-product of the educational process is the socially efficient person. Such persons may be characterized as:

1. *Economically competent.* The educated person should be able to earn a livelihood either in some productive employment or in some profession which renders socially valuable services. This is a minimum qualification, for certainly the school fails to discharge its *first* social responsibility if it develops personalities who become chronic economic liabilities.

2. *Socially adjusted.* The activities of the educated person should be fully integrated with those of his associates in whatever groups he participates. His status should be firmly established and his individual rôles adequately defined in order that frustration, conflict, and tension may be eliminated, so far as possible, from his social relationships.

3. *Socially minded.* The educated person respects the rights of others, recognizes the need for coöperative effort, participates in the give and take of the interaction of personalities in the group, is conscious of group as well as personal objectives, and is eager to assist in their attainment.

4. *Creatively volitioned.* The educated person has a disciplined will. He has a set of socially approved personal objectives; he is able to organize his effort, will and thought and to marshal resources for the realization of those objectives. He seeks to function on an expanding scale, to live completely, and to make what contribution he may to his time and generation.

Although it is true that it is impossible to distinguish those qualities of personality which are the individual's peculiar possession from those which are the product of his social contacts, it is also true that each personality represents a unique complex of qualities. Because of these individual variations diverse gifts are brought to the interaction and intercommunication of the persons comprising any group. As a result, group life is broadened and enriched. Education, therefore, must recognize individual differences and seek to develop them.

If, however, these unique personalities are to function successfully in the social milieu, individual differences must be modified or reconditioned until the individual can participate successfully in, and contribute significantly to,

⁸ J. K. Hart, *Inside Experience* (New York, 1927), pp. 212-213.

⁹ W. R. Smith, *Principles of Educational Sociology* (New York, 1928), p. 54.

the interactions in the various groups of which he is a member. But education must also concern itself with the aggregate as well as with the individual; for it must devote itself to the task of making a community as well as to the development of personalities. The former is not achieved with the accomplishment of the latter, because individual differences must be integrated if the group is to function successfully. In fact, the effectiveness of the whole social order is ultimately conditioned by such coördination within its constituent groups.

DETERMINANTS OF THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS

Excessive confidence is often placed in the educative process. It is, in fact, generally believed that education is the specific for all social ills. But the process by which persons become socially competent, like other social processes, operates under positive limitations. These restrict the educative process so significantly that results can be predicated only when full account is taken of conditioning factors.

Capacities of the individual. It is obvious that inborn capacities limit the educative process. These constitute a part of the biological equipment for which racial stock and parental inheritance are responsible. Aptitudes, special abilities, skills may be developed through education; but they cannot be implanted. The function of the school, therefore, is fully compassed when the individual is trained so that he may use his capacities to the maximum. But "no amount of training will make a race-horse of a mule." The educative process can only accomplish what innate capacities will allow.

Knowledge. At any given moment, of course, the educative process is also limited by the amount of wisdom and experience which a given group has accumulated. Moreover, in any given situation, education is also restricted by the quantity and kind of knowledge which is accessible. The essential difference between primitive and later education appears at this point. In modern institutions it is apparent that the effectiveness of the educative process is conditioned by the learning of those who teach and the library and laboratory facilities with which they function as well as by the maturity of the subject matter which is to be transmitted. Education, then, cannot transcend knowledge.

Interest. Again, the educative process is effectually conditioned by the ability of those concerned, especially the student, to maintain a continuity of attention and an endurance sufficient to secure a desired fulfillment. Lacking interest, educational disciplines become mere formalities which stir but do not develop the capacities of the individual. Eagerness to follow general or specific disciplines is necessary if personality is to grow or to mature. For, unless interest is aroused because some desired end is in view or some vital

connections are established, the educative process becomes a series of irrelevant tasks to be accomplished with as little effort as possible rather than a means of developing capacity for successful social interaction. Montessori appreciated this factor but neglected others equally significant.

Experience. The effectiveness of the educative process is also determined by the provisions which are made for the utilization of the knowledge which is acquired. This involves experimentation in actual social relationships; the establishment of accurate and deliberate connections between what has been learned, what has been done and its consequences; the uncovering of the meaning of experience; the evaluation and organization of thought and experience into behavior patterns; the working out of solutions for actual problems presented by specific situations. Thus education is to be regarded not only as means of enlarging or modifying environment but as environment *per se*.¹⁰ This aspect of education takes on increasing importance as social relationships grow more and more complex.

Discipline. Finally the educative process is significantly conditioned by the type and quality of the procedures which the individual employs in acquiring a knowledge of his social environment. The type of discipline utilized should, of course, be appropriate to the social background of those who are to be educated and to the particular educative method employed, whether it be passive mentation, social suggestion, formal disciplines, or actual experience. The effectiveness of these educational procedures is, in turn, conditioned by the personality of the teacher and the facilities with which he works.

When account has been taken of all the factors which condition the educative process as it is applied to all sorts and conditions of men, it is apparent that education can guarantee no general level of intelligence or quality of personality.

SOCIAL OBJECTIVES OF EDUCATION

It has been well said that "behind all educational theory there must be social theory. We must know what we wish society to be before we can know what we wish education to be. All ideas about education are based upon ideas about society even where no social theory is *consciously expressed*."¹¹ Since education seeks to prepare individuals for successful participation in social relations, it follows necessarily that its objectives will be appropriate to the culture-complex which the group has established.

From this standpoint, two theories of society have been advanced.¹² It is

¹⁰ John Dewey, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.

¹¹ A. C. Block, "Two Views of Society and Education," *Workers' Education Association Yearbook for 1918*, p. 33.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 33-38.

possible to conceive of the social order as a *machine* which exists for some material purpose such as national prosperity, ascendancy, or survival, and of each individual as a part of such a machine. In such a society education should, of course, seek to discover what part each individual is fitted by nature to play in the machine-order and to train him for that rôle. In such a system *mechanical efficiency* becomes the dominant educational aim because the "good of the machine" requires that each individual function according to his ability.

Or, it is possible to view the social order as a *social organization* of human beings striving to live as completely as talent and situation will allow. In such a society, education should concern itself with the development of personality so as to give individuals the most satisfactory possible adjustment to total environment. *Social efficiency*, in such a theory of social relations, becomes the chief educational objective.

From the sociological viewpoint, it is these aims, especially the latter aim, which constitute education a social process and the school a social institution. For the educator, then, every child should be both the raw material out of which a part of the social machine can be made and a human being whose life is to be a part of the life of society. Education, therefore, must make provision for the development of individual differences in capacity, interest and ability so that individuals may be prepared for wholesome living and significant achievement. It is equally required of education that it supply the facilities which will unify these heterogeneous individual elements so that the various parts of society may be sufficiently integrated to assure the continuity of the basic social organization.

Specifically, the educational aims which have especial social meaning are self-realization, social efficiency, social adaptability and social homogeneity.

1. *Self-realization*. This is secured through the development of the individual's aptitudes, interests, attitudes, tastes. Education unfolds personality, renders it self-conscious, and establishes its self-identity. While it is true that man becomes man by living with other men, interaction and intercommunication do not create personality: rather, they facilitate its growth. Self-realization is the product both of the innate qualities of the individual and of the culture of the particular groups which circumscribe his social relations; for the identity of a given personality is established in terms of individual traits conditioned by interaction, social suggestion, imitation and sympathetic radiation. "Thus social development and personal development are inseparable, the one necessarily requiring the other."¹⁸

Self-realization, then, is a process of social maturation in which the school aligns itself with the family to bring the individual into his social birthright.

¹⁸ W. R. Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-101.

The family, however, concerns itself with the physical and associational aspects of maturity, while the school specializes in the mental, vocational, and social aspects. The individual is thus made competent for adult social relations, just as the process of physical development, properly directed, prepares him to cope with the conditions of physical maturity.

2. *Social efficiency.* Education also aims to place the individual in the social milieu. By the development of inborn capacities, the individual acquires the ability to play rôles, to assume and maintain a status in the social order represented by the community in which he functions. Education prepares individuals for "a competent and satisfying life in the physical environment" as "coöperative members of an ongoing and improving human society."¹⁴ But "a competent and satisfying life in the physical environment" cannot be achieved unless the individual becomes a proficient craftsman in the economic, political, social and cultural activities of out-of-school life. Education equips the individual for socially efficient participation in these activities (a) by transmitting to oncoming generations the important products of racial experience, (b) by giving the individual a comprehensive understanding of his culture and civilization, and (c) by developing in him the socially desirable traits, habits, aptitudes and abilities. It is obvious that such social competency is not to be identified with vocational efficiency: the latter is only an aspect of the former. Negatively conceived, it is the aim of education to prevent and to correct social maladjustment, particularly such individual maladjustment as arises from non-congenital causes.

3. *Social adaptability.* From the psychological standpoint, education has been defined as "a process of making and preventing changes in human beings."¹⁵ These changes are made in the nervous system for the specific purpose of enabling the individual to function successfully in achieving the ends or aims which have been established, in the process of time, as those appropriate and proper to a balanced participation in the activities of all basic institutions. Since social institutions have been devised to meet fundamental human needs, the individual who does not participate in the activities of all of them functions only partially and incompletely. Education facilitates adaptation to the existing social situation.

But institutions are dynamic because individuals can change their environment and the specific mechanisms for satisfying basic human needs. Moreover, group life is constantly evolving and developing new aspects, as interacting personalities function on an expanding scale. As social relations grow more complex, the individual is increasingly dependent upon others, if he is

¹⁴ Soares, *op cit*, p. xvi.

¹⁵ E. S. Thorndike, *Education* (New York, 1912), pp. 1-8.

successfully to cope with the problems of a changing social environment. He must work more with and for others; he must contribute increasingly to a metamorphosis of his culture; he must constantly maneuver more intelligently to improve or even maintain his status. Education, therefore, must develop the individual's ability to adapt himself to a changing social *milieu* if he is to participate effectively in his social relations.

4. *Social homogeneity*. With true social insight Finney has indicated another educational objective of wide social import:

It runs in the dogma of the current pedagogical cult that schooling should cater to our individual differences and accentuate them as much as possible. This is a dangerous half-truth. . . . The other half is that we must be mentally equipped to keep step together in an *ever-increasing array of social activities*.¹⁶

It is admitted that "education should make us different"; but it should "also make us alike in our mental contents and our overt behavior. Individuals should be different in some respects but alike in many others." Sociologists from Simmel to Ross have maintained that the more elaborate the social process, the richer must be the common culture. A social interaction, characterized by interdependence, liberation and social control can be successful only when there is such a generous collective mental content. Education, therefore, must develop sufficient intellectual and cultural homogeneity to maintain an effective social organization.

Self-development, social efficiency, social adaptability and social homogeneity, then, constitute the fundamental objectives of those educational institutions that aim to develop personality and to prepare the individual for successful social interaction.

SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE SCHOOL

To realize these objectives is essential, if the school is to discharge its functions as a social institution. These significant social functions have been obscured by the increasing attention given to the mechanics of the expanding educational process. An analysis of these functions is requisite to a just evaluation of education as a social process and of the school as a social institution.

Transmission of the Social Heritage

As indicated above, the social heritage was originally passed on from generation to generation informally by the family, but eventually the fund of group

¹⁶ R. S. Finney, *A Sociological Philosophy of Education* (New York, 1928), p. 416. (By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.)

experience accumulated until it became too ponderous and too significant to be entrusted to the meager facilities of familial organization. The school was developed as a specialized institution, the specific function of which was (a) to conserve this fund of collective wisdom and experience, and (b) to transmit it. As social relations have increased in number and complexity, the lore of the race thus transmitted has become an intricate as well as a precious heritage.

The transmission of this social heritage to the next generation is a two-fold process.¹⁷ It involves (a) the impartation of explanations of the fundamental nature of institutions, mores, customs, traditions, and the indication that racial experience appears to demonstrate their essential connection with personal and group welfare; and (b) the habituation of the young to these fundamental institutions and procedures before they are mature enough to reason or to choose deliberately and wisely. Later these habits can be rationalized for them, provided racial experience makes it reasonably certain that they have sufficient justification.

The school by "systematically guiding youth through those selected experiences that are regarded as essential preparation for future life"¹⁸ brings the young "as rapidly as possible into modes of adjustment that have been found fruitful."¹⁹ This results in a tremendous economy of time and energy; for, with this wisdom accumulated from past experience the individual can shorten the period of trial and error and begin his achievement where his predecessors left off.

Integration of Knowledge

The school is also an institution for the organization of thought both by individuals and by groups of individuals. In the past, thought was organized by oral discussion. Sustained dialectic stimulates thought and its correlation because it extends the range of mental association. "In association each gets the benefits of thoughts which occur to others, while the solitary thinker waits till some promising idea comes into his mind and then dwells on it till further ideas spring from it."²⁰ Latterly, however, "reading is rapidly taking the place of oral discourse as a source of ideas."²¹ The phenomenal growth of the newspaper and the weekly and monthly journal as dispensers of ideas, opinions and beliefs is responsible for this change. The school combines both methods for the organization of thought. It first sends the student to sources where he

¹⁷ Finney, *op. cit.*, pp. 467-468.

¹⁸ C. C. Peters, *Foundations of Educational Sociology* (New York, 1921), p. 42.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

²⁰ E. A. Ross, *Outlines of Sociology* (New York, 1923), pp. 217-218.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

may secure facts and ideas; then it offers him the opportunity to discuss their validity and import.

But any thoroughgoing analysis of a given body of data or a specific subject matter quickly uncovers sharp conflicts and deep-seated antagonisms of thought. "Schools of thought," sets of dogmas, bodies of opinion, sectarian interests, mental sets, biases, prejudices, and inconsistent reasoning produce a situation of intellectual chaos which paralyzes the average mind. It is the function of the school to order, correlate, unify and systematize, as far as possible, this confused mass of fact and fancy; for no intelligence with respect to social relations or their direction toward desirable ends can be acquired except through such an organization of thought. It is natural, therefore, that personal interest and immediate satisfactions should become the dominant purpose of those who are unable to integrate their thought with the disconnected opinions, impulses, doubts and theories of others.

Inculcation of Standards

Eventually the school gives the individual experience in the evaluation of facts, ideas, opinions and beliefs. A knowledge of racial experience should supply the student with standards for testing truth objectively. The mind that is thus equipped can immediately detect quackery, faddism, fallacy, illicit propaganda, contradictions and humbug. Indeed, judgment develops only out of thought tested by the standards which emerge from generations of racial experience. Such standards are, in fact, a type of condensed experience, the upshot of a multitude of reactions and adjustments both individual and collective. Such standards serve as "conscious guides to conduct, especially in novel and critical situations."²²

Standards, obviously, are not inborn; they are acquired in social interaction and intercommunication. So complex and so expansive in this interaction and intercommunication that individuals, generally, are incapable of arriving at standards of behavior on their own account. Hence, the school has been assigned the function of imparting to youth "tastes, interests, ambitions, and a set of moral detestations and moral enthusiasms strong enough to inhibit instincts and to elicit zeals—detestations and enthusiasms that are not inborn and that embody the lessons of race (tribal or national) experience respecting the conduct of life."²³ And the school, especially the secondary school, becomes an agency for the inculcation of "the dominant social ideas and the dominant social organization."²⁴

²² W. C. Bagley, *The Educative Process* (New York, 1916), p. 222.

²³ E. C. Hayes, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology* (New York, 1917), p. 666.

²⁴ Inglis, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

Appraisal of Present Trends

Through the transmission of the wisdom and experience of the race, through the organization of thought and the integration of knowledge, and through the establishment of standards, the school not only makes the individual intelligent with respect to his civilization (economic and social order), but also renders him able to appraise present trends in social evolution. This has been called the *telic* function of education.²⁵ In every age there are trends and movements that run counter to the established mores, or the will of dominant interests. The school is, therefore, faced with the task of evaluating and of redirecting these trends if they are not promising. Otherwise much valuable human energy and resource is wasted in re-learning lessons which have already been learned at great cost. Such knowledge as the school imparts should make it possible for "educators to blue-print the institutions of to-morrow approximately as they ought to be" and "within limits, of course, to pour the developing minds into the mosaics of such worthy institutions."²⁶ This, it appears, is a necessary condition for social progress, however defined.

Guidance of Youth

Not only do individuals differ widely in physical, mental and emotional qualities, but they are also placed in a social *milieu* that is, as a result of industrialization and urbanization, infinitely complex and highly specialized. The necessity for guidance is therefore apparent: it becomes a means of conserving human values. To place the individual in the social order at the point where he can use his abilities most effectively, where he may render the largest possible social service, and where he will secure the maximum satisfaction from social relationships is a task for specialists who comprehend the social situation and who know the particular aptitudes and attributes of the individual. Guidance under such supervision benefits both the individual and the group, for it reduces to a minimum the lack of adjustment between individuals and social jobs. Here, again, the problem is more than one of vocational placement; it is one of broad social adjustment.

Obviously, "the greater the range of selection in the matter of life careers, the more difficult becomes the task of making a wise selection and the greater the chance of error."²⁷ Furthermore, the individual who makes a bad choice is heavily penalized in a highly specialized social order where minute division

²⁵ Finney, *op. cit.*, Ch. 6.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

²⁷ W. M. Proctor, *Educational and Vocational Guidance* (Boston, 1925), p. 5.

of labor involves special training for each individualized function. Again, "the lowering of the age of discretion and the consequent increase in the number of relatively free choices"²⁸ complicates the problem of wise selection. Finally, the "rich profusion of courses preparatory to all phases of life" offered in the modern curriculum aids the student in discovering his potentialities; but it may also confuse him if his aptitudes are varied or if his especial interest has not emerged.

It is obvious, too, that the school is the institution best qualified to perform the function of differentiating social selection because it is equipped to discover and to measure the capacities of the individual as these are conditioned by intelligence, previous training, social and economic status, health, character traits, personal disposition and personal ambition.²⁹ On these bases "it selects or examines the child with reference to social service and selects the features of social heredity that can most wisely be retained."³⁰ It can then apply such training in health and physical activities, in social and civic pursuits, in the worthy use of leisure, in character-building activities, in vocational requirements and opportunities as will facilitate an adequate and a satisfactory placement of the individual in the social order.³¹ Guidance is thus accomplished through the regular subjects of instruction, through extra-curricular activities, and through individual counselling. By this differentiating selection, the school not only prepares the individual to enter the vocation appropriate to his abilities but also equips him to acquire and maintain full social status.

Socialization of Individuals

It is certain that "human welfare requires that some original tendencies be cherished, that some be redirected or modified, and that others be eliminated out-right."³² This means that individuals cannot be left free to develop according to nature, because there is no evidence that man's unlearned tendencies are right—Schneider, G. Stanley Hall, and others to the contrary notwithstanding. It cannot be demonstrated, socially, that apparently wrong tendencies are either the prerequisite, the necessary correlate, or the result of some desirable tendency. Nor can it be proved, socially, that these apparently wrong tendencies inoculate or immunize the individual against their subsequent development. Such theories indicate a failure to appreciate the meaning of a racial experience which has demonstrated certain modes of conduct as de-

²⁸ W. R. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 719.

²⁹ Proctor, *op. cit.*, Ch. 3.

³⁰ Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 485.

³¹ Proctor, *op. cit.*, Chs. 7-14.

³² E. L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology* (New York, 1919), Vol. I, p. 270.

sirable and others as harmful. In other words, the experimental validity of existing mores is denied.

Again, it is generally conceded that "the problem of maintaining orderly social relationships is universal and increases in difficulty as society grows more complex"; for "the more intimate and mutually dependent people become, the larger the number of interferences that have to be adjusted."⁸³ Conflicts of interest and open antagonisms cannot be avoided so long as economic goods are limited in quantity, so long as superior status is the lot of a favored few, and so long as human wants are indefinitely expansive. Moreover, these interferences are so multitudinous, so infinitely various, and so unpredictable that neither statute law nor the police provide adequate facilities for their adjustment. A substantial body of accepted but extra-legal social procedures is therefore necessary, "if individuals and groups of individuals are to be held in leash and molded to type."⁸⁴ And, in general, social control of individual behavior becomes imperative if a workable compromise between chaotic individualism and *regimented* collectivism is to be secured.

In other words, orderly social relationships require that hereditary modes of response be directed or canalized by the weighting of environment, by rewarding desirable reactions, and by punishing undesirable responses, so that interaction and intercommunication will assure the tested and approved modes.⁸⁵ For habits are formed, voluntarily or through discipline, such as will facilitate the child's entrance upon adult relationships and render these more satisfying. This the school accomplishes when it supplies the elements lacking in the home and adds thereto sufficient equipment to produce an efficient social type.

Social Stability

Since change is often merely fortuitous, capricious or unintended; it may be either progressive or retrogressive. Some stability of social structures is therefore necessary if present well-being is to be conserved. A dynamic social order differs from a chaotic social milieu in that the former has substantial foundations and long-time, as well as specific, objectives. Too much stability, of course, produces a static order: but progress, however conceived, is possible only when there is a certain "dependable on-going" of the fundamental social processes. Social stability, then, implies first, *social orderliness*/secured through social habit, on the one hand, and "inventive intelligence/(to bring about needed change) on the other; secondly, *social conservation* of those social

⁸³ Smith, *op cit.*, p. 320.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 320.

⁸⁵ A. J. Jones, *Education and the Individual* (New York, 1926), Ch. 7.

structures and collective resources whose effectiveness in, and enrichment of, social relations has been tested in group experience; thirdly, *social justice*—the absence of which provokes those social attitudes from which destructive conflicts arise; and fourthly, *social control* by means of which orderliness, conservation and justice may be secured.³⁶

Social stability of this sort is secured through the school to the degree to which education produces social homogeneity, that is, to the degree to which the children of each succeeding generation are disciplined by independent thinking or memoriter training for similar social functions as well as for different social activities. This modicum of common behavior patterns, developed out of group experience, constitutes the substantial substratum upon which a dynamic social order may be constructed.

Furtherance of Social Progress

All sociologists agree that education is an essential factor in progress; indeed it is "an indispensable aid to all *telic* progress."³⁷ The education which makes for progress, however, requires not only the wide dissemination of information but also "the cultivation of ideals, biases, attitudes, insights and habits." The school, therefore, may play a rôle unique in the direction of human interaction, because "subtly controlled education can mold men almost at the will of those who guide it." But education, to favor progress, must inculcate the critical spirit and provide "a dynamic ideal that looks toward the future (rather than) to set them (men) against all change out of which progress must come."³⁸ Education thus not only conserves the past but also provides for shaping the future.

Sociologically conceived, education furthers progress (a) by conserving the social heritage; (b) by rendering it available for utilization; (c) by enlarging it through the addition of new culture-elements (the products of invention and creative intelligence) and through the selection of those elements which make for the survival of fit social entities; and (d) by increasing the intellectual resources and readjusting the social structures so as to assure a richer satisfaction of fundamental needs.

Education also contributes to progress when it develops the individual's ability to *readjust* himself to constantly changing social situations. Human interaction involves expansive functioning in a shifting environment. Successful participation in social relations, therefore, implies a continuous adjustment to social needs, to social situations, to persons, to groups of persons by means

³⁶ Compare Finney, *op. cit.*, Chs. 23, 24.

³⁷ Peters, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 285.

of toleration, constrained adaptation, accommodation and integration. The school is, hence, in a position (a) to facilitate *adjustment* to existing situations accomplished by a given set of adaptations (often considered final), and (b) to inculcate a set of principles, procedures and methods of *readjustment* to situations which will develop after the individual has completed his formal education.³⁹ That is, education should take account of social relationships not only as they are, but as they are becoming, as they are likely to be, as they ought to be.

Development of Social Leadership

Constructive social leadership requires (a) a wide familiarity with the intellectual resources of civilization and their effective utilization; (b) a knowledge of existing social structures, their functions, trends of change, and the social movements which should be checked and those which should be promoted; (c) an understanding of social relationships, generalized and comprehensive, such as makes possible the development of social policies which coördinate and integrate diverse or conflicting social functions; (d) the ability to formulate "as wise a public opinion on all the problems of modern life as the knowledge extant in any given generation can make them"; ⁴⁰ (e) a prestige sufficient to set the prevailing beliefs and ideals which determine both the patterns of collective behavior and the life programs of individuals; and (f) the ability to facilitate the functioning of followers by supplying opportunity for desired activity or by removing the factors or conditions which thwart the expansion of their personalities.⁴¹

Enhancement of the Quality and Content of Life

In the final analysis, education contributes generously to the *completeness of life*. This function is variously defined and often prostituted under the term "culture," because the dimensions of a complete life are either vaguely or partially conceived. Indeed, those whose education is marketable as well as those whose education is merely decorative seek training for the purpose of living life, as they see it, more completely. Richness of experience, power, prestige, in addition to mere quantity of satisfaction are ends sought.

It is patent that every person desires to function as fully as his capacities and limitations will permit. Groups also seek experiences which will enrich their collective living and force interaction to yield its satisfactions more

³⁹ Inglis, *op. cit.*, pp. 344-347.

⁴⁰ Finney, *op. cit.*, p. 337.

⁴¹ H. Hart, *The Science of Social Relations* (New York, 1927), p. 329.

abundantly. Life, apparently, is a good of which few persons or groups possess quantities more than sufficient to satisfy their desires. In fact, it is common knowledge that every stratum of society, by every possible means, searches hither and yon for experiences which will give greater variety and larger meaning to their associations.

Knowledge, of course, is a product of social interaction; it is also a kind of vicarious experience. As such it, as well as association, enriches living in much the same manner as first-hand experience. The school, then, in transmitting to posterity the wisdom of its ancestors not only facilitates and renders more effective the activities of the later generations but also equips personality to function on a larger scale. It thus adds definitely to the quality and content of living. Especially is this the result of the transmission of standards, objectives, attitudes and values which improve the quality of domestic relations, socialize the interactions of economic life, ennoble the activities of politics, and vitalize the functioning of religious institutions.

Again, quality of living is indicated by the avocational interests of individuals. Variety of avocations is as essential to the physical health and psychic balance of grown people as variety of play is necessary to the rounded development of children.⁴² Moreover, these interests develop attitudes, habits, and character just as significantly as the curricular activities of the school. In fact, the creative and the recreative use of leisure becomes an increasingly important problem as the machine takes over the mechanical tasks in the home and the factory. The shorter working day and the five-day week allow more time for the avocational activities which may increase the content of life and give added zest to living.

To function on an expanding scale should, of itself, evidence an increasingly satisfying life. The completeness of life is not, however, necessarily indicated by the *quantity* of experience but rather by the *quality* of it. To run the gamut of experience from asceticism of libertinism, for example, does not necessarily result in a sexual life that brings wider, deeper satisfactions through functioning on an expanding scale. To have lived through all that lies between poverty and wealth, between sin and sainthood, between ignorance and erudition, between ward-bossism and high political office may merely indicate quantities of cheap experience yielding momentary gratification of the baser impulses. Successful marriage, intelligent parenthood, productive careers, creative citizenship, significant social service, wholesome recreational interests, vital religion, profound friendship—these give enduring content to life and genuine quality to living.

⁴² Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-175.

EDUCATIONAL VALUES, SOCIOLOGICALLY CONSIDERED

Education, as such, has no final values. Whether it is conceived in terms of growth, differentiation, maturation, or social adjustment, account must always be taken of the fact that social relations, social situations, and social organizations are dynamic and metamorphic. Education functions fully when it gives individuals a knowledge of, and an ability to appreciate and evaluate those *social values* which have emerged from the experience of the race so that educated persons "may have a proper sense of values when they are called upon to make their own decisions."⁴⁸ In other words, education is under obligation to make provision for progressive development in later life. Educational values, therefore, derive their essence from the objectives of education. Sociologically speaking, educational value attaches to any form, procedure, or method (1) which brings the individual to social maturity, qualifies him for effective social participation, and develops his personality by equipping it with the facilities for living as completely as his talents will permit; or (2) which creates for the group, an *order* of social relationships characterized by a high quality of enduring satisfactions, by a degree of social stability which will guarantee substantial social progress.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. Explain: "All institutions educate."
2. Precisely what is involved in "successful participation in social relations"?
3. What is personality, sociologically conceived? Consult H. Hart, *The Science of Social Relations*.
4. "Education does not make people become great in ability as much as it finds and picks out those who are born with great ability." Do you agree? Give reasons.
5. Is it true that "if a person is born with a dull mind he probably will remain dull, if he is born with an average mind he will remain average, and if he is born with a very capable mind he will probably always be capable"? Defend your position.
6. Distinguish carefully between *social aims*, *social functions* and *social values* in education.
7. Is the *machine* theory of society entirely correct? Explain.
8. Compare and contrast *social* efficiency with *economic* efficiency.
9. Indicate in what specific respects education should make individuals different, and in what respects alike.
10. Distinguish between education and propaganda.
11. Differentiate *vocational* guidance, *educational* guidance and *social* guidance.

⁴⁸ B. H. Bodz, *Fundamentals of Education* (New York, 1921), p. 15.

12. Characterize a social order in which there is too much social stability. Is ours such a society? Explain.
13. Contrast the popular leader, and the reformer, with the genuine social leader.
14. Show specifically how the proper use of leisure contributes to the content and quality of living.

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CHAPTER IX

THE SCHOOL: A SOCIAL INSTITUTION

IN the discussion of the organization of the educative process it is necessary to distinguish clearly between the concern of the sociologist and that of the specialist in the field of education. The sociologist is interested in the school as a specialized agency developed by the group for the performance of prescribed educative functions of large social import. He is concerned, therefore, with the social functioning of the institution as an expression of group purpose. The educationist, on the other hand, is the specialist who plans the appropriate school organization and devises specific educational methods for the effective realization of that purpose.

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS

From the organizational point of view, account must first be taken of the various phases of the educative process. Specialists in this field have described three stages of intellection¹ which indicate the appropriate divisions of school organization. These are:

1. *Content of thinking.* The mind must first be stored with facts and information; it must also be given the simpler intellectual tools with which to function. Additional facts must be forthcoming as the mind comprehends what has already been given it. Thus the mind acquires the materials for the more complicated thought processes which follow. This, it is obvious, is the phase of the process assigned to the lower grades of secondary schools.

2. *Classification and organization.* In this stage of mental development contents are arranged in orderly sequence; relations are discovered. By comparison and generalization the individual constructs and reconstructs his world as new materials are added to his rapidly accumulating store. In general this function is performed in the higher grades of the secondary schools.

3. *Integration and evaluation.* The final phase of intellection appears when the individual begins to discover the meanings of what he has learned and to develop insight into the physical, economic and social forces operative in his world. In this stage he also becomes conscious of his methods of thinking; of

¹ C. H. Judd, "The Curriculum and the Junior College" in W. S. Gray (ed.), *The Junior College Curriculum* (Chicago, 1929), pp. 8-9.

comparison and generalization; he also develops the capacity for critical and creative thought. Here lies the especial field of the institutions of higher learning.

It should be noted, of course, that these stages are not sharply defined; as in all developmental processes, one merges gradually into the other.

In the organization of the educative process account must also be taken of the various administrative elements which condition its functioning, namely:

1. *The educational environment*—the buildings, grounds, books, laboratories and all the conditions under which the process is carried on.

2. *The curriculum* which embodies the content of the educative process, not only as respects what is taught, what is organized by the process but also as respects what the student needs to digest and assimilate in order to become socially efficient.

3. *Pupils* who are the objects of the educative process and for whom the group undertakes educational functions.

4. *Administrators* who organize the educative process, provide facilities, and devise educational policies.

5. *Teachers* who direct, supervise and engineer the process.

6. *Extra-curricular* activities which provide a laboratory of experience in which students may practise what is learned in the classroom.²

It is apparent, therefore, that any intelligent organization of education will be based upon (a) the stages of intellection which indicate the phases of the educative process, and (b) the elements which determine the effectiveness of its functioning. Certainly no proper organization of the school can ignore either set of factors.

THE SCHOOL GROUP A SOCIAL GROUP

People learned, of course, long before there were schools. The school is merely an apt and well-organized piece of social machinery for manipulating "the environment of the pupil so as to bring it about that he shall get the experiences which are most useful in preparing him for future life, and also that he shall get these in the order in which he can most profit by them."³ These experiences are an exact counterpart of the unselected experiences of out-of-school life. The school causes the individual to repeat these selected experiences just often enough to secure the desired degree of social adjustment but without the blind, haphazard duplications and the unnecessary repetitions of out-of-school life. Moreover, the school presents these experiences in their es-

² Compare H. H. Horne, *Psychological Principles of Education* (New York, 1917), pp. 31-33.

³ C. C. Peters, *Foundations of Educational Sociology* (New York, 1924), p. 40.

sential and simpler form unobscured by accidental or attendant, but unrelated, phenomena. An attempt is also made to give the student a more inclusive and better balanced quantum of experience than is forthcoming in the usual out-of-school environment.

In a very real sense, therefore, the school is a special social environment in which "the young gradually partake of the activities of the various groups to which they belong (by) nurturing the capacities of the immature."⁴ As a special environment the school not only fulfills its own specific obligations but it also assumes "responsibility for every phase of needed youthful training not adequately cared for by other institutions."⁵ This has been designated as its residual function.

In the organized pursuit of its objectives the school becomes, in reality, a social group with all its essential characteristics. *Esprit-de-corps* naturally develops among those associated in common activity directed toward specific purposes: a public opinion emerges and is consciously recognized by pupil and teacher alike; a variety of clubs, cliques, and organizations grow up quite spontaneously—in fact, pupils work more and more in subordinate groups as the educational process matures and differentiation of talent and interest occurs; and finally, leaders appear and followers are organized so that a genuine corporate life is developed in connection with student self-government and the direction of various school projects. Collective enterprises in the form of festivals and celebrations also attest the social nature of the school group.

The school is a social group in another sense, namely, in that it provides facilities for "the practice of living" not merely in its economic terms but in its wider aspects. Indeed, the school usually purposely subordinates ulterior aims to experience with broader social meaning. This experimental quality of school life has become a vital element in modern education as the doctrine of interest has been applied to intellection. In fact, the school has become the center of a wide range of interesting activities pursued under supervision on such a plane as to encourage a high type of motivation as well as performance. As a result students form desirable social habits and attitudes in this "practice of living."

The school also provides the student with facilities for *vicarious* as well as for direct experience. Since knowledge is accumulated experience, learning can be made a process by which the student dramatizes what is worth knowing. "Knowledge, thus conceived, is more than content"; it becomes a means of putting one's self into the experience of those whom one studies and of sympathetically identifying one's self with the larger human process.⁶ The various

⁴ John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, 1916), p. 26-27.

⁵ W. R. Smith, *Principles of Educational Sociology* (New York, 1928), p. 123-124.

⁶ Soares, *Religious Education* (Chicago, 1928), pp. 131-133.

curricular studies are vitalized and socialized when education is approached as reëxperience; for the individual is able both to add to and to relate his experience to that of others of his own and of preceding generations.

THE SCHOOL A SOCIAL INSTITUTION

Apparently, then, "the school is an institution for providing environments, for regulating environments, and for turning environmental forces to a *definite and conscious end*,"⁷ namely, the socially efficient individual. By manipulating the forces operative in the environmental situation the school controls the experience of the child in such a manner as to bring about a "maturation of adjustments in terms of which (he) can meet future situations more effectively."⁸

It follows, therefore, that the several divisions of the school should parallel in organization the various stages of intellection. This requires (a) that educational grouping shall be based upon the degree of social maturity attained by the student; (b) that the educational environment shall provide equipment appropriate to the various phases of the educative process; (c) that the curriculum shall offer subject matter appropriate to the capacities and interest of the educational group it is proposed to serve; and (d) that such extra-curriculum activities shall be devised for these groups as will afford opportunity for the application of the knowledge acquired to actual life situations. Of course, throughout the organization provision must be made for progression from less to more advanced divisions.

Again, in every phase of educational organization, it should be borne in mind that:

. . . there is an essential congruity of interest between the individual and society. The possibility of the development of the individual is found in his participation in social activities and in social consciousness. The possibility of the development of society is found in the development of social personalities in individuals.⁹

The school must recognize the dynamic nature of the social process since successful participation in it requires constant readjustment. The school should also never lose sight of its two-fold objective, namely, integration which works toward social cohesion and solidarity and *differentiation* which works toward variation and modification. To attain this objective the school must improve the present life of the student and also prepare him for the social relations of later years.

⁷ W. C. Bagley, *The Educative Process* (New York, 1916), pp. 38-39.

⁸ Peters, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

⁹ A. Inglis, *Principles of Secondary Education* (Boston, 1918), p. 340.

Finally, in the organization of the school provision must be made for the early assumption of out-of-school relations by the majority of the students who complete the more advanced grades. In fact, as the educative process reaches its later phases, the number of those who drop out of the school environment to assume adult or near-adult social relationships necessarily increases. Only the narrowly specialized educational institution can ignore its responsibility for such students, and no educational institution which admits its social responsibility can devote itself exclusively to preparation for the specific and limited relationships of "culture" or vocation. Hence the need for the school to conform to the ideals and form of social organization dominant in the social milieu of which it is a vital part.

When social principles, therefore, are given full consideration, it would seem obvious that the elementary and secondary schools should be organized to give (a) training in the rudiments or fundamentals of knowledge, especially in the use of the simpler tools of learning, such as spelling, writing, reading, and elementary mathematics; (b) a background of historical, geographical, and scientific informations; (c) a knowledge of the simpler habits of physical and mental hygiene; and (d) an appreciation of the simpler social ideals and standards of conduct. All these by giving content to his thinking both enrich the present life of the pupil and prepare him for larger relationships in the future.

According to these same social principles, it would appear logical that the high school should be organized to provide for (a) the perfection of the tools of learning through the study of languages and advanced subjects which give facility in the expression of ideas; (b) general science courses which give students advanced scientific information and an acquaintance with scientific methods; (c) an introduction to the social sciences through the study of civics, economic history and civic sociology which give the student a knowledge of the facts and principles of economic and social organization; (d) the development of the tastes and aptitudes of adolescence through the study of art, music and ethics, studies which facilitate self-realization, the constructive use of leisure, and worthy home-membership; (e) pre-vocational training, especially through courses that will bring the student into touch with a wide range of vocational interests and activities; and (f) socialization of the student through curricular and extra-curricular activities which require application of the techniques and knowledge previously acquired in educative process. The High School student, in his intellection, therefore, not only accumulates additional facts and information but he also learns to classify and organize knowledge.

In the collegiate division of its organization, the school parallels the student's

intellection by offering (a) courses which develop skill in the use of such advanced tool subjects as logic, higher mathematics, laboratory sciences, statistics and accounting; (b) courses which examine the organization, processes and trends of the social *milieu* in order to develop a social leadership capable of directing the necessary adjustments which must be made continuously in industry, government, education, religion and familial relationships; (c) courses in the natural sciences which give the student a comprehensive outlook on the physical world; (d) courses which give insight into, and aptitudes for, certain special interests—these present the student with the pre-professional knowledge requisite to an intelligent selection of his life work; (e) course with an ethical content which will bring the student to a full realization of his rôles as an active participant in the complex social order of his time; and (f) courses which develop critical thought and the ability to evaluate men and movements—these courses discipline both the mind and the emotions. Such disciplines complete and mature the student's intellection.

If this analysis of the social organization of the educative process is sociologically sound, it follows that the distinctive functions of the university are (a) professional training and (b) research, since the student's mental development is reasonably complete, and since it is the university alone which is adequately equipped for these functions. Because no precise stage of intellection is indicated in their organization, the junior high school and the junior college are transitional educational zones rather than separate school divisions with unique functions. The junior high school is generally admitted to be such a transitional unit; but the status of the junior college is not, as yet, so recognized. The vocational school, the "finishing school," the purely "cultural" college are, of course, narrowly specialized educational institutions which propose to give students a set of final adjustments at some specific level of intellection.

In each division of the school, it is obviously necessary that the student accumulate additional facts and information as a basis for more significant experiences. These enlargements of mental content must be classified, organized, evaluated and then integrated with the knowledge previously acquired. It is impossible, therefore, sharply to distinguish one stage of intellection from the others as the educative process matures; for, as in most developmental processes, socio-mental growth proceeds by imperceptible gradations. Moreover, the individual's intellectual development may be hastened or retarded by biological or environmental factors. The detailed schematization of local educational organization, therefore, is a function of the specialist in education rather than of the sociologist.

SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CURRICULA

Dewey insists that "the subject matter of education consists primarily of the meanings which supply content to existing social life."¹⁰ He establishes here a criterion for the selection of curricular materials which implies not only an original evaluation of subject matter but also its constant reëxamination and readjustment as social life changes. Certainly if education is to make individual socially competent, the curriculum must parallel changing social structures and procedures. The educator, therefore, must select and organize such educational materials as render the student's social milieu intelligible to him and hence prepare him for successful participation in social relations.

Sociologically conceived, the curriculum is neither an array of abstract courses of study for prospective technicians, a collection of intriguing apparatus for mental gymnasts, nor an accumulation of erudite fodder for intellectual prodigies. It is rather "a *program of activities* arranged with a view to achieving the educational goal,"¹¹ namely, an individual equipped for successful participation in the social relations of his environment at whatever level his abilities will permit. Such activities involve a progressive unfolding of the individual's capacities and their progressive socialization.

The relative social utility of the subject matter presented is, therefore, a legitimate test for all curricular offerings. That is, educational materials should be (a) those that function *frequently* in the life relations of the student as he moves from the simpler into the more complex relationships, (b) those that prepare him to meet successfully the more critical situations and more intricate interactions of adult life, (c) those that serve in many relations and situations and that are integrative in character, and (d) those that have a strong personal appeal to the learner because of their vital connection with his dominant interests. Such educational materials improve the individual's ability to deal effectively with situations, "to get along in his world," to cope successfully with the economic, political, domestic and religious problems of his immediate environment.

But these educational materials must have utility for the group as well as for the individual. "All subjects proposed for the curriculum must contribute to the perpetuation and improvement of such social and political life as we consider desirable. . . . The school should reveal higher and higher activities and make them both desired and to an extent possible."¹² To accomplish this purpose the curriculum must be based upon an inventory of the desirable characteristics of group members and upon a listing of desirable group activ-

¹⁰ *Op cit.*, p. 226.

¹¹ Soares, *op cit.*, p. 150.

¹² W. L. Uhl, *Principles of Secondary Education* (New York, 1925), pp. 675-676.

ities and objectives. Only thus can a curriculum which will make it possible for the school to pursue positive constructive ends be devised.

The curriculum can never be fixed or final. Changes in the subject matter of the educative process are not only inevitable but highly desirable as group life evolves and social interaction takes on new aspects and larger objectives. Moreover, specific materials are placed in new relationships to the educational objective as social life grows more complex. Obviously, the curriculum of an educational system devised to prepare the individual for socially competent participation in the social relations of a century or even two decades ago is inadequate to the complicated social situation presented by the present emergence of a new order from the social wreckage occasioned by the World War. Former subject matters may still have value in the present situation, but relative values may have shifted. Classical education could not meet the issues of a scientific and mechanical age, because it did not comprehend the social relations of a new order. The classical curriculum, that is, did not parallel an industrial civilization. Similarly, a purely "cultural" education cannot possibly meet the requirements of a highly specialized social situation because its conception of social relations is partial and hence inadequate. From the sociological standpoint, therefore, no subject matter justifies its inclusion in the curriculum until it reveals its social comprehension, its accommodation to changing social relationships and its contribution to a rich and effective social life.

When social principles determine educational policy, the problem of "required subjects" presents no insuperable difficulties, especially since the theory of formal discipline has been so greatly modified.¹³ It is obvious that the school should require (a) those subjects which provide the individual with the intellectual tools requisite to the development of his capacities, and (b) those educational materials which give him essential insight into his social relations. Prescription of any other subject reflects vested interests or personal bias. The disutility of such requirements has been rather clearly demonstrated by recent studies.¹⁴

Some recent trends in curriculum-making appear to take account of the social aspects and objectives of the educative process. These trends are: ¹⁵

1. the enrichment of the curriculum by adding new explorative studies and enlarging the content of the old, such as general science, economics, social problems and fine arts.

¹³ Compare, H. H. Horne, *Psychological Principles of Education* (New York, 1917), Ch. 6; E. L. Thorndike, *Principles of Teaching* (New York, 1906), p. 243; A. A. Douglass, *Secondary Education* (Boston, 1927), pp. 346-361.

¹⁴ See A. B. Crawford, *Incentives to Study* (New Haven, 1929), p. 113, for example.

¹⁵ Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 664.

2. a more critical sifting of materials and activities on the basis of their functional value; that is, materials which can be related to life are given preference in the curriculum.
3. differentiation in the content of particular subjects and the program as a whole to meet group needs and the social needs of the individual, as in "opportunity" classes, prevocational courses, and the like.
4. the increased emphasis upon social sciences.
5. the incorporation of extra-curricular activities into the regular school program.

Such trends reveal a broader conception of social relationships than that of the classical education which specialized in preparation for the so-called "learned professions" or for aristocratic social status. Explorative studies, guidance, vitalized materials, and differentiated courses indicate an attempt at enlarging socialization of the whole community. It is unfortunate that these trends have been so largely confined to public school education.

EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES

Recognition of the school's responsibility to provide the student with adequate opportunities for the practice of learning and for its utilization in life processes is also involved in the social conception of education. Culture cannot be imbibed, nor applied as a veneer. If the individual is to be socially effective, his education must have resulted in a development which unfolded, rather than encased, his personality. Such an unfolding is incomplete if it is confined to the intellectual processes; it is greatly enhanced and vitalized if it is practised in actual social relationships.

In the past, students have found such opportunities in activities carried on outside of the classroom. These have developed out of their own desires and efforts to vitalize knowledge; they have been pursued without recognition, encouragement or direction from teachers or administrators, without rewards of regular school credit, and apart from the regular school program. To be sure, some extra-curricular activities supplement the formal work of the curriculum with training which cannot now be fitted into the regular school routine, but recognition of the social nature of such activities and of the values they subserve, especially in social practice and in emotional direction, has given them a new educational status. It has been discovered that these values are in large part identical with those of the curricular program.¹⁶

Mr. F. J. H. Paul of the De Witt Clinton High School of New York City

¹⁶ E. H. Wilds, *Extra-Curricular Activities* (New York, 1926), pp. 30-32.

has developed the following classification of the educational values subserved by extra-curricular activities: ¹⁷

Individual values. These activities

1. Give the student a broader outlook on significance of each department of instruction, and the opportunity for the practical applications of principles learned therein;
2. Give the individual opportunity for specialization and the choice of a career;
3. Encourage the development of high standards of achievement;
4. Develop initiative and executive ability;

Group values.

1. Provide social objectives for all who coöperate in group activities;
2. Arouse desire for self-government and the sense of group responsibility for the selection of leaders on the basis of worth;
3. Create within the group a democratic public opinion that recognizes achievement and rejects accidental differences of birth and wealth;
4. Encourage group spirit of social service as the goal of school life.

The report of an investigation of extra-curricular programs made by the *American Educational Digest* presents a similar enumeration of the worthy contributions which these activities make to the educative process.

Extra-curricular programs, of course, involve socio-educational problems. That is, these activities do not produce values without cost, nor do they perfectly subserve the values they produce. After a study of the programs of 1,071 high schools, the *American Educational Digest* lists the following problems developing out of extra-curricular activities: ¹⁸ over-emphasis upon the extra-curricular program especially in athletics; development of false ideals (as a consequence); difficulty in securing competent faculty supervision and reasonable coöperation between faculty and students; inequalities of participation; excessive cost in money to students; neglect of curricular work; difficulty in finding sufficient time, space and equipment; elimination of outside interference; faculty domination; undesirable types of activities; financial difficulties arising from budgeting, failure to operate within the budget, and inadequate financial support.

These problems, however, are not peculiar to extra-curricular programs; they are inherent in the educative process. In spite of these difficulties, there-

¹⁷ F. J. H. Paul, "Student Organizations and the Development of Character," *National Education Association Addresses and Proceedings*, Vol. 60 (Washington, 1922).

¹⁸ Wilds, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-79.

fore, extensive programs of extra-curricular activities are increasingly fostered and supervised (especially in the high school) as an essential aspect of school organization, because it is now generally admitted that "only in a stimulating school society can an efficient training for social action be given."¹⁹

CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF THE SCHOOL

The social organization of the educative process in the school also prescribes the rôles which are played by each of its human factors, namely, the administrator, the teacher and the pupil.

Rôles of the School Administrator

The interactions of teacher and pupil, of course, have always evidenced the educative process; indeed, they antedate the establishment of the school. In early times, the rôles of the teacher were assumed by certain adult members of the family, the clan, or the tribe. The especial rôles of the school administrator were not developed until the school became an institution. As an essential element in educational organization, the administrator now plays the following rôles:

1. *An executive.* As such he is concerned with the selection of teachers and staff, the supervision of instruction and discipline, the organization of playgrounds and extra-curricular activities; with budget-making and school accounting, both instructional and financial. That is, he is concerned with the operation of the school *as it is*.

2. *An educational statesman.* The school administrator is here involved in the formulation of educational policies, the progressive organization of the curriculum and the facilities for its presentation, the development of appropriate types and methods of instruction, and the education of school boards and boards of trustees or regents. In short, he is the community's leader in educational matters. As such he is concerned with the school *as it ought to be*.

The administrator, of course, often delegates certain aspects of these rôles to others; but the responsibility for their effective performance is his alone.

Rôles of the Teacher

In general it is the function of the teacher to manipulate the environment of the pupil in such a way as to give him those experiences which will be most useful to him in the social relations of mature life. Moreover, the teacher should arrange situations so that the learner is given these experiences in the order in which he can profit most by them. For the most part, therefore, the

¹⁹ Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 691.

teacher is neither master nor instructor in the ordinary meaning of these terms. The normal learning processes should be relevant to the individual and social needs of the pupil. It is not the teacher's function to meet the pupil's needs for him but to assist him to develop the ability to meet them for himself.

The teacher, then, plays the following rôles:

1. *A director of experience.* It is the teacher's part to organize and direct the student's exploration of the social heritage; to interpret the wisdom and the accumulated experience of the race; to confront the learner with situations which will make knowledge necessary; and to utilize the student's natural aptitudes so that he forms the habits and develops the skills necessary to effective participation in social relations. The teacher, hence, is first of all a guide and a supervisor.

2. *An exemplar.* The immature take their ideals from persons whom they like or admire and whose approval they crave. The teacher is usually such a person. He is in a position, therefore, to "interpret and transmit to the next generation the fundamental ethical norms that compose the social conscience,"²⁰ especially if he possesses an appealing personality. If the teacher is likable, his ideals are adopted by his pupils, irrespective of their merits, particularly when the pupil's intellection is not yet capable of evaluation. The employment or retention of teachers who combine good character with attractive personality is, then, an important administrative problem because attitudes, values, and standards are involved in the relationship of teacher and student. Necessarily the teacher is an interpreter of life.

3. *A leader.* The teacher is not only an exemplar; he is also an inspirer. He "has a clear vision of something to be done, is able to give a few good reasons for doing it, and rests content with keeping these persistently in the attention of the group."²¹ Because of his poise, his penetration, his infectious enthusiasm, his gift of inspiring loyalties, and instilling confidence and self-reliance, the teacher gains a prestige which makes it possible for him to liberate and coördinate the energy of the group for social ends.

4. *An authority.* The teacher is also "a medium of communication between the pupil's mind and subject matter; the mediator between impersonal truth and personal life."²² The teacher is a man set apart to learn, to study, to think, to inquire, to question, to conclude—one whose thinking on the matters he considers should therefore be better than that of others. He possesses authority because of the integrity of his thinking, his vital experience, his comprehension of his subject matter, its relationship to the larger curriculum,

²⁰ J. M. Mecklin, *Introduction to Social Ethics* (New York, 1920), p. 292.

²¹ I. King, *The Social Aspects of Education* (New York, 1915), Ch. 17.

²² Horne, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

its social objectives, and the significance of his task. However, "the genuine teacher wants fellows, not disciples, and his happiest hour is when he finds that the cub he has trained is now able to hold him at bay."²³

5. *A disciplinarian.* "Companionship alone will never lift the child to the highest plane of development."²⁴ Neither can the teacher accomplish this if he is always stern and distant. But he must set tasks appropriate to the capacities of his pupils, hold them to the accomplishment of assignments, establish standards of achievement and motivate students to the realization of such standards. He must also restrain behavior inconsistent with educational objectives, reward behavior conducive to desired ends, develop habits of concentration and the power of persistent and consistent application; inculcate judgment, and oversee the acquisitive process.

6. *A public agent.* Often the teacher forgets that he is the agent of a group. In fact he is selected by a group to serve it as a specialist in the performance of an expert function. He is therefore subject to the will of the group; he is under obligation "to propagate what the dominant majority approve and to win the minority over to it."²⁵ It follows that "as a public servant he has no rights of teaching that which seems good or true to him quite irrespective of the collective opinions or valuations of society, or the largely controlling majority thereof, which he serves."²⁶ He is not to be restrained, however, from indicating what seems to be error, misjudgment, mistaken policy, exploitation or bad administration; but if the group which employs him cannot be convinced, then he should withdraw from its service and "undertake propaganda in his private capacity," or attach himself to a more congenial group.

Rôles of the Pupil

The pupil, of course, is the object of the educative process. In part, therefore, his rôles will be coördinate to those of the teacher.

1. *An explorer.* The pupil plays the rôle of an explorer as he acquires the lore of the race. The mores, folkways, customs, traditions, attitudes, achievements of groups are examined for their own sake, but particularly, for their meanings in the personal experience of the pupil. Thus the individual acquaints himself with the intellectual resources of his social order and with the emotional content of experience. The student's rôle of an explorer is the counterpart of the teacher's rôle as a director of experience.

2. *An imitator.* Because of his original equipment for great impulsive activ-

²³ E. A. Ross, *Social Psychology* (New York, 1912), p. 85.

²⁴ M. J. O'Shea, *Social Development and Education* (Boston, 1909), p. 344.

²⁵ Peters, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

²⁶ D. Snedden, *Civic Education* (New York, 1922), p. 276.

ity, the child acquires by both conscious and unconscious imitation. Imitative behavior brings him satisfaction when he finds that impersonation of his elders and his heroes is encouraging, amusing, stimulating. In simulating others the child really becomes himself, rather than another, for he is merely exploring, impulsively and unreflectively, various sorts of activity in order that he may discover which yields the most satisfaction. He thus "acquires a new facility for muscular coördination, a new skill, and in so far he becomes a person."²⁷ As he grows older, he consciously imitates the skills, attitudes, abilities, ways of thinking, feeling and behaving, which seem to him prerequisite to successful social interaction. The teacher guides the student in this exemplification of the folkways of his group. The student, in turn, copies the especial attributes of the teacher whom he admires and whose approval he desires.

3. *A follower.* The successful teacher first stirs the student's intellectual and emotional interest in the social heritage, then leads him through this selected experience. He thus learns the elementary lessons in followership (and in leadership) by reproducing the methods and procedures of the teacher. In his associative school experience, he acquires the rules of the game, the ability to coördinate his activity with that of others in securing group, personal and institutional objectives. Thus he learns to lead in some activities, to follow in others; he learns when to follow and how, when to lead and how. Those who have no capacity for leadership may, through memoriter training, develop an ability to participate successfully in social relationships through deliberate followership. This seems to be the social rôle especially of the duller intellects.²⁸

4. *A learner.* If education is a process by which knowledge is acquired, and if knowledge is merely accumulated experience, it follows that the student is engaged in a process of reëxperiencing what the group has established as worth knowing. He thus becomes a learner, since he lives through again the experience of his ancestors. This the teacher seeks to accomplish when students are induced to put themselves in the place of the original actors who settled the Mississippi Valley, fought the Civil War, abolished slavery, or introduced the factory system. By various means the learner identifies himself with the processes which yield him a knowledge of vital human relations. Indeed it is held that "nobody has knowledge unless he has entered into the original experiences that have been handed down as knowledge."²⁹ The significance

²⁷ Soares, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

²⁸ R. L. Finney, *A Sociological Philosophy of Education* (New York, 1929), pp. 406-407.

²⁹ Soares, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

of extra-curricular as well as certain curricular activities becomes apparent at this point.

EDUCATIONAL METHODS SOCIOLOGICALLY CONSIDERED

As indicated above, the sociologist is not primarily concerned with educational methods; nor is he usually qualified to discuss them. He is interested in the social objectives of education and in the social functioning of the school. Any method which furthers social ends is, so far as he is concerned, both justifiable and desirable. It is the especial function of the educationist to determine what methods are appropriate to, and effective for, these social ends. With his knowledge of the mental processes and of the motivation of human behavior; his ways of measuring capacity, of uncovering aptitudes and attitudes, of eliciting enthusiasms and loyalties, of determining the comparative effectiveness of these methods when applied to the various age-groups, he, rather than the sociologist, must devise the procedures for accomplishing specific educational purposes.

From the sociological standpoint it is only necessary (a) that students secure a full development of personality so that they are able to participate effectively in social relations and to contribute significantly to group achievement; (b) that the school be maintained as a social, rather than as an academic, institution; (c) that the curriculum should afford students social opportunity and guidance; (d) that the social organization of the school should parallel the stages of intellection and furnish students with the equipment necessary to successful functioning in the social situation on a level commensurate with his abilities; (e) that the educative process should not only develop but also integrate individual differences and cultivate individual similarities; and (f) that educational materials should always be regarded not as ends in themselves but as means to an end, namely, the complete social adjustment of an enriched life.

In short, education is a matter of vital social relationships. It cannot be separated from the social interaction either of persons or of groups of persons actually living *in communities*. Specific subjects, specific items of learning, specific educational methods, specific school facilities are necessarily related to these fundamental social facts. And "if *teaching* is to have any real share in *education*, it must learn, somehow, to work inside the experiences of those being taught and not forever hang on the periphery of experience, piously hoping that something may happen inside."³⁰

³⁰ J. K. Hart, *Light from the North* (New York, 1927), p. xiii.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. List the advantages and the disadvantages of (a) the learning process of the school, (b) learning by experience.
2. Secure statistics which show the percentages of students who complete the eighth grade, the high school, the college, and those who go on to professional schools. What do these statistics indicate with respect to the social obligations of the school?
3. Examine the validity of the social principles which should underlie the organization of the educational system.
4. How may the school discipline the emotions? Should it? Give reasons.
5. It is claimed that even the restated theory of formal discipline does not answer the question "Why secure training by an indirect method when it can be secured directly?" Do you agree? Give reasons.
6. How do extra-curricular activities give "emotional direction"? Illustrate.
7. "Educational administration should be undertaken only by those especially trained for its specialized functions." Do you agree? What are your reasons?
8. What are the characteristics of the "great" teacher? of "great" teaching?
9. Is teaching an art or a science? Explain.
10. Does the teacher's responsibility extend beyond the classroom? Why or why not?
11. Do teachers fail more frequently from lack of information, lack of training, or lack of personality? Significance?
12. Should teachers "chum" or "hobnob" with students? Give reasons.
13. What did Professor Palmer have in mind when he said that the ideal teacher is characterized by "a readiness to be forgotten"?
14. Comment: "What we need is not great schools but great men."
15. "The grouping of children in school classes on the basis of intelligence (test scores) will favor the bright child at the expense of the dull, and will eventually create an undemocratic and intellectual caste system in America." Do you agree? Give reasons.
16. Discuss the school as a social center.

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CHAPTER X

SOCIAL EVALUATION OF MODERN EDUCATION

THE chaos of modern education is the natural result of the changed social relations brought about by the Industrial Revolution. The extensive application of the machine to the economic process has wrought a profound metamorphosis in social interaction and in social attitudes. Impersonal relations, minute specialization of function, intricate interdependence, increased risk in and uncertainty of status, marked extremes in wealth and poverty, social stratification on an economic basis, the growth of a collective individualism which insists upon individual rights but only group responsibility—these, among other factors, have presented the school with a social situation radically different from any that preceded it. Confusion and disorder have developed in the educational system because it is not adapted to the new order.

In coping with this changed social situation the modern educator has attempted to meet the educational problems of a machine age by the application of machine methods to the educative process. Accordingly he has devised mechanical educational techniques and applied the methods of large-scale production to intellection in the expectation that such techniques and methods would produce results in the educative process similar to those which these devices have produced in the productive process. Educationists have thus sought to parallel the new social situation by paralleling its economic aspect only. The natural consequence, of course, is a social institution misshapen, in travail and hence, inadequate to the social need it subserves.

This pathological condition is indicated by certain outstanding, symptomatic characteristics.

Confusion with Respect to Objectives

Monroe boldly states that "in our own country the views concerning secondary education as to its purpose, scope, curriculum, method or organization are of the most diverse character even among those who are specialists in the field."¹ And there is abundant evidence that this condition is not confined to secondary education. In fact there is no consensus of opinion either with

¹ P. Monroe, *Principles of Secondary Education* (New York, 1914), pp. 1-2.

respect to the purpose, scope, curriculum, method or organization of higher education, especially of the college. This confusion has been "worse confounded," no doubt, because the attempt scientifically to determine the objectives of education has been so largely confined to a study of minute job analysis or the detailed particularization of attitudes, knowledge, skills and habits. The larger aspects of the problem have been generally overlooked in this careful application of the technical procedures of the industrial world. Specialists in education, for example, have distinguished as many as 160 activity-ability objectives² and as many as 200 significant cultural subdivisions³ which should claim the attention of the school. Only recently has any significant attempt been made to determine educational objectives by an investigation, first, of the more fundamental social needs of people, and then, of the specific knowledge and skills necessary to the satisfaction of those needs.⁴ Consequently, modern educational institutions are largely schools of learning, concerned primarily with the conservation and further accumulation of knowledge as such, rather than its social utilization in the development of personality and in the facilitation of individual and group achievement.

Application of Machine Methods to a Non-mechanical Process

It is patent that the educative process is concerned with sentient, not insentient, materials which vary widely in attributes, services and potentialities. To apply similar mechanical devices to a process which turns out screws, automobile parts or canned tomatoes and a process which seeks to develop human personality is obviously ridiculous. Yet this is precisely what is attempted when education is described in terms of a rigid curriculum, proficiency in which is tested by the new type of examination. Ability to participate effectively in social relations cannot possibly be discovered in answers to completion tests, a true and false examination or any combination of such procedures. It must be remembered that subjects should be "centers of a comprehensive outlook on life."⁵ No mechanical yardstick can measure the dimensions of such an element.

Especially does the inappropriateness of machine methods appear when, in educational organization, thirty or forty children are impounded in a single classroom and required to move in lockstep through the mazes of the various formal disciplines; or when a thousand university students are regularly

² F. Bobbitt, *How to Make a Curriculum* (Boston, 1924), Ch. 2.

³ C. C. Peters, *Foundations of Educational Sociology* (New York, 1924), pp. 378-381.

⁴ J. C. Chapman and G. S. Counts, *Principles of Education* (Boston, 1924), p. 194.

⁵ B. H. Bode, *Modern Educational Theories* (New York, 1927), p. 298.

herded into a large auditorium to listen to the lectures of their professor. Such procedures cannot secure a reëxperience of the social heritage. Genuine education utilizes the methods of handicraft rather than factory. It is folly to proceed as if it would be otherwise provided educators wished it fervently enough.

Indeed, "it has come about that means for the exact testing of results in education have been confined almost wholly to certain (intellectual) aspects of the learning process to the neglect of the equally important socializing aspects of the educative process."⁶ "Important non-intellectual abilities not only enter significantly into personality but also powerfully condition its social efficiency, namely: "initiative, persistence, ambition, tact, social insight, coöperative ability, aesthetic appreciations and such fundamental moral qualities as fairness, sympathy, tolerance, and reverence."⁷ From the sociological point of view, therefore, tests of socialization are as essential as tests of learning, because successful participation in social relations involves the use of skills and knowledge in the formation of judgments and in the direction of activities. Incidentally the weakness of the large university lies just here. Because of the scale of its operations, its conglomerate student body lacks the face-to-face contacts of the smaller group and affords but scanty practice in the formation of social judgments or in the direction of social interaction.

Another unfortunate development in the application of machine methods to the educative process is the attempt to educate on a large scale. Since education is a highly desirable "good," especially in a society organized on a democratic basis, the notion arises that schools must be multiplied and education increased in amount. In other words, democracy in education has been taken to imply that more and more people must go to school for longer and longer periods of time—this all irrespective of the capacity of the people concerned to profit by a more prolonged training. Here is a precise counterpart of quantity production poured upon a favorable market with no regard to its ability to absorb.

But "the cause of education is not advanced merely by multiplying schools."⁸ Unless consideration is given to the capacities of the people to be educated and the kind of education needed to render them socially efficient, there is no point in increasing the amount of education. Overproduction is certainly possible in education. It is usually evidenced by "systematic dawdling," "by stressing the sensational and appealing aspects of subject matter," and by the growth of extra-curricular activities.

⁶ W. R. Smith, *Principles of Educational Sociology* (Boston, 1928), p. 439.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 440.

⁸ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1930), p. 490.

- Again, the use of machine methods in education will, of course, have its influence upon the rôles of administrator and teacher. The former become mere money-getters, publicity agents, and politicians, who promote their institutions as business enterprises. The latter assume the rôles of "instruction foremen who assign lessons in books and listen to recitations with their eyes on assigned pages." ⁹ Or they deliver lectures compiled from excerpts of standard (or sometimes obscure) treatises. Such persons are able to teach what they know, but it is obvious that they cannot develop the student's eagerness to learn or his aptness in accommodation to social situations. Yet it is the latter rather than the former that is the essence of education.

In the mechanized educative process, much emphasis is placed upon the departmentalization of knowledge and the enthronement of the specialist who jealously guards his domain against the encroachments of aggressive colleagues. Like men in the different departments of a large business organization, these specialists regard group policies only from their single and limited viewpoint. They reject the approaches of all others as antagonistic rather than as complementary to their own. Every such specialist insists that his department is absolutely fundamental to the achievement of the institution, and that all others are mere adjuncts. When new departures are proposed, such specialists regard them as unwarranted attempts of well-meaning but uninformed persons to subvert "true education." Thus, the school marks time because its personnel has become "too specialized to take one another's viewpoint or to work together smoothly." ¹⁰

But, more significantly still, the curriculum of such an educational institution is rigidly departmentalized, and requirements are drawn up not in the interests of the student but to satisfy the claims of jealous specialists whose capacity or vision does not extend beyond the confines of their limited fields of concentration. Knowledge is not synthesized for the student; he is given no "comprehensive outlook on life." The school has merely presented him with unrelated bodies of facts or opinions which lack any significant correlation to the major processes of social interaction.

The total result of these attempts to apply the principles of business organization to the educative process is an *educational* determinism which accentuates rather than mitigates the *economic* determinism which stratifies the present social order. Mechanical educational devices are used to separate children into groups ranging from the duller to the brightest; then the educative process is modified for the former and elaborated for the latter. Limited opportunity is given the duller to share, through imitative participation, in the

⁹ J. K. Hart, *Light from the North* (New York, 1927), p. 110.

¹⁰ E. A. Ross, *Outlines of Sociology* (New York, 1923), p. 198.

cultural resources of civilization. On the contrary it is often arbitrarily assumed that they must be assigned to society's technical tasks because they are believed to be incapable of non-technical activities. Lack of capacity to function creatively does not preclude imitative participation in cultural resources.¹¹ Education, nevertheless, allows itself to become the handmaiden of such social stratification.

Educational Faddism

Even when educational methods are not avowedly "scientific," there is much unintelligent experimentation in education. In fact, educational experiments frequently disclose, even to the casual observer, all the ear-marks of fads pursued with the zeal which always characterizes such phenomena. Within the educational experience of a single teacher, there has been a rapid succession of such experiments, each of which was eagerly followed for a time, then promptly and quietly discarded for another. The following is a partial list of such experiments: the ideal system, the Montessori method, the Batavia system, the socialized recitation, standardization, supervised study, the project method, and the contract system. Each of these experiments appears to represent a single educational principle. The difficulty in each case seems to have been that a single principle was believed to embrace the entire complex educative process. Each of these "systems" or "methods," however, was advanced as an application of science to education.

Again, when education is based upon "the new psychology" there is a mis-marriage of intelligent procedure; for education is then conceived as habit formation and learning as mere repetition. From this point of view the educative process resembles animal training; indeed educative procedures are based upon results obtained from a series of psychological experiments with animals, such as rats learning to get out of a cage, dogs reacting to bells and meat. Such education "proceeds upon the assumption that *insight into the situation* is not necessary to learning, for the mind consists of what it has learned, that is, it is the product of environment."¹² Education thus becomes a means of facilitating passive adaptation to an environment which can be described in elemental terms. But "education has to do with insight, with valuing, with understanding, with the development of the power of discriminating, the ability to make choices amongst the possibilities of experience, and to think and act in ways that distinguish men from animals and higher men from lower."¹³

¹¹ R. L. Finney, *A Sociological Philosophy of Education* (New York, 1926), p. 409 ff.

¹² E. D. Martin, *The Meaning of a Liberal Education* (New York, 1926), p. 41. By permission of W. W. Norton & Company.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

Again, the methods of modern classroom procedure are such as to render the educative process largely an interaction between the instructor and the student. Papers are written *by* the student *for* the instructor, read and marked *by* him, discussed, if at all, *with* him. Recitations are carried on between these two with other students usually playing the rôle of disinterested onlookers. Thus, contact of mind with mind is greatly limited, and the student misses the experience of the interplay with his peers so characteristic of out-of-the-school relations. At its worst, such procedures result in a "pen and pencil education"¹⁴ which merely requires student to hand in at stated times written answers to questions from books or to pass examinations on notes taken from lectures or assigned readings. Since such methods do not "root down into any fundamental educational principle," the student secures no *vital* experience.

Modern education is too private a procedure. Its methods often preclude the development of the student's ability to evaluate educational materials. Where the discussion method is used in the classroom presentation of subject matter the student is asked to answer questions or to solve problems upon which he has had no opportunity either to cogitate or to gather either opinion or information. Consequently he is required to render snap judgments: indeed he eventually acquires the habit of approaching social situations with a calm faith in his ability to meet them on the spot without previous thought or preparation. Opportunism becomes his dominant attitude toward all group problems, especially toward the affairs of state, when the increasing complexity of the social order requires precisely the opposite attribute.

Sectarianism

Scholars vigorously criticize religionists for their unreasonable insistence upon adherence to specific creeds and their deliberate construction of rigid denominational barriers. Yet scholars are quite as guilty of sectarianism as the churchmen whom they castigate. Witness the bitter conflicts between various "schools" of scientific thought or the assumption of authority by the professor who refuses to recommend for degrees students whose thinking does not square with his "pet" theories. Likewise, school superintendents and principals who have espoused some educational fad usually proceed to classify students as inadequate unless they are able to measure up to the particular, and frequently peculiar, standards advanced by the faddist. Such procedures represent an assumption of finality as arbitrary as that of the ecclesiastic.

Educational sectarianism is also illustrated by the so-called classical educators who insist that an understanding of one's own civilization is always best

¹⁴ A. W. Burr, "Pen and Pencil Education," *Journal of Education* (December 26, 1927), pp. 637-639.

secured by the study of ancient or other civilizations rather than the one in which the individual is then participating. This point of view overlooks the unique features of contemporary civilization. Moreover, to comprehend the development of a civilization is one thing; to understand how to function successfully in it, with it, through it, is quite another. It is true that we must delve deeply into the thought and experience of the past if we are to understand the thought and attitudes of the present. But this guarantees only a knowledge of present trends; it does not teach us how to control or direct present social interaction.

In other words, it is assumed by the classicists that what has enriched the life of those who lived in an earlier, simpler social order has thereby demonstrated its efficiency for the newer order as it emerges. Historically speaking, the education of the Greeks proved inadequate to the social needs of Roman civilization. Roman education was in turn, inadequate to the civilization of the Middle Ages. And, notwithstanding the Renaissance, the education of the medieval period is inadequate to social order of modern times. The value of all educational material, therefore, must be reexamined as civilization changes. Background is always desirable, indeed necessary, but adjustment to the relationships of the modern order requires more than background.

The classicists also maintain that the student's capacities are best developed by the method of *indirection*. They hold that Latin, Greek and Mathematics are the studies which involve all the thought processes necessary to the solution of the social, political and economic problems of the present. This contention cannot be demonstrated experimentally; neither can it justify the time and energy spent on pure method which might be spent on materials which give both the content and the method requisite to effective participation in the social relations of a complex social order.

The rift between the culturalists and the vocationalists is another evidence of sectarianism in education. Assuming that the typical day of the average man's life may be devoted a third to work, a third to leisure, and a third to sleep, it is obvious that education, sociologically considered, must prepare the individual for effective participation in the social relationships of both work and of leisure. That is, its purpose is preparation for effective work, for effective leisure, and for *all* the important relations of his social situation. Quality of performance is its objective, whether the interactions are social, political, economic, religious or recreational.

On the one hand, the so-called cultural education disavows any attempt to qualify the individual for the hours of work except by indirection. On the other hand, vocational education assumes no responsibility for the individual's leisure. As modern machinery decreases the human work requirement, it

is, of course, important that education should concern itself with the enhancement of the quality of leisure; but it is also to be noted that improved mechanical technique has speeded up the work process and forced men to compete with machines. At the same time, a higher standard of living is required along with greater production. And forsooth, this same mechanical technique throws men out of work frequently and for distressingly long periods of time. Education should reckon with such factors in the social situation as well as with increased leisure.

It is plain, therefore, that it is a serious blunder to assume that preparation for leisure and its social relations is also preparation for the social relations involved in the pursuit of vocation, and that the latter relations can hence be allowed to take care of themselves. Moreover, the cultural college has not, as yet, been able to guarantee that its graduates will devote their increased leisure to study of great literature or to perfection in the fine arts, rather than to "violent bridge" and hectic motoring. Socially, at least, it is the first business of a good citizen that he be an efficient producer and breadwinner—for "the making of a decent living for himself and family is the *sine qua non* of making a life that is worthy of the name."¹⁵

As a matter of fact, it is impossible to distinguish cultural from vocational subject matter. Of the students in a course in the history of art, some will utilize the educational materials presented to develop their appreciative abilities; some will make the course a part of their preparation for a career in commercial art. Similarly, some students study Shakespeare because he wrote great literature; others because they expect to earn a living by the teaching of English. A "cultured gentleman" will become interested in manual training, not because he hopes to be a cabinet-maker, but because furniture-making is his dominant avocational interest. Again, a knowledge of accounting may prepare one to become an accountant or an auditor, or it may facilitate an understanding of the present economic order. The significant fact is that the *same subject matter is covered in each course, irrespective of the application which the student later makes of the materials presented.*

It is high time, therefore, that these sectarian attitudes and procedures be deliberately unmasked in education as in religion. Indeed, such divisive issues should be dropped because they lack meaning. If any vital problem emerges here, it is not the problem of careful separation of sheep from goats but the proper coördination and integration of their activities. Once more, the primary question is: does the material utilized present and does its method of presen-

¹⁵ J. L. Gillin and F. W. Blackman, *Outlines of Sociology* (New York, 1930), pp. 556-557.

tation facilitate "a comprehensive outlook on life" or subserve vital human relations?

Incompetent Personnel

In 1922 Bagley claimed that four fifths of all our teachers are to be classified as either quite untrained or deplorably mistrained.¹⁶ Teaching, according to Cross, presents a sharp contrast to other professions. Says he: ¹⁷

The usual preparation for law, medicine, architecture and engineering is eight years above the eighth grade. The men and women who educate themselves for these professions expect to work a life time in the profession for which they fit themselves. The public does not trust its health, its disputes, its buildings, its engineering projects to boys and girls of eighteen; but it does entrust to such untrained youths what is vastly more important: the training of the next generation of the citizens of the republic.

Yet the American teacher, especially in the secondary schools, is not only immature and poorly trained (fifty per cent of those employed in rural schools have had no training beyond the high school); ¹⁸ but he undertakes teaching either as temporary employment until marriage (women) or a more lucrative business position (men) releases his dominant interests. Or, he utilizes teaching as an employment in which money may be earned for other professional training. The inevitable consequence is a transient and inexperienced personnel. In fact, one third of the teachers in rural schools leave the calling every year. Their places must, of course, be filled with new recruits. It is not surprising, therefore, that the median salary for all teachers in rural schools in 1921-1922 was \$774.¹⁹ A low social status necessarily attends such underpayment. The qualifications of the urban teacher, except in the larger cities, are only perceptibly higher. The professional aspects of education apparently do not vary significantly with situation.

The teacher, however, is not solely responsible for his incompetency. The amount of training and its availability are usually beyond the control of the individuals who anticipate a teaching career. Moreover, the training which is available is seriously deficient. The teachers of the secondary schools are trained merely in subject matter and the methods of its presentation (chiefly the latter). Teacher-training institutions make little effort to prepare pros-

¹⁶ W. C. Bagley, *Proceedings of the Fifth National Country Life Conference* (Chicago, 1922), p. 41.

¹⁷ E. A. Cross, "The Truth about Teachers," *The Yale Review*, Vol. IX (July, 1920), p. 747. Copyright, Yale University Press.

¹⁸ N. L. Sims, *Elements of Rural Sociology* (New York, 1928), p. 307.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 310-313.

pective teachers to meet the disciplinary problems which present themselves in every phase of education. Yet efficient teaching, sociologically considered, requires not only knowledge on the teacher's part, but especially his ability to vitalize it in the student's reëxperience of it. This is only accomplished when the student is held to sustained application and progressive educational achievement.

Moreover, the training of the teacher for a career in higher education is not only similarly deficient, but it is also almost perverse. The requisite for positions in college and universities is increasingly the possession of advanced degrees awarded for proficiency not in teaching but in research. That is, these degrees bear witness of the ability of the prospective teacher to comprehend a limited subject matter so thoroughly that he can make an original contribution which will extend the boundaries of knowledge in that particular field. But it must be obvious, even to the untutored, that such training does not adequately develop the individual's ability to play the rôles of the teacher. Indeed such training may preclude the development of teaching ability. Yet, as specialization in education proceeds, the possession of such training is increasingly emphasized.

Adaptive Lag

The conditions cited above offer sufficient explanations for the school's failure to keep up with its environment. The social situation has changed completely since the broad outlines of the American educational system were conceived and its fundamental policies determined. No longer is economic opportunity abundant; no longer does the social ladder reach upward without limit. On the contrary, not only is the competition for the horny-handed jobs increasingly bitter, but the struggle for the white-collared positions also grows more relentless each year. The rapid development of machine industry and steadily mounting unemployment indicate a new economic order involving changed social relations. An educational system based upon the assumption that there is unlimited economic opportunity for all, especially the educated, is therefore pathetically obsolete. -

And yet educators continue to devote their energies to the consideration of the mechanics of teaching, of curriculum making, of schedule organization, and neglect the vital purpose of the educative process. That is, broad educational objectives have received less and specific educational devices have received more attention until the school too often resembles a factory operated under a system of scientific management. In other words, the social relations to which the school should bring adjustment have taken on new and different aspects, while the schoolmaster has been refining his former techniques. The

result is that the school which, more than other institutions, should keep abreast of its civilization, find itself preparing its students for a set of social relations no longer prevalent.

Defective Curriculum

The attempt has been made to demonstrate that "if the school is to function vitally its program of studies must epitomize the civilization itself—omitting only such parts of it as the social process will transmit automatically through social participation—and including no extraneous material."²⁰ If this principle is valid, sociologically, then in the making of the curriculum attention must be given to the *relative* value of educational materials in preparing the student for effective participation in social relations.

In the application of these principles, it should be observed that the students who come up through the secondary educational periods are no longer immature in that they lack experience. Modern youth is often more experienced than its elders, especially when account is taken not only of the range of activity now freely open to youth but also of the funds of information which are set before students in the earlier school years. But young people, to-day, are immature "in the sense that the possibilities which lie before them have so expanded that they are comparatively far from complete initiation into all that education and life have to offer."²¹ They are also immature in their abilities for self-direction, in familiarity with modes of thought, in social insight, and in balance of experience. It is obvious that this type of immaturity is not reached when educational materials are presented by the lecture method and tested by the new type of examination.

In the application of social principles to the curriculum, it must also be noted that much present curriculum making is based upon conceptions of the *absolute* rather than the *relative* value of certain subject matters. Formal instruction in English composition is a case in point. Numerous themes are required of students who lack the mental content to give substance and vitality to their compositions. Tests given at the end of such courses seldom show significant achievement. Again "higher mathematics is, in fact, a (technical) tool of specialists; it is not even a part of the common intellectual equipment of the most intellectual."²² It has little to do with common social relations. Modern languages, likewise, are tool subjects, of service to the few who need

²⁰ R. L. Finney, *A Sociological Philosophy of Education* (New York, 1929), pp. 165-166.

²¹ C. H. Judd, "The Curriculum and the Junior College," W. S. Gray (ed.), *The Junior College Curriculum* (Chicago), 1929, pp. 3.

²² Finney, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-174.

or desire to comprehend the thought of certain groups of people as it has been expressed in their literatures. Similarly, it is not possible to justify the prescription of laboratory courses in science on the grounds that every student should be familiar with the scientific method as exemplified in the performance of experiments. Such a position is logical only when absolute values are considered; for relatively few people, indeed, can utilize the laboratory method in solving the problems of their social relations. Scientific knowledge, of course, is available to all without the necessity of many hours spent in the laboratory repeating the experiments of the scientists. It follows, therefore, that a curriculum which not only includes heavy requirements in these subjects but repeats such prescriptions in successive divisions of school organization is a defective curriculum when successful participation in social relations is the objective sought. The retention of such requirements in the modern curriculum often evidences ultra-conservatism and vested interest. It may also indicate that the policy of prescription has developed out of interest in *teaching subjects* rather than in the *training of pupils*.

Separation of Extra-curricular from Curricular Activities

As extra-curricular activities are organized at present, they are pursued as ends in themselves or as a catharsis from the sustained discipline of curricular activities. Under such conditions they are not integrated with the educative process of the school but are, for the most part, carried on separately and independently of it. If the social analysis is correct, these activities should be engaged in as an application of the principles developed in curricular studies because they afford the student opportunity to reexperience what has been set forth in the more formal subject matters, or to apply directly in experience the knowledge presented there.

The effective administration of extra-curricular activities involves at least two problems, namely: (1) the promotion of a sufficient number and variety of student enterprises to cover the whole range of youthful interests and thus to stimulate universal participation; and (2) the development of means of supervision and control which will guard against abuses and juvenile ineptitude without taking from students the initiative, spontaneity, and sense of responsibility which constitute the chief educational values of student organizations.²⁸

Failure to coördinate extra-curricular and curricular activities and to administer them effectively has resulted in significant educational loss; for "there is a kind of poetic vengeance that as the result of our refusal to incorporate

²⁸ Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 692.

large areas of youthful interest in our recognized educational program, the young people have excluded intellectual subjects from what they call their 'activities.' ”²⁴

Educational Misdirection

When education is administered on the assumption that present needs can be met by transmitting the past unchanged, schools become agencies which provide “the grammar of assent, not a logic of inquiry. The mental posture they habituate in youth is the posture of conformity. They require belief, not investigation. They impose reverence for the past, not a new creation of it.”²⁵ Schools thus become mere instruments of self-reproduction without variation. This may be the especial defect of free public education because it is so much under the control of dominant political interests; but it is not entirely absent from the functioning of the privately endowed institution where instruction may be purchased for a price and where the purchasers may dictate the character of the instruction they purchase.

Since education is a public enterprise, it cannot completely escape political determination. Indeed public control is an essential aspect of an activity which is the expression of a group will and a group purpose. But clap-trap, partizanship and the use of public resource for the promotion of private interest are as likely to characterize this phase of political activity as any other. An educational statesmanship supported by constructive group opinion is hence necessary to the effective social functioning of the school.

The group should protect itself against another but very different type of educational misdirection which appears with increasing frequency as education expands. In its attempt to make up for deficient homes and ineffective churches the school may take on so many activities that it duplicates the more fundamental functioning of well-regulated homes and dynamic churches. This is both an unnecessary and an unwise duplication of effort. Basic social institutions should not compete but should supplement each other in any common function, especially where such competition requires the performance at public expense of functions which other specialized* institutions discharge without cost to the group. Nor should any educational enterprise make excessive demands upon the time and energy of the young people whom it serves. The claims of other institutions are legitimate and must not be ignored.

Negative Student Attitudes

It is probable that negative student attitudes are, in large part, the result,

²⁴ T. G. Soares, *Religious Education* (Chicago, 1928), p. 151.

²⁵ Dr. Kallen quoted by Martin, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76.

directly or indirectly, of some of the pathological conditions already described; yet no analysis of the defects of modern education should overlook this factor.

First, many students maintain an attitude of indifference toward the educative process of the school. This attitude is especially prevalent in the later phases of secondary education when the students become impatient to assume the activities of the work-a-day world yet are required to attend school. For them education is not an opportunity to be embraced but a sentence to be served. Of course, much is being done in the lower secondary school to challenge the pupil's interest, but little has been done in the upper secondary school to vitalize study. It is certain that this attitude of indifference is due, in no small part, to requirements which force the student to repeat subjects again and again in successive gradations of difficulty but not in application. Such repetition kills interest. Witness the eagerness with which students approach new subject matter which promises vital application.

In institutions of higher learning negative student attitudes also take the form of carping criticism of every educational factor employed. Many college students compensate for educational failure by roundly denouncing their institution or its personnel in some collegiate paper. But educational institutions usually possess limited resources. These necessarily limit their facilities and personnel. The super-critical student rarely takes these factors into account when he "headlines" deficiencies which are often more apparent to the administrator than to the student. Constructive student criticism may be very helpful and should be sought by administration and faculty, but an achieving educational institution cannot afford either the time or the energy necessary to break up the rationalizations of the student who will not understand that his institution can do no more than provide him with the guidance and the facilities for securing an education.

Age Stratification

As the school system is now organized, interaction is confined to age groups. From kindergarten through high school, students associate chiefly with those of their own age. Usually the membership of this group acquires no new elements throughout the period. Indeed, the group diminishes as the process advances for students drop out of the school group continuously. In the college or the university students associate with a different group but still on an age basis. Contact with other age groups is, at best, casual or indirect. Throughout the educative process, therefore, the different age groups live an isolated life unenriched by frequent and vital interaction with older and younger age groups.

This age division necessarily carries over into adult social relations not

only in play activities but also in group thinking. When older and younger groups do come into contact with each other in the educative process, some disciplinary action is usually under consideration and social interaction is limited to issues likely to arouse antagonism rather than understanding. It is probable, therefore, that educative experience in rigid age groups accentuates the conflict between the older and the younger generations. Wholesome, achieving social interaction, in contrast, requires an integrative association of all ages as well as of all conditions of men.

When the educative process becomes a series of academic goose-steps, the school languishes. To justify itself socially, education must change the patterns of the mind and recast the patterns of behavior. Social insight, social efficiency, and dynamic living are not merely matters of intellectual content; they are indicated by overt behavior eagerly directed toward significant objectives. A social diagnosis of modern education reveals the presence of serious pathological conditions; for most educational institutions secure no such results.

. . . no profound intellectual passion has been awakened, no habit of independent judgment formed. The college man shares the popular prejudices of his community. He runs with the crowd after the hero of the hour and shows the same lack of discrimination as do the uneducated. He votes the same party ticket, is intolerant along with his neighbors, and he puts the same value on material success as do the illiterate. His education has made very little difference in his religious beliefs, his social philosophy, his ethical values, or his general outlook on the world.²⁶

In short, nothing that is significant has happened. The educative process fails to inculcate standards, to deepen insight, to broaden vision, to quicken desire. And since nothing significant happens to the student, nothing significant happens to the social order, notwithstanding the millions devoted to education. "And if nothing happens, then the world must forever stew in its own juices: and just now those juices are not as sweet as they might be."²⁷

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. Comment: "Education is for the purpose of lifting overall boys into white-collared jobs."
2. Evaluate the mental test, the statistical curve, and the new type of examination, as methods of educational measurement when social objectives are considered.
3. Sociologically conceived, what principles are involved in specialization and departmentalization in education?

²⁶ Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

²⁷ J. K. Hart, *Light from the North* (New York, 1927), pp. 154-155.

4. To what extent are business methods and organization applicable to education and the school?
5. Are any legitimate ends served by educational fads?
6. Is there any connection between "pen and pencil" education and the application of business techniques to school procedures?
7. Draw up the case for and against:
 - (a) purely cultural education.
 - (b) purely vocational education.
8. Discuss the statement that "A college is a place where there is much teaching and no learning."
9. Outline a program for increasing the competency of American school teachers.
10. Is education essentially democratic? What should be the relation of education to government in the United States?
11. Examine the curriculum of your institution on the basis of the sociological principles discussed in the section on "Defective Curriculum."
12. "One always becomes famous in college outside the classroom, never in it." Do you agree? Give reasons.
13. What various devices might be used to correct undue political influence in education?
14. Comment: "The college graduate is one who can play a good game of tennis, wear his clothes well, talk about the latest novel, walk across the room with grace and dignity, and share the club opinions of his set, and there is nothing offensive in his table manners."
15. "The socially inherited worship of the white collar job is, in fact, uncritical guidance." Explain.
16. A certain type of student has been described as "an academic tree-sitter." Develop the analogy.

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CHAPTER XI

SOCIAL ORIENTATION OF THE SCHOOL

THE school, of all institutions, should keep abreast of fundamental social changes. Because education not only conserves civilization but also interprets it in current social interaction, adaptive lag in the school is wrought with graver social consequences than in other social institutions. For when the school is set in wrong relations with its environment, important social machinery is thrown out of adjustment, and eventually the entire social order is out of gear.

That the school is a dynamic institution which attempts to parallel the changing civilization in which it functions is revealed by the following educational adaptations of the nineteenth century: (a) extension of educational opportunity to the masses irrespective of class or sex; (b) recognition of broadly utilitarian objectives adapted to the needs of this universal clientele; (c) expansion of the curriculum to include the sciences, the social sciences, the fine arts, business and vocational subjects; (d) transfer of the control of the school from the church to the state; (e) development of supplementary education in night schools, extension courses, summer and vacation schools; (f) increasing professionalization of teaching through organization and the discussion of educational problems. The basic nature of these adaptations evidences an effort to meet needs arising out of basic social changes.

But the twentieth century faces a new educational situation which is in part due to the educational adaptations of the nineteenth century and in part to the new social situation brought about by the World War. The school of the nineteenth century served, in general, a few boys destined for the professions; boys made resourceful and industrious by home work and responsibility; boys who were the sons of American parents of the same social and mental equipment; a few thousand boys zealous for learning in preparation for a definite life purpose; boys whose social relations were those of a simple social order with few occupations and few problems. In contrast, the school of the twentieth century must serve all sorts of boys and girls destined for every occupation; city boys and girls who have never assumed work responsibilities; boys and girls of every nationality and creed; many thousands of boys and girls mostly unambitious and without purpose yet required to func-

tion in a highly complex social order with innumerable activities and relations of interdependence.¹ It is obvious, therefore, that further adjustment and orientation is necessary if the school is to function effectively as a basic social institution.

Perception of Social Values

From the sociological point of view, the first task which confronts the school of the twentieth century is that of perceiving the *social values* that the institution conserves. Attention primarily to *individual values* has been responsible for much of the tangential activity which now characterizes educational administration. The individual cannot set up his own standards of what knowledge is worth possessing or of what is worth achieving. These values he secures from the social heritage. Since the experience of the race has written there what it has found valuable, the individual secures profound satisfaction from achievement which embodies this experience because it is accompanied with marked social approval.

Education, then, should be increasingly interpreted as a *social* process, national and international in scope; for, in a very real sense, the form and significance, not only of interactions of the local group, but also of the whole social order are profoundly influenced by the type and content of the education which conserves, transmits, and translates the wisdom of preceding generations.

The final form of human society, so far as our minds are able to conceive it, is a world-wide coöperation for the development of man. Only so far as our civilization is leading on to this are we entitled to think of it as a station on the road to something better. If it is not leading on to this, but only to the conferring of rights on men and nations unable to translate them into corresponding duty, we must conclude that our civilization is a station on the road to something worse.²

This means that progress at least, and survival perhaps, necessitates the cultivation of the attitudes and facilities essential to increasing mutual helpfulness among peoples by a universal distribution of cultural achievements. That is, the process of personal and social enlargement begun in the primary groups must be extended to the secondary groups. In fact, it should reach beyond the boundaries of race or nation until it embraces the world order. Through education alone can the social interdependence of nations be facilitated by the development of a world consciousness that sees the behavior of

¹ H. H. Foster, *High School Administration* (New York, 1928), pp. 10-11.

² L. P. Jacks, "The Education of Industry," *Yale Review*, Vol. XIV (October, 1924), p. 54. By permission of Yale University Press.

the individual as an infinitesimal fragment of human interaction. The social chaos becomes a social cosmos only when a comprehension of the relations and interrelations of individuals and groups to the larger social units is a part of the common intellectual equipment of peoples.

The constructive discipline of the school develops the individual's capacity for self-control and self-direction. These are the counterparts of social control and social balance in the social order. Discipline within the school society is thus a preparation for larger social participation. As "a laboratory of supervised conduct" the school should develop attitudes and abilities that are capable of universal application because they preclude both selfish individualism and narrow nationalism. Effective participation in social relations should be conceived, therefore, in broadly inclusive terms, if the school is to bring the student "into sympathetic and intelligent relations with those great ethical traditions which make society possible."³

Redetermination of Educational Objectives

When the social values to be conserved by education have been fully established, then educational objectives must be conceived in terms of those values. These objectives will develop, of course, from the social process itself; they cannot be artificially arrived at or imposed upon the process from without. Whether these educational objectives are uncovered by a scientific or a philosophical procedure, or both, is unimportant. It is only necessary that the school provide "conscious and definite training through" and for certain specific types of social relationship,"⁴ namely, those which do not involve dependence, maladjustment or social waste.

In the redetermination of educational objectives in terms of the social values which are to be conserved three principles⁵ should be utilized: (a) the *principle of utility*, namely, that every activity and every study proposed should serve some useful purpose which is neither narrowly materialistic nor inanely idealistic; (b) the *principle of relative importance*, namely, that certain tastes and appreciations, certain types of knowledge, certain habits and moral characteristics are better adapted to the development of social efficiency, personal satisfaction, and institutional effectiveness than others both so far as the present and the future are concerned; and (c) the *principle of change*, namely, that economic, social and political changes place the individual under new demands which require changes in curriculum and in procedure. In a complex and changing social order these principles should be utilized con-

³ J. M. Mecklin, *An Introduction to Social Ethics* (New York, 1920), p. 293.

⁴ A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress* (New York, 1918), p. 522.

⁵ W. R. Smith, *Principles of Educational Sociology* (Boston, 1928), pp. 617-618.

tinuously as the school adjusts the educative process to the changing social situation.

Recognition of the Limitations of Guidance

Guidance is not a specific for educational misdirection, nor a panacea for social ills. It should be an open door rather than a clutch. For "the ultimate aim—in fact the only educational mission—of the guidance program is to produce intelligent *self*-guidance."⁶ The school, therefore, should not attempt to determine the specific social placement of the individual. Its efforts should be confined to the discovery of the student's aptitudes and interests, on the one hand, and to the disclosure of opportunities for their utilization, on the other. Guidance, in other words, should assist the student to make *his own choice* of a calling and avocation. Any prescription, compulsion, or strong influence must be avoided. The devices and methods utilized in guidance should be appropriate to the purposes just indicated. The zealous guide is likely to produce misfits and maladjustment if he advances beyond these limits.

Resolution of Conflicting Theories of Education

Sectarianism in education arises in large part from conflicting and inadequate theories of education. There is the conflict between the advocates of cultural education and the champions of vocational education; between those who hold that educational privileges must be extended to all and those who contend that educational opportunity should be related to the capacity and will to profit by it; and between the English theory of education which lays emphasis upon character and personality and the Continental theory which stresses intellectual development with little heed to conduct patterns.

Each of these theories embodies a valuable viewpoint. It is expedient, therefore, that they be reconciled by a theory which will embrace them. In other words, if educational theory can be developed out of a comprehensive social theory, then the function of the school becomes patent, namely, the preparation of the individual for successful participation in social relations. All education, sociologically conceived, must take account of the fact that "the individual must either be fitted to become a cog in a social mechanism or else must be educated according to some notion of how this mechanism should be changed."⁷ These larger issues afford an area of possible agreement for those whose approach to the educational problem is partial and hence inadequate.

⁶ W. R. Smith, *Principles of Educational Sociology* (Boston, 1928), p. 718.

⁷ B. H. Bode, *Modern Educational Theories* (New York, 1927), p. 234.

Conception of the Dual Nature of Education

From the sociological viewpoint, education is a two-fold process. For the individual education should secure as complete a life as capacity and environment will permit. Life is many things: it is existence, activity, achievement, habits, tastes, interests, and attitudes, yielding experiences, behavior, satisfactions, values, motivation. The complete life for the individual, then, will be one in which these elements are as rich, as varied, as refined and as integrated as possible. The school takes full account of the *individual* aspect of education when it develops the student's personality and his social efficiency.

But, in the final analysis, it is the individual who determines whether or not the school actually renders these services "no matter what the environment, no matter how rich and varied the stimuli may be, if the individual makes no response he cannot be educated."⁸ The complete life is achieved only when the individual desires it earnestly enough to undergo the discipline necessary to its achievement. "All education is self-education." Habits, interests, attitudes, ideals may be formed in the individual only when he voluntarily reacts to the stimuli which are presented to him. The school cannot develop aptitudes or capacities; it can only provide the facilities and the occasions for their unfolding. The curriculum, for example, merely outlines the activities which, if pursued, will develop the individual's capacities and facilitate the achievement of a complete life. It can also provide incentives and promote motivation; but it cannot guarantee the response of the individual.

The school is limited, therefore, in what it can accomplish for the individual (a) by the state of the social inheritance, that is, the wisdom and experience which has been accumulated to date; (b) by the capacities of the human beings who are to be educated (men are born with mental, physical, and moral limitations that condition their development); (c) by imperfections of methods which fail to evolve as rapidly as life creates new needs; (d) by flaws in the mechanics of organizing and transmitting the social inheritance; and (e) by the defective motivation or devitalized volition which precludes the functioning of the educative process so far as the individual is concerned.⁹

Education has, however, important *social* aspects which must also be taken into account. The elements which comprise the complete life must be organized in such manner as will facilitate the social survival of the individual; that is, he must be made socially competent. These socially competent individuals must then be so organized in effort, will and thought that their social relations will yield the maximum satisfaction for all and at the same time

⁸ A. J. Jones, *Education and the Individual* (New York, 1926), p. 116.

⁹ David Snedden, *Educational Psychology* (New York, 1923), pp. 302-303.

produce a social order in which social conflict is reduced to a minimum. If education contributes merely to the individual's estate, status or prestige, it becomes a means of accentuating individual differences and emphasizing social stratification. It should contribute also to the facility and effectiveness of social interaction and the organization and integration of group activity. Social solidarity is achieved most directly by education, because it makes the social order intelligible and develops a competency in social relations.

Within the limits set by conditioning factors, then, education produces socially efficient persons who live complete lives and at the same time lays the foundations of a substantial social solidarity by transmitting a set of common behavior patterns evolved out of the experience of the past. All cannot be taught to think, it is true, but all can be taught to react similarly, in spite of differences in intelligence.¹⁰ Herein lies the possibility of the maximum life for the individual and the integration of the activity of all. These are unique functions of the school.

Reorganization of the Educative Process

The organization of the educative process should, of course, parallel the stages of intellection and expedite the continuous progress of the student through them. When the test of the efficiency of the educative process becomes the degree of social effectiveness developed in the individual, it follows that the present policy of prescription which results in the "excessive duplication of required subject matter in successive administrative units" will need radical readjustment. The legitimacy of some prescription must be recognized; but the content of such prescription needs thorough review and study.¹¹ And if the chief purpose of the educative process is proficiency in social relations, it appears logical that social studies should be stressed in future curriculum-making.¹²

In fact the educative process requires a reorganization which will not only place a proper emphasis upon the educational materials relevant to the purpose of education but will also institute economies in the time devoted to specific procedures. In facilitating adjustment to an increasingly complex social order it is apparent, for example, that excessive expenditures of time for drill, for reviews, and for examinations tends to emphasize subject matter at the expense of the development of the student's ability to proceed. Indeed "loss of interest and energy result from (such) long preparatory periods of un-

¹⁰ R. L. Finney, *A Sociological Philosophy of Education* (New York, 1929), pp. 394-398.

¹¹ C. C. Peters, *Foundations of Educational Sociology* (New York, 1924), pp. 304-305.

¹² Finney, *op. cit.*, pp. 289-291.

motivated study.”¹³ A social as well as an individual loss is also involved because the individual's successful participation in group relations is delayed and sometimes forestalled by such procedures.

Again, the educative process should be reorganized so that adequate training for one group of pupils will not be secured at the expense of adequate training for other groups. Such training will provide for the dullards and the brighter intellects alike the maximum educational opportunity in both curricular and extra-curricular activities. It will also correlate extra-curricular with curricular activities so that no phase of the educative process becomes tangential.

Provision should also be made for the educative interaction of various age groups so that the training process may be as rich and as integrative as possible. “Youth wants age neither to dictate nor to abdicate, but to share in a common life.”¹⁴ With such interaction school discipline might become genuinely constructive for each case might then be looked upon “as an opportunity, not to punish a malefactor but to strengthen a weak morale.”

In the reorganization of the educative process increased recognition must be given to distributive scholarship. Full status is now accorded the productive scholar; but the services of the scholar who makes knowledge a common possession are, at present, underrated. Yet distributive scholarship is at least equally necessary to social adjustment and social order especially in a society which professes democratic ideals. If public opinion is to determine public policy, a common knowledge should characterize those who constitute the public. For “the joker in the argument for democracy is the ignorance of the people.”¹⁵

Finally, the precise nature of a truly democratic educational system must be determined if the educative process is not to be ineffectively organized. Such an educational system must recognize the limitations of the educative process: it must give to each person opportunity and training appropriate to his capacities and social potentialities. Not all are equally educable. We must not say that “A” students should have the same provision as “C” students. “A” students should have more, because society reaps larger dividends from the training of the better minds. Any educational system which ignores diversity of talent or lays out more on the slow and dull than on the eager and swift is neither effective nor truly democratic.

This social reorganization of the educative process presents problems which are the concern of the specialist in education.

¹³ W. L. Uhl, *Principles of Secondary Education*, pp. 516-517.

¹⁴ J. K. Hart, *Light from the North* (New York, 1927), p. 81.

¹⁵ Finney, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

Professionalization of Teaching

Since "the quality, training and social standing of the teachers of one generation determine largely the cultural attainment of the next, the problems of improving teaching personnel are vital not only to the teachers as vocational workers but to the public they serve."¹⁶ The teacher is, in reality, the high priest of civilization. His qualifications, therefore, should be appropriate to his social rôle. A teaching personnel, competent to the problems of twentieth century education, may be guaranteed by (1) low rewards at the early stages to exclude those without a call; (2) high standards of personality and training to eliminate the unfit before the vocation is entered upon; (3) indefinite tenure after a successful probationary period to establish stability of personnel; (4) professional activity and continued study to secure improvement upon initial qualification; (5) income sufficient to maintain a cultural plane of living and give the teacher a fitting social status; (6) continuous cultivation of the professional spirit. Above all, the teacher should be given the recognition to which the importance of his services entitles him.

Liberalization of Education

Whether it be classical, utilitarian, cultural or vocational in emphasis, the educative process should be so conceived, so organized, so administered that it "frees the mind, emancipates individuality, sets free personal powers, and widens the human outlook."¹⁷ Such self-realization is effected only when the individual is made conscious of, and intelligent with respect to, his total environment. Adjustment to the broader situation then will give range to personal powers. To accomplish this the educative process must offer more than a bohemian approach to the problems of living. Superficial analyses do not free the mind; they merely substitute one set of opinions or biases for another. Because it uncovers the nature of the world and man, the prerequisites of social order, the conditions of satisfying human relations, the requisites of achievement, and the essence of value, a liberal education should release the individual from the ignorance, the prejudices, the superstitions, the dogmas that thwart or inhibit self-realization through full social adjustment. Any educative process which seeks to accomplish less, falls outside the category of the truly liberal or the socially effective education.

Experimentation in Education

Although much of the educational experimentation of the past has been of the partial sort which over-emphasized particular methods or particular

¹⁶ Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 545.

¹⁷ H. H. Horne, *Philosophy of Education* (New York, 1905), p. 245.

aspects of the educative process or which attempted to apply machine procedures to a non-mechanical process, such experimentation revealed a willingness to pioneer and to improve which the school should conserve. The barrenness of such experiments is due to the fact that they were "conceived by narrow specialists and hobby-riders, even if their hobby be the specialized technique of the scientific method."¹⁸ Successful participation in social relations is an art to which the methods of science and industry are largely inapplicable. The educative process must hence be conceived in larger terms than the mastery of subject matter by means of highly scientized procedures based upon the accumulation of masses of statistical data.

In an evolving society, each decade is likely to be presented with a new social situation which requires the creative insight of a new educational program—at least, of trenchant modification of the current program. Every changed situation requires that we discriminate anew between the good and the bad, between the desirable and the undesirable in our old institutions. New educational ventures are, therefore, not only in order but they are necessary if social chaos is to be averted. And since such ventures must go beyond the science already developed, they are "safest in the hands of those who have the broadest possible knowledge of life, of society, of institutions and the intellectual resources by which they may be operated."¹⁹ Too much that is invaluable is involved in such pioneering to entrust it to incompetent hands, however well intentioned they may be.

Every serious effort to readjust the educative process to the changing social *milieu* should also recognize the ultimates in social education as they have developed out of the experience of the various elemental groups which comprise the community. These ultimates are:²⁰ *efficiency*—the effective application of energy and talent insisted upon by those who undertake the economic processes of collective activity; *social justice*—advanced by those who must cope with the problems of social maladjustment; and *creative freedom*—the concern of those who would give quality and refinement to social relations. Every educational pioneer is confronted with the task of integrating these ultimates in his particular program; for any educational innovation which promotes one of these ultimates at the expense of the others becomes a fad and not a significant educational experiment.

¹⁸ Finney, *op. cit.*, p. 544.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 544.

²⁰ J. K. Hart, *The Social Interpretation of Education* (New York, 1929), pp. 316-321.

Adult Education

The educative process, of course, does not end with school days. In a changing social order, and with advancing personal achievement, the individual who strives for successful social adjustment is continuously involved in new social relations. Moreover, existing knowledge is being constantly modified and readapted to the changed social situation. New methods, new techniques, and new knowledge are always being developed in any dynamic social interaction. It follows, therefore, that, if education is concerned with the facilitation of successful participation in social relations, its task is never completed for any individual whose total environment is metamorphic. Social adjustment is a process which is coterminous only with life itself.

Furthermore, what is learned in the school is at best a minor part of one's education—it is in fact merely the beginning of it. The school can do scarcely more than acquaint the individual with educational tools and methods and give him the more fundamental knowledge which is required for successful participation in social relations. The specific application of tools, methods, knowledge to the particular situations which confront the individual who possesses a particular combination of traits, aptitudes and attitudes is a problem which requires continuous study and development. It is the task of the school to equip the individual so that he may eventually "go it alone." Provisions for adult education of various types should therefore be increasingly a part of the educational program of the school. Recognition of these facts explain the university extension movement which swept the country between 1890 and 1910 and is still an important element in public education. It also explains the development of the vocational school which is practically an importation from Germany. But in each case the recognition was partial and conceived primarily in terms of present educational materials. Full recognition of the educational needs of the adult should eventually lead to the establishment in the United States of institutions similar to *Die Volkshochschule* of Denmark.²¹

Social Passion in Education

American education is confronted by a critical situation generated in a changing social order characterized by the disintegration of family and community, the breakdown of religious beliefs and moral standards, the collapse of the economic system, the spread of a collective individualism, widening dif-

²¹ J. K. Hart, *Light from the North; the Danish Folk High Schools and their Meanings for America* (New York, 1927).

ferences between social classes, increasing concentration of wealth and control in the hands of a few, international suspicion and distrust, increasing pressure of population upon economic resources and the steady replacement of men by machinery. In fact, the signs of the times indicate that humanity's most problematical period lies just ahead.

To meet this critical situation American education requires not only "a scientized technique" important as that may be but also a zeal, a passion that will carry American civilization on, humble as it faces its crucible problems, confident in the value of its social heritage, buoyant in devotion to a social task that is its own compensation, namely, "a humanized world composed of men, women and children, sound and accomplished and beautiful in body; intelligent and sympathetic in mind; reverent in spirit; living in an environment rich in the largest elements of use and beauty; and occupying themselves with the persistent study and pursuit of perfection." ²²

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. Comment. "Society does not so much need the development of more and brilliant geniuses as it needs the higher mental development of all the people."
2. Contrast education as a socializing process with education as an individualizing process.
3. Specifically how should the school prepare for successful participation in international social relations?
4. What devices and methods are appropriate to the function of the guidance specialist?
5. "No youth is properly educated for democracy until he has found out by experience how much backache there is in a dollar earned by manual toil, and how much skill is involved in good workmanship." (Finney) Do you agree? Give reasons What, if anything, should the school do about it?
6. "Giving special educational opportunities at public expense to people of superior mental ability is contrary to the spirit of democracy." Do you agree? Reasons
7. Just how may the school overcome the inertia and indifference of pupils to education.
8. Explain fully the principle that "all education is self-education."
9. Describe "the complete life" as the sociologist conceives it.
10. Discuss the statement: "Each person should be given at public expense only that particular and special type of education which is best fitted to his particular ability and probable future needs."
11. What specific suggestions can you make with respect to the reorganization of education so as to secure

²² C. H. Henderson, *Education and the Larger Life* (New York, 1902), p. 48.

- (a) proper prescription of subject matter;
 - (b) desirable savings of time;
 - (c) adequate training for all groups of students;
 - (d) educative interaction of age-groups;
 - (e) recognition of distributive scholarship;
 - (f) truly democratic education.
12. What obstacles to the professionalization of teaching are presented by teachers themselves?
 13. "The person of great inborn mental ability, if incorrectly educated, is more dangerous to organized society than an incorrectly educated person of low mental ability." Do you agree? Reasons.
 14. Discuss: "Vocational education is, out of all comparison, the biggest unsolved problem and unfinished enterprise in modern education." (Finney)
 15. Comment: "These youngsters (university graduates) seem to be gorged with much raw knowledge, not tested, and lacking the tone of time seasoned knowledge has."
 16. "The average mental ability of some of the races of the world is so low that they can never learn to make the fine adjustments necessary to continued peace among people in modern complex civilization." Discuss.
 17. "The task of education, as of civilization, is that of finding some way of getting the facts we know used in the reordering of the world." (Hart) Explain.

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CHAPTER XII

THE PUBLIC LIBRARY

As cultural evolution has proceeded, it has become more and more apparent that the school does not and cannot, complete the educative process. Necessarily, the school concerns itself almost exclusively with the training of the young. It does not and cannot function for the aggregate of adults whose education ends with school days. It follows, therefore, that the education which *prepares* the individual for successful participation in the social relations of a dynamic social order must be supplemented by an education which *facilitates readjustment* to the changing *milieu*. This latter educational function is increasingly recognized as the especial province of the public library.

DEVELOPMENT OF LIBRARIES

Throughout the ages libraries have been regarded as important social factors. Every civilization is now known to have had its system of book-making and to have gathered its books into collections which were organized, classified and utilized in some regulated manner. These early libraries were housed in temples or sanctuaries. The oldest library of which any considerable remnant exists is that founded in the seventh century B. C. by the Assyrian monarch, Assurbanipal. A large portion of the brick tablets which constituted this library is now preserved in the British Museum. These tablets were numbered and classified, and readers obtained them by presenting "a ticket inscribed with the requisite number."

The first library of record was that established by Sargon I some three thousand years earlier in the city Accad. This library was founded "for the public good" and placed in charge of a librarian, Ibinsarru, whose seal is still preserved. Libraries appeared very early in Egyptian history, too, for Diodorus Siculus tells of the extensive library of Rameses I; and "Ur of the Chaldees," with its highly developed civilization, had its libraries before Abraham left it to begin his distinguished career as the progenitor of the Hebrew people. The most famous library of antiquity, however, was that founded at Alexandria by Ptolemy I. This library grew rapidly until, under his successors, it became the most extensive book collection made before the invention of printing. The

number of separated works it contained is variously estimated at from 400,000 to 700,000. It was completely destroyed by fire in the fourth century B. C.

Libraries, both public and private, were numerous in Rome throughout its history. Julius Cæsar conceived the idea of establishing public libraries to "make men's talents public property." Cæsar's plans were carried on by the emperors who succeeded him so that by the fourth century A. D. there were twenty-eight public libraries in the Imperial City. Although these libraries were the center of the culture, and especially of the intellectual life of the Empire, they were destroyed when Roman civilization suffered eclipse. Indeed it seems as if "the iconoclasts of all ages have taken special delight in the destruction of books, as if in them they attacked the very soul of the system they would overthrow."¹

The library history of the Christian world begins in the sixth century A. D. with the publication of the rule of St. Benedict who advocated the constant reading and writing of holy books. As a result, libraries were established in every Benedictine monastery. By the patient toil of generations of copyists large numbers of manuscript volumes were accumulated. Throughout the Middle Ages these were the only libraries extant, for the Church alone was active in the collection and preservation of knowledge. With the founding of the early universities, however, the center of intellectual life inevitably shifts from the monastery to the school. As the control of education gradually passed from the cloister to the school the library developed as an essential element in the system of instruction.

The establishment of the National Library of Paris in 1350 and of the library at the University of Prague in the same year marks another epoch in the development of the library. Here, for the first time, the library assumed national scope and significance. Later the Renaissance greatly stimulated the demand for the classics; the invention of printing made it possible to meet the demand. This, in turn, created a wider interest in books which led to the founding of other great libraries such as La Bibliothèque Nationale, the British Museum, royal libraries at Berlin and Munich, and the Imperial Library at Moscow. These libraries, while national in scope and public in nature, were not for the people except as the people were benefited indirectly by the work of scholars. Public libraries were still found only in the monastery, the university and the palace where they served particular and specialized groups.

Although Martin Luther strove vigorously to persuade the mayors of Germany that libraries should be established as a necessary aid to education, the free public library, supported by funds from the public treasury, is an American

¹ W. I. Fletcher, "The Public Library Movement," L. M. Janzow, *The Library Without Walls* (New York, 1927).

product—a natural development of the subscription library organized by Benjamin Franklin and some of his friends in Philadelphia in 1732 and incorporated ten years later. The success of this venture was so marked that many other American cities and towns established similar organizations within the next half century. As the public discovered the import of the services rendered by these libraries, laws exempting them from taxation were passed by most States. Later various political units assumed the responsibility for the collection of the taxes necessary to their support. By 1853 the library movement had developed to the point where a convention of “librarians and others interested in bibliography” was held in New York City. The accelerated library movement in the United States, however, began with the organization of the American Library Association in 1876. By 1925 there were 6,524 public libraries in the United States with books totaling 65,000,000 volumes. These libraries made in that year 237,888,282 loans to borrowers and expended \$37,000,000.²

THE PUBLIC LIBRARY—ITS SOCIAL CAUSATION

The phenomenal growth of the public library since 1850 has been due to social causes.

1. *The establishment of free public schools.* These created a need for books and libraries which would supplement the work of such schools.

2. *The dissemination of liberal political views.* The achievement of universal manhood suffrage in the years just previous to 1850 had greatly increased the interest and the participation of people in the affairs of state. This led naturally to a demand for the greater knowledge of the machinery and problems of government to be secured from printed materials.

3. *The spread of the lyceum movement.* This movement began in Milbury, Massachusetts, about 1826, and spread first to New England and then to the West and South. These lyceums were originally town debating clubs, generally participated in and immensely popular. The preparation of speeches and papers delivered at the meetings of these lyceums developed the need for libraries of reference.

4. *The accumulation of surplus wealth.* The rapid growth of the factory system, which resulted in the accumulation of surplus wealth, made possible the financing of expensive schools and extensive libraries.

5. *The increased leisure for the laboring class.* During this period labor organized, demanded a larger share of the products it produced, and secured a material reduction in the working day. This “great increase in leisure among

² American Library Association, *Library Extension* (Chicago, 1926), p. 10.

the most populous classes made the library a necessity." Indeed it is significant that the development of the library "was synchronous with the labor movement and the achievement of shorter working hours."³

6. *The discovery that scientific and other knowledge is not beyond the ken of the ordinary man.* This is especially true now that he is the product of the free public school; and that the records of human achievement in the realm of thought, music and art, as well as science, are the heritage of anyone who can use them.

7. *Recognition of the need for adult education.* The achievements of the Workers' Educational Association in Great Britain, the Workers' Education Bureau of America and the signal success of the Danish folk high schools called attention to the fact that "with all our enormous expenditure for education, the conscious and systematic growth in the knowledge of the adult community has been almost overlooked." The modern public library, as a consequence, is no longer the exclusive servant of the priest, the scholar and the ruler. It is now a community institution. The recent advances made by libraries have been largely in the direction of making their contents more accessible to the public. These advances have taken the form of the removal of all fees for use of books, free access to shelves, encouragement of the home use of library books, the establishment of business libraries, children's rooms, and travelling collections, the organization of branch, county and State libraries, the adoption of publicity programs, and the use of the library as a community center. The public library, therefore, emerges as a specialized institution devised to meet a definite social need universally recognized. It is not the product of philanthropic zeal but of basic social causes working toward a fundamental social objective.

THE PUBLIC LIBRARY—A SOCIAL INSTITUTION

Dr. Learned has described the public library as "the community's intelligence service."⁴ If this be true, then books must be regarded as spiritual forces, not merely as physical materials. Indeed educators now admit that their chief duty is to arouse the curiosity of students with respect to social interaction and social values and to train them to satisfy that curiosity through the use of such intellectual tools as books, libraries and laboratories. The library, in reality, should be an active and a recognized factor in the daily life of men and women for it can be a potent agent in rendering the individual more effective in his personal life.

³ A. K. Borden, "The Sociological Beginnings of the Library Movement," *The Library Quarterly*, Vol. I (July, 1931), p. 282.

⁴ W. S. Learned, *The American Public Library and the Diffusion of Knowledge* (New York, 1924), p. 26.

[*The public library is an institution for the continuous communication of knowledge and ideas by means of printed materials.* It diffuses facts, opinions, and points of view among the members of significant groups. It aims, therefore, "to provide a representative and systematically arranged collection of literature from the daily newspaper to the elaborate treatise and encyclopedic work of reference."⁵ It seeks to digest and reduce to usable form the mass of important information now accumulating with unexampled rapidity. In other words, it makes available trustworthy knowledge of the widest possible range with relative promptness and good judgment. Expressed metaphorically "the newspaper is the library of the moment: the library is the newspaper of all time." That is, it is both the memory of the race and concrete basis of its personality.

Originally the library was a reservoir, a storehouse, a museum where the records of human knowledge were collected and preserved for posterity. In earlier times, one would no more have taken a book from the library than he would have taken a picture from an art gallery. In fact, most early libraries were operated on the principle that under no pretense should books be loaned to any person.

Later it was recognized that a reservoir is likely to become a stagnant pool; so "the cistern was made a fountain." Libraries then became dispensers of human knowledge. To put books into circulation became the dominating purpose of the librarian who believed that he should find a reader for every book on the shelves of his library and a book for every reader in the community. To facilitate the realization of this objective, various devices such as catalogues, branch libraries, distributing and delivery stations, travelling libraries, and inter-library loans were developed for increasing the accessibility of the resources of the library. In general, public libraries entered upon a period of quantitative functioning in which the effectiveness of the separate units was measured by statistics of circulation. The public library was no longer a passive receptacle but an active informational agent.

As an institution of communication, the public library is now moving into a third developmental phase—a qualitative one—in which it seeks to serve as a guide to the records of human knowledge. Circulation alone is no longer its comprehensive function; rather it offers to direct the individual to the books which serve his particular needs of the moment. That is, the library is not only an *instrument* of informative education; it is also, in fact, a *method* of education. Libraries, like laboratories, are workshops which operate under the direction of a trained personnel. In them, the individual may learn to solve

⁵ J. B. Brown, *Manual of Library Economy* (London, 1930), p. 14.

the problems of his particular social situation by recourse to the accumulated experience of others.

If it be true that "the better part of every man's education is that which he gives himself" (James Russell Lowell) then, of course, it is the library that supplies him with the opportunity and the means for such training. Public libraries are supported at public expense because they thus promote the general educational interests of the people. And in those localities in which private funds and gifts are relied upon for maintenance, it is usually required that the library give general free public service irrespective of the form of management or support if it is to be tax exempt. At least, the *public* library is conceived as one "either owned or controlled by the public or freely accessible to it."⁶

Public support of the library, therefore, is an admission that:

... the influence of books upon a reading community is powerful. It is more subtle than human companionship. The latter strongly affects and molds character; but books reach us at lower depths. They inspire us more profoundly; they touch our whole being, intellect, heart and executive purpose; they imperceptibly create or modify our ethical standards; they become our models of life and conduct; they lay hold of our highest and most sacred sentiments, and color our views of the life beyond.⁷

Naturally, a civilization that is built upon the hope of an enlightened citizenry will institutionalize not only the free public school but also the free public library which is founded upon a belief in the power of thought made permanent in printed form and rendered serviceable to the public.

Public support of the library is justified on the grounds (1) that the library is as essential to public welfare as the school; (2) that it is the only educational influence which is exerted through life and has the entire public as its clientele; (3) that it encourages an activity which is as wholesome and recreative and hence as desirable and legitimate as other forms of recreation financed from the public treasury; and (4) that private ownership and operation of the library is as inadequate and ineffective as the private ownership and operation of the school, except for certain highly specialized services which may be rendered by highly specialized plants to a restricted clientele. Because of its vital relation to public welfare the state not only undertakes to support but also to protect the library as well as other social institutions against exploitation or pernicious influence. It has also endowed the library with a legal entity which posits full social control.

⁶ A. E. Bostwick, *The American Public Library* (New York, 1929), p. 20.

⁷ B. K. Pierce, "Probable Intellectual and Moral Outcome of the Rapid Increase of Public Libraries," A. E. Bostwick's *Libraries and Society* (New York, 1920), p. 39E.

It is legitimate, therefore, to regard the public library as an essential element in a system of public education. When education is conceived in terms of successful participation in social relations, it is obvious that the public school does not, cannot complete the educative process. It was natural, therefore, that the library should develop as an educative agency *supplementary* to the school since it furnished the books which are the necessary instruments of education. Especially does the library serve as an efficient handmaiden to the school which uses some of the newer educational methods such as group instruction, the socialized recitation, the project method, individualized instruction or exploratory courses. As a supplementary institution, the public library enriches the curriculum for both teacher and pupil, encourages research, and affords opportunity for cultural reading.

But, as an educational agency, the library is sharply differentiated from the school. In its *Manifesto of 1917* the English Library Association declared that:

The aim of the library as an educational institution is best expressed in the formula "self-development in an atmosphere of freedom" as contrasted with the aim of the school which is training in an atmosphere of restraint and discipline; in the school the teacher is dominant because it is possible to pass on form, to teach an art; but in the library the pupil strikes out his own line, and becomes his own teacher; the library supplies the materials upon which the powers awakened and trained in the school can be exercised; the library and the school depend upon different ideas, deal with different material in different ways, and there is no administrative relation between the two; furthermore, the contacts of the library with organized education cease at the point where the educational machinery itself terminates, but the library continues as an educational force of national importance in its contacts with the whole social, political and intellectual life of the community.

The conception of the public library as an institution supplementary to the school has thus naturally and imperceptibly expanded to include the idea that it is also a *complementary agency*. The public library, as a result, is rapidly becoming a social institution in its own right. In the past the library has endeavored to serve in equal measure the child, the youth and the adult. For the child and the youth its chief function was, and is, that of supplementing and enriching the work of the school. But increasingly the public library is devoting its resources to the adult, or more properly, to persons whom the school no longer serves. Outside the school the public library has extended its service to every industry and profession, to every significant organization, association or institution in its effort to function for the adult. Indeed, the public library develops apace as "a continuation school for all the people," "the people's university."

THE PUBLIC LIBRARY AND ADULT EDUCATION

The function of the public library in adult education is unlimited in scope; for it must be remembered that the school provides educational facilities only for the first ten or fifteen years of the individual's social experience, yet education continues through a lifetime. The school, at best, prepares the individual for successful participation in the social relations of earlier adulthood. If the individual is to be successful in the social relations of later adulthood, educational provision must also be made for continuous readjustment as the individual's specific social relations take on new and larger aspects and as the social order itself changes. The knowledge of facts, relations and values made available by the library is as necessary to the later as to the earlier relations.

From the sociological point of view adult education consists in activities which develop the individual's ability to readapt himself to a changing social milieu. Adult education, therefore, implies that the individual continues the educative process while he is earning a living and discharging the responsibilities of maturity. Since it has been demonstrated that the ability to learn usually develops rapidly until the individual is about twenty years of age, and then, perhaps, after a stationary period of some years slowly declines,⁸ it follows that persons under fifty need not be deterred from learning because they are too old. And since the mature can acquire skills about as easily as adolescents, it also follows that adult education contains great possibilities.

Adult education is unique. It differs radically from formal education (1) in that it aims to provide for an exchange of vital experience; (2) in that it roots, not in external authority, but in personal experience; (3) in that it proceeds by a technique of discussion in which the teacher functions as a guide and stimulator rather than law-giver; (4) in that it is voluntary; (5) in that it is individual in respect to capacity, objective and environment; and (6) in that it allows freedom as to what, when, how and why the adult shall study. Adult education must, hence, be confined to small groups. It is never *mass* education but rather *man* education as he participates in the mass. It is most successful, in fact, when pursued individually.

Adult education should not be identified with vocational training or the mere attempt to increase earning capacity. It aims to develop tastes and interests, to give expression to inner urges, especially those with cultural and avocational intent. It may be undertaken as a means of advancing social status, of improving citizenship, of securing knowledge for its own sake, of enriching life as well as for increasing the weekly wage. Adult education implies that groups of interested persons may pursue any subject matter whatever. The

⁸ E. L. Thorndike, *Adult Learning* (New York, 1928).

whole range of human knowledge is open for their exploration. They are not limited by the specialties of teachers nor by the restrictions of prescribed curricula. Adult education also implies that the individual may educate himself without attending formal classes, or taking courses of lectures or passing formidable examinations. He may choose to study subjects for which there is no general demand; he may not be interested in credits, certificates or diplomas.

Herein lies the especial field of the public library. From it individuals or groups of persons may secure instruction in any subject for which it has a literature. In fact, the public library is peculiarly equipped for adult education because its work is "as broad as the interests of the human beings of its community, as deep as the possibilities that lie in any one of the personalities within its reach, as high as the aspirations of the most ardent dreamer of dreams within sound of its call."⁹ Moreover, each public library may adapt its educational program to the local situation.¹⁰ Particularly may it function as an agency which coöperates with other educational factors in the community to eliminate duplication of effort and to coördinate the various offerings of these educational agencies in meeting the local problem. That is, it may "give consulting and advisory service, supplemented by books, to those who wish to pursue their studies alone rather than in organized groups or classes"; it may "furnish complete and reliable information concerning local opportunities for adult education available outside of the library," and it may "supply books and other printed material for adult educational activities maintained by other organizations."¹¹ Thus the public library becomes, in reality, "an instrumentality of higher education to all classes of people."

Such adult education has been designated as "a permanent national necessity, an inseparable aspect of citizenship which should be universal and lifelong."¹² Recognition of this necessity has led to the organization of the American Association for Adult Education, the British Institute for Adult Education and the World Association for Adult Education which seeks "to establish contact between all those, whoever and wherever they be, who hold fast to the belief that the true purpose of education for young and old is the understanding and enjoyment of life, and that the uneducated man is not he who cannot read

⁹ I. E. Lord, "The Free Public Library," *Manual of Library Economy*, Ch. 6; American Library Association *Reprint*, p. 8.

¹⁰ Sarah B. Askew, *The Place, the Man and the Book* (New York, 1916), shows how a library may be adapted to the needs of a community.

¹¹ American Library Association, *Libraries and Adult Education* (Chicago, 1926), p. 9.

¹² Final Report of the Adult Education Committee, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1919. Cited in S. W. E. Bedford, *Readings in Urban Sociology* (New York, 1927), pp. 679-681.

or write or count or spell, but he who walks unseeing and unhearing, unaccompanied and unhappy, through the busy streets and glorious open spaces of life's infinite pilgrimage." In many countries, notably the United States, separate organizations have promoted adult education through university extension, lyceums, correspondence schools, forums, *Folkschule*, institutes, workers' education bureaus, and the like. It is possible that these activities may eventually be institutionalized as was the public library.

SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE LIBRARY

The public library, then, becomes an educational unit coördinate with the public school. In countries organized on democratic principles, it is obvious that an intelligent electorate is essential to successful government. An intelligent citizenry, however, can be secured only when the knowledge contained in books and periodicals is universally accessible. In general, it is the function of the library to facilitate the printed page in the fulfillment of its mission. More specifically, the following are the social functions of the public library:

1. *Conserves the social heritage.* On the shelves of the library are stored the recorded wisdom and experience of the race. Libraries are "the custodians of whatever is most worthy of preservation in our own life and literature. They are the natural depositories of what we have of memorial and of records; the original entries of legislation and of achievement. They . . . render history available; they . . . exhibit science"¹³ and art. For each succeeding generation adds its cultural achievements to those already consigned to the library.

2. *Distributes information.* If successive generations are to build upon the achievements of their predecessors, the records of those achievements must be available to the rank and file as well as to the leaders of each generation. "The ideal library, therefore, is one which invites everybody who has a question to ask, to which books contain an answer, to come to the library and put his question, with the assurance that he will be kindly received, his question sympathetically considered and every effort made to find the answer."¹⁴ The modern public library also assumes an active rôle as a distributor of information. It regards the whole community as a group of possible patrons and strives to suit the tastes of each and to create a demand for library goods where none exists. Facilities are developed to take books to people and to disseminate information with respect to the resources of the library.

3. *Selects educational material.* The library is an educational filtration plant. The reading public is left to the influence of the tawdry journalism of

¹³ H. Putnam, "Relation of the Free Public Library and the Community," A. E. Bostwick, *The Library and Society* (New York, 1920), p. 326.

¹⁴ S. S. Green, "Libraries as Information Bureaus," Bostwick, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

the day, unless the library assumes responsibility for a selection of reading material which excludes the pernicious, the sordid, and the sensational. "The library which helps to circulate a book helps to promulgate the doctrine which the book contains, and if public libraries circulate books which teach restless, irreverent, or revolutionary doctrines, they offer us the incongruity of a municipality aiding in the propagation of ideas which are subversive of social order."¹⁵ Yet the public library has a duty to the opinion which is struggling for recognition as well as to the doctrine which is accepted. In its selection of books, therefore, the public library should consider the needs of the community as well as its desires. Critical selection will discriminate by picking out what is best rather than by excluding what is bad.

4. *Guides reading.* On the whole, books cannot do their beneficent work unaided. By serviceable catalogues, booklists and displays, the library calls attention to its best and richest resources and emphasizes quality rather than quantity of reading. By inducing the individual to "read with a purpose," existing interest can be turned to account. The library thus becomes the intellectual clearing house of the community and an intellectual center giving breadth and depth to the reading materials which the community may utilize in the development and enrichment of its collective life as well as in the unfolding of individual personalities through the sharing of the experience of others. Such guidance in reading is given by personal work with individuals and with groups through story telling, book talks, reading clubs, dramatization, instruction in the use of the library, catalogues, booklists, and through bulletins, exhibits and contests.

5. *Develops social homogeneity.* When we recall that 30 per cent of our population has come to us from an alien life and from alien institutions, that one third of the people in our large cities are of foreign birth and that 70 per cent were either born abroad or of foreign parentage, the task of assimilating these alien elements takes on indicative dimensions. These heterogeneous elements of our population can be rendered homogeneous only through the diffusion of common knowledge and understanding. The machinery for spreading such knowledge includes, of course, the newspaper, the lyceum, the motion picture, but, more significantly than any or all of these, the *books* that uncover the verified facts, the matured judgments and the products of constructive imagination which constitute the American social heritage. The public library is an effective agency in rendering this heritage easily and quickly accessible to every degree of intelligence in a form that commends itself to immediate appropriation. For "knowledge, however important, must be prepared in a great variety of ways for a great variety of minds, or it fails

¹⁵ H. Putnam, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

to take hold. . . . When diffusion is left to itself, each individual appropriates such elements as chance to fit him; when, on the other hand, it is made a positive, conscious process, its efforts at adaptation may not cease until the knowledge functions correctly in the mind of the recipient. To bring this about requires extensive organization, intelligently maintained and skilfully directed."¹⁶ This the public library is equipped to do, especially in its work with foreigners; for homogeneity results only from the general inculcation of a set of common ideas.

6. *Provides intellectual recreation.* It is admittedly good public policy to encourage healthful and innocent forms of recreation such as municipal parks and playgrounds. These provide physical recreation. The library furnishes an intellectual entertainment which is no less legitimate and desirable. This social function of the library is not limited to the "high brows" who voluntarily seek the library for this purpose; it is especially significant as the motivation for the services which the library renders to the child, and through him to all sorts and conditions of men. In the new social order, the constructive use of increasing leisure constitutes a portentous social problem. The library, by putting the individual in contact with the best thought of his own and previous times, affords limitless opportunities for the creative use of leisure. For leisure, to be creative, must be both spontaneous and disciplined, both voluntary and controlled. The library alone makes such intellectual recreation possible.

7. *Produces intellectual tools.* The public library functions as a producer when it publishes bulletins, monthlies, manuscripts of interest to scholars (unpublished correspondence, diaries, papers), catalogues of current editions, catalogue cards, classified and annotated lists of special collections or classes of books, handbooks, descriptive pamphlets, or the results of local research. These facilitate the functioning of the library especially in rendering knowledge and experience accessible to the public.

8. *Furnishes laboratories for research.* Large or ancient collections of special materials serve chiefly the purposes of scientific and literary research. In exploring the wisdom and experience of the race, such research may result in improved control of the physical and social environment. Thus the learned public library discharges its social responsibilities. Such libraries aid the student in his investigations by giving access to rich accumulations of printed materials, by assisting in the search for facts, illustrations and authorities, or by suggesting interesting literary and scientific studies which may have social meaning. Such libraries also furnish information and inspiration to clergymen, teachers, journalists, authors, physicians, legislators—specialists whose work bears intimate relation to the welfare and advancement of people.

¹⁶ W. S. Learned, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.

9. *Promotes social interaction.* In their provision for those who seek recreation and good fellowship with each other through the medium of books, many libraries have become social as well as intellectual centers. Such provisions take the form of children's story hours, special reading rooms, boys' rooms, smoking rooms, game rooms, public use of the library auditorium, and arrangements for the social intercourse of members of study clubs, labor guilds, missionary societies, neighborhood clubs, or other civic organizations.

Consideration of these various social functions of the public library completely dissipates the notion that the library is the abode of pure literature and of scholarship in the older sense and establishes the conception that it is a social institution of profound import.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PUBLIC LIBRARY

Notwithstanding the importance of the social services rendered by the public library, more than 45 million people in the United States are without library service. Of these more than 42 million, or 93 per cent, live in the open country or in communities of less than 2,500 persons. In other words 82 per cent of our rural population, but only 6 per cent of our urban residents, have little or no access to public libraries. In fact, no libraries are found within the limits of 1,135 of the 3,065 counties in the United States.¹⁷ Only in Massachusetts and Rhode Island are all inhabitants provided with library service.

Moreover, the Federal Board for Vocational Education, reporting in 1920, found that six million boys and girls between the ages of fourteen and twenty are not in school and that more than one half of the public school enrollment, or eleven million pupils, attend one-teacher or hamlet schools. That is, 62 per cent of the children in the United States are educated in rural schools, and in many of our States 75 per cent leave school before finishing the sixth grade. These facts clearly outline the field of service of the public library.

In general two types of plans for increasing the service of the public library have been developed, namely, those that put books into the hands of persons, and those that put library service into local centers. For the most part, however, libraries in the larger service fields augment the service of those in the smaller fields through inter-library loans. For example, State extension agencies tend to decrease their direct loans to individuals but to increase their service to individuals through loans to county and local libraries. The following tabulation indicates the organizational set-up of both types of library service designed to meet the social situation described above:

¹⁷ W. C. Nason, *Rural Libraries*, U. S. Department of Agriculture, *Farmers' Bulletin* No. 1559, p. 4.

TYPES OF LIBRARY SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES

NATIONAL

Library of Congress

A depository for all books copyrighted in the United States.

Exchanges official publications with foreign governments and (through the Smithsonian Institute) with learned societies.

Heads up a recognized inter-library loan system by lending to college, university, state, municipal and other libraries books which they do not possess and cannot secure elsewhere.

Extends bibliographic and other services to the libraries of the country, to the scientific bureaus of the government, and to private individuals after they have exhausted their local and state libraries.

Acts as a central cataloging bureau.

Renders research and reference service to members of Congress.

STATE

State Library Extension Agencies (State library commissions, State libraries with extension as one function, or library divisions of State departments of education).

Set up programs for the library development of the whole state.

Draft needed library legislation and work for its passage.

Aid in establishing libraries on a unit large enough to be effective, and in developing existing libraries.

Supplement the service of libraries in the State by lending books to meet special needs

Give direct book service to communities, groups and individuals through traveling libraries and direct mail service, until adequate local library service is established.

Often advise or supervise school and institution libraries.

Administer State aid for libraries in States where such aid is available and in these States have some authority to set standards.

Encourage professional training of librarians and sometimes maintain training agencies.

Other State Libraries

General State libraries may include any or all of the following: library extension, State book service, legislative reference, in addition to general library service to State departments and State legislatures.

Other State libraries are chiefly devoted to law, documents, and historical material, and give reference service in these special fields.

University libraries and university extension departments sometimes lend package libraries.

COUNTY

County Libraries

Provide county-wide book and library service through:

- A headquarters library.
- Branch libraries in towns and villages.
- Stations in rural schools, stores, club centers, county institutions.
- Parcel post service.
- Book-automobiles (in many county systems) which make regular trips throughout the county.

MUNICIPAL

Municipal Libraries

Render library service to residents of cities, towns and villages through:

- Central libraries
- Branches and stations
- Book-automobiles
- Libraries in schools, hospitals, jails
- Specialized Departments to
 - Boys and girls
 - Young people
 - Foreign-born
 - The blind
 - Business men, etc.

SPECIAL

*Special Libraries*¹⁸

Provide library service for limited groups requiring specialized service to meet particular needs, such as:

- School libraries
- College and University libraries
- Law libraries
- Medical libraries
- Historical libraries
- Commercial libraries
- Industrial libraries
- Finance-bank libraries
- Scientific libraries
- Technical libraries
- Insurance libraries
- Art libraries

¹⁸ The *Special Libraries Directory* for 1925 lists 975 libraries of this type.

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Libraries in museums
Welfare and recreational libraries
Libraries on naval vessels
Prison libraries
Hospital libraries, etc.

From the above it is clear that the organization of library service in the United States is extensive. Provision is made for national as well as local and individual service. Moreover, various State library extension agencies have been organized to render the usual book service to communities with none or very small libraries, to develop local and county libraries, and, through conference and field work, to give unity to the policies of public libraries and standards to the practices of the various library units in the State. Representatives of these agencies regularly visit the libraries in the State to discuss technical administrative problems with local librarians and library boards. The amount of library service in any State or community depends upon geographic, climatic, and economic conditions, the density of population, financial support, the appreciation of its services, but, more significantly than any or all of these factors, upon the vigor of the extension agencies. Throughout its organization, however, the public library studies the needs of the community it proposes to serve and seeks to supply the educational materials which will both enrich and render more effective, the living of its people.

SOCIAL TECHNIQUE OF THE PUBLIC LIBRARY

The American public library has developed numerous special techniques for making its service effective. American librarians become aware of specific library needs by constant effort to discover what their communities are doing and thinking, what educational, economic and social movements are stirring in the region and its various neighborhoods, and what changes are taking place in local government, industry, finance, religion, education, recreation, employment, and population. The appropriate techniques are then applied so that its library organization may function with increased effectiveness.

To render its resources accessible, the library compiles a *card catalogue* which lists its books by author, title and subject. Multiple *cross references* and *analytics* then give the reader a complete record of the library's material upon any given subject. These materials are arranged on the shelves according to a standard *classification* which facilitates the location of desired books. *Open shelves* give the reader immediate access to these materials so that he may examine them at his leisure and select what appeals to him. *Charging systems* then make it possible for him to take from the library such books he may desire

to explore thoroughly. Libraries also prepare *reading lists* of various sorts for distribution among readers who do not have access to the card catalogues or the open shelves. These techniques supply adequate routines for the easy location of books and for their distribution with facility.

Public libraries, interested in adult education, have compiled *directories* which place information concerning such opportunities prominently before the community; ¹⁹ *readers' advisers* have been added to library staffs to render specialized service to those who "read with a purpose"; a series of attractive reading courses prepared by specialists in various fields have been provided at cost to readers who desire to secure the knowledge which other educational institutions may accredit; *readers' bureaus* have been developed in connection with the reference departments of public libraries to give individual guidance especially to the reader of periodical literature; systematic *study courses* have been provided for out-of-school readers who desire to parallel the work of the public school; *extension service* is offered to organized classes pursuing some special course of study; and labor and industrial groups needing technical materials, are given specific library and educational service through the establishment of *special libraries*.

Librarians have also developed a series of techniques for making the community conscious of its library and its resources, such as the book-automobile which brings books to the reader's door; a *staff* which can command the respect of every element in the community; the treatment of its *patrons as guests* when they come to use the library building and its facilities; constructive, dignified, definite *publicity* of its organization, methods, finances, history, equipment, staff, circulation, and reference work; timely *book displays* featuring notable events, anniversaries and the like; *exhibits* of interesting materials adjunctive to the primary service of the library; and *field representatives* who establish direct relations with groups in bringing the library and its resources personally to the attention of the community and to obtain for the library information with respect to the service required by various agencies. And, as facilities for real and continuous study and instruction by radio are developed, the public library will, no doubt, make provision for the books to which radio talks refer.

Finally, the public library has devised techniques for increasing the effectiveness of its service. Chief among these is the *library survey* (of city or county) which uncovers the ecology of the community served, the make-up of its population and its collective mind, its vocations, its institutions, its cultural agencies, its county and state backgrounds. Such surveys are important

¹⁹ In 1929 the directory of the Chicago Public Library, for example, listed 392 agencies giving 6,075 courses on 546 subjects with hours and prices.

means for discovering situational problems and for visualizing the work to be done; they also facilitate the foundation of adequate policies and effective procedures. The *location* of the central library building, branch libraries, depositories and service stations at points where population centralizes also involves a technique which increases the adequacy of library service.

With these facilities the public library attempts to serve every type of reader, those who read for recreation as well as those who read for information and for development. It makes a reasonable effort to meet the desires of library rummager, the crank, the curiosity hunter, the intellectual tramp, the walking encyclopaedia, the book gourmand and the proverbial bookworm.

RÔLES OF THE LIBRARIAN

It is frequently said that "the library after all is very much what its librarian makes it." Of course every social institution is largely what its personnel determines it shall be; but this seems to be especially true of the library because "the habitual activities of the modern librarian exhaust themselves in pure service of a high order voluntarily sought by every age and grade of individual for almost every public and private purpose—a service rendered without pose or pressure solely on its merits."²⁰ Consequently librarianship has moved rapidly toward professionalization because it has never been subjected to the profits motive.

The expansion of the public library which resulted from the development of its social functions gave rise to the modern profession of librarianship. The older librarians were usually scholars who were known as "keepers of books"—a title which the librarian in charge of the British Museum still retains although it by no means describes his function. These older librarians were good conservators unselfishly devoted to a work in which they had a high professional pride. The development of the municipal library, however, necessitated a new type of librarian, namely, the scholarly administrator who is both a purveyor of books and, because of the limited funds at his disposal, an efficient business man.

But as yet there was no "library science" and no particular art of librarianship. These emerged when it became apparent that the modern librarian must be equipped to administer an institution which has increasingly significant social purposes.

Without the needed knowledge so to organize it as to make its materials most easily available, without the needed ability to make it correspond to the needs of the public, it is as impossible for a library to become the factor in public educa-

²⁰ W. S. Learned, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

tion that the law intended it should be, as it is for the school to do its proper educational work without a duly qualified teacher.²¹

The librarian of the present day, then, plays rôles which are appropriate to the social functions of the institution he directs.

1. *Administrator.* As an administrator, the librarian organizes the work of the library and formulates plans and policies for its continuous development. These he presents to the library board, or trustees, for their approval. He then represents the board in the execution of such policies as they adopt. As an executive the librarian supervises the routine of accession, classification and cataloguing of books (in the smaller libraries he also participates in this routine); he enforces rules and is responsible for the cleanliness and attractiveness of the library's quarters. And, if he is alert, he maintains intimate contacts with the community and its component parts, its institutions, its significant persons and activities.²²

2. *Selector of books.* The modern librarian must be more than a lover of books; he must be "the missionary of the book." That is, he must know the people whom his institution serves, and then he must select the books which will meet their needs helpfully and constructively. In playing this rôle the librarian assumes a definite responsibility for the literary taste of his community. Indeed he becomes a sort of intellectual god-father to the clientele of his library. Of course he must know books, editions, collections, standard works, and book resources.²³

3. *Purveyor of books.* The librarian acts as a provider of desired printed materials. As a purveyor of books he is concerned with the techniques employed in putting the resources of the library into circulation and in the efficient administration of the facilities for supplying the reader with the materials which meet his problem. To increase his library's resources he coöperates with other libraries in the exchange of books and periodicals. Once more he seeks personal contacts which will give him an intelligent knowledge of the interests of those to be served. Lacking such knowledge he will be unable either to interpret or to carry out the comprehensive policies of the library which aims to function as a social institution.

4. *Educational adviser.* When the library functions as an institution for adult education the librarian becomes a consultant, an adviser in self-education. In other words, he is a guide to and helper in the use of books. This requires that he have the trained and experienced facility for finding and organiz-

²¹ Asa Wynkoop, "Why the State Should Provide Standards for Public Libraries," *Library Journal*, Vol. 49 (February 15, 1924), p. 161.

²² J. A. Lowe, *Public Library Administration* (Chicago, 1928), Ch. 1.

²³ Corinne Bacon, *Principles of Book Selection* (New York, 1907).

ing material suited to the reader. He should "possess the personality, tact, sympathy, enthusiasm and understanding of educational psychology comparable to that of the successful teacher"; his "knowledge and experience should be such that (he) will be able wisely to recommend suitable books on the same subject to men and women who differ in ability, education, and purpose."²⁴ This rôle of the librarian is also significant:

. . . to be ready but not overanxious to assist; to be responsive, but not intrusive; to be suggestive but never insistent; to recommend books without forcing one's own literary tastes or standards upon others; while helping newcomers, to make them independent in the use of the library instead of leading them to rely upon someone else to do the work and use all the judgment for them, all this requires a nice adjustment of balances.²⁵

Obviously, eminent librarians, like great teachers, are born—not made. Training and experience cannot create the natural endowments or the positive genius for library work; they will, of course, provide a passable substitute. But "stickit ministers, unlucky schoolmasters, retired soldiers, minor journalists, unsuccessful booksellers or similar remnants of the failures or the superannuated in other walks of life"²⁶ cannot qualify for the modern task. If the service of the average public librarian appears commonplace or inadequate, it may be due to the fact that his task is herculean as well as to any personal deficiencies that he may have. He is held accountable for expert knowledge of a vast range of printed materials. The worth of the services of the librarian is obvious; they require a type of personality that is equipped for the social functions involved.

It has been well said that "the old-time librarian was proud and complacent in his possession of books. The present-day librarian smiles at this barren conception and bases his pride on the number of books distributed and the number of readers enrolled. The librarian of to-morrow will look on both conceptions as about equally crude and unworthy and will base his pride on the aid his library can give in making the use of books a means of positive and cultural advance."²⁷

SOCIAL LIMITATIONS OF THE PUBLIC LIBRARY

That the public library operates under positive social limitations needs no proof. It is obvious, of course, that the library cannot surmount the inability

²⁴ *Adult Education and the Library*, Vol. II (March, 1927), p. 8.

²⁵ W. L. Taylor, "The Library Friend," A. E. Bostwick, *The Library and Society* (New York, 1920), pp. 389–390.

²⁶ J. D. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

²⁷ Asa Wynkoop cited in J. L. Wheeler, *The Library and the Community* (Chicago, 1924), p. 11.

of many adults to assimilate thought from the printed page, nor can it undertake functions which are beyond the ability of its personnel. Like the school, the public library cannot transcend its human factors. Similarly, in its organization for extension service it must reckon with lack of personal contact between librarian and borrower, with the ineffectiveness of scattered effort and long-range work, with inadequate choice of selection by borrowers, with the cost of transportation and duplication, with insufficient book supply and personnel to render adequate library service.

To overcome these limitations the American Library Association is now investigating "the possibility of encouraging the production of more books of educational value so written as to interest and be understandable to men and women of limited knowledge of the subjects treated and of such education and so situated as to require simplicity of language, brevity of statement and non-technical treatment."²⁸ The first list of such books appeared in 1929.²⁹ And in its extension service, the book-automobile is establishing intimate contacts between the librarian and the borrower removed from the immediate vicinity of the headquarters library.³⁰

Adequate library service is of course also contingent upon adequate funds. Public libraries cost money. Those who administer them, therefore, repeatedly encounter the universal dread of taxation which is always current when tax rates are felt to be all that business and property will stand.³¹ Yet the American Library Association believes that one dollar per capita of the population is a reasonable minimum annual revenue for a library in a community desiring to maintain an adequate and a modern public library system with trained librarians.

Limits to the social functioning of the library are also set by the tastes and interests of the public it serves. While the pressure upon the public library for current fiction and purely recreative literature has been greatly relieved by the newspaper, the periodical press, the cheap "library" and the cheaper magazines, librarians are still subjected to an insistent demand that trivial, tawdry and ephemeral publications be provided at public expense. Funds spent for such literature cannot, of course, be utilized in the wider ranges of adult education.

Again, the effectiveness of the public library will be definitely measured by the quality of its personnel. This, in turn, will be determined not only by per-

²⁸ From a resolution adopted at its meeting in Seattle in July, 1925.

²⁹ Emma Felsenthal, "Readable Books in Many Subjects," *Journal of Adult Education* (April, 1929).

³⁰ Julia Wright Merrill, "Books that Travel," *American Farming* (March, 1928).

³¹ C. B. Roden, "The Library in Hard Times," *Library Journal*, Vol. 56 (December 1, 1931), pp. 981-987.

sonal and professional qualifications but also by the salaries paid and the status accorded the librarian.

Moreover, public libraries may impose limitations upon themselves, when, like other institutions, they "run too much to brick and mortar." Service ceases to be the major function of the library when its personnel is chiefly concerned with buildings, equipment, methods, technique and bibliography. That librarians should approach the problems of the library from the point of view of scientific research is, of course, admitted. Nor can it be denied that the effective functioning of the library requires the development of scientific techniques. Statistical analyses of what people desire to read, relative interest in subject matter, measurements of vocabulary difficulties in A. L. A. subject headings, and the like, give the librarian valuable information with respect to the public he serves. In shaping library policy, however, it is also necessary that he recognize the obligation of every *social* institution to canalize conduct toward socially approved ends.

Notwithstanding its social limitations, however, the public library is steadily improving the quality of its service. Increasingly the State is taking the position that the public library is a vital factor in the mental and social health of its citizens. An enlarging stock of enlightened ideas, is, it holds, a *sine qua non* of organizational vigor. The State, therefore, is actively promoting the expansion and improvement of library service through State aid and advice, certification of librarians, regulation of hours, service, facilities, and the establishment of library extension agencies. In its approach to these problems the State assumes that the public library is an essential part of its educational system and as such requires similar consideration by legislatures and State officials. Of paramount significance is the work of the Library of Congress—a National Library created by congressional act and maintained by the national treasury for the specific purpose of setting standards for the nation's libraries.

As a means of professionalizing librarianship, librarians have formulated a body of knowledge which is the basis of library administration. This has involved the reduction to printed form of the principles which underlie library practice. Standards have thus been developed within the library itself. Also, the standards for library schools and training agencies have set minimum requirements for faculty, students, financial support, resources and curricula for training on different levels. Eventually this will make it possible for the State to set up requirements for appointments which will protect the public from incompetent service and advance the status of those already in the ranks.

In the immediate future the public library must discover the legitimate range of its activities in a constellation of specialized social institutions. Public libraries have established museums and art galleries, maintained lecture

courses, operated community centers, collected lantern slides, provided facilities for dramatics, dinners and moving pictures, held exhibits of dolls, embroidery, bird-houses, and stuffed birds, loaned music, music-rolls, phonograph records and cook books—all as adjunctive to its primary function. The importance of such service and its relation to the specialized social task of the library should be determined, at least definitively, if the public library is to serve its social purpose.³²

. . . public libraries stand in the main for the humanities . . . they may be made anything in the interests of community life that far-seeing committees and broad-minded officials may desire to make them. The literature they circulate so freely is constantly reacting on life in all its phases, creating fresh currents of thought, presenting again the culture of the ages, contributing to the formation of an intelligent civic spirit.³³

In other words, the public library is at "the stage of envisioning possibilities"; its scope and functions cannot, as yet, be fully determined. Certain it is, however, that the public library is a creative agency in the intellectual movements of any community. As such it must be a free institution, sensitive to the intellectual needs and interests of its readers and eager to launch upon some adventurous experiments as creative centers of learning.³⁴

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. Why is the public library a social institution? Why is it a sanctioned rather than a basic institution?
2. List the advantages and disadvantages of the public library as a means of adult education.
3. Should the public library purchase books that are
 - (a) apologetic of vice
 - (b) "radical," subversive of interests that support it
 - (c) "conservative"
 - (d) soon out of date
 - (e) fostering discontent with homely duties
 - (f) morally confusing
 - (g) of current interest
4. Should public libraries buy only the best books, or the best books people will read? Explain.

³² J. T. Jennings, "Sticking to Our Last," *Library Journal*, Vol. 49 (July, 1924), p. 614.

³³ R. D. Macleod, *County Rural Libraries* (London, 1923), pp. 25-26.

³⁴ E. C. Lindeman, "Adult Education," *Library Journal*, Vol. 50 (May, 1925), pp. 446-447.

5. Who should decide what the public may read? Reasons.
6. Lowell, in his paradoxical style tells us that what Dr. Johnson called "browsing" in the library is the only way in which time can be profitably wasted. Resolve the paradox.
7. How did the idea arise that the library is "the exclusive abode of pure literature and scholarship in the older sense"? What factors have made it a social institution?
8. Why is library work with children so significant socially?
9. Justify socially the creation of a national library? the establishment of State library extension agencies? the certification of librarians?
10. Can you discover any field of activity for which public libraries have not developed adequate techniques?
11. Should there be a 'library science'? Explain.
12. Comment: "A library is three-fourths librarian; the building and books make up the other fourth."
13. "The best thing that can be said for any book in this library," said an enthusiastic librarian, "is that it is entirely worn out, and we must buy two new copies of it." Do you agree? Reasons.
14. Describe any pathological conditions which the public library has developed. Discuss causes, and remedies.
15. Just what is the State's responsibility for library service?

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CHAPTER XIII

THE STATE: A SOCIAL INSTITUTION

THE state transcends mere political organization. It is a set of human relationships purposively established by the common will because every political organization is in essence a social group which seeks, by means of government, to accomplish certain collective ends. The political process, hence, is an aspect of the social process for "the state is society politically organized, political organization is social organization politically considered."¹ The state is therefore a distinctive form of purposive human association having close relationships to other parts of the social system. In fact, "political structure plays in social life a part almost as important as that of anatomical structure in organic life, determining the means, ends and potentialities of group life."² Political relationships are thus necessarily interwoven in the whole social fabric. It follows, therefore, that the state is a basic social institution.

As such, the state is the concern of the sociologist as well as the political scientist. Basically, the state is revealed in the constitution, written or unwritten, through which a group expresses itself definitively with respect to its objectives, defining and delegating certain powers which it wishes to have exercised in order that certain group ends may be accomplished. In other words, constitutions create the social machinery by means of which the collective behavior of the body politic is to be canalized. The state is thus an expression of group purpose—that is, the purpose of a group of people resident in a given geographical area, speaking a common language and possessed of a common social heritage. Obviously the state is a significant form of human association. The sociologist is properly concerned with this state that lies *behind* the constitution, with the social origins of the political community it establishes, and with the social functions it requires of its specialized personnel. The political scientist, on the other hand, is concerned with the state as expressed *in* the constitution, that is, with the political structure which it sets up, with the political machinery it installs and with the political methods it prescribes. This means that the political scientist is a specialist in government, expert in judgment with respect to the effectiveness of the political organization. As

¹ W C MacLeod, *Origin and History of Politics* (New York, 1931), p. 15.

² W D Wallis, *Introduction to Sociology* (New York, 1927), p. 288

viewed by the sociologist, then, the state is a form of social organization designed to meet certain specific human needs. As viewed by the political scientist, it is a piece of social machinery for accomplishing certain political ends.

STATE AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION

Every person develops multiple interests. Some of these interests lead him to cooperate with others having similar interests; some bring him into conflict with persons having contrary interests. This means that "he is a sharer in certain concrete ends which must be realized in cooperation with some and against the opposition of other persons."³ Some of these interests, of course, are purely private and personal, but for the most part they are shared with other persons. Some interests are temporary, others are lasting or even permanent; some interests are valued more than life itself, others will be surrendered at the least suggestion of personal cost. In such a welter of varied and conflicting interests groups of persons will find it necessary to determine what interests may be pursued, and how far, also what persons may pursue these interests and how far. Otherwise the group will fail to establish the social order requisite to its successful collective action.

Sociologically conceived, *the state is the institution which organizes the will of a people, politically constituted, with respect to its collective interests.* This will is carried into effect when certain well-defined powers to perform certain specific tasks have been delegated to certain persons selected by the people to express and enforce its will. Thus the collective interests of the body politic are safeguarded particularly with respect to the behavior of persons whose interests conflict with those of others. Orderly group relationships are possible only when there is agreement as to what interests are to be collectively conserved. This agreement is expressed in the law which represents an actual evaluation of collective interests. Such an evaluation of collective interests establishes norms of conduct believed to be consistent with group welfare and sanctioned by the group as a whole. States, the governments of which are controlled and manipulated for the personal interests of a few, are hence perversions of the idea of the state.⁴ Whether controlled by the many or the few, the state, from the sociological point of view, must conserve and promote what are believed to be collective, rather than personal, interests.

The state, therefore, is no mere juristic abstraction. It exists in a set of social relationships involving interaction and intercommunication. It cannot exist apart from the persons who compose it—legal fictions to the contrary notwith-

³ G. H. Sabine in tr. of H. Krabbe, *Modern Idea of the State* (New York, 1922), p. LXI.

⁴ F. A. Bushee, *Social Organization* (New York, 1930), p. 167.

standing. Rationalizations of the will to power on the part of a dominant group cannot supplant the concept of the state which is based upon historical experience. Such experience indicates indisputably that the state was developed to meet fundamental human needs which could not be met in simpler ways, that its structure reflects the character of the social group which called it into being and that its authority rests upon powers delegated to a specialized personnel for the purposes of social control.

The realistic nature of the state is also indicated by the concreteness of its basic elements. The state, first of all, has certain physical bases such as land, territory, natural resources and wealth.⁵ These constitute the physical limitations which circumscribe the activities of the body politic. The state, again, has certain social bases; namely, people having relationships conditioned by a common origin or a common social heritage.⁶ These determine the nature and extent of political interaction. Finally, the state rests upon certain socio-psychological bases; to wit, sets of social attitudes which control the expressions of group will and a galaxy of collective representations which sets one body politic apart from others.⁷ The existence of such foundational elements demonstrates the actuality of the state as an association of human beings differing from other associations only in objectives, structure and methods of procedure.

As a basic social institution, the state has certain unique features. (1) It is an organization which includes all persons residing within a given geographical area. (2) Participation in the activities of the state is exclusive and obligatory—indeed, participation is not only a right but also a duty laid upon every citizen. (3) The authority of the state is unlimited; that is, no other organization may dictate to the state. Since it is the organized agency through which the political community acts, the state must possess supreme authority if it is to enforce the will of the body politic. (4) In order to be effective, government must be supported by the sentiments and traditions of the bulk of the population. A common social heritage is therefore indispensable to the functional unity of the state. (5) The state is concerned with many general interests, other associations concentrate on a few special interests. (6) Relatively speaking, the state is an enduring form of social organization.⁸ At least, no state has ever been known to liquidate.

These unique features of the politically organized group, however, do not

⁵ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1920), pp. 425-427.

⁶ Bushee, *op cit.*, pp. 164-165.

⁷ E. B. Reuter, and C. W. Hart, *Introduction to Sociology* (New York, 1933), p. 185

⁸ M. M. Laeserson, *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sociologie*, II (December, 1926), pp. 305-326.

differentiate the state from the government. Yet this distinction is important. Since it is composed of the persons in whose hands are placed the functions of political control, the government is the administrative mechanism through which the state acts to make its will effective. This it accomplishes when the government makes and enforces the laws which provide the group with orderly modes of interaction. The state is designed to integrate the conflicting interests of opposing groups and to furnish the restraint necessary to insure that the political process will operate constructively. Government is the agency through which these groups carry on the public phases of their conflict and secure, to a greater or lesser degree, the objects of group interest. The state and the government are hence not separate social institutions but phases of the same institution. They bear the same relationship to each other as education bears to separate schools. For example, in 1932 there existed some sixty-five major state powers although more than 300 distinctive governmental areas could be distinguished.

THE POLITICAL PROCESS

If a social process is "a sequence of occurrences by means of which transition is made from one condition to another,"⁹ then political action constitutes such a process since it is a group in action, moving from a condition of social conflict to a condition of social order. As such, it may be resolved into two elements: namely, "loyal adherence to tradition and restless contrivance and invention looking toward change and adaptation."¹⁰ The former supplies the social heritage which stabilizes the political group; it is the point of departure for the trial and error method of arriving at a more desirable political situation. The analysis of political action therefore begins with an evaluation of the factors which condition the behavior of the political group; such as, the physical environment in which the group must function, the hereditary traits and capacities which set limits to the political achievement of the group and the cultural patterns and social values which determine the direction of its political action. These supply the arena in which political struggle takes place.

In every political community the cultural patterns are organized about the interests of the dominant group and in opposition to those of minor groups. These latter struggle vigorously and continuously to push their programs. Conflict with the dominant group, however, usually brings frustration or defeat to opposing groups. These then assume the rôles of left wings, radical parties or belligerent classes. Under these conditions the political process is characterized by action and reaction, adaptation and re-adaptation, evolution

⁹ Reuter and Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

¹⁰ C. E. Merriam, *New Aspects of Politics* (Chicago, 1931), p. ix.

or revolution as the social situation changes. Maladjustment, war, graft, spoils, exploitation, instability, clashes between science and authority, hence, may be evidences of a pathological social order. On the other hand, they may be signs of political growth and development. An entirely stagnant society may present a picture of perfect peace. A dynamic society may present a battle between those who want donkey paths and those who want concrete highways. A static society believes disease to be God's will; a dynamic order wages war on bacteria and infection against the very opposition of the God-willers. A static society accepts poverty and unemployment as the necessary result of incompetence; a dynamic order fights desperately for living wages, reasonable hours, tolerable working conditions in spite of the bitter resistance of grasping profiteers. In short, a dynamic political process is indicated by any social situation in which groups are struggling to release their constructive possibilities through a wider range of political action.

Yet each group, when it becomes dominant, develops its own interests and neglects those of other groups. To be sure, the dominant group may act to conserve natural resources or to provide for children, but this is not objectively expressed moral purpose; it is, rather, shrewd expediency, since the continued dominance of the group may depend upon such provisions. Moreover, the ethical plays no part in tariff or pork barrel legislation or in appropriations for the construction of highways and public buildings. The state disposes power. The group which succeeds to the place of dominance acquires the authority which is vested in the state. It is, hence, a matter of great importance to groups as to whether they are to run the state or whether they are to be subordinate to other groups. The dominant group, for example, dictates changes in the state, determines the destination of national income, and controls vast resources. Tens of billions of dollars change hands when a Hoover gives way to a Roosevelt. The political process, therefore, is a process of determining whose will the state shall obey. This is arrived at by tests of strength between the dominant group and contending groups.

Political action, then, develops out of social unrest; it aims at a condition of relative adjustment. It is concerned with such standards of behavior as are subject to discussion; that is, with "matters in regard to which there is difference of opinion. . . . Politics is concerned with issues. . . . Political questions are matters of compromise and expediency. The political process by which a society or social group formulates its wishes and enforces them, goes on within the limits of the mores and is carried on by public discussion, legislation and the adjudication of the courts."¹¹ This political process, how-

¹¹ R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Society* (Chicago, 1921), pp. 52-53.

ever, is an aspect of the general social process¹² in which groups are evolving one social situation from another by means of various types of collective behavior.

THE NATURE OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Since "the potentialities of the individual remain potentialities until they are released by group life,"¹³ it follows that sound social procedure ignores neither the individual nor the group. No social organization which either loses the individual in the group or abandons the group for the individual will long endure. To define and correlate the relations of the individual with the group, of one group with another group, and of the individual and the group with the state, are the objectives of political organization. Political association is grounded in the sense of mutual rights and obligations by which interests are more certainly ascertained and more justly evaluated. "Law exists only because men do continually value and revalue interests, because they do aim at harmony of interests and recognize the propriety of respecting the interests of others."¹⁴ Indeed, the state views the individual "as a being who wishes to realize himself as a member of society,"¹⁵ and whose interests must therefore be integrated, so far as possible, with those of others.

It is obvious that "the will of an organized group (with respect to its interests) may be derived directly and in the simplest way from the wills of its members or it may be so independent of them as to be able to defy them or to mold them at will. The members may decide everything; they may decide only certain matters; or they may decide only who shall decide."¹⁶ As numbers increase and as social relations grow more complex, the masses cannot decide everything. If the state is to function effectively, the members must be limited to decisions on certain matters or to the decision as to who shall decide. Eventually, of course, the task of organizing the will of the group becomes so intricate and so delicate a problem that the masses must be restricted more and more to decisions as to who shall decide. Too much is at stake in the affairs of the modern state to risk popular decisions on all public questions. Moreover, the members may be so uninformed that they are incapable of wise decision as to their interests in many important issues, or they may know their interests but not be willing to recognize them.

But no matter how restricted his direct participation in the legislative formulation of group will becomes, the individual citizen may still express his

¹² Reuter and Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

¹³ M. P. Follett, *The New State* (New York, 1918), p. 6.

¹⁴ Sabine, *op. cit.*, p. lxxiii.

¹⁵ H. Laski, *Authority in the Modern State* (New Haven, 1927), p. 65.

¹⁶ Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

wishes through such non-political groups as trade unions, employers' associations, women's clubs, chambers of commerce, good government leagues, farmers' organizations, and the like.¹⁷ Such organized groups express collectively the will of the individual voter and secure effective political action on matters affecting his interests. Since ballots only elect representatives who are then free to legislate as they may decide and since such representatives cannot be called to account for their political acts until a subsequent election is held, direct participation in the political process, as a matter of fact, organizes the will of the group much less significantly than the simpler, more democratic methods. Possessing greater resources than the individual and voicing a collective rather than a single will, the labor union and other non-political groups keep up a constant bombardment of legislative halls. Such efforts are far more effective than the ballot. In fact, they are certain to constitute an increasingly significant aspect of the political process.

ATTRIBUTES OF THE STATE

The significant attributes of the state are not those usually listed by writers such as Bluntschli¹⁸ and Willoughby,¹⁹ who deify the state, but rather those which indicate that the state possesses the attributes common to all social institutions.²⁰ First of all, it is to be noted that the state centers about an idea, namely, the necessity for resolving conflicting economic and political interests. Secondly, the state has a structure, a framework, which brings this idea into the realm of reality, namely, government, courts, police systems and commissions. Thirdly, the state has a purpose, to wit, the organization of the will of its people with respect to matters of common concern. In the fourth place, the state has permanence. Indeed, to overthrow a state requires group action of a supreme sort. Because an increasingly complex social order multiplies the points of conflict, the need for the state, and hence its permanence, grows rather than diminishes. States do not go into liquidation but rather increase their functions as a growing tree puts out more roots.

Fifth, the fact that the state is the result of "a public judgment lodged in the popular mind" gives it the authority of the collective will, that is, "the right or the capacity to command or to exercise power over others."²¹ Various writers, however, maintain that the authority of the state differs from that of other social institutions not only in the fact that it takes precedence over

¹⁷ Gillin, Dittmer and Colbert, *Social Problems* (New York, 1928), p. 58; Merriam and Gosnell, *The American Party System* (New York, 1929), pp. 218-219.

¹⁸ S. K. Bluntschli, *The Theory of the State* (Oxford, 1885).

¹⁹ W. W. Willoughby, *Examination of the Nature of the State* (New York, 1903).

²⁰ *Infra*, Ch. 1, pp. 5-7.

²¹ Reuter and Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 423.

any other authority, but also in that it possesses the unique qualities implied in the term *sovereignty*, namely, permanence, exclusiveness, unity, all-comprehensiveness, inalienability, imprescriptibility, indivisibility and ilimitability.²² The state thus becomes the body having supreme and unlimited power to formulate in terms of law and to execute through government the collective will of the body politic with respect to political conduct. Because of its unique qualities, it is held, the will of the state "dominates and overrides, in case of conflict, all other wills, whether of persons or associations. To it all other wills are potentially subject."²³

It is admitted that the authority of the state designates such aspects of political power as the self-determinative character of the state, a supreme power of judgment and execution in case of conflicts between individuals and states, and exclusive control of government.²⁴ Unless it were vested with such authority the state could not fulfill its purpose, that is, to resolve conflicting interests. But the authority of the state, like the authority of other social institutions, is supported and modified by public opinion; the action of the state is, in its final analysis, an act of government—a representative body of citizens whose decisions command general acceptance.²⁵ Political administrative bodies, like the administrative bodies of other social institutions, are composed of persons designated to formulate and carry into effect the collective will of the group. The authority of the state, therefore, is unique, not in essence, but in scope. That is, it applies to all persons and associations occupying a given geographical area. In other words, the authority of the state differs from that of other social institutions only in that it is less circumscribed.

Originally, sovereignty was conceived as the personal attribute of the monarch. Later it was identified with the state as the organ of the monarch; later still it was made an attribute of the state as a whole rather than of any particular element or organ. Finally, the people acquire sovereignty when they are identified with the power of the state through revolution. Since the Counter-Reformation it has been clear that the recognition of political authority as distinct from religious authority has destroyed the notion of a single, universal sovereignty which embraced all social life.²⁶ With the passing of the sort of political absolutism which insisted that the monarch ruled by divine right or by virtue of special skills, sovereignty became merely "the dominant human power, individualistic and pluralistic, in a politically organized and

²² J. W. Garner, *Political Science and Government* (New York, 1928), pp. 170-179.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

²⁴ MacLeod, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-14.

²⁵ Laski, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-24.

politically independent population.”²⁷ Absolute sovereignty, hence, is a political fiction, non-existent in the actual relationships of people. The authority of the state springs from the same sources and is subject to the same limitations (inclusiveness excepted) as the authority of other social institutions.

For centuries men have endeavored to set the state apart as a sort of mystical entity. This is unrealistic. The state always develops out of the exigencies of actual social interaction. As a functioning unit, the state must have an authority which can decide upon courses of collective action when the body politic is faced with vital issues. Otherwise political organization is futile. Again, the participation of incapable and immature citizens in the activities of the state must be carefully safeguarded lest its survival be jeopardized. Since no man can excuse himself from participation in political relationships, the quality of his citizenship must, hence, be protected at all odds. A genuine collective will is the product only of a free ballot. A free ballot is possible, however, only when there is free speech. Since the individual becomes a citizen of the state irrespective of his wish, the state must often induce him to exercise his suffrage. For an effective state the non-voter is either a fulsome parasite or an actual traitor.

Sixth, it is also evident that the state is not only a significant agent of social control but is itself subject to social control. The common will created the state, the common will expressed in the constitution, in legislative enactment, in elections, and, if necessary, in revolution still controls the state. The political upheavals in Russia, Italy, Spain, Austria and Germany since 1917 are conclusive evidence that the state, even when despotically governed, is ultimately subject to the will of any group of its citizens who may acquire dominance.

Finally, the state carries the collective will of the body politic into effect through a specialized personnel. Public officials of every variety attest this attribute of the state. In fact, it is asserted that in the modern complex state one out of every twenty of the population are normally on the public payroll.²⁸ The essential attributes of the state, hence, are those which distinguish any social institution from other forms of social organization.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE

All institutions take shape under the pressure of the social needs present in universal social situations. The need for regulation appears to have been

²⁷ F. H. Giddings, *The Responsible State* (New York, 1918), p. 38.

²⁸ National Industrial Conference Board, *Report*, 1932.

recognized in the earliest forms of human association.²⁹ Behavior had to be canalized, even among preliterate peoples, if human relationships were to be satisfying, constructive and orderly. Authority to regulate interaction within the dominant group proceeds in the first instance from the group opinion which seeks to guarantee the mores. To make this authority effective, it is lodged with certain persons whose function it becomes to safeguard these mores. This delegation of authority, it is obvious, grows increasingly necessary as the population increases and social relationships become increasingly complex. Only thus can the dominant group maintain its culture patterns, preserve a modicum of freedom for its members and secure coöperation, voluntary or coerced, toward approved ends.

The state, then, is necessarily a regulative organization. To define the relationships of conflicting groups in such a manner as to maintain group unity and to advance group achievement is its chief purpose. Such unity, it is obvious, could have been accomplished by various methods, that is, (1) by the subjugation of conquered groups, (2) by the compounding of tribes, (3) by the federation of larger peace groups, (4) by the extension of paternal authority, (5) by the definition of relationships to new population elements such as traders, merchants, and the like, (6) by organization for protection against invading groups or for enlargement of the food territory, or (7) by deliberate coöperation to achieve otherwise impossible objectives. Different states probably secured political unity by different means. Certainly no one theory explains the origin of all states. If it can be said that "the state grew out of conflicts precipitated by the food struggle and the lust for power, . . . the struggle to be free and to suppress this struggle,"³⁰ then any organization which resolved conflict of interest groups sufficiently to establish political unity may have given rise to a state.

Assuming merely that "the state finds its antecedents in the simpler regulative systems of undeveloped peoples,"³¹ the later phases of its development emerge distinctly from the mass of anthropological and historical data. In order to maintain the unity of the state and their control of it, the dominant group is compelled to grant concessions as minor and subordinate groups expand or as invading groups challenge the authority of those in power. These concessions took the form (a) of increased participation of these minor groups in the affairs of state, or (b) of types of federation which conserved the integrity of opposing groups.

Violence is done, then, neither to logic nor to available facts if it is assumed

²⁹ Sumner and Keller, *The Science of Society* (New Haven, 1927), Vol. I, p. 459.

³⁰ F. E. Lumley, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1928), p. 395.

³¹ Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 701.

that the organization of *clans* provided an instrument for resolving, by one means or another, the conflicting interests of opposing familial groups. Whether clan organization developed as a result of war between families or as a means of achieving common ends is of little importance. The significant fact is that clan organization became an effective means of adjudicating conflicting interests. Such organization, moreover, possessed the great advantage that it discovered areas of agreement thus avoiding the costs of war both in resources and in human life. In the council of the clan, composed of the recognized heads of the opposing families or of representatives chosen by those who controlled familial organization, a group of interested, yet disinterested, persons became arbitrators of conflicting claims and protectors of the common interests of the larger group.

Similarly *tribal organization* through a council representing the various clans who may have come into conflict over food areas, hunting grounds, and the like, provided a means for the settlement of differences which also preserved the status of the dominant clan groups. Likewise the *confederation of tribes* and then the *nation* served to resolve conflicts and maintain the integrity of the controlling groups in the larger political arena. The setting-up of each succeeding organization, however, was probably preceded by a period in which differences between groups were settled by war and the decimation of large numbers of the population of these earlier groups. When alien elements, such as slaves, conquered peoples, merchants or traders, constituted a weak minority, the state for a time functioned as an engine of exploitation rather than of adjudication. When these elements become powerful enough to demand recognition they are then able to secure concessions from the dominant group, particularly in the form of increased participation in the affairs of state.

Assuming that population steadily increases and that food territory is definitely limited, especially among earlier peoples, it follows that ever larger groups are thrown into a conflict which in the end becomes a bitter struggle for survival. In such a social situation, political organization develops as a specialized institution for the maintenance of orderly relations between groups with conflicting interests. The following stages of political development may be indicated:

1. Familial organizations develop protective and judicial functions which are vested in the headship of the family.
2. Familial groups increase in population until this simple organization becomes inadequate.
3. This inadequacy becomes apparent when kinship groups face a major crisis such as famine or attack by powerful enemies.

4. The control of the dominant groups is maintained through agreement to form a super-organization which functions in meeting the crisis.
5. If this super-organization succeeds, it is continued as a means of meeting future exigencies and of settling disputes between conflicting groups after the crisis is passed.
6. Successive confederations develop under similar conditions as population continues to increase and as the area of conflict widens.

While it is not likely that all political communities have passed through the same phases of development, it is probable that, generally speaking, changes in the structure and procedures of the state take place largely because of the increased number of persons who must be allowed to participate in the political process.

The state thus emerges over the family and eventually over all other institutions "not merely as one institution among many, but the condition of all"³²—not in the sense, however, that it has an absolute and inalienable authority, but that it is the all-inclusive social institution established to maintain a condition of order among individuals, groups, organizations and other institutions. The state occupies a position of primacy and supremacy, therefore, not because of some mystical sovereignty it is believed to possess, but because of the social functions it performs.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. Distinguish the state from (a) society, (b) community, (c) nationality, (d) a people, (e) race.
2. When does a nation become a state?
3. What is the relation of a written constitution to the state?
4. The state is designated as an institution which "organizes the will of a people with respect to matters of common concern." Does the state also organize effort and thought? Explain.
5. What, if any, distinction is there between a *citizen* and a *subject* of the state?
6. Is a state truly sovereign if it lacks the power to limit or assign a part of its sovereignty to another body?
7. From the sociological point of view may there be a non-sovereign state? Explain.
8. Is the authority of the state founded on fear or on consent? Why do we acquiesce in the acts of government?
9. It is claimed that sovereignty is indivisible. Where then does sovereignty rest when a central government admits that certain policies, such as those concerned with marriage and divorce, with taxation, with the regulation of public

³² N. Wilde, *The Ethical Basis of the State* (Princeton, 1924), p. 165.

utilities, insurance companies and factory conditions with the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. are the especial province of the governments of political subdivisions?

10. The annual cost of crime in the United States is about eleven billions of dollars. Such a situation indicates an inability of the state to enforce its laws. Can such a state be said to possess sovereignty?
11. Specifically what limitations are placed upon the authority of the modern state?
12. Political philosophers have advanced various theories of the state. These have been summarized in Mackenzie's *Outlines of Social Philosophy*, 1927 ed., pp. 145-153; Garner's *Political Science and Government*, Ch. 10; Barnes, *Sociology and Political Theory*, Ch. 3; Leacock, *Elements of Political Science*, Chs. 2 and 3. Relate each of these theories to the concept of the state as a social institution.
13. It has been held that writers who discuss the origin of the state have one of two sets of factors in mind: namely, psychological motives which give birth to the state, or, institutions out of which the state develops. Detail the classification of these factors. Which factors really explain the origin of the state?
14. Following the logic of the development of political organization, characterize the next step in political evolution.

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CHAPTER XIV

THE STRUCTURE OF THE STATE

SINCE the state is not an abstraction, it possesses a structure or framework which brings the political idea into the realm of reality as an institution devised to meet a specific human need. The product of no divine decree, the state developed out of the experiences of the generations with the problem of harmonizing conflicting human interests. In resolving these conflicts the state has evolved an organization, ways of doing things political, pieces of related and specialized machinery for accomplishing its objectives which have become almost universal: namely, a legislative organization which serves to express the collective will of the body politic, a judicial system which interprets and applies that will and an executive organ which administers that will. These three aspects of political organization constitute the structural elements of the state.

CONSTITUTIONS DESCRIBE THE STRUCTURE OF THE STATE

The structure of the state is specifically prescribed in the fundamental law of the particular body politic embodied in its constitution. This document prescribes and establishes the framework of the state when it sets up the various organs of government and indicates the sphere and functions of each. This necessarily involves an enunciation of the underlying principles upon which a particular people proposes to canalize its political conduct such as representative government, division of powers, an independent judiciary, limited suffrage or occupational representation. Constitutions are then a complex of culture patterns which organize group behavior with respect to certain sets of ideas as to what constitutes proper political action.¹ Those who frame a constitution, therefore, are "interpreters of national life," for the document they execute is "the people's volitional expression of their own nature and destiny."²

Since the state is the institution which adjudicates conflicting social and economic interests, it follows that it must also establish certain power relation-

¹ W C MacLeod, *The Origin and History of Politics* (New York, 1931), pp. 21-22.

² H H Horne, *The Philosophy of Education* (New York, 1913), pp. 138-139.

ships between individuals and groups. Obviously a state does not exist unless the organs of government possess the authority necessary to resolve conflicts of interest and to maintain orderly human relationships. That these conflicting interests are essentially economic may or may not imply that the fundamental elements in political power are therefore economic; but it is significant that these interests which are in conflict are always group interests. These necessitate an organization which lays down and enforces rules which provide orderly working arrangements for such conflicting interests. A constitution, then, sets up the organizational structure of the state and distributes to its various organs the authority necessary to its effective functioning.³

The structure of the state, therefore, will be set forth in three sets of constitutional provisions: namely, those which outline the organization of government, those which describe basic political relationships and those which provide for revision and amendment. All such provisions, it is assumed, carry into effect the fundamental principles enunciated in the bill of rights. These principles underlie both the organization of government and its procedures. Prescriptions setting forth the civil and political rights of citizens and imposing restrictions upon power of the state to interfere with the enjoyment of those rights, provisions enumerating classes of prohibited legislation or regulating specific administrative practices are, strictly speaking, attempts to make specific application of these fundamental principles so as to safeguard the body politic against the tyrannical practices of those in power. Such provisions relating to practices are to be distinguished from those establishing organization and relationships since the former are concerned with political procedures while the latter prescribe governmental structure.

The Constitution of the United States affords an illustration of a typical written constitution for a federal state. Its chief provisions may be grouped as follows:

I. Provisions Setting Forth the Organization of Government

A. Legislative Department

Bicameral organization

Composition, election and organization of Congress

Powers and duties of each House

Limitations upon powers of Congress

Privileges of and restrictions upon members

B. Executive Department

Term of office, election, qualifications and compensation of President

Powers of the President

Impeachment procedure

³ W. B. Munro, *The Makers of the Unwritten Constitution* (New York, 1930), p. 8.

C. *Judicial Department*

Kinds and number of courts

Terms of judicial office

Jurisdiction of various courts

II. *Provisions Establishing Basic Political Relationships***A. *Relations of States to Federal Government***

Division of powers between State and federal government

Spheres of federal supremacy

Protection of States by federal government

Powers reserved to the States

B. *Relations of Constituent States*

Full faith and credit

Rights in one State of citizens of another

Admission of new States

Government of territories

Compacts between States

Suits against other States

Extradition

C. *Relations of Citizens to Federal Government*

Status of aliens

Naturalization and expatriation

Criminals and their treatment

Due process of law

Jury trial

Excessive punishments

Compensation for property taken

Political disabilities

Suffrage

Slavery

III. *Provisions for Amendment of the Constitution*

Constitutions may be established by any one of four methods: by deliberate creation at the time a people set up a political organization; by grants of power from a ruler who consents to surrender the exercise of his authority in accordance with certain principles and through certain agencies; by a revolution which wrests control of government from an autocratic ruler; and by a process of gradual evolution in which a transition is made from autocratic rule to popular government.⁴ But irrespective of the method by which constitutions are established, the same major structural elements appear in the organization of every modern state.

⁴ W. F. Willoughby, *An Introduction to the Study of the Government of Modern States* (New York, 1919), Ch. 6.

WRITTEN AND UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS

After some four hundred hours of debate and deliberation during a period of some eighty-one days, the framers of the Constitution of the United States set forth the structure of our political organization in a document of some eighty-nine sentences. Written a century and a half ago to meet the needs of a people living in a relatively simple social order, such a document, it is obvious, should be materially amplified as it is applied to conditions which its framers could not possibly foresee. That they expected such amplification is increasingly certain.⁵ Although this amplification did not come in the manner they anticipated, the Constitution of the United States has been so modified by formal amendments, by judicial decisions, by legislative enactment, by official opinions, by usage, custom and precedent that "no one can obtain even a silhouette of the American political system if he confines his study to the nation's fundamental law as it left the hands of its architects in 1787. . . . Governmental powers of vast import have been nurtured from these pages until we can now speak of the written constitution as merely the taproot from which the tree of American nationalism has grown."⁶

The structure of the state is, therefore, never adequately described in the written constitution of any historical state. In all such states an unwritten constitution develops inevitably and necessarily as the political organization meets the issues of its collective life through successive decades of experience in dynamic social situations. This unwritten constitution, of vastly greater dimensions than the written, is found in the law reports, in certain acts of federal and state governments, in the decisions of the courts, especially of the supreme tribunals, and in treatises on constitutional law. Necessarily, the words and phrases of the written constitution are applied to situations which its framers did not foresee. Moreover, ambiguities and deficiencies of expression appear in the most carefully framed instruments. Again, differences of opinion as to the meaning of constitutional provisions are bound to arise. Intention must be read into original statements although such intention may have been conspicuously absent. Finally, conclusions must be drawn with respect to the applicability of provisions in the constitution to issues which "lie beyond the direct expressions of the text."

The necessity for the interpretation and amplification of the provisions of the written Constitution of the United States is apparent when it is remem-

⁵ See Munro, *op cit.*, pp. 1-23; C. E. Merriam, *The Written Constitution and the Unwritten Attitude* (New York, 1931), pp. 1-8; J. B. Mathews, *The American Constitutional System* (New York, 1932), Ch. 4; W. W. Willoughby, *Principles of Constitutional Law of the United States* (New York, 1930), Ch. 32.

⁶ Munro, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

bered that the framers of the original document could not possibly have foreseen the organization of American economic enterprise on national and international scales, the development of the corporation, the trust and the holding company, the rise of powerful political parties, the decline in the power of the states, the rise of dominant metropolitan areas, sweeping extensions in suffrage, the decline in importance of agriculture and the increasing importance of manufacturing, or the definite participation of the United States in international affairs. Under such conditions it is obvious that the original constitution must be stretched, interpreted, "twisted and tortured" (Lord Bryce) to meet such changes in the social and economic order. Indeed, it is easily seen that the original document may, in fact, come to describe but a small part of the structure of the American state.

Because of the inadequacies of the written constitution of the United States an unwritten constitution provides for (a) the organization of Congress, (b) congressional procedures, (c) the implied powers of Congress, (d) the presidential Cabinet, (e) succession to the Presidency when neither the President nor the Vice-President is available, (f) the President's changed relation to law-making, (g) the organization of the federal judiciary, (h) the jurisdiction of federal courts, (i) taxation and the fiscal functions of federal and state agencies, (j) the regulation of commerce and labor, (k) interpretation of foreign relations and treaty-making powers, (l) the enumeration of the military and war powers of the President and of Congress, (m) the regulation of elections, (n) the protection of persons accused of crime, (o) the determination of what constitutes due process of law in taxation, in exercise of right of eminent domain and of police power, (p) the protection of contracts, (q) the definition of civil rights in time of war and (r) "the equal protection of laws." This enumeration, although incomplete, indicates the significance of the unwritten constitution in the description of the structure of the modern state.

CONSTITUTIONS IN A DYNAMIC SOCIAL ORDER

It is not sufficient, however, merely to make adequate constitutional provision for the organization of the state. Unless the structure of the state is supported by the attitudes and habits of the body politic, the provisions of the constitution, written and unwritten, will remain empty phrases. Sections of a constitution in which significant groups of citizens do not acquiesce are usually ignored and thereby effectively nullified. Note, for example, the voidance of the constitutional provisions establishing an electoral college and those bestowing suffrage on the American Negro. In the end, of course, the willingness of a people to accept the interpretations and requirements of a

constitution will be indicated by those whom it places in control of government, especially of the courts. The group or party in full control will always be able to secure an interpretation of the law and the constitution which will make it possible for the group to work its will without legal check. Lincoln and the emancipation of the slaves, is a case in point. In a dynamic social order, therefore, constitutions are neither "the guarantors of liberty" nor "the bulwarks of property." These lie not in "parchment barriers" but in the attitudes of the body politic expressed through agents who are responsible to the people and who may be overthrown by them if they will.

The functions of the constitution of a state, then, are three-fold: first, to determine the structure of government as regards its legislative, executive and judicial phases; second, in federal states to distribute governmental powers between the central government and its constituent political subdivisions; and third, to designate what limits, if any, rest upon the exercise of these powers—such limits being indicated either by specific grants of power, by implied limitation or by express prohibition.⁷ When these functions are effectively performed "a condition of peaceful certainty" pervades the political behavior of citizens because a degree of order is established in a mass of intricate personal and property relations. The desire to reduce uncertainty to a minimum is especially potent when personal liberty, family, property, religion and other valued associations are in jeopardy.⁸ The desire for such security, however, has led to the separation of powers and the establishment of systems of checks and balances which at times seriously impair the efficiency of governmental machinery.

It follows necessarily that any sound system of constitutional government will be characterized by a *stability* that eliminates the paralyzing uncertainties of political situations which undermine allegiance to and respect for the state and by a *flexibility* that keeps the fundamental law of the land abreast of changing social situations and changing political attitudes. No group of constitution-makers is, or will be, omniscient. Such men are powerless to provide for the sweeping changes in political ideals and in political relationships that political evolution and political revolution inevitably bring. Adaptation and adjustment to a dynamic order is as appropriate and as necessary in the realm of politics as in the realms of industry, the professions, education or religion. The experience of preceding generations possesses great value for the effective conduct of the affairs of state but does not exclude, nor occlude, the social values which emerge from experience in a changing social order.

⁷ Mathews, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-9.

⁸ H. Finer, *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government* (London, 1932), Vol. I, p. 183.

Recognition of the dynamic nature of the present social milieu implies a similar attitude toward a constitution. Sound social policy requires that a constitution shall conserve the best of past political experience, that it shall keep political structure abreast of current political needs and that it shall alter the framework of government only in response to permanent shifts in the attitudes of the body politic. Specifically, this means that constitutions should not prescribe in needless detail and that they should be amended without too much restriction. Since each generation approaches its political structure from experience in a changed social situation, each generation should, in fact, create its constitution afresh.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. Distinguish between the use of the terms "constitutional" and "unconstitutional" in England and in the United States. Which use is to be preferred, sociologically? Give reasons.
2. Enumerate the unique features in the structure of the American state.
3. Evaluate, sociologically, (a) the theory of the separation of powers and (b) the system of checks and balances.
4. From the social point of view enumerate the advantages and disadvantages of (a) written constitutions, and (b) unwritten constitutions. (Cf. Garner, *Political Science and Government*, pp. 524-528.)
5. Who were the makers of the unwritten constitution of the United States?
6. How do constitutions come to be regarded as sacred?
7. Is the Constitution of the United States a revolutionary or a conservative document? Explain.
8. What revolutionary changes have been made in the Constitution of the United States since 1789?
9. Show how the provisions of the Twelfth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution have been effectively nullified.
10. Under what circumstances, if any, should provisions of the Constitution be set aside? Give reasons.

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CHAPTER XV

FORMS OF THE STATE

FROM Aristotle to the present time, political and social philosophers have classified and reclassified states and governments. A wide range of bases have been used for the differentiation of the various types of political organization, such as, the number in whom controlling power was vested (Aristotle, Montesquieu, Rousseau); the type or quality of the ruler (Machiavelli, Bluntschli, von Mohl); the economic aspects of political control (Marx, Loria, Duguit, Oppenheimer, Commons); the manner of exercising authority (Willoughby); the manner by which the will of the state is formed and expressed (Jellinek, Burgess); the external structure of the state (Waitz, Pradier-Fodère, Marriott); and the nature of the political relations established (MacIver).

A SOCIOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION OF STATES

Since the state is a social institution, its essence is found in a set of organized relationships of a political nature. And since the whole purpose of such relationships lies in the organization of the political will of the body politic, the sociologist, it would seem, should differentiate between states on the basis of the type of political organization set up to express this common will. The state, of course, is to be distinguished from the government through which it functions. Although all states are essentially alike in their primary ends and purposes¹ they differ significantly in the means by which they carry those ends and purposes into effect. Jellinek is perhaps justified, then, in asserting that the only scientific basis for distinguishing between states is the particular manner by which the will of the state is formed.²

The traditional classifications of states as monarchies, aristocracies, democracies; or as world powers, lesser powers, petty states; or as sovereign, part-sovereign, neutralized, non-sovereign states; or as unitary, federal, confederate states are therefore arbitrary because they are based upon "accessory characteristics" and external phenomena rather than upon fundamental political relationships. From the sociological standpoint, the state exists for the organization and execution of the will of a people on matters of common con-

¹ J. W. Garner, *Political Science and Government* (New York, 1928), p. 240.

² G. Jellinek, *Recht des Modernen Staates* (Berlin, 1900), Ch. 20.

cern. The different types of will organization, hence, will suggest the various forms of the state. When government does not at all times reflect the will of the body politic expressed directly or indirectly, no state exists but only a proprietorship or private patrimony. Sociologically speaking, political organization becomes a state only when it is characterized by a government concerned with the well-being of its citizens.

Upon the basis of the nature of the political relationships established, states may be classified as *power states*³ in which the will of a people is organized for them, if at all, by a person or group of persons in whose authority the body politic acquiesces (the political relationships thus established are essentially those of the political dependence of the many upon the few; except when ruled by a benevolent despot, the government in such states is an instrument of personal power), and *welfare states* in which the body politic expresses its will directly or through representatives chosen by a general electorate (here the political relationships established are those of at least nominal political independence of the many; state officials are regarded as the agents of the body politic responsible for the promotion of the general welfare of all citizens). These main types of political organization may be subdivided as follows:

I. *Power States*

A. *Dictatorships*

Political

Monarchical (Russia under the Czars)

Ministerial (Germany under Hitler and Hindenburg)

Economic

Corporate (Italy under Mussolini)

Class (Russia under the Soviets)

B. *Aristocracies*

Nobility (Greek city states)

Bureaucracy (Japan)

II. *Welfare States*

A. *Pure Democracies* (New England town meeting)

B. *Representative Governments*

Constitutional Monarchy (England)

Republican Government (United States)

These forms are not mutually exclusive. In the modern welfare states (democracies), especially, it is difficult to draw lines of sharp demarcation, because governments so frequently are unique only in the particular complex of features selected.

³ R. M. MacIver, *The Modern State* (London, 1928), p. 341.

POWER STATES

In power states the many occupy a status of political subordination to a few. In earlier historical periods, such states were, apparently, almost universal. Indeed, some have held that tyranny is a necessary step in political evolution, especially when peoples are politically undisciplined. However that may be, the genesis of absolutism can be definitely traced to the development of kingship from war chieftainship⁴ in states where it was necessary to hold in subjection a conquered people. In such a situation domination is maintained by means of a cunning organization of physical force through privilege or by an adroit manipulation of racial jealousies, class hatreds and religious prejudices or, most significantly, by carefully planned partnerships between rulers and priesthood so that despots are clothed with a sanctity which renders authority unassailable.⁵ Military peoples thus develop a strong and highly centralized political organization, first, to assure success in military undertakings and secondly, to control a potentially militant group (the conquered) which is included in its body-politic. It is natural, therefore, that the successful war chief should be given much power in times of peace.

The social situation confronting politically immature peoples, then, is such as to favor the development of the power state. Among such peoples the authority of the state is likely to be vested in a single person who becomes the monarch or the dictator who claims that he is giving good government. Of course, such claims "are generally matters of policy rather than conviction and in any event gain little credence"⁶ for even politically undisciplined peoples soon discover that the course of political events is determined not by a benevolent consideration of their interests but by the personal ambitions of the ruler. The autocrat, then, may rule in his own right. Or, the authority of the state may be vested in him as the dominant figure in a political group organized either as a great corporation (Italy), or as a single economic class which undertakes to dictate to other groups and classes what it professes to be for the general welfare (Russia under the Czars).

When, however, a few persons, representing no particular social or economic class, presume to determine the general welfare on the basis of assumed political qualification, the power state takes on the form of an aristocracy. The political relationships established here are those of the dependence of the many upon a self-constituted group. All governments are, in a sense, aristocratic. Lord Bryce long since called attention to the fact that the states are actually

⁴ C. A. Ellwood, *Cultural Evolution; A Study of Social Origins and Development* (New York, 1927), pp. 209-210.

⁵ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1920), p. 618.

⁶ MacIver, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

governed by a few because the public opinion which influences and determines public policies is made by a relatively small number of people. Indeed, wherever standards of fitness are imposed upon the exercise of suffrage, governments are aristocratic to that degree. In fact, the strength of the aristocratic form of political organization lies in its assumption that some are better fitted to govern than others. At its best, aristocracy seeks to put into public office persons of talent, training and experience. At its worst, it falls a victim to its own conceit and perpetuates in office those who prostitute political power to personal ends.

Power states have survived until recent times, in part, because of the abject condition in which they have held their citizenry, and in part, because of the advantages of the autocratic form of government. These advantages are simplicity of political organization, unity of political counsel, continuity and consistency of policy and quick and effective action. A form of political organization with these advantages is, obviously, well adapted to the needs of: (a) a people who lack political capacity, (b) a people who have not yet developed a significant degree of political consciousness, (c) a people who face paralyzing critical situations which threaten to disrupt the state, and (d) a people whose government has become too extensive, too complicated for the intelligent participation of the average citizen. Under such circumstances a people will tend to continue its autocratic government or to revert to it after an unsuccessful experiment with more democratic forms of political organization.

Until recently, however, the historical trend in political organization was distinctly away from the power state because of certain serious social weaknesses inherent in such a political system:

(a) The governments of such states tend to become those which express, not the common will of a vigorous body-politic, but the will of a small group or indeed of a single person who identifies the interests of the state with personal cupidity and ambition. Under such conditions the state is administered, not for the welfare of its citizens, but for the self-aggrandizement of the monarch or the dictator and the groups he represents.

(b) Autocratic governments deny to subjects the development which comes to citizens who participate in the affairs of the state.

(c) Such states cannot command the loyalty, affection and good-will of its people since it requires that whenever interests conflict, those of the many citizens must be sacrificed to those of the few who rule.

(d) Autocratic governments, under the most fortunate of circumstances, cannot guarantee that wise, capable or benevolent persons will succeed to office especially when those who rule derive their office and power from inheritance.

(e) Power states are expensive. With rare exceptions, rulers who pursue personal ambitions and cupidities contribute little to general welfare or to social progress.

(f) Autocratic governments usually impose a regimentation of political behavior (sometimes of all conduct) which is revolting to the intelligent citizen. Such control of personal conduct, however, is an effective, if not necessary, means of sustaining the authority of the ruler.

It is obvious, therefore, that in power states the general will of the body-politic with respect to matters of common concern is likely to be thwarted or balked. It is inevitable, then, that as intelligence increased the body-politic should move, by revolution if necessary, toward forms of government in which the general will is given freer field.

WELFARE STATES

MacIver holds that "if we are right in our interpretation of the state as an organ of community, we must regard all states in which the general will is not active as imperfect forms."⁷ It is possible, of course, that a benevolent despot or a socially minded aristocracy may be sensitive to the general will, and any government that is well organized and expertly administered in the interests of its citizens is likely to appeal to the mass of people.⁸ It is also possible that a democracy may degenerate into a government by the rich who may control or the clever who may manipulate the body-politic. However, the political organization which modern democracies are trying to develop is believed to be a form which effectively facilitates the formulation and expression of the general will through the citizens' active participation in government. As Ellwood states it, modern democracy "presupposes the self-conscious, intelligent coöperation of the whole mass of people in the process of government."⁹

John Stuart Mill defined democracy as that form of government in which "the whole people or some numerous portion of them, exercise the governing power through deputies periodically elected by themselves." Garner adds that democratic government is "one which is constituted and administered on the principle that every adult citizen . . . who is not regarded as unfit by reason of his having been convicted of crime, or in some countries because of his illiteracy, should have a voice at least in the choice of those who make the laws by which he is governed and that his voice should be equal in weight to that of every other elector."¹⁰ In theory, the welfare state is one in whose government

⁷ MacIver, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

⁸ J. S. Mackenzie, *Outlines of Social Philosophy* (London, 1927), pp. 140-141.

⁹ Ellwood, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

¹⁰ Garner, *op. cit.*, p. 387.

every qualified adult citizen has a share, one in which a minority acquiesces in the rule of the majority, and one in which political action is controlled by public opinion. Voting for representatives is the typical function of the average citizen in such a state. The laws these representatives enact are deemed to be the expression of the will of the body-politic. The constitution, written or unwritten, defines the scope of the self-government thus established.

- The welfare state, however, is more than a political system; it is a political order in which the larger interests of the masses of people are the deliberate concern of a designated group of persons. It presupposes that the end of government is not the enhancement of the power of a few, but the promotion of the well-being of the many. The interests of individuals and of classes are considered only in relationship to those of the whole body of citizens. Indeed it is assumed that the people will alter or abolish any government which fails to promote the general welfare. This implies not the abolition of classes but of class privilege. The welfare state cannot exist where any one class, a plutocracy, an aristocracy or the proletariat, has exclusive or unique powers. "That would only be a true democracy," Giddings asserts, "which was an organization of the entire people, that is, in which all groups, all classes had their say in proportion to their numbers."¹¹ The general welfare requires that the interests of all functional groups shall be given appropriate consideration by those who administer the state and that none shall be condemned to low status merely because of birth.

Conceivably, welfare states may be classified according to the number who are immediately concerned with the formulation of the general will. In *pure democracies* the entire body-politic participates in the enactment of law (as in the New England town meeting or some of Swiss cantons); such participation, of course, is practicable only when the number of citizens is small. In *representative governments* designated persons are selected by the body of citizens to formulate and express their will for them. Such a type of political organization is necessary in the complex modern states with extensive populations.

The welfare state, established for the explicit purpose of organizing the general will on matters of general welfare, has commended itself to modern nations because: (a) it sets up a political organization whose personnel is derived from the body-politic and is immediately responsible to it; (b) it establishes political relationships of coöperative independence rather than of acquiescent dependence; (c) it develops the political capacity of peoples through actual participation in political action—it therefore serves as a training school for citizenship; (d) it stimulates interest in public affairs and

¹¹ F. H. Giddings, *Civilization and Society* (New York, 1932), p. 221.

strengthens political loyalties by giving the individual a stake in government; (e) it insures a degree of efficiency in government since its rulers are freely chosen by their fellow citizens ordinarily for short terms and are directly accountable to them for the manner in which they function; (f) it guarantees a larger measure of welfare since the body-politic may unseat a government which does not advance its well-being. These elements of strength in the organization of the welfare state appears chiefly in democratic political theory.

In practice, however, the organization of the state on the basis of popular control through popular suffrage has shown certain inherent weaknesses which restrict its effectiveness, namely:

(a) The welfare state lacks unity and continuity in the body which formulates the general will because this body is continually changing; (b) the welfare state fails adequately to protect minority interests since the majority rules even when the minority has superior political capacity; (c) the welfare state rests upon a philosophy of equality that is fallacious for no form of government can alter hereditary differences or guarantee equality of achievement; (d) because the average citizen does not, and cannot, appreciate the value of administrative skill or realize the spread between performance and reward, the welfare state fails to attract men of gifts to public service. Public officials are selected, not upon the basis of their superior qualification to handle the difficult and technical affairs of state, but upon their ability to capture favorable public attention and to win votes. The inevitable result is laxity, inefficiency and extravagance in the management of public business; (e) because of the size of its deliberative bodies and the multiplicity of interests and points of view represented therein, the welfare state finds it difficult to act promptly or decisively on important or critical issues; (f) the welfare state frequently succumbs to crowd psychology and tends at times to become mob-minded. Because of its blind faith in legislation and its lack of adequate means for fixing responsibility, it is likely to become an easy prey to sinister corruption. When government officials are motivated by love of power and desire for spoils rather than concern for the common weal, politics is a prolific breeding-ground for unscrupulous agitators, flatterers, bosses and demagogues; (g) the welfare state lays excessive burdens upon the average elector when it requires him to select many persons for public office, to initiate legislation, to pass judgment upon proposed measures and to recall unworthy or incompetent persons; (h) the welfare state relies upon a public opinion which is often fickle, uninformed, prejudiced and unfair; the democratic state wrongly assumes that the public possesses the best attributes of its more intelligent and judicious citizens. At any given moment of time a single welfare state may not reveal all of

these weaknesses but no such state is immune from the social pathology of these deficiencies.

Some of the defects of the welfare state are due, not to imperfections in political organization, but to imperfections in the social order itself. As Bushee has so well said, "Society itself is not a democracy, hence naturally, a government growing out of it cannot be truly democratic."¹² Society is still sharply divided into classes characterized by marked differences in economic status. Such differences are bound to bring about differences in the political influence and power of social groups. In such a social order the more influential classes will gain a disproportionate number of political offices and will rule, to some extent at least, for their own advantage. The interests of such groups are hence always more tenderly considered than those of less powerful groups. Assuming that imperfect human beings could devise a perfect state, imperfect human beings could not perfectly administer it.

"THE BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT"

It cannot be asserted unqualifiedly, therefore, that the democratic welfare state presents "the best form of government." Although Garner¹³ and Willoughby¹⁴ hold that, notwithstanding its defects, democracy is destined to become universal, Lord Bryce,¹⁵ Lowell¹⁶ and others maintain that representative government shows signs of decay, that confidence in popularly chosen assemblies is declining and that the people have shown themselves unequal to their political tasks and, in general, subservient to political parties. The recent replacement of representative government in Europe by dictatorships gives support to the contentions of those who question the future of democratic political organization. That none of these reorganized governments fully established the representative principle, is a fact that cannot be ignored. On the other hand, there is evidence that the distrust of democratic political organization is, in part, due to deliberate propaganda aimed to produce such a lack of confidence. Classes whose interests are served by such distrust have long been busy poisoning the channels of public opinion by insinuation, innuendo and bold misrepresentation.

No single form of political organization, however, will meet the needs of all

¹² F. A. Bushee, *Social Organization* (New York, 1930), pp. 169-170.

¹³ Garner, *op. cit.*, p. 403.

¹⁴ W. F. Willoughby, *The Government of Modern States* (New York, 1919), *passim*.

¹⁵ J. Bryce, *Modern Democracies* (New York, 1929), Vol. II, p. 576.

¹⁶ A. L. Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (New York, 1914), Parts III and IV.

peoples. "In determining what is the best form of government for any particular society," says Garner, "we must take into consideration the stage of development which the society has attained, the intelligence and the political capacity of the people, their history and traditions, their race characteristics and a variety of other elements."¹⁷ The conclusion inevitably follows that "monarchy is a necessary system for certain peoples, aristocracy is better adapted to certain others; while democracy is still better suited to other societies."¹⁸ In other words the best form of government is a relative thing, that is, "the desirable type of government is that which is best suited to the needs of existing society at a particular time. . . . Social conditions, therefore, should determine both the normal and prevailing type of government, and the revolutionary changes (in political organization) that are necessary to meet the stress of extraordinary conditions and occurrences."¹⁹

After all, the chief weakness of the democratic welfare state lies not so much in the participation of the masses in a government for whose functions they are incompetent, but in the failure of the body-politic to choose qualified persons for public office—persons who because of inherited capacity, adequate training and significant experience would be able to give expert guidance to the affairs of state. "If democracy is to succeed the actual powers of legislation must be entrusted more and more to persons fit to exercise them."²⁰ For such peoples as are suited to democratic government, the political scientist should devise a form of government which will incorporate the elements of strength in both autocratic and democratic states. It should be possible to develop a form of political organization which is capable of prompt and decisive action, which continuously and consistently promotes the general welfare, yet which affords the body of citizens the political education, the sense of security and well-being issuing from active participation in the affairs of state.

The test of good government is neither the detail of its organization nor the refinement of its procedures. What the state actually does, rather than what it professes to be, measures its social worth. The quality of government is fully indicated by the quantity and the quality of the service which it renders to its constituency. The competency of public officials, in turn, is indicated by their ability to provide such service. The voter, however, can pass an intelligent judgment upon his government only when he is fully and accurately informed. The effective exercise of political suffrage, that is, rests back upon the agencies which shape public opinion, especially the newspaper. When the news and

¹⁷ Garner, *op. cit.*, p. 440.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 440.

¹⁹ H. E. Barnes, *Sociology and Political Theory* (New York, 1924), p. 3.

²⁰ Giddings, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

editorial policies of these agencies suppress materials such as election frauds, strikes, industrial exploitation, threats of organized interests and malfeasance in office, citizens cannot form correct opinions either as to the effectiveness of government or the competency of public officials.²¹ So long as the sources of public opinion are poisoned, therefore, no final evaluation of democratic government is possible.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. Enumerate the advantages of limited monarchy as compared with absolute monarchy.
2. Sociologically speaking, does aristocracy present any advantages over dictatorship as a form of the state? List.
3. Distinguish soviet government from aristocracy.
4. Why is autocracy "an expensive luxury"?
5. Evaluate the following definitions of democracy:
 - (a) "the rule of a few manipulators who can collect suffrages in their own favor with great success." (Ernest Barker)
 - (b) "another name for an aristocracy of orators." (Thos. Hobbes)
 - (c) "a society in which every democrat aspires confidently to become an aristocrat." (Finney)
 - (d) "a people as a certain number of millions, mostly fools." (Carlyle)
 - (e) "a corrupt, dollar-worshipping plutocracy or oligarchy of the rich." (Treitschke)
6. "All things considered, the world will be better off if we give to all people, of whatever degree of inborn mental ability (idiots, etc., excepted) equal opportunity in deciding social policies even though some mistakes result, than if we have 'things run' by a select class of highest mental ability, although with greater efficiency." Do you agree? Give reasons.
7. Comment: "The sovereign will of the people is a polite name for the tyranny of the best organized faction." (E. D. Martin)
8. Explain: "At its best democracy may represent an ideal form of government, at its worst it may be little better than mob-rule." (W. F. Willoughby)
9. Analyze sociologically Lincoln's characterization of democracy as "government of the people, by the people, for the people."
10. Calhoun maintains that "democracy is a social order in which every group may exert direct and unrestricted power on all collective interests in proportion to its numbers." (*Journal of Social Forces*, Vol. II. p. 505.) Should superior (great) men not exert more influence than their numerical strength would allow?
11. Evaluate the following list of assumptions in democratic government:
 - (a) "That every honest, self-supporting adult citizen is qualified to participate in the business of government;

²¹ Lumley, F. E., *The Propaganda Menace* (New York, 1933), especially Chs. 7-10.

- (b) "That he is as well qualified as any other of his fellow citizens;
- (c) "That the great mass of people possess the capacity for self-government;
- (d) "That the average man is able to select rulers who will govern in the interests of society."

(Garner, *Political Science and Government*, p. 388.)

12. Does Pope settle the issue when he says.

"For forms of government let fools contest;
Whate'er is best administered is best."

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CHAPTER XVI

FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE

IN organizing the will of a body politic with respect to matters of common concern, the state seeks to establish order out of a welter of conflicting interests. This constitutes the primary objective of the state. The functions of the state, on the other hand, are concerned with the creation of conditions and relationships which shall be satisfying and constructive. Objectives imply purpose; functions connote activity. To illustrate: the functions of industry consist in the production of goods desired by consumers; that is, food, clothing, machines and the like. The objectives of those who manage industry, however, are profits and dividends. Similarly, conditions and relationships of security, justice, welfare and progress are secured through the functioning of the state, while the achievement of a social order and a civilization constitute the objective of the state.

DEVELOPMENT OF STATE FUNCTIONS

As political organization evolved from "the simpler regulative systems of undeveloped peoples" to the complex control mechanism of modern times, the functions of the state have also broadened. The political activities of early groups must have been concerned largely with the control of the rest of the population in the interests of the dominant class. That the individual exists not for himself and his family but for the state was the principle which governed political relationships under these conditions. By depressing personal liberty and dignity and exalting obedience, loyalty and patriotism as virtues, the dominant group assured its power and advanced its interests. In many of the backward countries of the world the state still functions as "an engine of exploitation" of the many by the element in the saddle.

With the decline of warfare, however, the control of the dominant class was weakened. Citizenship was also broadened as new elements were assimilated by the body politic. As a result rulers were forced to emphasize the rights of citizens rather than the duties of subjects. The functions of the state then took on a protective aspect as the notion grew that political organization must include all the people. The state hence came to be regarded as a sort of "col-

lective policeman." Indeed, early chieftainship embodied this newer idea of the functions of the state.¹ The early chieftain was not only the war leader, the trustee and manager of tribal property and the chief high priest in the religion of his people, but he was also the guardian of the mores, the keeper of order, the one who safeguarded the peace, enforced laws and arbitrated violations. These protective functions have remained an important part of the duties of every modern state.

In recent times the functions of the state have been increasingly concerned with the promotion of the general welfare. Wherever the control of political organization passed into the hands of the bulk of the people, the collective will interpreted the state, not as an end in itself, but as an agency for increasing the well-being of citizens generally. Not only is political organization required to maintain certain established conditions and relationships, but it now becomes its positive obligation to improve existing conditions and relationships. No longer is the citizen's individuality to be sacrificed to the state whenever a dominant group requires, but his personality is to be preserved and enlarged through the facilities and opportunities provided by the state.

THE PROPER FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE

The *laissez-faire* philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries carried the theory of welfare to an unwarranted conclusion when they took the unqualified position that the welfare of the community is best served if the individual is left free to pursue his own interest as he understands it. It was assumed that there was a "natural order," "a system of economic harmonies" in men's relationships that would, if allowed to prevail, work to the advantage of mankind. Indeed, the physiocrats went so far as to maintain that consumer's demand provided an adequate and effective regulation of economic relations. They argued, therefore, that politics and economics should be firmly and sharply separated and that political power should never be used for economic ends. Except to protect the individual against fraud and violence, the state was never to impose restrictions upon the activity of individuals and under no consideration was government ever to become a competitor of private enterprise in operations of an economic character.

These doctrines first developed as a protest against the vexatious system of regulations instituted by Colbert who, as Minister of Finance, imposed a rigid mercantilism upon French industry (1675-1683) in the hope of securing a favorable balance of trade. Consistency in the application of *laissez-faire*

¹ W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, *The Science of Society* (New Haven, 1927), Vol. I, pp. 480-488.

doctrines, during the eighteenth century, however, required that no check be placed upon the growth of combination among producers. Full freedom had to be granted here as elsewhere in "the natural order," notwithstanding the fact that such combination resulted in a large-scale industrialism in which economic activity was effectively controlled, not by consumer's demand but by producer's profit. To correct this perversion of the natural order the policy of unrestrained *laissez-faire* was modified to permit state regulation of certain types of economic activity having an especial bearing upon public welfare. Here the government was to function as a referee of, not as a participant in, such activities.

This individualistic philosophy was widely current in the colonies at the time of the Revolution. In their eagerness to safeguard the country against such abuses of political power as those instigated by George III, the framers of the Constitution of the United States embodied therein a bill of rights which set forth clearly what was conceived to be the proper province of the state. Later, through amendment, substantive law has also been made a part of the Constitution. This was done to prevent legislative revision or repeal of certain statutes which were regarded as essential to the American political order. The Constitution of the United States, therefore, includes in one inflexible document provisions which set up the structure of the state, statements of political principles which guarantee the rights of individual citizens, and laws which describe specific functions of the state. Yet it is generally conceded that constitutions, bills of rights and substantive law are separate political instruments each endowed with unique functions.

If it be held that the state is revealed *in* the constitution, the question as to what are proper or improper functions of the state will be determined by reference to that document. But constitutionality in the United States may mean reference to political structure, to the bill of rights, as well as to the will of the body politic as expressed in substantive law. Viewed sociologically the state, of course, transcends the constitution, for the framework which it provides is merely the means of carrying the state into being. Moreover, since the state is an organization of *all* the people, and since it is the *all-inclusive* social institution, it may undertake any function which the common will may assign. When the state expresses this common will, the propriety of its action may not be called into question. In specific instances it is legitimate to consider whether welfare is furthered more effectively by state functioning or by the delegation of those functions to subordinate institutions or organizations; but these are questions of efficiency, not of propriety. The only test that need be applied is that "all state action must be directed towards the ultimate welfare of the people as a whole and never diverted into channels for the private

gain of a few if this will be detrimental to the best interests of the majority." ² What the state may do cannot be reduced to hard and fast theories. The sphere of government activity is relative. As Ross so well says, "it is idle to lay down definitely the proper functions of the state, because its scope should depend upon such variables as the trend of social relationships, the development of the social mind, the advances of technique, the talent available for government. . . ." ³

FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE VIEWED SOCIOLOGICALLY

Conceived sociologically, the functions of the state may be grouped into four major divisions: those concerned with the *conservation* of social values indispensable to political and social order; those concerned with *social control*, that is, with the reconciliation, adjustment and coördination of the behavior of competing or conflicting interest groups; those concerned with *social amelioration* of the life conditions of maladjusted and disadvantaged groups; and those concerned with *social improvement*, that is, with the enhancement of the life possibilities of all groups. These major divisions may be subdivided as follows:

I. *Social conservation*

- (a) Promotion of internal order through the settlement of disputes between citizens and through the protection of persons and property from the depredations of ill-disposed classes
- (b) Development of ordered relations with other states; defense against external aggression
- (c) Administration of social justice
- (d) Conservation of natural resources
- (e) Protection of public health; sanitation
- (f) Enactment of sumptuary laws and restrictions

II. *Social control*

- (a) Determination of the political rights, duties and privileges of citizens and groups of citizens
- (b) Regulation of trade and industry
- (c) Legislation with respect to labor
- (d) Control of marriage and divorce
- (e) Determination of responsibilities of parents for children
- (f) Regulation of emigration and immigration

III. *Social amelioration*

- (a) Relief of poverty and distress

² F. A. Bushee, *Social Organization* (New York, 1930), p. 162.

³ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1920), p. 624.

- (b) Care of the insane, the feeble-minded and the epileptics
- (c) Unemployment relief
- (d) Provision for dependent and neglected children
- (e) Provision for indigent aged
- (f) Social insurance

IV. *Social improvement*

- (a) Provisions for public education
- (b) Promotion of art
- (c) Promotion of scientific investigation and research
- (d) Development of wholesome recreation
- (e) Eugenic legislation
- (f) Maintenance of highways; postal service
- (g) Internal improvements
- (h) Crisis government

No particular unit of government is necessarily charged with all the functions listed above. This enumeration includes functions which the central government must either perform or delegate to some constituent political unit. The classification merely recognizes the practices of existing and enlightened governments. A century ago many of these functions were not assumed by any state. Because knowledge of nature of infectious disease was lacking, for example, no state functions in this field were recognized. Now governments have much to do on this score. One hundred years hence new discoveries and new knowledge will lay new functions upon government. Should means be found for controlling weather or preventing feeble-mindedness, the functions of the state would be expanded to cover such needs. Indeed, the functions of any enlightened government at any period of time will be determined by the needs of the time collectively recognized.

TRENDS IN GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS

As social situations shift in a changing social order, it is inevitable that the general welfare of the body politic will take on new aspects. This will result in a corresponding shift in governmental activity. If the state is to continue effectively to organize the general will with respect to the well-being of its citizens, some of its functions will have to be curtailed, others will have to be expanded and certain new functions will have to be added. Such shifts in governmental activity have been necessitated by certain recent social changes which have profoundly altered the social situations confronting the welfare state; namely, the disappearance of the frontier, the increase in population, the improvement of the means of transportation, the development of new agencies of communication and, most significantly of all, the concentration

of population in cities with the consequent growth of metropolitan areas. These social changes have increased social and economic interdependence, multiplied social contacts, stimulated intercommunication and intensified social interaction. The necessary result has been an unprecedented increase in the areas of conflict and hence in the number of matters of concern to the general will.

Under such conditions, individual, as well as general, welfare becomes involved in a welter of delicate and intricate social interrelationships which only the state can control. This is especially the case when a people must cope with such problems as industrialization, urbanization, currents of international migration, contagious disease, general crop failures and economic depressions. In a complex social order characterized by frequent impersonal social contact, it is obvious that such crises require concerted group action—they cannot be met by the individual nor even by the efforts of single groups. In fact, such problems call for the mobilized resources of the entire body politic. When local governmental units find themselves incapable of controlling such social situations, appeal to larger political units must necessarily be made if welfare is to be conserved.

The period of readjustment and reorganization which followed the World War witnessed such shifts in governmental functions as a result of changes in the social situation. These may be outlined as follows:

A. Shifts in the Functions of the Federal Government

- (1) A decline in *general functions* accompanied by an expansion of certain specific legislative, judicial and executive services.
- (2) A shift in *military expenditures* "from defence services to activities designed to serve, protect and compensate veterans of the World War."
- (3) A doubling in the bulk of *civil functions* (1915 to 1930) especially those concerned with (a) general law enforcement including the administration of federal penal and correctional institutions; (b) the promotion and regulation of commerce, transportation and communication, the development of codes for American industry with emphasis upon service and self-government; (c) the promotion of education, science and research in government Bureaus, in agriculture, invocationsal education and in rehabilitation.
- (4) An increase in the use of *direct subsidies* and conditional grants to states for relief to hard-pressed home-owners, for unemployment and drought relief and similar projects. These constitute a notable change in the functions of the federal government.

B. Changes in the Functions of State Governments

- (1) An increase in welfare functions due to coöperation with the federal government in projects for relief of distress due to economic depression.
- (2) Assumption by the state of certain functions which county, township

and city governments were no longer able to perform satisfactorily, not only in administering relief, but also in dealing with crime, safeguarding labor and conserving natural resources.

- (3) An expansion of some of the older functions of government which have been increasingly acceptable to an interested public, such as, construction of surfaced highways, provision of institutions for the physically and mentally handicapped, children's aid, libraries, regulation of financial institutions, and the like.

C. Trends in Functions of Local Governments

- (1) A marked increase in newer welfare functions such as city planning, centralized purchasing and maintenance, traffic control, provision for crime records, maintenance of clinics for venereal disease, child welfare, prenatal care, dental inspection, public health nursing, food inspection, vocational education, libraries, special educational provision for disadvantaged children, establishment and maintenance of such recreational facilities as playgrounds, golf courses and swimming pools;
- (2) A trend toward state control—local officials carry on many of these newer functions under the state guidance in order that uniform standards of service may be maintained throughout the state.

It is to be noted that these changes indicate a marked decline in the purely political functions of government and an increased emphasis upon state activities concerned with the general welfare.

LIMITATIONS TO STATE ACTIVITY

Munro holds that "there is nothing a government should not do, if it can do the thing better than it would otherwise be done."⁴ This statement implies that the only limitations which may be imposed upon the activities of the state are those indicated by consideration of the efficiency of the service rendered. Specifically such limitations would seem to be:

1. *That the state should leave to private action any function in which the welfare of citizens is more adequately served by non-political than political agencies.* Of course there are functions which the state alone can perform; there are also functions which the state is more fitted to perform than any other organization. But there are functions which the state performs at a disadvantage with other agencies, notably, literary, artistic and scientific activities. There are also functions which the state should not perform at all, such as the control of people's opinions, attitudes and morality.⁵ Citizens should be free to make up their minds with respect to the activities of the

⁴ W. B. Munro, *Invisible Government* (New York, 1928), p. 23.

⁵ R. M. MacIver, *Society, its Structure and Changes* (New York, 1931), pp. 196-202.

state. Otherwise the gangs, cliques and blocs who make it their business to induce public opinion favorable to the state as they administer it will perpetuate their rule. Similarly, the delicate function of creating proper moral attitudes should be left to other agencies. Officials of the state are necessarily concerned with a group of basic functions whose exercise demands forthright action. They cannot be concerned with the slow, involved process of building up moral attitudes. Such functions the state should never subsume.

2. *That the state should include in its program "only so much of the complete welfare of its citizens as can be appreciated by all as really theirs."*⁶ This means that the state is limited in its activity by the intelligence and will of its people. Should the state undertake functions beyond the general level of sympathetic understanding, the common will will not support the activity no matter how significantly it may contribute to welfare. The Volstead Act is, perhaps, a notable example. As social mindedness and intelligence are increased, more and more elements of a complete welfare program may be undertaken by the state.

3. *That the state should function only in matters of social interest.* State action in the interests of a special group may only be taken provided the action will not be detrimental to the best interests of the majority. In times of group crisis it is obvious that many state activities will assume a social import that they lack under normal conditions. And, of course, state interference is necessarily increased when a population develops wide differences in culture or great inequalities in social position and economic possession. In the long run, however, the activities of the state should promote general rather than specific well-being.

4. *That the state should, so far as possible, engage only in such political action as represents something done by the individual rather than something done for him.* Whenever possible the government should avoid activities that destroy initiative or pauperize. Functions that place the state in a position where citizens regard it as a "splendid grab-bag" or as "a good cow to milk," are functions which an effective state will eliminate, for such activities not only pauperize but they represent an illegitimate exploitation of valuable resources.

Whatever functions or services the state undertakes at the command of the common will for the common good should be so clearly and concisely described that they may be easily understood by the majority of citizens. Moreover, such functions should be regularly and fully performed without variation or favoritism. Uncertainty respecting governmental activity tends to paralyze individual and group activity. When the functions of government are not understood

⁶ N. Wilde, *Ethical Basis of the State* (New York, 1924), p. 151.

and cannot be definitely relied upon, satisfying economic, political and social action is impossible.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. Distinguish between the objectives and the functions of the family, the school and the public library.
2. Indicate the factors which liberated the earlier states from centralized, coercive rule.
3. Evaluate the different attitudes which may be taken toward the functions of government. (Cf. W. F. Willoughby, *Government of Modern States*, Ch. 9.)
4. What specific amendments to the Constitution of the United States are, in fact, substantive law?
5. Why must the sphere of government activity be relative?
6. Analyze the justice-function of the state.
7. Sociologically speaking, when is a state justified in declaring war?
8. What specific services may the state render in safeguarding public health?
9. Justify sumptuary laws and restrictions.
10. "The state is supposed to be the *channel* and not the *source* of control." (Ross) Explain.
11. Should the state interfere in economic activity to
 - (a) restrain monopoly?
 - (b) lower railroad rates?
 - (c) protect child workers?
 - (d) fix wages and hours of adult labor?
 - (e) set prices at which products must be sold?
 - (f) limit profits?
 - (g) control production?Give reasons in each case.
12. To what degree should the state regulate sex relations, marriage and divorce? Explain.
13. To what extent is the state justified in making parents responsible for their offspring? Explain.
14. "It is questionable if the state has the duty of educating the children of the poor, especially when such education is financed by general taxation, because those of the poor who are thus educated then demand employment of the sort for which their education qualifies them. Eventually this means that a larger number are educated than can secure such employment. The demand then is for subsidized employment. The taxpayer is hence bled once for education (schooling) and again for this employment." Do you agree? Give reasons.
15. Why should the state make provision for the incompetent, the pauper, the

feeble-minded and the indigent old? Would it not be better to let natural law care for them? Explain.

16. Specifically what is *welfare*?

17. In promoting welfare should the state confine its efforts to preparing favorable conditions or should it also assist the individual in working out his fortune? Explain.

18. Should the state function as a statistical and research agency? Why or why not?

19. Which is better: that laws be enforced or that they be just? Give reasons.

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CHAPTER XVII

ORGANS OF THE STATE: THE ELECTORATE

IN the evolution of social institutions it has been noted that the position of dominance in the institutional hierarchy has passed from the family, which was the original, all-inclusive institution, to the state which has become the *over-all* institution. The scope of the activity of the modern state is, therefore, broad and inclusive. Adequately to meet the requirements placed upon it as the institution which controls the relations and conditions of its citizens except as these have been assigned to more specialized institutions, the state has divided its field among its various organs. These are the electorate, the legislative, the judicial, the executive and administrative branches of government.

THE ELECTORATE AS AN ORGAN OF THE STATE

If the state be the social institution which organizes the will of a political community on matters of common concern, it follows that the fundamental requisite of political organization consists in providing the means by which the citizens of the state may express their will and arrive at common decisions with respect to the problems confronting the body-politic. This is accomplished by the device known as voting. A person who possesses the right to vote is known in political science as an elector. The electorate, hence, is composed of the entire body of electors. To organize an electorate, therefore, is the primary task facing a community which desires to function as a state.

Now the electorate does not include the whole body of citizens but only those to whom the constitution gives the right to vote. In other words, the body-politic designates which of its members it desires to act as elector. The electoral franchise thus becomes a right conferred upon the citizen by his political associates for reasons of social expediency. Even in modern democratic states, voters constitute only a fraction of the population. Because the general welfare of the entire body of citizens is, in large measure, dependent upon the manner in which the elector discharges his function, *it* is conferred only upon those who are believed to be politically competent; that is, a process of selection excludes those who, for various reasons, are considered incapable of action for the common good.

Sociologically conceived, the exercise of suffrage is a social duty because it is intimately related to the effective functioning of an inclusive social institu-

tion. The right to vote is a function which the citizen is presumed to perform in the service of the state in return for the services which the state performs in his interests. Citizens are endowed by the constitution and the law of the state with the power to declare authoritatively the general will with respect to matters legally reserved to them.¹ Qualified citizens, therefore, who fail to discharge their electoral function, commit acts no different in nature from those of members of legislatures or other state officials who omit the performance of duties legally required of them.

If suffrage can be regarded as, in fact, a public office involving a public trust, it is obvious that there is the same justification for requiring fitness for this as well as for public office. In fact, the qualifications of electors "should differ only in degree, not in kind, from the qualifications deemed essential in office holders whose duties are more continuous and numerous."² These qualifications have been described as "loyalty to the fundamental principles of American government, willingness to use the vote, according to one's conscience for the best good of the commonwealth without fear or favor and a reasonable degree of political intelligence."³ In practice, however, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to select electors by applying these tests. The qualifications of voters have hence been reduced to such minimum standards of fitness as "are capable of prompt and precise application by administrative officers." At present the following groups of persons are excluded from the lists of electors: minors, aliens, incarcerated criminals, paupers, vagrants, non-residents and persons under guardianship. Property, sex and religious qualifications have practically disappeared but educational tests are now imposed by some sixteen states.

In general, the trend of suffrage legislation in the United States has been steadily in the direction of universal enfranchisement of adults. In the original colonies, the franchise was restricted to adult males possessing certain amounts of property and confessing certain faiths. Morals tests were, at times, also imposed. Such restrictions obviously excluded the majority of citizens. By 1860 suffrage had been extended to all adult white males with the usual exception of socially incompetent groups. The period since the Civil War has witnessed a struggle to enfranchise the Negro—a struggle which has secured the ballot for Negroes only in the North. The twentieth century brought the vote to women—an enfranchisement of a large number of persons neither superior or inferior to those already possessing it. Thus during the period of our national life those possessing the right to vote have increased from a bare 6 per

¹ A. N. Holcombe, *State Government in the United States* (New York, 1916), p. 143.

² R. C. Brooks, *Political Parties and Electoral Problems* (New York, 1923), p. 355.

³ Holcombe, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

cent of the population to a group constituting from 40 to 45 per cent of the population.⁴

Along with the expansion of the electorate has gone an enlargement of its powers. Originally only legislative offices were filled by direct popular election. To these have now been added certain executive and judicial offices and the direct election of United States senators. The direct primary legislation of 1890 extended the control of the electorate to nominations and still later to legislation through the initiative and referendum. The recall gives the voters power to pass upon the performance of their representatives. These increases in the power of the electorate were given in part to increase the power of the people and in part to win votes for the political party in office. The power, destined for the people, has been appropriated by political leaders. Frequent calls to the polls to labor with long cumbersome ballots have made the suffrage a burden rather than a privilege for the average elector, with the result that many have become non-voters. "Too often," says Brooks, "elections register the voice of the boss, not the voice of the people."⁵

NATURE OF THE ELECTION PROCESS

Elections serve a two-fold function: they decide what persons shall occupy public office and they register an opinion upon the issues of political campaigns. Elections, therefore, are necessarily concerned with issues as well as with personnel. This is at once clear when account is taken of the votes registered by new or radical parties which challenge the existing political set-up. An election, hence, is "merely our modern and highly refined substitute for the ancient revolution, a mobilization of opposing forces, a battle of the 'ins' against the 'outs,' with leaders and strategy and all the other paraphernalia of civil war, but without violence to the warriors."⁶ The shifts in power at election time, then, represent peaceful means of registering the general will of the body politic in matters requiring political action.

In the modern state with an extensive population the election method of registering the public will possesses several limitations: (a) the electorate is, for the most part, unacquainted with the qualifications of the candidates for whom it votes; (b) the voters are probably uninformed with respect to the merits of the issues presented for its consideration; (c) in the two-party system only one or two positions can be taken upon these issues because the major political parties will frequently take identical positions upon public questions; (d) the issues selected for political campaigns are chosen on the basis of their

⁴ J. Q. Dealey, *Growth of American State Constitutions* (Boston, 1915), p. 150.

⁵ Brooks, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

⁶ W. B. Munro, *Invisible Government* (New York, 1928), p. 17.

vote-getting power rather than their importance; (e) campaign propaganda frequently, if not always, distorts issues to the point where voters are confused and even misled with respect to political problems; (f) much of the voting in elections represent traditional political attitudes passed on from one generation to another.

In spite of these limitations, however, elections are socially preferable to violent political overturn as a means of political readjustment. Governments never contemplate their own termination. Those in power expect to keep it. Elections are a device expressly developed to insure that dissatisfaction will not grow to the danger point. Elections, faithfully abided by, have never resulted in violent overturning of government. They constitute, therefore, a way of political peace other than by submission.

Because of these limitations "a long period of time intervenes between the recognition of a social problem and the adoption of measures designed to solve it." ⁷ Not only so, but methods of solving such problems are worked out long before they are adopted as parts of a political program. Indeed, so much time elapses that the problem often reaches an acute, if not chronic, state before any notice of it is taken either by political parties or the voter. The conclusion has then been drawn that "the persistence of unsolved problems . . . long after the method of solving them have been worked out, is due largely to the ignorance, indifference and inactivity of the citizen." ⁸

Although Eldridge admits that such cultural lag may be explained, in part, by the opposition of vested interests, more should be said in defense of the average citizen. The modern state constantly faces difficult social, economic and political questions involving facts, information, principles and policies beyond the grasp of the mass of voters. Many citizens recognize their incompetence on such questions and expect their representatives to make good their deficiencies. In fact, considerations of general welfare require that representatives proceed beyond the competence of their constituencies in the solution of questions upon which an intelligent public will has not or cannot be formed. It is necessary to take a similar position when representatives sidestep their responsibilities on the plea that their constituencies are divided upon important issues such as, birth control, tariff, labor unions, war, and the like. When it is remembered that, practically, the average voter can inform himself upon the qualifications of his representatives and the merits of public questions only by an intake of political propaganda, the responsibility of the average citizen for cultural lag in political action is not so plain.

⁷ S. Eldridge, *The New Citizenship* (New York, 1929), p. 20; see also pp. 333-349; and W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, p. 192.

⁸ Eldridge, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ELECTORATE

It is conceivable that an unorganized electorate might select its public officials without the services of political parties, but such elections would be difficult to execute except in political groups where voters are few. In power states, where the body of citizens do not participate in the affairs of government, the problem of registering the general will never arises. In the modern welfare state, however, the number of electors is so large that some means for the orderly conduct of elections is necessary. In such states it is not possible for the average voter to know specifically what persons are qualified for public office or to understand fully the issues which confront the government. If the electoral function is to be discharged satisfactorily, therefore, voters must be organized and informed. This need has called into being the political party.

The political party has been defined as "an association of voters believing in certain principles of government, formed to urge the adoption and execution of such principles in governmental affairs through officers of like beliefs."⁹ This definition implies: (a) that a political party is a group of citizens organized as a political unit to exercise, through voting power, an influence upon government which they could not summon singly; (b) that the group so organized advocates certain principles and policies for the general conduct of government which it regards as superior to those in operation; and, (c) that the voters thus associated designate and support certain candidates for public office as those who will, if elected, put these principles and policies into effect. These implications indicate the social significance of the political party; they also describe its purpose. It is to be noted, however, that the political party is an extra-legal, but integral, part of the political machinery of the welfare state.

As thus constituted the political party has been interpreted variously: (a) as an agency providing responsible government (Ford, Goodnow, Wilson, Root, Croly); (b) as a "broker" of candidates and policies (McLaughlin, Lowell, Holcombe); (c) as the by-product of social and industrial forces (Steffens, La Follette, Bryan, Roosevelt, Veblen); and (d) as a necessary agency of popular control under actual conditions (Ratzenhofer, Small, Bentley, Brooks, Adams, Kent, Ostrogorski).¹⁰ From the sociological point of view, however, the political party is an interest group or combination of interest groups which pursue certain common ends with respect to government.¹¹ When

⁹ Supreme Court of Indiana in *Kelso v. Cook*, 110 N. E. 987, 1916.

¹⁰ C. E. Merriam and H. F. Gosnell, *The American Party System* (New York, 1930), pp. 414 ff.

¹¹ H. E. Barnes, *Sociology and Political Theory* (New York, 1924), p. 115.

such interest groups contend with other interest groups for control of the state, political parties become typical conflict groups.¹²

That political parties represent well-defined social interests is clearly indicated when party membership is analyzed over a period of years. In fact, the same political party will represent different occupational, racial, religious and sectional groups in different sections of the same state. Under such conditions it is obvious that the political party arrives at unity by a series of compromises and adjustments. Sufficient harmony must be established between conflicting interest groups to make possible effective action, for the strength of a party will depend upon the number of individuals and interest groups which it can successfully combine without sacrificing aggressiveness. Parties form and re-form as they go down in defeat either on issues or personalities. New platforms are developed, new policies worked out and new tactics devised in order that political parties may continue to represent the current state of public opinion in the groups so organized. For, if a public will is to be formulated, at least two parties must contend for electoral support. A political party having no opponent eventually calls resistance into being, since no single group can know the general will.

Political parties, hence, are not only interest groups but they are also competing social groups. Although they may represent the same or similar interests political parties are contenders for political office. When they represent opposing interests the conflict is open and vigorous. Since they "combat other similar groups or compromise and trade with them as appears expedient"¹³ political parties are typical conflict groups. The nucleus of this political conflict group is the *party machine* composed of professional politicians whose purpose it is to keep themselves and the party in power. This explains the absence of political conviction, the opportunism, the selfishness and the corruption which frequently characterize party procedures.

While it is true that it is "the attitude toward the established order of things which fundamentally distinguishes party from party,"¹⁴ it is to be remembered that political parties do not control the mass of legislation. An examination of a given body of legislation will demonstrate that most of the enactments of any legislative body have been urged by various non-party groups. It is only when "some question affecting the organization or the party directly, or some interest closely allied with it" that the political party, as such, "takes a definite position."¹⁵ For the most part, political parties do not govern; they organize

¹² E. B. Reuter and C. W. Hart, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1933), p. 311.

¹³ Reuter and Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 311.

¹⁴ R. M. MacIver, *The Modern State* (London, 1928), p. 410.

¹⁵ Merriam and Gosnell, *op. cit.*, p. 448.

the electorate for the purposes of government. Political parties are primarily interested in the control of political office; they are concerned with legislation as a means of perpetuating such control. It is the electorate, rather than the party, which regards legislation as a method of promoting welfare.

The organization of the political party follows closely the political organization of the state. The structure of the party is most in evidence at its national convention and in the primary. At its national convention, with its delegates from states and territories—delegates who have been selected in local caucus—the party formulates the statement of its position upon current issues and nominates its candidates for national offices. Through the primary, the party aims to secure the nomination of candidates who will register heavily at the ballot box when the election is held. Although the national set-up is the dominant aspect of party organization, state, county and local units furnish the broad basis upon which this national organization rests. Between conventions and primaries party organization consists of a series of committees and committeemen—persons who make a profession of politics. These constitute a governing body which has a direct personal interest in the success and continuity of the party. This group, in fact, tends to become the party's master rather than its servant.

Among modern states two forms of party government have developed, the two-party system and the multiple-party or bloc system. In the former two major parties alternate in control of government; that is, when one party is defeated in the elections, the other normally succeeds to power. The strength of this system "lies in the fact that it provides a clear contest which assumes a simple issue."¹⁶ In the multiple-party system, many opinion groups contend for political office with no party normally in the majority. "The government of the day depends upon a coalition of groups, and is the result of bargains and agreements between them."¹⁷ These coalitions break up and re-form as different issues are considered and as public opinion shifts. The chief advantage of such a government lies in its sensitivity to the will of the body politic.

Historically, most governments first develop a two-party system. As the state matures politically, however, the multiple-party system is likely to emerge because political issues do not remain simple. Each system, therefore, has its advantages and its disadvantages. These may be summarized as follows:

Advantages of the Two-Party System

- (a) Reasonably stable government guaranteed
- (b) Concentration of authority and responsibility together with easy means of enforcing it assured

¹⁶ MacIver, *op. cit.*, p. 420.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 418.

- (c) Government is simple and almost automatic in operation
- (d) Contest for control is certain and clear-cut.

Disadvantages of the Two-Party System

- (a) Voters have a narrower elective choice since they must accept one or the other of the parties or forego voting
- (b) Electoral institutions place a heavy premium upon party conformity
- (c) Political leaders are required to give slavish devotion to the party
- (d) Strong, independent leaders are regarded as a menace because they place party success in jeopardy
- (e) Mere politicians are given abundant opportunity to pursue their political machinations
- (f) Strong vested interests in political opinion often established
- (g) Artificiality is introduced into political groupings because the free expression of political opinion is hampered by insistence upon party loyalty

Advantages of the Multiple-Party System

- (a) Government responds immediately to changes in public opinion
- (b) Political leaders must bargain openly for support
- (c) Political groups can freely organize, unite and separate with every change in the social situation
- (d) Opinion-groups are able to formulate doctrines without the compromise usually required by the two-party system
- (e) Independent voter has a wide range of electoral choice

Disadvantages of the Multiple-Party System

- (a) No party can normally expect an absolute majority
- (b) Particular governments are short-lived—they “rise and fall with dramatic suddenness” irrespective of merit
- (c) Continuity of political policy is difficult to maintain under such conditions
- (d) Governments lack the assurance which the two-party system always gives

No evaluation of these two systems of party government is complete, however, until account is taken of the fact that “the advantages and disadvantages of either system are relative to the intelligence and culture of the community (for) the essential thing is that government should rest upon as broad a basis of opinion as possible, maintaining, in spite of party character, the unity of a whole people.”¹⁸

SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Political parties, then, constitute the social machinery by which the electorate is organized with respect to matters of political concern to the body-politic.

¹⁸ MacIver, *op. cit.*, p. 420.

This general function, however, should be subdivided into a number of more specific functions.

1. *The formulation of public policies.* The body-politic is continuously confronted with a welter of issues, varying in importance and in urgency, all of which compete for public attention and acceptance. To evaluate these issues and to select those which are to be submitted to the electorate constitutes the primary function of political parties. Upon these issues, carefully formulated, the parties appeal to the voters for support at the time of election. The policies adopted are always, nominally at least, for the common good. Of course, organizations dealing with legislative problems, professional and trade associations also carry on vigorous campaigns for the adoption of proposals for desired political action. When such organizations have an intensive public interest in their proposals, political parties will include these as planks in the party platform. For obviously, political parties will choose the issues most likely to secure votes. Minor parties, which have no prospect of acquiring control of government, are, therefore, more likely to present significant public issues than the major parties who are out to win elections. At any rate the decisions rendered at the polls determine, in theory at least, what policies the successful candidates will subsequently put into operation in their administration of the government.

2. *The selection of personnel.* When the platforms have been formulated, political parties then proceed to select election candidates who are committed to the party's view on public questions and who are popular enough to win votes for the party. Such candidates are put before the electorate in caucus, primary, convention and election. Appointive as well as elective positions have come under the control of the party group. Although such positions are nominally controlled by officials charged with the power of appointment, these officials make appointments only after consultation with party officials. Frequently, too, such appointments are actually turned over to the party group.

3. *The promotion of political unity.* The Constitution of the United States embodies the principle that the organs of the federal government shall function as checks upon each other. This implies, if it does not actually foster, opposition between the legislative, the executive and the judicial branches of government with respect to state policies. It is to be noted, moreover, that the Constitution makes no provision for joint action of national and state governments upon important political issues. Political parties, therefore, perform a significant service to the state when they present continuously to all organs of government in the various political units the same public issues and insist everywhere upon the same public policies. Working majorities in legislative bodies may so

coöperate with executives of the same party that unity of political principle and policy is secured.¹⁹

4. *The administration and criticism of government.* The electorate assumes that the party in power will administer government in accordance with the policies set forth in the party platform upon which it was elected to office. Actually, of course, the party in power may only meet in part the issues requiring solution. Indeed it may fail to fulfill some, or even many, of its pre-election promises. In either case, the party's ineffectiveness may be due to its insincerity with respect to issues or to its lack of a majority sufficient to control governmental processes. At any rate, it puts into operation a type of government upon which the electorate may pass judgment and which the parties out of power may criticize. Since no party is ever in complete control of government and never completely out of office, parties out of power can be relied upon to point out deficiencies and failures of the party in power and expose weaknesses, graft or corruption. Parties out of power ("the opposition") thus present to the electorate for its ratification or rejection a different type of government with different policies for promoting the general welfare.

5. *Political education and leadership.* That the electorate may be informed with respect to the issues which divide the parties seeking its support contending political groups present imposing masses of "data" to the voter from the platform and through the press. Every agency of propaganda is utilized in explaining the party's position upon the current issues and in opposing the point of view of other parties. Such propaganda is often based upon misrepresentations, statements of half-truths and appeals to prejudice, but nevertheless the electorate is presented with the alternatives between which it must choose. Such social suggestion as proceeds from these educational activities of political parties provides the voters with definite leadership in political thought and action, especially those whose duller intellects cannot supply a basis for reasoned behavior.

6. *Stimulation of interest in government.* In the process of educating the electorate on important issues, political parties present existing conditions so vividly that voters become concerned with respect to the political situation and, hence, interested in the outcome of the election. Contending parties, of course, vie with each other to secure the attention and support of the voters. The activities of those who conduct political campaigns are designed to arouse the enthusiasm of the "regulars," detach adherents from other parties, win the allegiance of "independents" and recruit new voters. All these are accomplished by broadcasting colorful propaganda, by exploiting the personality of the party's candidate, exposing the personal history of opposing candidates and

¹⁹ H. R. Bruce, *American Parties and Politics* (New York, 1927), pp. 25-28.

by using slogans, battle-cries and symbolic representations which sum up the significance of the campaign. Political parties also stir the interest of voters in the affairs of state by enlisting electoral participation in what seems to be a popular decision upon public questions. Potency is given these appeals by vigorous attempts to establish a linkage between the individual's well-being and the success of the party.

7. *Intermediation between individual and government.* Political parties also act as intermediaries between the social organization and the individual citizen, particularly where laws and ordinances are complicated or difficult to understand, where regulations are enforced with relentless rigidity by officials of government or where regulatory enactments are unworkable and unsupported by the community. The adjustment of the immigrant to his new social environment has been greatly facilitated by this service of the local politician. "In many cases there may be established a relation something like that between patron and client, especially among the weak and helpless in urban centers or with the rich and powerful who wish to evade certain provisions of the law. . . . The amount of this adjustment or mediation, legitimate or illegitimate, is greater than is commonly supposed; in fact, it forms a great part of the stock in trade of the politician," for it includes such services as information regarding governmental services and personnel, innocuous personal services, doubtful privileges, spoils and systematic graft.²⁰

8. *Nationalization of political processes.* In the earlier years of American history, political parties did much to break down the strong allegiance to the State as over against the central government. Parties definitely strengthened the bonds of federal union when they developed organization and activities on a nation-wide basis and crossed state lines in support of candidates and policies. These services have not been confined to the early decades of our national history. Political parties still emphasize national rather than State issues; State and local political organizations are, in fact, almost obscured by the national set-up.

9. *Facilitation of orderly political change.* This function of political parties has been too succinctly described by MacIver to call for restatement.

Without the party system . . . the coup d'état, the putsch or revolution are the only methods of securing a change in government. Without it, the government in power is controlled by the pressure of custom, which itself is weakest in times of crisis; by the desire for popularity, which is easily overborne by the ambitions of depotism; by the consideration, too insecure to allay the fears of the subjects,

²⁰ Merriam and Gosnell, *op. cit.*, pp. 444-445. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

of the advantage to itself of a contented prosperous people; and beyond that by the fear of revolution. Without the party-system the state has no elasticity, no true self-determination. Without it government is rigid and irresponsible, conceived in terms of mastery rather than of service. The state under such conditions is either a closed system of arbitrary domination or else the battlefield of contending factions. The party-system is based on the contrary theory that men are rational beings, in so far at least that they admit principle to be a better ground of government than force, persuasion more desirable than compulsion, and the conflict of ideas more desirable than clash of arms.²¹

POLITICAL PARTY FINANCE

It has been estimated that the amount of money necessary to carry on the functions of political parties has now reached the impressive figure of twenty million dollars for every national election. This means an annual average expenditure of five million dollars. Such an amount is necessary in part because of the large and heterogeneous electorate which must be reached, in part because of the higher cost of advertising, services, materials and supplies and in part because of increasing apathy of the public which necessitates increasingly elaborate political campaigns. Present costs appear especially high when compared with the \$100,000 spent in Lincoln's first campaign. It has been pointed out, however, that "while campaign funds have increased about 65 per cent in twelve years (1912-1924), the electorate has increased 100 per cent and prices have increased 63 per cent."²² Although campaign expenditures have not increased out of proportion to the growth of the electorate or the rise in prices, no party can elect its candidates to office without large sums of money for political campaigns.

The funds needed to finance the activities of political parties are secured from the following sources chiefly: contributions from office-holders who owe their election to the party, contributions from candidates for office as members of the party, contributions from citizens with a general interest in the party and contributions from group interests having a special stake in the issues of the campaigns. To these items should be added the services contributed by public employees, volunteers, the press and interested organizations. Such contributions of money and services are generally regarded as legitimate. Machine control of the police departments in some of the larger cities, however, makes it possible for local political bosses to collect "large and constant tribute" for protection given to criminal, vice and underworld elements. These practices have provoked such "violent outbreaks of public indignation" that

²¹ MacIver, *op. cit.*, p. 399. Copyright by The Clarendon Press, Oxford.

²² J. K. Pollock, *Party Campaign Funds* (New York, 1926), p. 175.

"some of the most powerful city bosses in the country have gone down in defeat." ²³

Because of the large sums raised and the sources from which they have been derived, the public has demanded government regulation of party campaign funds. This has taken the form of (a) requirements of publicity as to campaign revenues and expenditures, (b) restrictions on the sources from which party revenues may be derived, (c) restrictions as to the character of campaign expenditures, and (d) limitations on the amounts which may be expended.²⁴ Such regulation, however, has not been particularly effective in eliminating corrupt practices. This failure has been due to defective machinery for the enforcement of such acts, to the difficulty of securing convictions under such acts, and most significantly, to misapplication in the acts themselves. The crux of the problem of party funds lies not so much in the amount as in the source and use of such funds. If campaign money is given openly and with no actual or implied obligation, if such funds are used legitimately and with reasonable economy, there is no occasion for restrictions upon the amounts secured. With these qualifications, "no fund can be called too large, because in arousing political interest and in spreading information the party is doing work of the worthiest kind." ²⁵ It should be noted, however, that the distribution of such funds between opposing parties may be such as to give the party which possesses a disproportionate amount of campaign money an unfair advantage in presenting its case to the electorate. The party with the largest campaign fund, in other words, is in a position to present its case more fully than its opponents can afford to do. The result may be that political issues will be settled on the basis of emphasis rather than merit.

PROBLEMS OF PARTY GOVERNMENT

While political parties perform important functions in organizing the body-politic for effective political action, certain pathological situations have developed to a point where they seriously impair the social services rendered by the party organizations. In fact, these pathological situations have become such as materially affect the general welfare; they are, therefore, problems of immediate concern to the body-politic.

1. *The spoils system.* The spoils system may be defined as the practice of using political office to advance personal or party interests at the expense of efficient administration of government. Specifically, the spoils system involves the bestowing of honors, preferments, preferences, favors and appointments in

²³ Brooks, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

²⁴ Merriam and Gosnell, *op. cit.*, pp. 337-344.

²⁵ Pollock, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

return for support given to party policies; it includes such practices as log-rolling, gerrymandering, jack-potting and organized lobbying for powerful interests—practices which obstruct the expression of the public will through law-making bodies; it secures a control of the administrative machinery of government which acquiesces in inadequate enforcement of law and the political interpretation of statutes and ordinances so that political parties may dispense the privilege and protection necessary to political power; and, finally, it interferes with the administration of justice, gains control of police departments and arranges the election or appointment of corruptible judges. In fact, political parties have carried the spoils system into every aspect and area of government.

The causes for such developments are not difficult to uncover. The rapid growth of population, the heterogeneity of population elements, the concentration of population in cities, notions of equality, the principle of rotation in office, long ballots, electoral apathy, weak governmental administration, sweeping social and economic changes, favorable geographic position and unlimited natural resources, abundant economic opportunity—these are the factors which have provided fertile soil for the development of a spoils system.

It is common knowledge that the corrupt practices of political parties have resulted "in a breakdown of representative government over large areas and long periods of time"; "in enormous waste and inefficiency in conduct of government" and in the general frustration of the public will as it seeks social improvement.²⁶ Moreover, the spoils system is inimical to the party itself. The enormous profits of the spoilsmen are bound to develop envious rivalry of politicians in the out-group and bitter opposition from an indignant electorate. Eventually corrupt practices become so offensive that the party is retired from office. Neither is the spoils system favorable to legitimate trade and industry. "The field of special privilege is necessarily small and those outside this little area are not favored. The small producer and tradesman have not been a part of the system or its beneficiaries. On the contrary they have been in many instances its earliest victims."²⁷ These, together with the great mass of citizens who are exploited by such practices, will eventually force adjustment upon the spoilsmen. Sound, permanently profitable business policies can only be based upon integrity and fair play. From every point of view, the spoils system is condemned as anti-social and unprofitable. It must be replaced by a merit system honestly administered by a competent civil service.

2. *Election procedure.* Because of the federal nature of our government, economy requires that national, state, county and city offices be filled at the

²⁶ Merriam and Gosnell, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

same election. Consequently ballots have been known to contain the names of as many as ninety candidates for some fifty-two offices. Blind-voting and indifference are the inevitable results of such procedure. These give great advantage to those skilled in political manipulation. To assure a degree of intelligent electoral participation, therefore, it is desirable that only the more important offices should be elective and that only a few of these should be filled at any given election. This means a short ballot.

Under the party system as it now operates, election procedure affords no means of giving significant political minorities adequate representation. In fact, present procedure virtually disfranchises such minorities. Some satisfactory method of securing minority representation is required for the full expression of the general will.

Finally, in the reform of election procedures it is obvious that gerrymandering should be eliminated as an obstruction to the expression of the public will. Gerrymandering maintains existing class control; representative government does not imply the perpetuation of the *status quo*. As long as representation is based upon locality, election districts must be honestly and frequently reformed with shifts in population. Otherwise government cannot be representative.

3. *Direct legislation.* The republican form of government is organized upon the principle that law-making is wholly the function of legislatures composed of representatives of the people. The initiative and referendum proceed upon the principle that the people themselves shall participate directly in the making of laws. Under these devices the electorate is asked either to enact law or to pass judgment upon measures under legislative consideration. Although publicity pamphlets are issued for the information of the electorate, experience shows that the average elector votes, if at all, largely on the basis of superficial opinion rather than upon conclusions drawn from a careful examination into the merits of the proposed measure. When it is remembered that modern governments are confronted with issues upon which the average voter is incompetent to render judgment, it is obvious that direct legislation affords the political boss another fertile field for party cultivation. Unless the initiative and referendum can be confined to matters upon which the electorate can render sound judgment, it is obvious that direct legislation only increases the power of the political manipular.

4. *The recall.* The recall is "neither more nor less than a special election to determine whether an official shall be superseded before the expiry of his term."²⁸ As such it is sharply distinguished from the initiative and the refer-

²⁸ J. D. Bennett, *The Operation of the Initiative, Referendum and Recall in Oregon* (Portland, 1915).

endum. A truly representative government must operate on the principle that an official is entitled to public office only so long as he is representative. Obviously this is not a matter of term of office, but of attitudes on issues. As a means of increasing electoral control of the executive and legislative branches of government experience with the recall favors its extension. As a method of controlling the judicial process, however, the recall shows serious defect. If judges must administer justice with the popularity of their decisions in mind, it is obvious that the courts could no longer function impartially.

5. *Non-voting*. Representative government cannot express the general will unless a large majority of the electorate consistently exercise the suffrage. Of course, to vote intelligently requires "some knowledge of our government, national, state and local; some familiarity with its history, particularly in recent times; some acquaintance with our public men; some insight into the economic, sectional, racial and other groups that are struggling for mastery; and finally, some conception of the issues which this struggle has brought forth for contemporary solution" both nationally and internationally.²⁹ Intelligent participation in the political process, therefore, involves more than poking ballots into ballot boxes; it requires the development of a wholesome political consciousness and the desire for genuine public service on the part of an active citizenship. When only 56 per cent of the electorate vote, assuming that they vote intelligently, it is clear that government fails to register the general will. If a large number of those who do vote, do so to receive some political reward, it is obvious that representative government itself has failed.

In view of the problems presented by modern party government, two conclusions clearly follow: first, either the electorate must intelligently exercise its political function or it surrenders government to those who exploit it for personal ends; and second, when the electorate cannot vote intelligently upon political issues, the general welfare requires that a different type of representative government be established.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. Point out the inadequacies of the early theories of suffrage.
2. Characterize the various periods in the history of suffrage in the United States.
3. Should persons on unemployment relief not be denied right to vote since they are as dependent on the state as are paupers? Give reason.
4. What should be the results of lowering electoral standards in the United States? Why have these results not been forthcoming?
5. Why do political parties thrive only among progressive and advanced peoples?

²⁹ Brooks, *op. cit.*, p. 545.

6. What are the features of a standard party platform? (Merriam and Gosnell, p. 214.) Of what sociological significance is such a platform?
7. Describe the process of party growth. (MacIver, *The Modern State*, pp. 401-406.)
8. "Political parties usually have a deep-seated distrust of democracy." (W. F. Willoughby.) Explain.
9. Chart the organization of a typical political party.
10. Contrast European and American political parties. Explain the differences.
11. Which system is preferable—the two-party or the multiple-party government? Explain.
12. What significant public policies in the United States have been developed (a) by minor political parties; (b) by non-political organizations to the point where major parties have included them in their platforms?
13. Describe political party reform tactics. (Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 548.)
14. At what specific points does the general structure and framework of government in the United States fail to articulate with the party system?
15. (a) Explain the position of minor parties in the United States.
(b) What functions do they perform?
16. Political parties "prevent popular vagaries from driving their way to statute-books. They are the most solid obstacle we have against the danger of Caesarism." (Laski.) Explain.
17. Mr. Havemeyer of the Sugar Trust testified before Congress: "In Republican states we contribute to the Republicans, and in Democratic states to the Democrats . . . (and in doubtful states) we contribute to both sides." Explain this practice.
18. Classify party expenditures into legitimate and illegitimate items.
19. Should "tainted" money ever be used to finance the activities of political parties? Give reasons.
20. Specifically how do blind-voting and indifference favor the political boss?
21. (a) Indicate the nature of such practices as:
 - (1) log-rolling
 - (2) gerrymandering
 - (3) jack-potting
 - (4) lobbying
 (b) What are the social consequences of such practices?
22. Is proportional representation socially sound? Give reasons.
23. Suggest a remedy for non-voting.
24. Should one vote at all if he cannot vote intelligently?

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CHAPTER XVIII

ORGANS OF THE STATE: LEGISLATIVE BODIES AND THE JUDICIARY

IN the modern welfare state the legislative branch of government is composed of representatives elected by the body-politic for the specific purpose of organizing its will upon matters of public concern. These representatives are clothed with authority to enact such statutes and ordinances as the common welfare requires. From the sociological viewpoint, any political group so constituted becomes a legislative body. The term applies therefore to houses of a national congress, to state legislatures, to county boards of supervisors, to city councils and to town meetings.

LEGISLATIVE BODIES AS ORGANS OF THE STATE

To the legislative branch of government the state assigns the task of making the laws which are to govern the relationships of its citizens. These laws are then interpreted by the courts and enforced by the administrative branches of government. With the exception of the town meeting, legislative bodies are formal conferences of delegated persons for the discussion of public affairs. As such they function for the state much as boards of directors function for corporations.¹ Composed of many persons holding divergent points of view and representing various interests and different areas, legislative bodies supply the body-politic with a universe of discourse in which the policies of government are defined and its methods of procedure agreed upon. Discussion and deliberation rather than action characterize the behavior of such bodies. Political action is implied, however, for the purpose of such discussion is, or should be, the solution of critical political situations. Constitutions, of course, take out of the field of parliamentary discussion certain questions relating to the structure of the state. These questions the citizens regard as settled. Constitutional provisions thus assure the public that legislative bodies will confine their deliberations to the problems of immediate and pressing importance.

Analysis of the various types of legislative bodies reveals certain elements which are common to all. These constitute the essential characteristics of such bodies.

¹ W. F. Willoughby, *Principles of Public Administration* (New York, 1927), pp. 10-11.

1. *Representative in character* (except town meeting). Some principle of representation is always followed in the selection of the members of all legislative bodies except the town meeting. Corrupt practices aside, those elected to a legislative body always represent a constituency. Authority is derived from this representation.

2. *Legislative in function*. Law-making is the principal function of legislative bodies. Power to impeach and to review certain judicial decisions are functions of minor significance.

3. *Formal in aspect*. A constitution always prescribes the composition of the legislative body. An election system with designated procedures for nominating, balloting, filing of returns and issuing credentials provides for the selection of legislators. The sessions of such bodies are held at stated intervals and in prescribed places; they are conducted in accordance with "orders of business," rules of order and house rules.

4. *Deliberative in procedure*. The issues under consideration by legislative bodies are always settled by an open discussion of desired ends and the methods of accomplishing them.

5. *Authoritative in action*. The decisions of legislative bodies are binding both upon all citizens including members of legislative body. Optional acquiescence is rarely contemplated. In modern democratic states, at least, a political body lacking any of these characteristics can scarcely be designated a legislative body.

Since legislative bodies act for the body-politic, it follows logically that they possess the powers of the electorate which places them in office. With such delegated authority, it is the province of legislative bodies to set up such governmental agencies as they deem necessary; to prescribe the manner in which governmental powers shall be exercised; to set forth the policies of government; to determine what activities the government shall undertake, what agencies and organizations shall be responsible for these activities, what rules of procedure such agencies shall follow in discharging these responsibilities and what personnel shall be employed by such agencies; to pass the laws which orderly social interaction seems to require; to raise and appropriate funds to meet the expenses of government; and to supervise and control governmental agencies. Representative government usually leaves to the discretion of legislative bodies questions relating to the manner in which they will carry out these functions.

In the formulation of the general will on matters of public concern, constituencies may be either areas or social groups. In *territorial* representation those selected for political office undertake to voice the opinion of the district from which they come; in *vocational* representation legislators are assumed to

reflect the point of view of an economic interest. When local areas happen to be dominated by a single interest such as a railroad, a mine or an industry, it would seem that these types of representation might coincide. But any such interest is likely to include divergent groups. Since the problems which confront modern governments are, for the most part, industrial and commercial, vocational representation aims to set up a legislative body composed of deputies from every type of economic interest in the body-politic. Full vocational representation requires that every such group elect a representative to express its will in the legislative body. Territorial representation, on the other hand, proceeds upon the principle that public questions may be settled on the basis of common interests of the electorate rather than the special interests of particular groups.

When the legislator represents a given area with its divergent interests he must be a judge as to which interest he will represent. Some legislators, of course, concede to whatever group presses hardest, but the assumption is that he functions as an arbiter of contending interests. When the legislator represents an interest, on the other hand, he necessarily becomes an advocate. Since he is sent to the legislative body to secure what he may for the interest he represents, he is likely to be ousted if he does not protect and enhance its preserves. In organizing the general will with respect to matters of common concern, however, the general welfare requires that legislators should distinguish between the public interest and personal or class interests. On some matters of common concern, there is no general will which can be organized. The common will at these points needs corrective education as well as legislative organization. If government is to promote general welfare and to avoid extremism, legislative bodies must be composed of those who can surmount the interests of particular groups and settle issues on the basis of public welfare.

LEGISLATION—THE WILL OF THE POLITICAL GROUP

Legislative bodies, then, are specific agencies for organizing the will of the body-politic. Statute law succinctly expresses the will thus organized with respect to matters of public concern especially as regards behavior. Law, hence, is "the expression of a principle of order to which men must conform in their conduct and relations as members of society, if friction and waste are to be avoided among the units of the aggregate. . . ." ² In most civilized states legislation "originates in the sense of right of that part of the population which is permitted to exercise the electoral franchise." ³ Law provides for the opera-

² R. Pound, *Criminal Justice in Cleveland* (Cleveland, 1922), p. 563.

³ H. Krabbe, *The Modern Idea of the State* (New York, 1922), p. 91.

tion of this sense of right which has been developed out of the experience of the group in varied social situations. If this experience is incorrectly interpreted or deliberately misrepresented, legislation sets up standards of conduct which further experience will demonstrate to be either inadequate or harmful.

Political behavior patterns thus reflect the cultural background of the group. The political consideration of a public problem is possible, in fact, only when the political group has a body of common experience which can be discussed. This cultural background is made up of folkways, mores and the resultant social organization; it may also be comprised of sets of group relationships which express conventionalized modes and procedures. These represent an integration of opposing interests which has resulted from previous discussions of the means of securing what are deemed to be desirable group ends. In other words "the law usually indicates just what may be done at any given moment both as regards actuality and possibility . . . it reveals not only what the ruling majority or the ruling minority actually desires, but also what they will or will not tolerate."⁴ The general will thus formulated in the law expresses both the state of the social mind and the purpose of the political group. From this point of view legislation becomes a means of "societal self-direction."

Since order, discipline, cohesion and coöperation are conditions essential to effective group life, certain rules governing the behavior and the relationships of group members are necessary. With such rules lacking, conflict, confusion and disorganization ensue with the result that the group fails to secure for its members the satisfactions for which it was organized. To guarantee satisfactions various regulative devices such as, customs, folkways and mores develop. Violations of the conventionalized behavior patterns bring group disapprovals and, in extreme cases, social ostracism. At any point, however, where behavior jeopardizes the well-being or the survival of the group, law appears, for such behavior must be prevented.⁵ Law, therefore, crystallizes the mores into more definite form. Certain types of "behavior are banned and specific penalties assigned."⁶ In fact, the political group disintegrates unless it can satisfactorily inhibit anti-social action and compel behavior that promotes collective welfare. The functions of law thus exceed in significance those of other traditional regulative devices because law must evaluate individual and group interests, coördinate common interests and resolve conflict of interests, both within the group and among groups. In other words, law must not only develop the ways and means for safeguarding common interests; it must

⁴ C. M. Case, *Social Process and Human Progress* (New York, 1931), p. 199.

⁵ W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston, 1911), Chs. 1, 2.

⁶ H. H. Horne, *The Philosophy of Education* (New York, 1905), p. 139.

also "set up valuations of the relative worth of the multitude of interests with which, in one way or another, the group is in contact." ⁷

Legislation definitely formulates the codes of behavior which are made effective by the active and recognized power of the government. A law, therefore, embodies "a principle or rule of conduct so established as to justify prediction with reasonable certainty that it will be *enforced* by the courts if its authority is challenged." ⁸ Rules of conduct enforced only by public opinion or incidental group action lie within the mores; statute law implies administration by specialized functionaries chosen for the purpose. ⁹ While mores and laws alike represent social attitudes which have emerged from the experience of the race, statute law sets forth the types and forms of individual and collective behavior which constitute minimum standards for the members of the political group. Conduct above the basic norms is secured through such non-statutory media as morality, patriotism and religion.

The experience of the race has clearly indicated that much conduct of value to the political group lies beyond the behavior induced by custom, impelled by the mores or required by law. In fact, resort to *unwritten law*, under the guise of expediency, reasonableness or equity, is necessary in the administration of law, first, because all the intricate relations of a dynamic social order cannot be completely regulated, and secondly, because the making of law by legislative organs inevitably lags behind the changing valuations of urgent social interests. Where there are lacks or defects in the organization of statute law the unwritten law supplements with rules "derived from the operation of a sense of right." ¹⁰ Such rules may also be used by the courts to modify or even to abrogate statutory law when these violate the prevailing sense of right which gives force to all law, written or unwritten. Since the law derives its authority from the group's acceptance of it, neither the action of a legislature nor the edict of a ruler is sufficient, of itself, to compel desirable behavior. ¹¹ Legislation must at all times demonstrate the correctness of its evaluation of the interests with which it deals. For "the validation of law is not a matter of the source from which it emanates, but of the acceptance which it secures." ¹² Both at its inception and in its functioning, therefore, law must express the will of the dominant political group or it loses its power to compel conduct and thereby ceases to be law.

⁷ Krabbe, *op. cit.*, translator's introduction, p. LXVII.

⁸ B. N. Cardozo, *The Growth of Law* (New Haven, 1924), p. 52.

⁹ Sumner and Keller, *The Science of Society* (New Haven, 1927), Vol. I, p. 660.

¹⁰ Krabbe, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-110.

¹¹ H. Laski, *Studies in Law and Politics* (New Haven, 1932), pp. 237-248.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 247.

LIMITATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION

Legislation, sociologically conceived, must be viewed as the formulation of the will of the political group in terms of codified rules which set minimum standards of behavior for those who participate in the activities of the political group. Such codes are necessary to the effective functioning of a body-politic; indeed, they completely condition political action. Legal codes define political relationships, set metes and bounds for political action and give direction to the political process. Political interaction thus matures in legislation; administrative action carries legislation into effect while judicial action tests its consistency and validity. Sound legislation, therefore, involves not only the adequate statement of rules for political interaction but also the full recognition of the *limitations* to which legislative action is subject.

1. *Law is made effective, in the final analysis, by the consent of those whose relationships are regulated thereby.* Much obedience to law is "the product of habit or inertia." Such consent, of course, is entirely passive. Law also derives authority from the prestige of the groups responsible for its formulation and enforcement, but ultimately the law acquires power to compel conduct because those to whom the law applies give their consent to the regulations thus imposed. Refusal of a significant number of persons to accept legislative enactments renders them, irrespective of their source, inoperative.¹³

2. *The legal capacity of any government is determined by its ability to maintain the standards of conduct desired by the electorate.* Ordinarily a government can count upon the support of its citizens provided its legislative and administrative functions, in the main, establish and enforce the norms of behavior believed to be necessary to the realization of political objectives. This means that the body-politic rather than public officials must, in the long run, "define the uses of the law" and indicate "to what purposes its coercive authority shall be devoted."¹⁴ Wherever the people have a voice in the affairs of state, governments cannot long usurp these prerogatives with impunity.

3. *Law is concerned with interests as well as with rights.* Rights are abstract, exclusive and final. As conditioners of political action, therefore, they tend to narrow the field of collective behavior. Interests, on the other hand, are concrete, inclusive and relative. As conditioners of political action, they tend to enlarge the field of collective behavior. As Sabine has expressed it "a right seems to belong strictly and solely to the person who possesses it and to imply the exclusion of others from that which lies within its scope. An interest, on the other hand, is a share and it carries with it the suggestion of other sharers.

¹³ Laski, *op cit.*, pp. 247-248.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 249-250.

There is no limit to the number who may share . . .”¹⁵ Rights are hence subjective and possessive while interests tend to be objective and collective. Since law attempts to formulate a general will with respect to matters of common concern in a changing social *milieu*, it is logical to conclude that law is likely to be effective in proportion as it deals with interests rather than rights. Sociologically, the rights of the individual are always relative to his social situation; indeed, they can never be considered apart from a social set-up. Interests, however, necessarily embody an evaluation of a social situation. When legislation seeks to settle issues on the basis of rights rather than interests, the law becomes an inchoate mass of vague abstractions irrelevant to its social purpose.

4. *Law is neither absolute nor final but relative* because it is based upon “premises which in their origin were relative and transitory.”¹⁶ In a dynamic social order it is obvious that political relationships will change with changes in the habits and opinions of the body politic because new political objectives will develop from such changes. Moreover, new situations will throw people into new relationships with each other. The development of machine industry with its corporate entities and legal personalities, for example, brought into being political relationships of a new order. Social control of political interaction necessarily took on new aspects when men were placed in relationships not only to other human beings but also to legal personalities. Again, the discovery of the germ-origin of disease has greatly altered social relationships. Consideration of the public interest has brought much legislation requiring sanitation, vaccination, quarantine and the like. “Failure of government to recognize adequately these underlying changes may result in revolution, the abolition, not of the state, but of the undesirable directorate or government and its replacement by a new one. . . .”¹⁷ It is especially important that the body of law which is socially inherited be modified by further legislative enactment or be reinterpreted by the courts so as to correct excessive lag. The legal fraternity cling to the earlier idea that the law’s chief function is to protect the rights of the individual. The sociologist insists that it is now the prime purpose of the law to protect the public interest by inhibiting inimical behavior.

5. *Enactment does not achieve the end of law; enforcement is necessary.* If it be true that some ten thousand laws are placed upon the statute books in this country annually, it is patent that the body-politic and its legislative representatives have excessive confidence in the potency of mere enactment. Since ten thousand new problems do not appear annually, many thousands of laws must

¹⁵ In the translator’s introduction to Krabbe’s *Modern Idea of the State*, p. lvii.

¹⁶ Cardozo, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.

¹⁷ W. C. MacLeod, *Origin and History of Politics* (New York, 1931), p. 9.

be passed in the effort to enforce existing laws. To be effective, laws must, of course, "be founded on an appreciation of the existing state of the social mind developed by the group";¹⁸ they must also be certainly and quickly enforced if they are to affect the behavior of the group significantly. In fact, those who plan to forestall the will of the group often allow laws to be passed but arrange that they will not be enforced. Such empty gestures do not achieve the end of law.

THE JUDICIARY AS AN ORGAN OF THE STATE

If it be granted that the legislative body is the proper agency for the formulation of the will of the body-politic, it does not follow that satisfying group relations will result automatically from such a formulation. Orderly interaction is not produced, if, once the general will has been organized, the members of the political group continue to settle their private wrongs by an individual interpretation of that will. Indeed, government has no control over the behavior of its citizens "if each individual is allowed to define his own rights, to defend them or to avenge their infringement."¹⁹ Group solidarity and maximum well-being are guaranteed only when the prohibitions and the sanctions of the group are uniformly interpreted. Such interpretation is possible only when this function is assigned to a qualified personnel. While only a fraction of the inhibitions that limit the daily conduct of the individual are the product of law, nevertheless the law sets forth those limitations which are believed to be a basic minimum for successful group life. The effective state, it appears, must have some agency which will determine how much individual liberty is consistent with the well-being of others and what constitutes justice between conflicting interests especially when these are considered from the viewpoint of group objectives. Such justice may involve the criminal law in which the courts deal with transgressors or it may involve the civil law in which the courts settle disputes not necessarily arising from infractions of the law. In most modern states the judiciary has been designated as the specific adjudicator of both sorts of contention.

SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE JUDICIARY

The judiciary is in reality, therefore, a group of specialists concerned with the rules which govern political interaction. They derive their powers from the political group which called them into being and delegated to them the following judicial functions.

¹⁸ Gillin and Blackmar, *Outlines of Sociology* (New York, 1930), p. 230.

¹⁹ Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 630.

1. *Application of existing law to individual cases.* These may be either civil controversies between individuals or trials of persons accused of law violation. In each case, it is the function of the court to discover the facts and then apply the law to the facts. "Whether the law is right or wrong, just or unjust, is a secondary matter; the duty of the judge is to adjudicate upon the law as it is, not upon the law as it ought to be. It is far better that a bad law should work injustice in an individual instance than that a judge by deliberately refusing to recognize it should impair the principle of law itself."²⁰ The courts thus become agencies for enforcing the formulated will of the legislative body because they punish those whose conduct falls below the norm. In applying the law to such behavior the judiciary seeks to adjust particular individuals to the existing law so as to give justice to all concerned.

2. *Interpretation of the law.* Legislative bodies cease to exist when their terms of office expire, but the laws they enact continue in force until amended or repealed. Language, however, does not always permit so precise a statement of law as to leave no doubt of its meaning. When questions as to the intent of specific laws arise, therefore, it is impossible to refer again to the particular legislative group which placed the law upon the statute books. Some impartial body, some group of qualified persons must be set up for the purpose of interpreting the laws enacted by legislative bodies. What the law requires or what is right in given instances can only be determined by disinterested specialists. Since the law cannot be minute in its provisions, the decisions of the judiciary not only interpret and declare, but also elaborate and expand the law. Thus it often happens that the courts in reality make law by reason of the construction or interpretation placed upon specific enactments. Such functioning, of course, is non-judicial and raises the question of competency.

3. *Determination of the validity of laws.* Constitutions often include bills of rights which set forth certain fundamental political principles which the creators of the particular state believed should characterize the relationships of its citizens. Under pressures of various sorts, legislative bodies may pass laws which are not consistent with those principles. In order that statute law may not violate the fundamental law as expressed in the constitution, therefore, the judiciary has been given, or it has assumed, the function of adjusting new laws to existing laws. In the United States, for example, courts have the power to set aside legislative enactments on the grounds of unconstitutionality. The judiciary thus functions as a check upon legislative bodies and even upon executives who may have exceeded the powers granted them in the Constitution.

Where courts determine the constitutionality of new laws, it is obvious that

²⁰ S. Leacock, *Elements of Political Science* (Boston, 1913), p. 207.

the validity of legislative enactments may, and often does, depend upon the point of view of a particular court, and, not infrequently of a single judge. Legislatures are bodies freshly elected and confronted with new and definite situations. They pass laws which they believe these situations require. The courts, on the other hand, are often bodies appointed for long terms whose decisions are based upon precedents of long standing. In most modern states, therefore, the judiciary must accept as valid any act of legislative bodies. Where the people are regarded as "sovereign" and the legislative body as the means by which the will of the "sovereign group is expressed, and where constitutions are unwritten, it is difficult to raise the question of constitutionality. If ultimate political authority rests with the body politic, any act of its legislative representatives is valid unless and until a similar body determines otherwise. In such states any enactment of superior legislative bodies transcends the Constitution. Both, in fact, are products of the general will.

4. *Administration of property.* The courts are frequently called upon to administer property when the owner is, for any reason, legally or mentally incompetent, or when he has failed to make adequate provision for its transference or disposal. This fiduciary function is assigned the judiciary because they are supposed to be honest and disinterested. The courts frequently delegate this function to qualified persons or organizations.

Whatever the function performed the courts are always involved in the settlement of a controversy. Such settlements require more than "a mechanical fitting of the case with the strait-jacket of rule or remedy."²¹ Judicial functions imply a judicial process. Dean Pound distinguishes three steps in the adjudication of a controversy according to law; first, "ascertaining which of the many rules in the legal system is to be applied, or if none is applicable reaching a rule for the cause . . . on the basis of given materials in some way which the legal system points out"; second, "interpreting the rule so chosen or ascertained . . ."; and third, "applying to the cause in hand the rule so found and interpreted."²² Essentially, then, the judicial process requires that rule be fitted to cause, not the cause to the rule.²³

If such is the nature of the judicial process it follows that justice, like the law, is neither absolute nor final. From one point of view, indeed, the application as well as the making of law is not "determined precisely by a weighing of interests. In practice the pressure of wants, demands and desires will warp the actual compromises made by the legal system this way or that"²⁴ as it seeks a

²¹ R. Pound, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Law* (New Haven, 1922), p. 102.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 100-101.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

resolution of conflicting interests. Justice must be relative to time, place and situation. This is clearly demonstrated when the state, faced with such great emergencies as war, domestic disorder or severe economic depression, sets aside the constitutional guarantees. The group that administers justice, therefore, cannot be regarded as absolute or final. Specifically this means that the courts are not supreme; they are "creatures of the state and of its power, and while their life continues they must obey the law of their creator."²⁵

REQUISITES OF AN EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL PROCESS

To keep the peace, to remove all unnecessary restraints to individual self-assertion, to conserve the significant features of the existing order, to secure the maximum satisfaction of wants—these constitute the social purposes of the judicial process. To accomplish these purposes the judicial process requires:

1. *An adequate legal philosophy.* Of prime importance to an effective judicial process is a legal philosophy which recognizes the significance of the rôle of the judiciary in a changing social order. New social situations call for new social policies; these cannot be reviewed on the basis of long-established precedent. Reference to ancient practices or to musty judicial decisions does not necessarily establish justice in a dynamic order. Social development is heavily shackled unless new social policies are evaluated by a realistic jurisprudence which admits the relative nature of law and justice and the absolute necessity for the adaptation of social means to social ends.

2. *Certainty in procedure.* When technicalities rather than sound principles determine the selection of juries, the admission of evidence and the use of expert witnesses, it necessarily follows that the judicial process becomes uncertain, if not fickle. If justice is lost in a wilderness of precedent and formalism, disrespect for the law and the courts grows apace.

3. *Individualization in the application of law.* The judicial process frequently miscarries when, in the disposition of a controversy, the court takes no account of the total social situation but applies mechanically a law which apparently covers the case.²⁶ Individualization of the judicial process, in contrast, implies that judges are given latitude in finding the law to be applied in given cases, that courts are allowed discretion in application of equitable remedies, that penal treatment is adjusted to the individual offender, that police may decide what offenders shall be brought to court, and that administrative parole and probation may be substituted for imprisonment. In other words, the judicial process concerns itself not with the punishment of an offense so much as with the social rehabilitation of the offender.

²⁵ Cardozo, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

²⁶ R. Pound, *Mechanical Jurisprudence*, 8 Col. L. R. 603.

4. *Expedition in the application of law.* Repeated postponements, demurrers, formal motions, exceptions to pleadings, changes in venue, appeals to higher courts, new trials and similar legal devices delay the application of the law until, in many instances, years pass before the judicial process is completed. Such delays entail crowded calendars and heavy costs; they serve the interests of the litigant who gains by urging the technicalities which cumbersome rules of procedure allow. Under such conditions the judicial process often becomes farcical. Justice, certainly, is not furthered by such practices.

5. *Equality in application of the law.* When there is one law for Lazarus and another for Dives, when penalties vary with the social and economic position of the offender, when "expert" lawyers serve the "interests" only, when bribery and "influence" warp the decisions of the courts, then there is no doubt that the judicial process is corrupt. Effective application of the law insures adequate defense for all accused persons irrespective of economic status, legal advice to all regardless of means and "opportunity for anyone with a grievance or a good answer to a complaint to prosecute his grievance or to make his answer."²⁷

6. *Use of expert witnesses.* In the determination of guilt, trial by jury was a marked advance over the ancient ordeal, but it is extreme to take the position that jurymen can determine the validity of all evidence presented to the court. Technical knowledge is required to settle questions of paternity, sanity or mental ability. It is obvious that neither the judge nor the jurymen is competent to pass upon such questions. Evidence in such matters must be secured from those especially qualified in such fields. The expert witness has become especially important in the application of the law to criminal cases where experts in wood, ballistics, finger-prints and lie-detection are able to determine scientifically the validity of evidence submitted either by the defense or the prosecution. The development of scientific methods for the detection of guilt steadily discounts the rôle of the jury in the judicial process. Expert witnesses are, of course, often equally important in settlement of civil cases.

7. *Prompt and certain application of the law.* The history of penology proves conclusively that drastic legislation and severe penalties do not diminish criminal behavior. The effective application of the law is, as a matter of fact, more adequately assured if the offender can be certain that he will be quickly apprehended and punished for any violation of law. This is impossible, of course, when every available influence and every known legal device is used to retard and to modify the judicial process.

8. *Socialization of the legal fraternity.* If the judicial process is an essential aspect of the larger social process through which a successful group life is secured, then legal training involves more than "the acquisition of merely

²⁷ H. Laski, *Grammar of Politics* (New Haven, 1929), p. 572.

practical techniques." Legal education should impart a social point of view based upon a knowledge of the social foundations and the social functions of law. Lawyers who use their talents merely to win the case rather than to secure justice for their clients exploit a social function for private gain. It is ridiculous for such lawyers to defend such a practice on the grounds that it is not their function to determine innocence or guilt or that justice can only be secure in heaven. When the social objectives of the judicial process are considered, such defenses only further implicate these lawyers in activities which are at least unsocial, if not actually criminal in nature. The successful lawyer should find his services an integral part, not of a movement to circumvent the law, but of "a ministry of justice." If the application of law is to be made effective, the legal profession must strive to facilitate rather than to obstruct the judicial process.

9. *A qualified personnel.* Since no social agency can be more vigorous than the personnel which administers it, it is clear that effective application of the law can be secured only when the judiciary is composed of qualified and superior persons. Unless the system of selecting judges places competent persons on the bench, and unless those persons are kept free from the pressure of politics and of powerful interests, the judicial system becomes diseased. To secure a qualified judiciary some have proposed the election of all judges by popular vote; others believe that all judges should be appointed by high elective officials; still others have advocated recall of incompetent judges or the recall of judicial decisions. Since judges must seek "to evolve from the competing social interests which appear before them, a solution which maximizes the public advantage,"²⁸ it is obvious that provisions for the competency and the independence of the judiciary are of prime importance.

10. *Adequate facilities and personnel.* Many competent and socially minded judges are unable to function effectively in the application of the law because their courts lack the necessary facilities and personnel. Given trained investigators to secure all the information needed for an intelligent consideration of cases, given probation and parole officers to carry out individualized treatment of offenders, given an adequate secretarial staff to keep full records, given research facilities for the evaluation of present practices, the judiciary can then be made responsible for an effective judicial process.

To secure a judicial system which has the requisites described above some additional legislation is clearly necessary. Provisions for the offices of public defense and legal advice, for the selection of qualified judges and for adequate court facilities and personnel are properly the province of legislative bodies. But mechanical jurisprudence, the elimination of delays and inequalities in

²⁸ Laski, *op. cit.*, p. 542.

the application of the law, the professionalization of the legal fraternity and the socialization of legal philosophy are problems that lie beyond the reach of the law-maker. Changes in social attitudes of the judiciary, lawyers and the public, changes in the social atmosphere especially as regards economic classes and changes in social values—these and these alone will render the judiciary an effective organ of the state.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. Present the arguments for and against:
 - (a) the territorial system of representation
 - (b) the vocational (Soviet) system of representation
 Which system has the larger weight of argument?
2. Distinguish between true politics and "partytics" (Park), particularly as these types of political action apply to legislative bodies.
3. Present the case for and against (a) territorial representation, (b) vocational representation in legislative bodies.
4. What are the socially significant rôles of the legislative representative?
5. Reconcile diversity of legislative opinion with unity of the general will.
6. Distinguish between law, custom, mores.
7. Show how law is an evaluation of interests.
8. What is meant by: "the study of law is . . . the study of principles of order revealing themselves in uniformities of antecedents and consequents"? (Cardozo, *Growth of Law*, p. 37.)
9. Evaluate each of the twelve conceptions of the nature of law described by Dean Pound in his *Introduction to the Philosophy of Law*, pp. 59-70.
10. Explain the statement that "the unwritten law has primarily a supplementary function." (Krabbe, p. 102.)
11. What social advantages and disadvantages inhere (a) in written constitutions; (b) in unwritten constitutions?
12. Park has described laws as "social plans." Discuss.
13. Explain: "A law which is obeyed in 'prohibition' Iowa . . . will be broken in Wisconsin or Minnesota." (Gillin and Blackmar.)
14. Should courts have the power to declare laws unconstitutional? Give reasons for your answer.
15. Should courts be allowed to make law by virtue of their interpretations of existing statutes? Give reasons.
16. Does individualization in the application of the law not create inequalities? Explain.
17. "Of all the methods of appointment (of judges) that of election by the people at large is without exception the worst." (Laski.) Do you agree? Why or why not?
18. Do you favor recall of judges? recall of judicial decisions? Give your reasons.

19. Should social policies be subject to judicial review? What are your reasons?
20. Evaluate the jury system as a device of applying the law
21. What should be attitude of the courts toward martial law?
22. How may the judiciary be removed from the influence of powerful political rings?

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CHAPTER XIX

EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS OF THE STATE

IN the organization of the state for social purposes political functions should be assigned to the various organs, not only on the basis of propriety, but also of the likelihood of wise and effective performance. Applying this principle, the electoral organ is allotted the function of organizing the will of the political group on matters of common concern, the legislature with the function of formulating the collective will, the judiciary with the task of interpretation and application of that will, and the executive with the function of enforcing that will through a coordination of the various departments of government into an effective whole. The executive organ is, in fact, the center from which irradiate the lines of political power. Since authority for the immediate discharge of political functions is concentrated in the executive organ its functioning is characterized by action rather than deliberation. Promptness and unity of purpose, hence, are prime requisites of the executive departments.

THE EXECUTIVE AS AN ORGAN OF THE STATE

In the conduct of the affairs of state the executive is in large measure an agent of the legislative organ, especially in the enforcement of law. This does not assign the executive to a status subordinate to that of the legislative assembly for wide discretionary power must be given those who enforce the law. In other fields of action, especially in dealings with other states, the executive organ functions without explicit instructions. In some states, of course, the executive organ dictates to all other departments of government, but in most states its status is more or less coordinate with that of the legislative body. Where executives of the state secure their office by hereditary succession, rather than by elective procedures, however, their position is removed from the direct influence of the other organs of the state.

Roughly speaking, therefore, the executive organ of the state functions most effectively when the chief executive plays the rôle of a general manager,¹ that is, as an official superior to all other administrative officers. When the

¹ W. F. Dodd, *State Government* (New York, 1923), pp. 245-246.

chief executive has no direct control over the administrative organization of subordinate political divisions, he is likely to resort to the field of legislation in the exercise of his functions. Because of his power in this field he exercises an indirect influence over these subordinate political units.² As a general manager the chief executive is strictly subordinate to legislative assemblies; in fact, he becomes the agent through which the latter exercises the powers of general administration.³ At any rate it is necessary for the chief executive of the state, if he is to be effective, to work through and with the legislative bodies whose grants of power and money determine the scope of his political functioning.

The spheres of political action in which the executive organ functions, however, are not confined to the field of legislation, but include also (a) relations with other states, (b) execution and administration of government, (c) creation and conduct of crisis government, as in war or in severe economic depression, and (d) granting of pardons and reprieves to certain persons convicted of crime. These fields of activity are sufficiently extensive to bring the executive into contact with all foreign states with whom diplomatic relations are maintained, with all departments of the government, national, state and local, and directly or indirectly with every citizen of the state. The personnel of the executive organ, hence, vastly outnumbers that of the other organs. Through its many administrative departments thus manned, the executive acquires the immediate control of the machinery of government. This, in turn, gives the persons and the party in office control of the state.

An examination of existing governments reveals three fundamental types of executive organization each having a different form of control, first, *dictatorship* in which the executive is superior to every other organ of government and controls, directly or indirectly, all political functions; second, the *presidential system* in which the executive derives his power, not from the support of the legislative organ, but *directly* from the electorate to which he is *directly* accountable and upon which he depends for continuance in office; and third, the *cabinet system* in which the executive, usually a prime minister, shares his responsibilities with a group of men chosen by him to administer the affairs of state. In this system the entire executive personnel resigns when it can no longer command the support of a majority of the legislative organ. Variations of these types have been developed in individual states to meet the requirements of the particular political philosophy current in its body-politic.

As the organ possessing immediate control of the affairs of the state, the executive usually exercises the following prerogatives: to represent the state

² W. F. Willoughby, *Principles of Public Administration* (Baltimore, 1927), pp 36-42.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 42-50.

and to deal directly with other states in all international relations, to function as leader of the political party in power, to put into effect the policies set forth in the platform of party and endorsed by a majority of the electorate, to co-ordinate and integrate the organization and administration of government, to enforce the laws of the state as seems to him wise and expedient, and to control the expenditure of the vast sums of money necessary to the operation of government. Possessing the extensive powers inherent in these prerogatives, the executive, it is clear, occupies the strategic position in political organization.

ADMINISTRATION AS AN ORGAN OF THE STATE

In most modern states the executive organ is responsible for political functioning in the fields of diplomacy, public finance, money, the army, the navy, the postal service, the public domain and internal affairs, agriculture, labor, commerce, education, colonies, public works, coast guards and certain judicial matters. The mere listing of these aspects of the work of the executive organ clearly indicates that the scope of its functioning has become so extensive that the capacity of a single executive officer is no longer adequate to the task of administering government. This inadequacy is even more apparent when it is noted that the work of each department requires the knowledge of an expert in its field. Obviously the chief executive cannot be expert in so many fields; he must, however, be in a position to command the services of specialists if adequate provision is to be made for these aspects of government.

If social purposes are significant in political functioning, it should also be pointed out that the various administrative departments deal with problems of vital importance to public welfare—problems the solution of which should be removed from the uncertain field of party politics and placed in the hands of persons having the expert knowledge required in the various fields, relative permanence in tenure of office and compensation sufficient to secure satisfactory service. Effective administration in technical fields can be obtained by no other means. Since the administrative fields were so fruitful of spoils, however, "the spoilsmen have vigorously opposed efforts to introduce merit and efficiency into the public service instinctively recognizing that the entrance of these factors would crowd out the spoils and favoritism upon which they had flourished so long." ⁴ Under the pressure of public opinion, however, the political spoilsmen have been forced to make concessions and, in some instances, to give way to the demand that technical problems be handled by technically competent persons rather than by political henchmen.

⁴ Merriam and Gosnell, *The American Party System* (New York, 1930), p. 127. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

As executives, with the consent of the appropriate legislative assemblies, have placed in the hands of specialists the problems of tariff schedules, railroad rates, public utility charges, trade practices, insurance rates, the conservation of natural resources, and the like, an extensive administrative organization has developed, both in the state and in its subordinate political units. This administrative organization is rapidly becoming, if it has not already become, an organ of the state. In contrast to the executive and legislative organs which created this administrative organization, it is non-political in character. It is composed of commissions, bureaus and departments whose personnel is selected, in theory at least, on the basis of technical ability rather than political prestige. To these commissions, bureaus and departments are referred the technical governmental functions which are beyond the competence of politicians. In an effort to place political functioning on a basis of fact rather than opinion, these administrative agencies are charged with the task of furnishing the policy-determining organs with reliable data on the important social, economic and political issues which confront them. For the most part, however, administrative agencies execute the orders which put into operation the various policies adopted by the legislative and executive organs of the state.

While in theory administrative agencies make no decisions of a political character, in practice they perform functions which have much political import. This is likely to be true especially in the field of law enforcement where the executive is given broad discretionary powers. In this and in other fields of political functioning commissions, bureaus and departments have subsumed many things. To expand, irrespective of the relative importance of its work is apparently an inevitable tendency in administrative organization. Because of the technical nature of their tasks administrative agencies also tend to become independent of the layman whom they serve and to whom they are responsible. In some instances these agencies have resented the call for an accounting. Obviously these are tendencies which must be resisted.

Administrative agencies thus actually become spheres of control. Assuming that their technical knowledge places them beyond the jurisdiction of the electorate, or even of the legislature and the executive, these agencies display an independence of action that runs sometimes counter to social interests. Co-ordinated and integrated, not individuated, functioning of related governmental agencies is essential to an effective state. Yet any executive who attempts a proper grouping of administrative agencies, or who seeks to harmonize their efforts by eliminating duplications of service and unnecessary departments, will find himself wrestling with deeply entrenched interests. While recognizing the unique and valuable services which administrative agencies can

render to a government called upon to perform many difficult and technical functions, it is still proper for these agencies to render an account of their stewardship. The services of experts are desperately needed in the affairs of government; much will be gained if they will omit their displays of superiority.

While the executive and administrative organs of the state are concerned with political functions which have important social consequences, it should be noted that these functions are primarily technical and managerial. Further analysis of these organs, therefore, is properly the province of the political scientist rather than the sociologist.

CONTROL OF THE STATE

The nature of the state has been variously conceived. During the Middle Ages when the Church dominated the social scene the notion developed that the state had been divinely decreed. According to this view, political authority and political functions belong to a Supreme Being who directs human affairs through chosen agents. Later the state came to be regarded as a means of achieving "racial" and "manifest destinies." Power and dominion, of course, are the actual objectives of those who thus conceive the state. Again, the state has been held to be an agency for maintaining the *status quo* especially as it relates to economic stratification, property interests and special privilege. These, it is maintained, should abide, because the course of social development has demonstrated their survival value. In contrast, the dispossessed have viewed the state as an engine for the advancement, at their expense, of the economic interests of the advantaged. Others have claimed that the state exists "for the sake of making it possible for individual men to realize their fully interpreted wills to power, and thereby to encourage these individuals to become as completely personal and rational as they have it in them to be."⁵ This view, obviously, is a projection of the philosopher's ideal rather than the description of a reality. In fact, all of these views of the state approach the institution from the standpoint of an interest or a bias which interprets phenomena in terms of its particular objectives.

When realistically viewed the state is found to be, in the main, an institution for the *adjudication of conflicting interests* in accordance with a collective will organized with respect to matters of common concern. In the formulation of this collective will, groups of citizens organize about opposing interests. Political institutions are developed to adjust the conflicts between those interests and to keep them within legal and pacific bounds. In undemocratic countries this adjustment may lead to domination and subordination. In

⁵ W. E. Hocking, *Man and the State* (New Haven, 1926), p. 325.

democratic states, however, interests contend for political control as well as for economic advantage. Because control of the state confers upon public officials extensive powers over the property and relations of millions of men and billions of money, contending interests use every variety of organization, influence and pressure to acquire the political offices necessary to such control. Clerics, military men, moneyed men, men of ideas, as well as economic groups vie with each other for political office. No group, in fact, scorns political power and no organ of government is immune from efforts at political manipulation.

If it can be assumed that 750,000 elective,⁶ to say nothing of appointive, offices in the various city, State and national organs of government in the United States are regularly filled by party representatives, it is obvious that the state inevitably reflects the point of view of and warmly considers the interests of the dominant group. Since the state is not an independent moral entity "with a life and ends of its own which can be stated in terms other than the welfare of its members any more than an ordinary business corporation can be said to have interests of its own other than those of its stockholders,"⁷ it is natural for the group in control of government either to identify its interests with those of the body politic or to justify its use of political power as corrective of the misuses of previous administrations. The behavior of dominant political groups, at least, reveals no unmistakable political conscience. Groups seeking control of the state, therefore, attempt to organize public opinion and the collective will about their own objectives. To achieve this end, they will not only employ every legitimate means for convincing the electorate of their superior program, but, if necessary, they will resort to vicious propaganda, misrepresentations of opposing groups, vote purchase, ballot frauds, intimidation, riots, seditions and even attempts at revolution. Political order requires that this struggle of conflicting interests for political power, like the struggle for economic advantage, be canalized. This is accomplished by provisions for elections at stated times with no options which favor interests of those in power; for a secret ballot which will discourage intimidation; for suffrage laws which indicate clearly who may vote; for freedom of speech and the press which gives opposing interests equal opportunity to state their cases; for freedom of assembly to discuss public questions pro and con; for limitations of the campaign expenditures of single groups so that issues may be more equitably presented; for the initiative and referendum which limit what representatives may do; and for written constitutions and judges to interpret them.

⁶ Merriam and Gosnell, *op. cit.*, pp. 242-243.

⁷ Willoughby and Rogers, *Introduction to Problems of Government* (New York, 1921), pp. 28-29.

In canalizing the struggle for political power, it is to be remembered that no element which wishes to dominate or becomes dominant will be willing to share its power with others. On the one hand, those in control or those seeking control are likely to describe the proposals of opponents as "red," "communist," or "revolutionary" and to shout that the very existence of the state is threatened. On the other hand, contending parties have also brought additional groups into the suffrage, increased the number of elective offices, advocated direct election of United States Senators and moved to protect public discussion of state issues in order to secure or maintain control of government. Ross long ago pointed out that the group rived in many ways upon a variety of questions was less likely to destroy itself than one divided on a single issue.⁸ True political wisdom, it would seem, consists in so broadening the base of the state that no group lacks the opportunity to present its case.

Since the state is likely to be more rather than less significant, control of it will also be increasingly important. As social relations grow more and more complex and involved, it stands to reason that the state will be increasingly regarded as the only institution which can adequately attend to the problems of the general welfare. The problems of unemployment, of relief, of economic insecurity, of population growth, of disease, of slum clearance, of social and economic inadequacy and the like have long since outgrown the resources of private agencies and other social institutions. The state alone possesses the power and the resources necessary to the solution of such problems. No human being, moreover, can predict what new functions will devolve upon government. It is probable, however, that the state will be called upon to function wherever services involve the coordination of extensive units (as in weather forecasting), or large resources (as in geological surveys), or full authority (as in control of broadcasting), or indirect returns (as in investigations of the stratosphere). As an inclusive and dominant social institution, therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that the state will take on increasing rather than diminishing significance.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. Is there a sociological justification for the division of political powers? Explain.
2. What are the social advantages of a system where the chief executive functions as a general manager? (Willoughby, *Principles of Public Administration*, p. 51.)
3. List the merits and defects of each of the executive systems described in the chapter. (Refer to Marriott and to Garner.)

⁸ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1930), p. 153.

- 4 Why are great men so rarely chosen President? (Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, Vol. I, p. 8.)
5. Present the arguments for and against the use of commissions, bureaus and departments composed of experts for technical political functions.
6. What is meant when it is said that "there is no politics in politics"? Is this statement true? Explain. (Merriam and Gosnell, *The American Party System*, p. 54.)
7. "What is called democracy tends hardly to be government at all, but only a thinly veiled mode of anarchy;—it is really not government for the good of the people, but at most for the good of those parts of the people that happen, from time to time, to acquire power and influence." Discuss.
8. "The state is no moral entity." Do you agree? Give your reasons.
9. From a sociological point of view are the initiative, referendum and recall sound? Give your reasons.
10. Explain: "Elections are the modern substitute for revolution."

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CHAPTER XX

SOCIAL PATHOLOGY OF THE STATE

THE state, like other social institutions, functions in a changing social order. The dynamic nature of the social processes with which political institutions must reckon is evidenced by such social situations as result from (a) the vast increases in human population resulting from the conquest of disease and improved sanitation; (b) the increasing density of population in cities made possible by rapid travel and instantaneous communication; (c) the growth in the number and size of corporate entities which concentrate the organization of an extensive industrial system; (d) the intensification of the collective racial and national struggle for existence characterized by rivalries for power, distrust, suspicion, fear and other national neuroses; and (e) the increase in social and economic insecurity indicated by more frequent depressions and by mounting unemployment. During the last half century the state has made heroic attempts to adjust its organization to this changing and challenging social order by the spread of the democratic idea, by extensions in the suffrage, by the development of expert political bodies, by the regulation of business and industry, by increased international coöperation, by the overthrow of immobile autocracies and the establishment of new types of government.

Notwithstanding these efforts to correct maladjustments, political organization still finds itself in many wrong relations with its environment. Abuses and misuses of political power persists: first, because in political functioning as in familial interaction, the scientific knowledge which has been accumulated from experience has not been extensively applied to the problems at hand. The desire to monopolize political power, the entrenchment of the spoils system, the spread of the dogma that one man is as politically competent as any other, have blocked efforts to put the scientific knowledge and methods into political functioning. Yet the significance of the state, especially in the adjudication of conflicting interests, grows steadily and increasingly greater as the social order becomes more complex. Secondly, pathological political conditions have developed because of the imperfections of political organization, especially in the fields of municipal government and of sectional representation. The state, like the family, was developed in a social order that was primarily rural and agricultural. The growth of the city, especially of the metropolis,

has placed the state in an urban environment where it must function for an industrial order. Many metropolitan areas, moreover, are controlled by a state government in which the rural sections elect a majority of the government and refuse to reapportion representation as required by law lest the control of the government pass into the hands of the urban dwellers.¹ Present political organization also takes no adequate account of sectional, as against state, interest; yet regional interests assume an ever-increasing importance to effective political action in a state with extensive territory and varied natural resources.²

These, and similar problems, however, call for the specialized services of the political scientist who is expert in matters of political organization. Since the sociologist is concerned with the state that lies behind political organization, he must confine his attention to the pathological conditions which result from wrong social attitudes and warped social values.

Adaptive Lag in Government

Says Merriam: "The danger in American government at the present time is not *lack of stability*, but *lack of mobility*, failure to make prompt adjustments to the new era in industry and commerce. Government is at many points a generation behind the development of social and economic life and the urgent problem is that of bridging the gap."³ Failure to recognize the inadequacies and imperfections of existing political organization or to take account of fundamental social and economic developments is due, not to the lack of knowledge of what has happened, or of how to proceed, but to the desire to perpetuate present lines of power, to protect vested interests and to continue existing classifications. In other words, adaptive lag is occasioned by wrong social attitudes and perverted social values which center about personal advantage rather than general welfare.

The Spoils System

Recognizing the legitimate and necessary rôle of political parties in political action, those interested in the socially effective state must insist upon the elimination of the spoils system and its usual counterpart, corrupt practices in elections. Party government, in other words, must be accompanied by party responsibility for the proper conduct of primaries, for the selection of qualified candidates, for the presentation of genuine political issues, for the legitimate

¹ C. E. Merriam, *The Written Constitution and the Unwritten Attitude* (New York, 1931), pp. 41 ff.

² W. B. Munro, *Invisible Government* (New York, 1928), pp. 137 ff.

³ Merriam, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

use of campaign funds, and for the active support of civil service wherever instituted. Conversely, party responsibility for socially effective political action will require the elimination of such practices as the distortion of issues created by the party itself, oligarchical administration of party organization, shiftiness and self-seeking in party functioning, coercion of police forces, corruption of the courts and manipulation of legislative machinery. Political parties should recognize the state as a social institution devised by the body politic to meet fundamental human needs. Party representatives should no longer be permitted to use public office to secure personal gain or advantage. 7

Fundamentalism in Politics

Blind faith in political formulas is another significant cause of failure of political organizations to adjust themselves to changing social situations. Popular political thinking is filled with such abstractions as "we must avoid entangling alliances," "all citizens are equal before the law," "the Constitution is the bulwark of American liberties," "that government is best which governs least," "public office should seek the man, not man the office," "government rests on the consent of the governed," "ours is a government of laws, not men," "the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy," and so on. As Munro has so clearly pointed out, none of these formulas is true without many and significant qualifications. Some of them embody only half-truth, some of them no truth at all.⁴ These abstractions, however, are almost universally substituted for careful and thoroughgoing analysis of political problems and political procedures.

To regard the Constitution of the United States as final is another expression of political fundamentalism. That a document, written in the eighteenth century by men who could not possibly foresee the new social situations which would result from nineteenth- and twentieth-century developments, should be adequate to the solution of present political problems is a point of view that violates the requisites of reason. For the framework of the state and the political principles upon which it acts, as well as the fields in which it functions, should change with the basic changes in the social and economic orders. England, with her unwritten constitution, has developed a type of political mechanism which escapes political fundamentalism and exemplifies the type of political liberalism which democracy implies.

Deluge of Laws

It has already been noted that some ten thousand federal and State laws are passed annually. Exclusive of judicial decisions which interpret laws, the

⁴ Munro, *op cit.*, Ch. 1.

biennial output of statutes requires 125 printed volumes. These figures do not include the grist of city ordinances. New York City expects its police to enforce some sixteen thousand ordinances.⁵ It should also be borne in mind that vested interests often forestall legislation upon a few important issues by pressure securing the passage of many unimportant laws. It is obvious that a disproportionate amount of political energy is given to *law-making* when *law-enforcement* should command an equal, if not greater, share of public concern. With these facts in mind, Sutherland asserts that "it is probable that we have never in the history of the world had so much governmental regulation of conduct as now and that government has never had as little influence as now."⁶ The average American citizen believes, apparently, that a political problem is solved when a law has been placed upon the statute books. Hence, the large number of unenforced laws.

Propaganda

It is common knowledge that dictatorships maintain their control of the affairs of state only by the most vigorous censorship of the press and the publication of such information as strengthens the prestige of the dictators. So many and so complex are the problems demanding political action in democratic countries, that those interested in given questions must resort to "artful headlines, insinuating cartoons and adroit handling of materials" to secure the attention of the law-maker. When it is not unusual for a thousand bills to be presented in a single legislative session, it is obvious that no legislator can be self-informed upon so many issues. It is inevitable, therefore, that he should accept ready-made opinions especially when bombarded with shrieking publicity supported, perhaps, by pressure and influence. Under such conditions, however, issues are settled according to inadequate information and bias.

Improper Political Functions

Originally the state functioned primarily in the political field where it concerned itself with relations to other states and with maintenance of its prestige and power. Under democratic influences the government took on local political duties such as guaranteeing the rights of citizens, securing of justice in the courts and the protection of lives and property. To these were added later such ministrant functions as provisions for health, education, sanitation, highways, child care, and the like. The state proved to be so competent in these fields, especially in the regulation of commerce and industry, that latterly the state has been assigned a variety of functions that involve the regulation of

⁵ Munro, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22

⁶ E. H. Sutherland, *Criminology* (Philadelphia, 1924), p. 162.

personal conduct. When it becomes the duty of the government to see that two ounces of cheese and two ounces of butter are served with every commercially prepared meal, when public officials must determine what and how much citizens may eat, or drink, or even purchase, then the state is burdened with functions it is not competent to perform. Increase in the duties thus assigned to the state has increased the cost of government in the United States from \$1.93 per person in 1850 to \$38.42 per person in 1930.⁷ Excessive confidence in the ability of the state to solve social and economic problems should not lead to an indefinite and unwarranted expansion of its functions.

Non-voting

While it is true that "the really important thing is not that men should express opinions, but that they should have opinions to express,"⁸ it must also be admitted that effective government requires not only that citizens have opinions but that they should register those opinions at the ballot box. The informed citizen is a useful citizen only when he exercises his suffrage. The absence of the uninformed voter from the polls is usually desirable, but when a large fraction of the intelligent electorate are politically indifferent to the critical issues confronting the state, there is cause for grave concern. Non-voting, of course, may reflect the failure of parties to present really important issues. Non-voting then becomes a symptom rather than a disease. Social attitudes are diseased if men seek the ballot box only when they are faced with economic necessity or driven by ambition. To leave voting to the henchmen of powerful interests and political bosses in times of industrial peace and prosperity indicates unwholesome states of mind.

Usurpation of Political Power

In modern democratic states, the people are held to be the final authority in law. Courts that assume this prerogative, therefore, usurp political power. From its institution in 1789 to July 1, 1932, a period of 143 years, the Supreme Court of the United States held fifty-eight enactments of Congress unconstitutional. Of these decisions only four were made during the first seventy-five years and fifty-four during the next sixty-seven years of its history.⁹ These figures do not include the large number of state laws set aside on similar grounds by State Supreme Courts. During President McKinley's administration, corporation lawyers developed the idea of the constitutionality of law

⁷ J. M. Beck, *Our Wonderland of Bureaucracy* (New York, 1933), Ch. 1.

⁸ R. Luce, *Legislative Principles* (Boston, 1930), p. 214.

⁹ L. B. Evans, *Cases on American Constitutional Law*, 3rd ed. (Chicago, 1933), pp. 22-24.

and persuaded the courts to substitute their judgment for that of the legislature. This notion has developed until every legislative act, State and national, must stand the tests of the courts before it can be assumed to be the law of the land. Final authority no longer rests with the people; it has been taken over by the courts. The courts have also arrogated to themselves the power to review executive acts on similar grounds. An analysis of the cases where the Supreme Court has invalidated acts of other organs of government and then reversed their decisions because of popular protest would be revealing in this connection. Such usurpations of power, defended as a necessary element in a system of checks and balances, places unlimited power in the hands of small groups of men who assume that they can speak for the rank and file of citizens.

Pressure Politics

It is increasingly apparent that the state has nothing to lose and much to gain if the paid lobbyist is kept off the floors of legislative assemblies. Registration of lobbyists has improved, but not corrected, the problem of undue influence upon law-making of interests who alone profit by the passage or failure of certain proposed legislation. It should be noted once more that issues are settled under such conditions by pressure and by influence rather than by merit. Extensive and powerful lobbies have profoundly influenced recent legislation in the United States.¹⁰ The implications of such influence are, in fact, sinister. When hundreds of farmers armed with pitchforks invade legislative halls to demand the passage of certain laws, or when those interested in specific legislation bombard congress with thousands of telegrams, or when thousands of bonus-seekers march intimidatingly upon the national Capitol, certainly democratic legislative procedure has fallen on critical days.¹¹

Amateur Political Functioning

If "political democracy is an anachronism which cannot permanently endure,"¹² then the problems which confront those who administer the state are beyond the competence, perhaps the comprehension, of the average citizen. Such problems as those presented by tariffs, by public finance, by social legislation and by international relations puzzle the minds and challenge the abilities of those especially trained in these fields. The government of a modern state is, in fact, a large-scale enterprise and its business, "like all other large-scale business, needs the services of experts. The people in general cannot

¹⁰ P. H. Odegard, *Pressure Politics: the Story of the Anti-Saloon League* (New York, 1928).

¹¹ H. S. Prichett, "What's Wrong with Congress," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 155 (March, 1935), pp. 288-294.

¹² H. U. Faulkner, *American Economic History* (New York, 1924), p. 661.

understand its intricacies nor adjudge the qualities requisite for the conduct of this business.”¹³ Yet the democratic system, as it operates at present, gives farmers, salesmen, small-town professional men and political henchmen responsibility for the solution of technical political and social problems.

Since the masses are not qualified for administrative political functioning, government, when it is efficient, is “of the people and for the people” but not “by the people.”¹⁴ Because of his inability to conceive of political functions in terms of general welfare, the amateur in government is the easy prey of political bosses and special interests. Good government can only proceed from those who are genuinely socially minded, who can be objective in point of view and who can act in the interests of all groups. Good government is not achieved merely by turning one political party out of power and putting another in office, for such procedure merely passes political office around so that all may have a chance to “milk the cow.” Effective political action requires that public officials surmount the interests of person, group and class.

To place political administration in the hands of those qualified to discharge political functions does not remove political power from the body-politic. “The determining of functions and policies still rests with citizens or their representatives. State highway commissioner, food chemist, forester or pathologist is there only as a servant to carry out effectively their purpose.”¹⁵ Since the expert is trained to hold emotions in leash, to render deliberate judgments and to act on the basis of facts, the difficult tasks of government can be more safely entrusted to him than to any other. The effective state then becomes possible where there is an intelligent citizenry sufficiently socialized to comprehend the social objectives of political action, and a qualified political personnel to carry social policies into effect. Under such conditions democratic political leadership may be an appeal of intelligence to intelligence for clear thinking upon political issues. It need no longer be “a test of skill in the use of the psychology of suggestion.”¹⁶

Narrow Nationalism

Any given state exists as an integral part of a society of states, that is, a state cannot live socially isolated from, or independent of, other states. In fact, a state is a politically organized group which interacts with other similarly organized groups. As such, they have common as well as conflicting in-

¹³ MacIver, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-189.

¹⁴ Munro, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

¹⁵ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1920), p. 285.

¹⁶ F. H. Hankins, *An Introduction to the Study of Society* (New York, 1928), p. 368.

terests and common as well as peculiar problems. From the sociological point of view, therefore, the relations of states do not constitute a unique order; fundamentally, the relationships of states are those of typical social groups. States differ significantly from other social groups only in the functions they perform and in the scope of the authority they exercise. Within their borders the states possess supreme authority. They use this authority, through the enforcement of law, to maintain orderly interaction between all component groups. Outside their borders, however, the states completely lack such power. When challenged or hard-pressed, states maintain their prestige and prerogatives by resort to war. "Consequently," says MacIver, "we face the paradox that the state is, nationally, the great instrument of social security, but, internationally, the greatest menace to that security."¹⁷ Orderly relations between states, in fact, remains the outstanding problem of present civilization.

Nationalism is the crux of this problem of orderly relations between states. Yet nationality is, in the final analysis, merely "an historical formation" which develops out of a common social heritage. Nationality has been defined as "the subjective corporate sentiment permanently present in and giving a sense of distinctive unity to the majority of the members of a particularized section of humanity, which at the same time objectively constitutes a distinct group by virtue of possessing certain collective attributes peculiar to it such as homeland, language, religion, history, culture or traditions."¹⁸ Nationality, thus described, is essentially a form of group egoism no different in nature from other types especially in its anti-social tendencies. Linked with greed, ambition, and feelings of superiority, national egoism, because of its scope, becomes a powerful factor in warping the social attitudes of the citizenry. The social values set forth by such nationalism are the antithesis of those indicated when account is taken of the objectives of democratic political action.

Nationalism, notwithstanding its unsocial aspects, cannot indefinitely preclude coördinated and coöperative interaction between states. As differences and distances disappear before modern transportation and communication, the observance of national boundary lines becomes an increasingly artificial procedure. Through the interchange of ideas and techniques national groups are acquiring a common social heritage which is steadily modifying national differences. As the interdependence of states increases with this diffusion of cultural patterns, economic and social organization can no longer be restrained within national boundaries. The fundamentals of law, the norms of welfare

¹⁷ R. M. MacIver, *Society, Its Structure and Changes* (New York, 1931), p. 203.

¹⁸ B. Joseph, *Nationality, its Nature and Problems* (New Haven, 1929), pp. 308-309.

and the standards of morality are matters of universal import. A competitive nationalism, therefore, only increases international maladjustment. Eventually states will apply the principles of coöperation to a set of relationships so obviously interactive.

When unrestrained economic competition resulted in the elimination of some business units and the impoverishment of many others, enterprising business men abandoned the competitive principle and developed "associations," interlocking directorates and combinations so that all concerns involved might survive and prosper. The identity of the constituent business units was usually maintained in such economic organization, but the right to cut prices, lower rates and give rebates was surrendered. In return each concern was assured a share of the business to be done and a profit on its transactions. Now the rivalries for trade, the struggles for territory and dominance lead to disorders in the political process not unlike those which cut-throat competition produced in the economic process. Relatively speaking, the surrender of national prerogatives in order to achieve national security through cooperation involves no more significant sacrifice, relatively speaking, than that required of business units which combine with others to gain economic security. Indeed, it is altogether likely that the same fundamental economic laws apply to an acquisitive society of nations as apply to an acquisitive society of merchants or producers.

Social evolution furnishes further evidence of the feasibility of a coöperative international order which conserves national identities and guarantees national security. When prehistoric families, because of increasing numbers, came into conflict with each other over lands, or food supplies or hunting grounds, they settled their disputes by wars. After many millenniums it was discovered that an organization of these families into clans with a governing body composed of representatives of the constituent families could settle inter-familial conflicts without incurring the heaving losses of life and property involved in warfare. Similarly, when wars between clans had, for untold generations, exterminated some and greatly weakened the others, tribes were organized on the same principles. In like manner and for similar purposes, tribes were eventually organized into confederations and confederations into nations. At this stage in the development of social organization the application of the coöperative principle has been suspended by a narrow nationalism that insists that the process of social evolution has run its course. Each of sixty nations now exercises the "sovereign" right to formulate and effect its own program of action. The relations of modern states are thus characterized by an absence of law and government which borders on anarchy.

The need for an international law and an international authority to enforce

that law is obvious. Such international organization would, of course, involve restrictions upon the imperialism of some states in order that other states might survive. But all collective action, from that of a boys' club to that of "sovereign" states, involves the surrender of some minor liberties in order to secure a larger field of activity. It is only a narrow nationalism born of a blighted patriotism that fails to envision the greater gains of international coöperation. Economic imperialism, ambition for political power, national greed, delusions of national superiority, unwarranted national suspicion, self-imposed prejudices and fears are obstacles to the security of the state. Recurrent economic depressions of increasing severity will convince business men of the need for order in economic relations; recurrent international wars, increasingly devastating, will perhaps convince political men of the need for order in state relations.

It is frequently asserted that, with human nature as it is, international organization is impracticable because human beings are incapable of corporate sentiments on so large a scale. Since it seems impossible to develop culture patterns on an international basis, it is concluded that nationalism represents the limits of political and social sentiments and loyalties. This argument has been advanced by vested interests in all ages of human development in an effort to discourage those who would widen human horizons. As a matter of fact the limits of human loyalty have never been precisely determined. It is known, however, that human nature is capable of response upon a national basis. Loyalty to the interests of the national state requires recognition of the need for coöperation between states. Internationalism, in fact, makes no further requirement; it does not insist that human beings develop a fervent love for the entire human race. Effective international organization requires only that national groups be reasonable enough to settle their *inter*-group conflicts as they resolve their *intra*-group differences. There is no evidence that such reasonableness would not be forthcoming provided that the social attitudes of the national groups had not been warped by deliberate misrepresentations and vicious propaganda.

It is certain that states cannot long endure the increasing economic burdens of war and preparedness.

War has become an economic battle of steel and gold. The American Civil War cost a million dollars a day until the crisis when expenditures grew to three million dollars per day. The World War cost the United States Treasury over one million dollars for every hour of participation over two years of hostilities. The War Department estimates the total disbursement to have been twenty times the pre-war debt. American expenditure in this war was sufficient to have carried on the Revolutionary War continuously for more than one thousand years at the

eighteenth-century gait. Loans incidentally were made to Allies at the rate of one-half a million dollars an hour during the same two years.¹⁹

If the social as well as the financial costs of war continue to increase as they have in the past it needs no seer to prophesy that costs of future wars are beyond human calculation. Unless the era of independent national states be regarded as an epoch transitional to an international order, there is no security for the state.

STATUS OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

The present trend toward a highly centralized type of government with marked curtailment of parliamentary powers seems to indicate a decline in representative government. In Russia, Italy, Spain, Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia, Poland, Turkey, Hungary and possibly Rumania, genuinely representative procedures have been either emasculated or abandoned. At least these governments no longer function in the customary representative manner. The pathological conditions which have developed in the modern state explain, in large measure, this decline in parliamentary government. If it is true that representative government is a form designed to express political aspirations and to solve political problems, "then it is obvious that this type of political organization is inadequate to the task of solving the more complex social and economic problems which now confront the state. The exigencies of severe economic depression have plainly revealed the weaknesses of representative government as a means of conserving human welfare."²⁰

The democratic state has been most successful among homogeneous peoples with an historical background of unifying traditions. Among people differing in race, religion, ethical and social codes, the representative principle can be employed much less effectively, especially when economic inequalities are emphasized by marked social stratification. Men are not born equal, nor can all of them gain equality, for education cannot develop abilities when capacity is lacking. Political organization is effective only as it reckons with human inequalities. "The weakness of representative government," Dr. Bluemel asserts, "lies in the fact that men differ in mental make-up, and that no man can readily represent another man's mind. A representative is a substitute, but a man cannot substitute for another in matters of deliberation and counsel unless he understands the other's psychology."²¹ Where population elements

¹⁹ Colonel L. P. Ayes, *The War with Germany*, U. S. War Department (Washington, 1919), p. 131.

²⁰ A. Salter "Toward a Planned Economy," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 153 (July, 1934), p. 34.

²¹ C. S. Bluemel, "The Mind in Government," *Mental Hygiene*, Vol. 16 (April, 1932), p. 233.

differ significantly, therefore, the organization of a general will upon matters of common concern becomes a difficult, and at times, an impossible task.

In modern democratic states, governments reckon increasingly with general political incompetence. If the lower one sixth of the population now produces one half of the next generation, it is clear that representative political organization is confronted, not only with increasingly difficult and intricate problems, but also with an increasingly incompetent electorate. This lower one sixth of the population includes the economically incompetent, the mentally deficient, the mentally diseased, criminals, sex perverts, vagrants, alcoholics and the constitutional inferiors. The ballot is no kindness to such groups; in fact, it is a handicap to effective government. Present democratic procedures, however, give as much weight to one ballot as to any other. When account is taken of the fact that the electorate is increasingly asked to settle questions upon which even the more advantaged groups are uninformed and hence incompetent, education, of course, offers no immediate and perhaps no ultimate solution of the political problem presented by these groups.

Since it is impossible, in practice, to limit suffrage to the politically qualified, the apparent alternative is to restrict the political powers of the electorate to matters upon which it is competent. Such procedure requires that legislative assemblies confine their political action to the determination of the fundamental fields in which the state is to function and the basic principles upon which it is to act. Such procedure also involves the delegation of large powers of administration to the executive organs of government within the limits set by the legislative assembly. As government reaches more and more into the fields of industry, human relations and social welfare in an increasingly complex social situation, the direct, and even the indirect, action of the electorate in ordering the course of administration must be restrained, it would seem, if efficient and economical performance of governmental functions is to be secured. Failing this, the democratic state inevitably develops into a power state when social situations become critical.

REFORM OF THE STATE

Since the state is increasingly an inclusive institution, its failure to function effectively has serious import for all social organization. If the state functions badly, it is obvious that industry, the family, the school, the public library, health and recreation centers, et cetera, may be gravely handicapped in their service to the group. The correction of pathological political conditions, therefore, is a matter of prime importance. Two lines of attack upon such conditions are possible. *First*, the political experts may be called upon to devise more

perfect forms of political organization and more effective political machinery. Improved tools would thus be placed at the service of the body-politic. *Secondly*, a direct attack may be made upon diseased social attitudes. Improved political machinery will not increase the effective functioning of the state unless those in control use it to accomplish such ends. States of mind are, therefore, more important than the texts of constitutions for attitudes provide the dynamics for political action. Unless political attitudes are sound and vigorous, revision of organization and procedure will not correct pathological conditions.

To properly condition political motivation, constructive social leadership will necessarily employ every legitimate social device which has been developed for the purpose. For as Lord Bryce has so well said, "to the people we come sooner or later; it is upon their wisdom and self-restraint that the stability of the most cunningly devised scheme of government will in the last resort depend."²² Whatever the devices used to reconstruct the social attitudes of the people toward their state, certain objectives appear essential: to recondition the acquisitive impulses of the individual so as to place them in their proper relationship to group's interest in social justice—unity in the political group is not accomplished through economic adjustment alone, but through an integration of interests; to eliminate exploitation of public office for private ends—the misuse of political power always engenders menacing states of mind, in both the official and the citizen; to develop powers of re-adaptation in politics—changing social situations call for constant readjustment and reorganization; and to discover the universal interests which will furnish areas of agreement and frames of reference for effective political action. Only such changes in the mechanics of government as facilitate such an attack upon social attitudes are of any consequence in the reform of the state.

Communism, fascism, socialism and capitalism all proceed upon the assumptions, (a) that one group has a monopoly of political wisdom, (b) that it alone is capable of serving and conserving human welfare, and (c) that its interests therefore take precedence of those of other groups. Each *ism* is consequently determined to turn out of office the adherents of other political faiths and to entrench itself in the seats of authority by revisions of constitutions or by drastic legislation. When it has acquired political power, however, each *ism* does not hesitate to coerce and exploit its opponents precisely as its predecessor has done. As groups are constituted at present each coöperates with others only so far as their prejudices coincide. Collection action rarely exceeds the limits of bias. It is likely, therefore, that a more effective state is possible only when economic and social relations provide a larger frame of reference for political action based upon sound social attitudes and directed

²² J. Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (New York, 1889), Vol. I, p. 173.

by a type of political leadership which, because of the high quality of its performance, can call forth the fervent loyalties of all sorts and conditions of men.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. Should certain metropolitan areas such as New York City and Chicago be recognized as separate political units? Give your reasons.
2. Recognizing dominant regional interests, remake the map of the United States so as to create natural geographic divisions having approximately equal population.
3. How many states now have civil service? How effective is civil service in placing qualified persons in office?
4. What is "the type of liberalism which democracy implies"?
5. "When a man ceases to be, his power and his wants cease with him; and having no longer any participation in the concerns of this world, he has no longer any authority in directing how its government shall be organized or how administered." (Thomas Paine) Do you agree? Why or why not?
6. Under what conditions may the state properly undertake to regulate personal conduct?
7. Chart the evolution of political organization as described in this chapter.
8. Does the Constitution follow the flag? Should it? Give your reasons.
9. Is a league of nations a super-state or a confederation of states? Explain.
10. Show how the state serves the individual most effectively in the long run when it serves group ends. Illustrate.
11. What are the relative advantages of coercive and democratic political leadership?
12. From the sociological standpoint should popular control of government be increased? Give your reasons.
13. "Self-government is better than good government." (Abraham Lincoln) Do you agree? Why or why not?
14. "As a rule the average citizen does not vote *for* anything, but *against* something." Do you agree? If so, what significance attaches to this aspect of popular government?
15. Comment: "Democracy is the most expensive form of government known to man; its cost increases as the square of its direct popular participation in it." (Munro, *Invisible Government*, pp. 127-128.)
16. "The steady erosion of state (as a political subdivision) powers is bound to go hand in hand with the increasing complexity of our economic and social life." (*Ibid.*, p. 152-153.) What is your opinion? Why?
17. Which of the following statements do you believe is true? Give your reasons.
 - (a) "Create good government and education will naturally become a department of its activities."
 - (b) "Educate mankind and the need for government will shrink to a minimum and settle itself."

18. What should be the relation of education (a) to the government? (b) to the state?
19. Comment: "We develop government because it is an agency which generates social control when we should develop institutions like the family which are agencies for generating self-control." (Borsodi, *This Ugly Civilization*, p. 431.)

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CHAPTER XXI

THE SOCIAL SETTLEMENT

THE state, however, provides only minimum standards for the *conditions* under which its citizens live, and the *relations* which they establish with one another. Moreover, its attitudes toward social situations is, for the most part, passive. It is, therefore, to certain sanctioned institutions that its people turn for the active promotion of improved social standards. The social settlement is such an institution.

THE SETTLEMENT IDEA

The social settlement is the institution which provides for constructive social interaction between men and women of culture and social character and the socially underprivileged of specific neighborhoods. Such interaction enables the socially starved to function on an expanding scale by means of contacts designed to increase the quantity and improve the quality of their social relationships. In other words, the social settlement strives to enrich neighborhood life through the organization of the social, intellectual and cultural interests of the diverse elements in socially disorganized communities.

Obviously such neighborhoods lack the social resources necessary to the enrichment of life. As Barnett so well said, "it is the poverty of their own life which makes the poor content to inhabit uninhabitable houses, and content also to allow improved dwellings to become almost equally uninhabitable. It is the same poverty of life which makes so many careless of cleanliness, listless about the unhealthy conditions of their workshops, and heedless of anything beyond the enjoyment of a moment's excitement."¹ It is equally apparent that many urban neighborhoods abound in social resources. The social settlement attempts "to relieve, at the same time, the overaccumulation at one end of society and the destitution at the other,"² especially as it pertains to social and educational advantages.

The social distance between the privileged and the underprivileged classes, however, normally precludes coöperation for social betterment. The settlement, therefore, provides a residence for the privileged which gives personal contact

¹ C. R. Atlee, *The Social Worker* (London, 1920), p. 192.

² J. Addams, *Twenty Years at Hull House* (New York, 1920), p. 126.

with the underprivileged and identifies them as citizens with all the public interests of the disorganized community. The settlement thus becomes, in reality, an inclusive neighborhood club set up in an area of disintegration for the purpose of facilitating coöperation among persons of different classes, races and creeds, in a series of activities which remove antagonizers, interpret the various neighborhood elements to each other and promote common functioning for common objectives. When the settlement has developed among neighbors the habit of working together, the consciousness of a unity of interest inevitably emerges.

Neighborliness is thus induced "between need on the one hand and opportunity and ability on the other."³ This friendliness becomes socially purposive, for it is characterized by an interest in people which issues from a definite philosophy of human welfare, by a democratic spirit which admits no doubt of its validity and no limitation in its application, by a social method in which the welfare of the individual is secured through group coöperation, and by a practicality which regards facts as a necessary basis of intelligent action.⁴

To achieve its purpose, the settlement revives, in these disorganized urban areas, the neighborhood spirit characteristic of healthy village life. Although it is neither school, church, nor political party, the settlement advances general culture, stirs moral consciousness, and encourages civic integrity. Essentially, the settlement is a *stimulus* toward enriched individual and community life as expressed through various educational, recreational and civic enterprises.⁵ By making its larger resources available to every little tenement home in the district, the settlement conserves the social resources of the neighborhood, canalizes group and individual conduct, provides moral education and creates the social machinery necessary to the enlarged functioning of the neighborhood and its members.

In its earliest phases the settlement had a semi-religious motivation; namely, "the rescue of the fallen." Under the influence of Barnett, however, the settlement was sharply differentiated from the mission as an institution for the downward percolation of culture. Toynbee, it is said, hoped to devote his life to "the social expression of culture." Indeed, the motives of those who have distinguished themselves in settlement work seem to be akin to those who have rendered unique service in the field of religion. In both fields the workers have been distinguished by a zealous devotion to the ideal—the one with respect to another world, the other with respect to this world.

Specifically, the motives which have dominated those who have established

³ J. L. Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency* (New York, 1921), p. 517.

⁴ H. E. Wilson, *Mary McDowell, Neighbor* (Chicago, 1928), Ch. 10.

⁵ M. Simkhovitch, *Report of Greenwich House* (New York, 1903).

settlements were, first, *the passion for democratic organization*. Settlements were founded by those who believe that the cultural heritage should be the common possession of all social classes. From the beginning, settlement workers have insisted that the advantaged share with the disadvantaged the social goods which they possessed in superabundance. Settlement workers have also striven to break down class prejudice, to eliminate class antagonisms, to obliterate class lines, to resolve class conflicts, and to extend democratic organization beyond its political expression to the social order of the neighborhood and the district. Through the education of the disadvantaged they have improved existing political institutions and ushered the underprivileged into their social inheritance.

Secondly, the settlement worker has never been content with a purely rational approach to the problems of the disadvantaged. They have steadily maintained that the sharing of the cultural heritage shall be a matter of the heart as well as of the intellect. Working people, they hold, are worthy human beings, entitled to substantial social status. As such they should be respected and self-respecting. They must not be so much helped, as helped to help themselves. The settlement's initial problem, hence, consists in the interpretation of their relationships to the working people themselves and to the community at large. The superior-inferior attitudes of current philanthropy are replaced by the neighborliness and friendliness of social equals. And the residence of settlement workers in the area served identifies the settlement staff with the community and its problems in a manner which exemplifies this essential *humanitarianism*.

Thirdly, the earlier philanthropic activities had been based upon hearsay information, and sensational descriptions of the ill-housed, the ill-nourished and the ill-clad. Settlement workers were the first to insist that a democratic sharing of the cultural heritage must proceed from actual studies of the situation of the poor and a mutual appreciation of the personalities involved. Cooperation for the enrichment of neighborhood life could not be assured, they believed, unless actual conditions and needs were known. Settlement workers have always been motivated, therefore, by *a desire for a scientific knowledge* of the problems which confront them and for scientific procedure in dealing with those problems.

Lastly, the settlement has equipped both its residents and its neighbors with facilities for *expansive functioning*. It has "provided children with means to play, young people with means for social intercourse, families with opportunities to mingle with others, and the community *with means for the discussion of common problems*."⁶ Settlements have also provided working people with

⁶ Gillin, *op. cit.*, p. 525.

opportunities to meet educated men and women, to organize purposive group activities, to celebrate festivals, to secure better organization of relief in times of crisis, to obtain legal protection against exploitation, and to gain improved service from public and semi-public social agencies.

Various types of agencies have, of course, been influenced by settlement motives; these agencies have also employed settlement methods to accomplish their objectives. Three types of such agencies have been distinguished⁷ to only one of which may the term *settlement* properly be applied. These are *missions*, *parish agencies*, and *typical settlements*.

Missions are religious and reformatory organizations which seek to propagate a certain set of religious doctrines by means of a specific and fixed program. Conversion and proselytism are their chief objectives. In general "their object is to reach the masses with the religious appeal unhindered by the barriers which hedge in the church."⁸ Gospel or rescue missions make only a spiritual appeal but other missions combine with their religious functions the giving of food, clothing and shelter. These employ material relief, however, not as a means of restoring the poor to social normality, but as a method of increasing membership rolls. These agencies, in fact, have pauperized the poor and perpetuated their dependence upon the bounty of the rich. Obviously, such organizations cannot be classified as social settlements.

Parish agencies also frequently call themselves settlements, but these agencies are organized by denominational groups for the specific purpose of promulgating sectarian religious activities. These agencies are set up, staffed, governed and largely financed by particular denominational groups. Although they often carry on a considerable range of educational and recreational activities, their overt objective is the propagation of the tenets of their faith among a lower social stratum. Settlement motives and methods are used for purposes narrowly religious (indeed, sectarian) rather than broadly social.

The *typical settlement*, by contrast, is committed to no doctrinal position, nor is it identified with any denominational or other well-defined group. Instead, the typical social settlement is "free to understand and meet the needs and outreachings of the people among whom the settlement works, in so far as the staff has the skill, the intelligence, the sympathy and the learning"⁹ requisite to these tasks. Such settlements seek to integrate the diverse interests of the neighborhood, to discover areas of agreement between conflicting groups, to emphasize likenesses rather than differences, to relieve ignorance or lack, and to increase the control of the underprivileged over themselves and their

⁷ A. J. Kennedy, *Social Work Year Book*, 1929 (New York, 1929), pp. 426-427.

⁸ R. Calkins, *Substitutes for the Saloon* (Boston, 1919), p. 134.

⁹ Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p. 426.

environment. In short, the typical social settlement spreads culture as broadly and as deeply as the neighborhood and the community will absorb it.

The Jewish social settlement, however, departs from the typical settlement in several important respects. namely, it is racial in character; it is not necessarily separated from agencies which regularly administer material relief; and it does not insist upon residence, because the Jewish ghetto has an abundance of social resources within itself. "The function of the (Jewish) settlement is mainly to organize these forces, to protect the community from negative influences and to present opportunities for educational and social betterment."¹⁰ To adjust the Jew to American institutions and procedures, yet to retain his interest in Jewish ideals, culture and history is the specific task of the Jewish social settlement. The residence of the worker in a settlement house, therefore, is not essential to the Jewish agency.

To summarize, social settlements function in accordance with certain well-defined principles—first, that ideal democracy is possible, second, that the settlement must give the individual an understanding of his relation to society, since modern education fails at this strategic point; third, that the social salvation of the individual is inextricably involved in the welfare of his group and his neighborhood; fourth, that neighborliness is the essential and effective method of enriching social relationships, fifth, that facts and figures are the necessary basis of intelligent social action; and sixth, that social responsibility is most effectively awakened when friendly contacts are established between those of widely different social classes.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SETTLEMENT

The settlement originated about fifty years ago. It developed out of the breakdown of the traditional organization of the English parish which came with the industrial revolution. The growth of factories brought such huge agglomerations of population to hitherto self-contained villages that their simple social organization was completely broken down. The old English system of town government decayed, and corporations and parishes became "the close preserves of little cliques."¹¹ The English system of local government at the time rested upon the theory that every district contains a sufficient number of persons able and willing to perform the necessary civic functions, and that local government can be adequately administered if each inhabitant in turn undertakes his share of the communal burden. This system had been adequate so long as each locality was an economic unit with a hierarchy of

¹⁰ B. D. Bogen, *Jewish Philanthropy* (New York, 1917), pp. 244-252.

¹¹ Atlee, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

classes to which traditional functions could be assigned. It disintegrated, therefore, under the impact of the new order ushered in by the industrial revolution.

In America a similar disorganization appeared in large areas of those metropolitan communities where working people were organized industrially but not socially. There they lived in destitution, "the majority of them without leisure or energy for anything but the gain of subsistence. They move(d) often from one wretched lodging to another. They live(d) for the moment side by side, many of them without knowledge of each other, without fellowship, without local tradition or public spirit, without social organization of any kind. . . . Too often their only place of meeting (was) the saloon, their only host a bartender; a local demagogue formed their public opinion."¹²

In both England and America, however, the upper classes had been awakened to the misery among the working people by the agitations of the Christian and Fabian Socialists, and by the writings of Carlyle, Ruskin, Henry George, and others who had attacked the crude doctrines of the Manchester School of economists, especially its narrow interpretation of wealth and welfare. These writers had stressed the value of the individual; they had vigorously asserted the right of every human being to opportunity for the full development of his faculties. Every individual, they maintained, should experience beauty, the joy of craftsmanship, or other creative effort. These doctrines deeply influenced the people of ability and refinement among whom a passion for social justice had already been stirred by Lord Shaftesbury and Charles Dickens.

During the depression of 1867 the futility of the efforts to relieve distress by gifts of money became fully apparent. Especially significant was the experience of Edward Denison who had been assigned to one of the East End (London) branches of the Society for the Relief of Distress. On December 24, 1867, he wrote, "Things are so bad down here and giving money away only makes them worse. I am beginning seriously to believe that all bodily aid to the poor is a mistake, and that the real thing is to let things work themselves straight; whereas, by giving alms you keep them permanently crooked. Build school-houses, pay teachers, give prizes, frame workmen's clubs, help them to help themselves, lend them your brains; but give them no money, except what you sink in such undertakings as above."¹³ Denison's activities in this East End neighborhood greatly interested Ruskin, John Richard Green and Octavia Hill, but his premature death in 1870 delayed the establishment of the first settlement for more than a decade.

¹² J. Addams, *Philanthropy and Social Progress* (New York, 1893), pp. 4, 5.

¹³ Sir Leighton Baldwin (ed.), *Letters and Other Writings of the Late Edward Denison, M. P.* (London, 1872), quoted by Woods and Kennedy in *The Settlement Horizon*, p. 19

In the meantime the movement for "democratic neighborliness" was carried forward within the limits of the church by certain curates, vicars, and bishops who had been influenced by the humanitarian forces of the times. At the universities and colleges, tutors, lecturers and professors were discussing the conditions among the working classes which had been brought about by the Industrial Revolution. In 1872, Samuel A. Barnett accepted an appointment to the vicarage of St. Jude's, Whitechapel, where he at once began the reorganization of poor relief, the establishment of schools, and the elimination of the resorts of vice and crime. Arnold Toynbee entered Oxford in 1873 where he came under the influence of John Ruskin and Thomas Hill Green. There he also met Barnett whose work at Whitechapel was intriguing the interest of university students. Eventually this interest became so profound that they accepted Barnett's invitation to share in the work at Whitechapel, and Toynbee Hall, the first settlement, was organized in 1884 with Barnett as warden and university men as resident workers. Other settlements were soon established throughout London and the provinces under the auspices of the universities, colleges, and various religious bodies, especially the Church of England, with Toynbee Hall as the pattern.

The first American settlements were organized by persons who had lived at Toynbee Hall or who had talked with Barnett. Neighborhood Guild (University Settlement) was established in the lower East Side of New York in 1886 by Stanton Coit. Hull House and Northwestern University Settlement (Chicago), College Settlement (New York) and South End House (Boston) were all opened in 1891. Different situations called these separate settlements into being, such as the need for home nursing among the poor, the attempt to provide comfortable boarding houses for young working women receiving low wages, and the need for day nurseries and kindergartens to ease the burden of working-class mothers. But despite these diverse origins, American settlements have developed a central purpose, common functions and similar organization. By 1894 American settlements, exclusive of religious houses, numbered eight; by 1935 more than 205. In that year some 300 church houses were also designated as settlements.

The essential identity in the organization of American settlements is due, in part, to the characteristic environment in which they were established, and in part to certain tendencies which appeared early in their development; first, the decreasing prominence given to the religious aspects of settlement work as it became apparent that the settlement should prepare for, and reinforce, rather than duplicate, the work of the church for which it was not equipped; second, the tendency increasingly to elicit coöperation in its work from its local constituency; and third, the municipalization of certain settlement activities, such

as, kindergartens and playgrounds, which were obviously public, rather than private, functions.¹⁴

Once established the settlement tends to pass through three stages in its development—an *initial stage* in which the efforts of its founders and residents are given to locating the settlement, making the acquaintance of its neighbors, discovering the needs of the neighborhood and developing a social and educational program on the basis of personal hospitality; an *intermediate stage* in which the settlement building is equipped with a few institutional rooms such as an assembly hall, a gymnasium, and several small club rooms, designed for experimentation with specific types of social, educational and recreational activities; and a *final stage* characterized by an extensive plant with rooms or buildings devoted to well-organized activity in music, handiwork, dramatics, athletics, and home-making, each set apart under a special board with its own equipment, staff, financial organization, and program. Most American settlements have entered the second developmental period; a few, the third.

SOCIAL SERVICES OF THE SETTLEMENT

From the beginning, settlement activities have been organized on the basis of manifest neighborhood *need*, of available *talent* to direct desired services, and of local *interest* in specific functions. Always, however, the settlement works toward the fulfillment of its dominant purpose—to stimulate the development of personality, group consciousness, and social conscience by means of more and richer social contacts. Its unique services may, therefore, be enumerated as follows:

1. *Social investigation.* The settlement has always held that the objective study of the neighborhood or district which it serves is its first task. The correction of local inadequacies is undertaken, therefore, only after penetrating surveys have uncovered local conditions. For example, before organizing specific activities, settlements have made investigations of slum conditions in tenement districts; the sweating system; casual labor; saloons; infant mortality; diseases especially prevalent among the poor; dietary conditions; sale of narcotics; home reading; dispossessed tenants; children's street games; truancy; conditions surrounding working children; working girls in department stores, factories, and canneries; festivals and their social possibilities, et cetera.¹⁵ Such investigation is, in fact, a continuous function of every settlement since the industrial neighborhood is ever changing.

¹⁴ W. I. Cole, *Motives and Methods of the Social Settlement Movement* (Cambridge, 1908), pp. 10-17.

¹⁵ Typical of such investigations are *Hull House Maps and Papers*, 1895; *The City Wilderness*, 1899; R. A. Woods (ed.) *Americans in Process* (1902); R. A. Woods, *Young*

2. *Social experimentation.* The social settlement has functioned most significantly, however, as a social laboratory where new social apparatus is devised, tested and modified in actual experiments directed by competent persons of varied tastes and training. The settlement thus serves as a sort of social experiment station where procedures are devised for meeting particular needs and situations—procedures which, if successful, can be applied elsewhere by other social agencies, or can be taken over by some governmental unit and employed generally.

Numerous and varied are the social experiments which the settlement has carried to a point where the practicability of, as well as the social necessity for, certain social apparatus has been fully demonstrated. They include play spaces, parks and playgrounds; fresh-air camps and excursions; charity based upon service and rehabilitation rather than doles; kindergartens, adult education, manual training, domestic science, worker's education, branch libraries, milk stations, home nursing, health examinations, school nursing, mother's pensions, garbage disposal, industrial guidance, democratic neighborhood organization, the constructive direction of the energies of "gangs" and "natural groupings."

3. *Improvement of the neighborhood environment.* Settlement workers have ever waged a vigorous campaign for the improved housing of the poor. They have persistently exposed the ugliness, the sordidness, the menace of living conditions in tenement houses; they have worked relentlessly for the adoption of building codes and standards for model tenements. They have insisted that filthy streets be paved and systematically cleaned; that city dumps be renovated; and that adequate provision be made for the collection of garbage and the disposal of sewage.

4. *Organization of the neighborhood's economic groups.* In periods of unusual distress the settlements have assisted in the administration of relief especially through voluntary visiting for outdoor relief agencies. Coöperative restaurants, boarding clubs, rooming houses and coal clubs have been organized and supervised by settlement residents. Employment bureaus and consumers' leagues have been established; sewing and cooking classes with supper clubs have given impetus and prestige to the domestic arts. Day nurseries have been maintained for the relief of working mothers. Work rooms have been provided for those skilled in the handicrafts.

Convinced that the labor movement represents "a concerted effort among workers to obtain a more equitable distribution of the product and to secure a

Working Girls (1913). See Woods and Kennedy, *The Settlement Horizon* (New York, 1922), pp 447-472; also their *Handbook of Settlements*, for more extended lists of investigations.

more orderly existence for the laborers,"¹⁶ settlements have assisted in the organization of labor and trade unions, have sought to hold the unions to their broadest ideals, to prevent the movement from developing into class warfare, and to keep it conscious of its historic value in social development. Persuaded that a larger and steadier view of industrial relations should be taken than either the employer or the worker had developed, settlements have held conferences on labor matters, investigated child labor, women's work and wages, served as agencies of conciliation and arbitration in labor disputes, and supported labor legislation with facts as well as influence. Within the union itself, the settlement has mediated between the individualist and the socialist, and has both encouraged and developed constructive labor leadership.

5. *Socialization of local politics.* The corruption of local politics which the settlement often uncovers, is amply illustrated by Jane Addam's discovery that at least one fifth of the voters in her ward had secured their jobs through the patronage of an alderman who had entrenched himself during a period of some twenty years by utilizing his office to secure free licenses for peddlers, free railroad passes for local business men, clemency from the courts for significant law-breakers, and positions on the city pay-roll for persons who rendered him political service.¹⁷ "The object of the settlement, therefore, in political matters is to lift local issues to the level of common, honest, local needs; to instill into the mind of the local voter, by actual experience on his part, a conception of the city as a coöperative enterprise based on mutual aid, instead of either an oligarchy whose favor is to be gained by truckling, or an efficient despotism under some commercial Cincinnatus."¹⁸

With these objectives in view, settlements have investigated the activities of political machines and given publicity to their practices. They have co-operated with the better type of politicians irrespective of party; they have participated in political campaigns; secured the establishment of juvenile courts and probation; given legal aid to those who could not pay lawyers' fees; kept a watchful eye on the saloons, dives, and vice areas of the district; held classes in citizenship; agitated for desirable laws and ordinances, especially those which would improve local conditions; utilized political campaigns to the full for purposes of education and enlightenment; participated in city, state, and national movements for social betterment, and promoted international good-will.

6. *Social organization of the neighborhood.* Since the district which it serves

¹⁶ J. Addams, "The Settlement as a Factor in the Labor Movement," *Hull House Maps and Papers*, p. 187.

¹⁷ J. Addams, *Twenty Years at Hull House*, pp. 316-317.

¹⁸ R. A. Woods, *The Neighborhood in Nation-Building* (Boston, 1923), p. 71.

is typically an area of disorganization, the settlement's largest field of service lies in its promotion of constructive interaction in the social, as well as in the economic and political, relationships of its neighbors. Specifically this service is rendered by (a) the organization of club activities for various groups of children, young people and adults; (b) the formation of neighborhood councils, neighborhood improvement associations and juvenile protective associations; (c) the establishment of social centers for neighborhood gatherings, and forums for the discussion of neighborhood problems; (d) the Americanization of immigrants by facilitating their adaptation to the new social situation, and by breaking down class and national prejudices; (e) by provision for a well-defined and well-integrated group life for those who live in isolation because of maladjustment; (f) the improvement of local family life by re-defining the rôles of parents and children, by setting up a higher type of family life as exemplified in relations of settlement residents, by encouraging rational mating, and by mediating domestic quarrels; and (g) the democratization of neighborhood relationships through the organization of parents' associations, the development of self-government, the socialization of professional service, and through pure neighborliness and friendliness.

7. *Provision for recreation.* The settlement's recreational program is, of course, adapted to the needs of the various groups in the neighborhood rather than to those of a single group scattered throughout the city. Especially is it designed to meet the needs of the unassimilated elements of the neighborhood. As a recreational agency the settlement has, when possible, provided play spaces, small parks and playgrounds for outdoor activities; it has equipped gymnasiums for indoor recreation; it has developed athletics for men and boys; it has established recreation centers with facilities for dancing, bowling, billiards, and pool; it has conserved and promoted characteristic festivals; it has supervised all its recreational activities so that its play program provides for the constructive use of leisure time.

8. *Health promotion.* Because of the character of the urban areas in which its neighbors live, the health activities of the settlement have been especially significant. Indeed, as a result of its work, the poor of these areas have better medical service than the middle classes. Dispensaries and free clinics place the best medical skill at the service of those too poor to pay the doctor's fee; resident and nursing service of a high order is also provided and, at times, physicians have maintained residence at the settlement house in order that they might be readily accessible to those in need of medical attention. Settlements have also maintained milk stations, convalescent homes and summer camps for neighbors in need of such facilities; they have provided follow-up work from school, hospital, asylum, dispensary and summer camp; they have

held socio-medical exhibits, participated in anti-tuberculosis campaigns, promoted health examinations, health education and social hygiene.¹⁹

9. *Supplemental education.* The type of education received in the settlement is not primarily concerned with techniques, but with the development of personality.²⁰ It is an education which is appropriate to the situation which its neighbors and their children face. It offers educational "opportunities not otherwise available"; it stimulates "the self-direction of those to whom the regular channels are impossible owing to circumstances of time or place."²¹ Of course, boards of education have taken over many of the educational devices which were developed by settlements. Moreover, efforts to secure adequate and improved school facilities are no longer as necessary as formerly. Settlement workers are, therefore, freer to give their attention to education supplemental to that of the school, such as, vocational instruction to limited groups, classes in hand work, workers' and adult education. Settlements have also organized reading clubs, given continuation courses, provided lectures on appropriate subjects, and coöperated with university extension activities. They have developed educational facilities for children with educational handicaps; they have visited homes and schools in the interests of the school child; they have secured scholarships for talented, but poor, students; and they have acted as truant officers in enforcing school attendance.

10. *Development of neighborhood culture.* Originally settlement neighborhoods were culturally destitute. This destitution was due, however, not to the lack of talent, but of the opportunity to develop it. To provide such opportunity, settlements arrange for art exhibits and lectures; they hold classes in painting, sketching, drawing; they offer instruction in pottery-making, modeling, needlecraft; they give training in dramatics, interpretive and folk dancing. Most significantly, however, settlements have developed schools of music which put a full musical education within the reach of serious students who cannot pay the professional rates. These schools are conducted by thoroughly qualified teachers who offer a complete range of curriculum. Musical training is given any child who desires to study. Chorus work, orchestra, and other forms of group music are also undertaken. Indeed, it is claimed that "settlement music schools and departments are to-day the most outstanding educational institutions for the training of working-class children in music to be found anywhere in the world."²²

While it espouses no form of organized religion, settlement work is often

¹⁹ See *Social Hygiene*, Vol. II (July, 1916), pp. 383-434.

²⁰ D. Rosenstein, "The Educational Function of the Social Settlement in a Democracy," *School and Society*, Vol. VI (September, 1917), pp. 366-379.

²¹ M. Simkhovitch, *The Settlement Primer* (Boston, 1926), p. 35.

²² A. J. Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p. 429.

permeated with a religious spirit. Settlement workers regard religion as a positive social influence. Only when it assumes sectarian aspects does it become a disintegrating factor. The settlement, therefore, coöperates with the church in every activity where it functions as a truly cultural agency.

11. *Publicity.* In addition to the services listed above, settlements seek to keep the public informed of the needs of the working classes living in the industrial quarters of our cities. This is accomplished through public meetings, conferences, lectures, articles in magazines, and books written by residents.

In all, the services of the settlement aim to develop individual and group personality through extended and enriched social relations which provide opportunity for self-expression in constructive social interaction.

SETTLEMENT METHODS

Formal institutional procedures have no place in settlement work. The settlement must be free to meet new opportunities and to develop new techniques as the neighborhood situation changes. But some methods are commonly employed.

1. *Residence.* Workers carrying major responsibilities always live in the settlement neighborhood. There they identify themselves with the community that they may fully understand their neighbors and their neighbors' points of view. There they gain a first-hand knowledge of the conditions of the district. There they work with their neighbors in the solution of common problems. Says Woods: "this whole movement of the university settlement would seem to have sufficiently demonstrated one thing: it is, that if anything of value is to be done to assist working people, a good share of the help must come from persons actually living as neighbors to them. There is no way to bring well-to-do and poor together except by having them come together."²³ Culture, it is claimed, spreads most rapidly by contact.

2. *Research.* As indicated above, settlement workers believe that a careful, objective study of the social conditions in the neighborhood it serves is a *sine qua non* of effective effort. In settlement work, as in other fields of social service, accurate knowledge is not only helpful in making social contacts; it is necessary to constructive service. "Science and sympathy are not antagonistic but supplementary to each other. To lack either is to be ill-prepared to deal with those who are poor or in unfortunate circumstances."²⁴

3. *Neighborliness.* In the socialized interaction of persons of different social classes, yet confronted by the same environment in common neighborhood experiences, a neighborhood opinion is formed and a neighborhood organization

²³ R. A. Woods, *English Social Movements* (New York, 1891), p. 117.

²⁴ E. R. Groves, *Social Problems and Education* (New York, 1925), p. 211.

developed to meet local problems. The settlement conceives of the neighborhood as a sort of glorified family to the life of which each member of the community is expected to contribute according to his abilities. In friendly association, the social resources of the neighborhood are brought to light, organized and directed toward neighborhood improvement. Good-will is the settlement's chief asset. To socialize it, in a social situation where classes are not only highly developed and sharply differentiated but also removed from each other by much social distance, is the chief concern of the settlement.

4. *Coöperation.* As far as possible settlement workers identify themselves with the various organizations which are working constructively in the neighborhood. They never introduce a fully developed institutional scheme; instead they foster such wholesome activities as are already under way, especially those which the neighbors themselves have launched. While they participate actively in local organizations, they rarely, if ever, assume official positions. They prefer to remain sufficiently in the background to escape factional conflicts and to maintain a detached status. Especially do settlement workers make friends with the leaders of local organizations and other influential persons in the neighborhood such as officers of the law, teachers in the schools, workers in other social agencies, and clergymen in charge of churches. Self-help, however, is the dominant purpose in such organizational relationships.

5. *Substitution.* As a social center in a diminutive social democracy, the settlement affords its neighbors opportunities for wholesome recreation, for the constructive use of leisure, and for a higher type of personal and group functioning. In so doing it offers an effective substitute for the speakeasy, the dive and cheaply commercialized recreation. The settlement does not attempt to impose its class standards upon the neighborhood, but by sympathetic understanding, by vital personal interest and contact, it induces self-respect and higher motivation. By uncovering and nurturing social resource in personal, home, and neighborhood associations, the settlement lessens the appeal of disorganizing and disintegrating agencies.

The settlement approaches its neighborhood through the family. Residents secure their first friendly and most intimate contacts with the men and women of the district in their homes; they seek, thereafter, gradually to develop the possibilities of home life among their neighbors through improvements in the equipment, sanitation and care of their living quarters, in the preparation and serving of food, in their reading, their recreation, their morals, and their religious life. Moreover, the settlement's organization is itself of a familial type. While it is not a typical family group, it has the atmosphere of a normal home. As such, it is a factor in the home life of the neighborhood, for in the settlement house its neighbors may at least discover what can be done to beautify

the home, to increase its comfort and convenience and, perhaps, something of what may be the quality of domestic interaction.

SETTLEMENT ORGANIZATION

Since the settlement aims to face the whole problem of the less favored classes, it is located, not in a distant or sequestered working class quarter, but in a section which is accessible to a wide urban area. The settlement, hence, selects a location which will place it in the social cross-currents of a district which reflects the emergent aspects of the larger metropolitan area of which it is a part. Especially does it seek a situation where it may serve many varied social groups such as the very poor, the regularly employed, the racially antagonistic, the unadjusted immigrant, the criminal and the vicious.

The organization of settlement activities within its selected area may be either centralized or decentralized. The *centralized* settlement concentrates its work in a single house, or in a group of adjacent buildings from which it attacks the problems of the neighborhood as a unit (Hull House, Chicago). The *decentralized* settlement, on the other hand, distributes its activities throughout the district in centers, each of which develops a character and a constituency of its own as it works at close range with its particular problems (South End House, Boston). Local conditions will, of course, indicate which type of organization will be the more effective in a given area. In general, however, it appears that centralized organization works best in sections where no extremes of population exist; where a wide variety of conditions prevail, scattered centers accomplish more.

Naturally the internal organization of the settlement is extremely simple. A board of trustees or directors is elected by a general association to which members pay annual dues. This board selects a head worker or director who is responsible for the organization of the work in which directors, workers and neighbors share responsibility. In general, the neighborhood groups initiate and carry on efforts for local improvement, the settlement staff organizes and directs these efforts and the board of trustees develops, and secures support for, the entire settlement organization and program. All settlement organization, however, centers in the head resident.

The settlement functions most characteristically through *settlement clubs*—a device common to settlement organization. These clubs develop out of the personal interests of the members; they exist so long as these interests continue. Neither the resident nor the volunteer leader of such clubs has official prerogatives. They are merely members of the group with a personal influence exercised because of personal qualities. Settlement clubs are hence purely associative. To members, they afford opportunities for wholesome social inter-

action with those of similar interests. To the settlement staff, these clubs constitute a fruitful source of the intimate contact with and the knowledge of individuals and groups so necessary to effective neighborhood service.²⁵

The settlement's outlook, however, is not confined to the locality in which it works. It has responsibilities to other settlements, to other social agencies and to the city of which its neighborhood is a part. Recognition of these responsibilities has led the settlement to participation in municipal and inter-settlement activities and to the formation of city federations of settlements for the promotion of common objectives. To complete its wider organization, a National Federation of Settlements was formed in 1911 and an International Conference in 1922.

Finance is the settlement's most serious problem. Those responsible for the raising and use of settlement funds are usually persons of wealth or influence, friends of the head resident who live outside the neighborhood. These not only contribute substantial sums themselves but they also secure funds from others. Increasingly settlements are supported by community chests or central financing agencies. As settlements take on the attributes of neighborhood social centers they will, of course, be financed as other community enterprises are financed.

SETTLEMENT PERSONNEL

Because of the nature of the service rendered, "it is not the settlement proper, but the settlers that are of paramount importance."²⁶ Buildings, equipment, and organization are, in the end, but tools. Whether they are employed effectively or significantly depends upon the persons who manipulate them. The settlement, like all social apparatus, is the vehicle of an idea, an instrument for self-expression. It has no inherent qualities but only such as are imparted to it by its personnel. The services of the settlement are, of course, definitely conditioned by the sort of mechanism through which they are rendered but, much more significantly, by the quality and the motivation of those who function through this mechanism.

The earlier settlement workers were exclusively college or university graduates of independent means, but without specific vocation. With such a personnel Barnett hoped to make the settlement virtually self-supporting; at least it would be relieved of the task of soliciting funds for current expenses. He believed that a sufficient number of such persons could be found in every city where settlements might be established. American settlements, on the other hand, have always made "a modest financial provision" for all workers, es-

²⁵ A. J. Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p. 427.

²⁶ A. C. Holden, *The Settlement Idea* (New York, 1922), p. 171.

pecially for those who must earn their living. Experience has also modified the earlier practice of limiting settlement workers to college or university graduates, since the settlement has need of many specialized services for which such persons cannot qualify.

The staff of the early settlement was composed, generally, either of men or of women. The work of these settlements, however, differed only in approach—the one worked chiefly with men and boys, the other with women and girls. To meet the needs of a given neighborhood adequately, it was therefore necessary to organize “women’s houses” or “men’s departments.” Obviously, much is gained when the settlement can employ a mixed personnel—when both sexes participate in the organization and administration of the settlement’s activities.

In settlement work there are two types of job; namely, that of the *head resident* who always lives at the settlement, and that of the *group leader* or *instructor* who may or may not be a resident.

The rôles assumed by the head resident are primarily those of an administrator. As such, he represents the settlement in the community and functions with the trustees in initiating and developing settlement policies, both organizational and financial, thus giving unity and continuity to the work of his settlement. As chief executive, he selects a staff and directs its services. In fact, he assumes full responsibility for all the activities of the settlement. He assigns work to the various group leaders on the basis of talent and interest; he must have a knowledge of everything that is being done by all of his staff. He is also responsible for the morale of his workers to whom he must give effective leadership. To his neighbors, the head resident is friend, counsellor, citizen-at-large. Tact, force, vision, insight, sympathy, ability to inspire and to lead, are his qualifications.

The *group leader* or instructor also plays the rôles of neighbor, adviser and fellow-citizen. But he is also a community organizer, an educator, “a social politician.”²⁷ Since his work is an integral part of neighborhood work, he should be especially skilled in the art of living and working with people. To play his rôles effectively, the group leader should possess initiative, originality, enthusiasm, humility, sincerity, fearlessness, simplicity. He should have faith in human beings, belief in the possibility of progress, and technical ability since right spirit is not enough.

CRITIQUE OF THE SETTLEMENT

The achievements of outstanding settlements attest the valuable and unique social services which this social institution has rendered. Settlements have indeed accomplished much with almost no precedents or carefully prepared

²⁷ Simkhovitch, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

programs. "That they have done so much is largely due to the fact that they have been headed by educated men and women of great ability, who possessed a rare consecration to high ideals."²⁸ These achievements constitute the settlement's social justification.

Nevertheless, the settlement has had the defects of its qualities. Consequently it has not been without its critics. It has been asserted²⁹ that settlement objectives are vague; that its purposes are indefinite; that its methods are slipshod; that its workers are often untrained, casual or dilettante; that its many clubs "come to nothing definite at the end"; that its policies do not square with economic principles; that it depends too much upon legislation for the correction of specific social injustices; that "moral earnestness does not qualify men and women for social nursing"; that it has not served men as effectively as it has women and children; that it becomes socialistic (at least, seemingly so) in its interests; and finally, that its work is merely ameliorative because its policies are controlled by the capitalists who supply it with funds. Others have held that, as long as 90 per cent of settlement residents turn their backs on the colony as soon as they have gained enough experience to be valuable, extensive results cannot be expected.³⁰

Again, it has been alleged that, as the social experiments which the settlement has made so successfully are incorporated in the activities of other institutions, the settlement is left without unique social function. Indeed, notable settlement neighborhoods have so changed as other agencies have provided facilities for education, recreation, sanitation, health and culture, that settlement work in its traditional forms has been discontinued (as in College Settlement and East Side House, New York). It is claimed, therefore, that the saying of earlier settlement residents that "the work of the settlement is to make itself unnecessary" is being fulfilled. In fact, one writer³¹ confidently asserts that settlements are now on the decline. Notwithstanding vigorous assertions to the contrary,³² it is not only possible but likely that as workers become increasingly independent, they will favor the self-supporting community center rather than the settlement. Indeed, as the settlement increasingly becomes an agency through which "the district can express itself and work out its own salvation" it loses its unique, traditional characteristics and assumes those of a neighborhood social center.

²⁸ Gillin, *op. cit.*, p. 539.

²⁹ J. L. Laughlin, *Latter-Day Problems* (New York, 1917), Ch. 4.

³⁰ E. J. Ulwick, "Difficulties in Settlement Work," *Charity Organization Review* (London, December, 1903).

³¹ H. G. Duncan, *Backgrounds for Sociology* (Boston, 1931), p. 370.

³² R. A. Woods, *The Neighborhood in Nation Building* (Boston, 1923), pp. 312, 317, 321.

However, the fundamental need for constructive social interaction between widely separated classes persists. It is generally conceded that "the division of classes is still wide enough to call for the efforts of a mediating agency";³³ also, that such social interaction is necessary to a stabilized, yet dynamic, social order. To lift the plane of such interaction alleviates, but does not meet, the need. The settlement is, after all, a vision of relative, rather than absolute, social justice. It appears, therefore, that it will continue its valuable service but with modified, or perhaps different, functions as a new social order develops out of the disorganization of the old.

At least, present tendencies seem to indicate a changed emphasis in settlement work. New buildings of exceptional quality and a marked increase in capital resources and endowments, provide the facilities for further settlement services if such fields should develop. Programs are being adjusted to the more comfortable working-class incomes as the neighborhood improves its standard of living. New forms of cooperative and cultural enterprise are being developed as the settlement increasingly concerns itself with problems arising from irregular employment, from disorganized family relationships, and from divisive racial, national, religious, economic and social interests. Indeed, wherever social strain is likely to develop, there the settlement is seeking to secure adjustment in advance of tension or conflict.

Moreover, settlements may still render valuable social service as agencies which arouse neighborhoods to a consciousness of their capacities and responsibilities; as places of training for young social workers who need first-hand experience with social maladjustment; as centers of social research; as institutions for the higher education of working people for whom neither the school nor the public library makes adequate provision; as "laboratories where new ideas can be worked out and experiments tried of every variety of new social effort."³⁴

It appears likely, therefore, that the settlement will continue to function as a community center devoted to the improvement, by all possible means, of the quality of the social interaction between those whom propinquity makes neighbors. The settlement always functions most effectively in those urban areas where access to specialized cultural institutions is difficult. It is possible, therefore, that the settlement may increasingly become a sort of unspecialized and undifferentiated institution which functions in specific urban neighborhoods in the stead of the more specialized agencies. Since it is unlikely that libraries, theaters of quality, art galleries, museums, colleges, and the like will ever be so completely developed as to reach every neighborhood in these metro-

³³ Gillin, *op. cit.*, p. 542.

³⁴ Atlee, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

politan areas, the settlement may persist for an indefinite period as an institution which organizes and integrates neighborhood life and provides facilities for self-expression to all sorts and conditions of men, especially in urban areas lacking the services of specialized institutions.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. Discover the specific contribution which each of the following made to the settlement movement.

Thomas Carlyle	Henry George
John Ruskin	William Morris
Charles Kingsley	T. H. Green
2. Consult S. A. Barnett's *Toward Social Reform*, pp. 276-288 and then list:
 - (a) the limitations of the *parish agency*;
 - (b) the advantages of the settlement as compared with the mission.
3. Why is health so important a problem in tenement house areas?
4. Discuss the settlement as a socializer.
5. Account for the significance of settlement music schools.
6. Should settlements more positively espouse the cause of religion? Explain.
7. Why do settlement workers not identify themselves with local secret societies?
8. What are the advantages of residence in settlement work?
9. Account for the influence of the settlement in local politics and government.
10. List the advantages and the disadvantages of the *centralized* type of settlement; the *decentralized* type.
11. Construct a settlement organization chart.
12. Present case for and against the settlement club.
13. Describe and explain the changing emphasis in settlement activities.
14. Which of the following methods of financing settlements is preferable? Reasons.
 - (a) endowments
 - (b) gifts
 - (c) dues and fees
15. Why is no specific professional training provided for those anticipating settlement work?
16. What are the difficulties under which all settlement work is carried on?
17. Show how the emergence of a new social order might provide the settlement with new fields of service.

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CHAPTER XXII

THE HEALTH CENTER

ANOTHER sanctioned institution to which the state turns for the active promotion of improved social conditions and relations is the health center. It is, perhaps, the institution most recently developed by the state as a specialized institution dealing with a function which has become so involved that the parent institution is no longer capable of adequate administration. The vital connection that exists between health and the vigor of the group, and hence with its achievement, is now fully established. Lack of bodily and mental vigor because of disease, fatigue or poisons, is not only a serious individual handicap, but it is also serious social liability.

SOCIAL IMPORT OF HEALTH

The desire for health is, in essence, an aspect of the desire for life. Of life man has never had a superabundance. No matter how hard or how painful his living, he has always struggled to prolong his life as much as possible. Even the most abject slave preferred unremitting drudgery to death. The desire for health, then, is merely the desire to live longer or more comfortably, since its absence brings disease or death.

It is natural, therefore, that even early man should have been interested in health. It is common knowledge that the preliterate sought by superstitious effort to protect himself against disease which he regarded as the work of malignant spirits. The distress of disease was relieved, he was convinced, by some effort of the individual to frustrate or appease these spirits through magic, incantation, rites or sacrifice. He believed he might even escape epidemics if he employed proper and sufficient magic. Later, when disease was thought to be the punishment of an angry God for sin, wittingly or unwittingly committed, health was still regarded as a matter of individual responsibility.

Certain aspects of the Industrial Revolution, however, forced a new conception of the cause of disease. Large populations had been crowded into manufacturing towns without provision for sanitation or other wholesome living conditions. These populations were, of course, chiefly of the working-class poor who were necessarily the victims of their environment. The ravages of cholera and typhus which resulted from congestion under such conditions

proved conclusively that health is a product of a social situation as well as of individual behavior. The efforts of Edward Chadwick, Southward Smith, Lord Normanby and Ashley Cooper (Lord Shaftesbury) for better living conditions among the poor of England led eventually to the passing of the Public Health Bill of 1848. Provision for adequate sanitation was the chief object of this bill, and control of typhus its first achievement.

Recognition of the inter-relations of poverty and ill-health, and of the social causes of disease, continued from this time on until health, like work, is now regarded as a significant social concern. In his health relations as in his work relations, the individual of modern times "is linked up with thousands and millions of other individuals whom he may never see."¹ Indeed, "when he drank water from his own well, and milk from his own cow, ate meat from his own beef or pig, he could protect himself against disease by being clean and by killing only healthy animals. Now when his water is carried over hill and dale through many miles of pipe, when his milk is brought from farms hundreds of miles away, and when he gets his meat prepared and canned from packing houses which send their goods all over the globe . . . he may become a victim of disease without knowing why."² And, because of the interdependence of those employed in factory and office, his ill-health clogs an economic process in which his work is part of an integrated whole.

HEALTH SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES

The social significance of health is indicated by the extent of illness in the United States. Studies made by the Committee on the Cost of Medical Care and the United States Public Health Service show that, in addition to innumerable cases of non-disabling sickness which are not registered, there are at least 130,000,000 cases of disabling illness in the United States every year. This means an average of one such illness for every man, one and one-half for every woman, and two for every school child in the country. 700,000 of these occupy beds in hospitals on a single average day.³ It has been estimated that from 3,000,000 to 4,500,000 persons in the United States are sick at any given time, and that while we live, on the average, to be almost sixty, the health span of life in this country is only about ten years.⁴

The health situation in the United States is further revealed by the fact that from 65 to 95 per cent of our school children have one or more defects that

¹ R. M. Binder, *Major Social Problems* (New York, 1924), p. 118.

² *Ibid.*, p. 119. By permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc.

³ A. B. Mills, *Report on the Extent of Illness and of Physical and Mental Defects Prevailing in the United States* (Washington, 1929), p. 12.

⁴ W. S. Sadler, *Race Decadence* (Chicago, 1922), pp. 69-70.

seriously interfere with successful school work.⁵ Of the 3,208,000 men examined during the draft of 1917-1918, 521,606, or more than 16 per cent, were found unfit for any form of military service.⁶ Again, not less than 900,000 persons in the United States are mentally defective.⁷ Moreover, the number of mental patients in State hospitals has increased from 173.4 per 100,000 in 1910 to 222.3 per 100,000 in 1928.⁸ These figures, it should be noted, do not include patients in private homes and institutions.

No exact computation of the economic cost of preventable ill-health and disease is possible; but some careful estimates of these costs for limited groups and for particular diseases give an indication of a probable total figure. The Bureau of Labor⁹ recently estimated that the wage-earners in the United States yearly lose \$213,540,000 in income because of premature death and the illness which precedes it. Tuberculosis alone cost its victims \$850,000,000 in 1922.¹⁰ A study of 4,570 cases by the Committee on the Cost of Medical Care showed that the average annual cost of illness per individual in the group whose income is under \$2,000 is \$15.28; that of the group whose income is \$5,000 and over, \$76.86.¹¹ The total cost of preventable disease in the United States, therefore, is certainly not less than 1.5 billion dollars annually.¹²

Added to these economic costs are certain social costs which represent significant social resources expended in mere maintenance. One and a half million attendants, nurses, and physicians are necessary to care for the sick and the defective.¹³ Probably 75 per cent of those receiving aid from agencies giving material relief find themselves in this situation directly or indirectly because of sickness. Ill-health is also a cause of vice and crime.¹⁴ Much personal and social disorganization, indeed, are chargeable to this same account.¹⁵ And the billions expended in the construction and maintenance of hospitals, asylums and sanitariums are funds withdrawn, of course, from more constructive social service.

These costs have been materially increased by the specialization in medicine

⁵ Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁶ R. M. Binder, "Eugenic Aspects of Health," *Publications of American Sociological Society*, Vol. 16, 1921, p. 18.

⁷ Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

⁸ U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Mental Patients in State Hospitals in 1928* (Washington, 1930), pp. 37-38.

⁹ *Bulletin*, Whole Number 101, pp. 18-19.

¹⁰ H. Emerson, "Prevention of Tuberculosis" in *American Review of Tuberculosis*, August 1922, p. 457.

¹¹ N. Sinai, and M. Klen, *Miscellaneous Contributions on Cost of Medical Care*. #2.

¹² H. H. Moore, *Public Health in the United States*, 1923, Ch. 5.

¹³ Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

¹⁴ E. R. Groves, *Social Problems and Education* (New York, 1925), pp. 228-229.

¹⁵ S. A. Queen and D. M. Mann, *Social Pathology* (New York, 1925), Part III.

which has not only improved the quality of the service rendered by the physician, but also required the patient to consult several experts in order to secure a complete diagnosis or an adequate treatment of his ailments. The present emphasis upon *curative* medicine, both in the training of physicians and in the treatment of disease, has, of course, delayed the full development of *preventive* measures which would reduce the costs of ill-health and of medical care by the discovery and treatment of disease in its incipient stages.

The import of this situation is beginning to be apparent both to the medical profession and the public. Various means for reducing these costs have been developed such as free clinics and dispensaries, pay clinics, group clinics, municipal hospitals, public, school and visiting nurses, joint office personnel, and group insurance. Such measures, however, ease the burden chiefly for the lower economic groups. The middle class still finds that it cannot afford adequate medical service or preventive care. While the well-to-do and the very poor, therefore, have adequate medical attention, the large proportion of the American people find ill-health too costly a burden. Resort to faith-healers, quacks and vendors of patent medicines is the natural result of such a situation; it is likely to continue so long as the care of disease rests upon a purely commercial basis.

RISE OF THE HEALTH CENTER

When Jenner, Pasteur, Lister, Koch, and others had discovered the significance of bacteria and their rôle in the spread of contagion, the connection between bad housing, lack of sanitation, failure to quarantine, excessive fatigue, occupational poisoning, and other unhealthful living and working conditions was more fully understood. It was then obvious that such social conditions devitalize the body and thus lessen its resistance to disease germs. It was also apparent that curative medicine alone failed to make adequate provision for health. Various health movements were hence undertaken, each attacking an aspect of the health problem but always from the preventive standpoint.

Significant among these preventive programs were the *anti-tuberculosis* movement organized for a nation-wide attack on a major preventable and curable disease; the *infant welfare* movement directed toward the reduction of infant mortality due to improper feeding, unclean milk, bad housing conditions, employment of mothers, et cetera; the movement to reduce *maternal mortality* through prenatal care and the improvement of midwifery; the attack on *industrial accident and disease* through the safety first movement, the guarding of dangerous machinery, and provision for removal of dust and poisons; the *rural health* movement concerned chiefly with rural sanitation as a means of controlling contagious diseases in rural areas; the *social hygiene*

movement organized to curb the spread of venereal disease and to promote wholesome sex and family relations; the movement to reduce the numbers dying prematurely of *old-age diseases*; and the *mental hygiene* movement concerned with the promotion of mental health through control of mental and nervous reactions.

The development of health education in the public schools of the United States also reflected the interest in preventive measures. Although school gymnasiums were built as early as 1825, it was not until 1850 that Horace Mann made health a curricular subject in the schools of Massachusetts. Now all States require the teaching of physiology and hygiene in their elementary schools. In 1894 Boston introduced medical inspection as an essential preventive measure. Now the typical school program includes all three phases: health service, health education, and physical training. Some schools go so far as to consider health education as a twenty-four-hour-a-day problem.

Prior to the establishment of organized health centers settlements had for some time held classes on health subjects for the mothers in their neighborhoods. Social workers, too, had discovered the important part played by illness in social maladjustment. Moreover, clinics and dispensaries were disseminating health information as well as prescribing for acute ailments. In 1916 the Federal Children's Bureau instituted baby clinics in a number of localities in which studies of child welfare were undertaken. To these clinics mothers brought their babies for examination by local physicians. If the infant needed medical or surgical treatment the mother was urged to consult her physician, but always she was given information as to proper feeding and care of the child. These clinics were temporary, of course, but they spread a knowledge of preventive measures which often involved the whole family situation.

As a full-fledged institution rendering continuous service, however, the health center first took shape in Milwaukee during the administration of Mayor Seidel, 1910-1912.¹⁶ On the basis of his experience as Secretary of the New York Milk Committee, Wilbur C. Phillips organized health centers about the Milwaukee Child Welfare Bureau. Later he rendered a similar service in Washington, D. C., and later still in Cincinnati. Health centers were also organized in New York City, Boston and Cleveland. Workers in the fields of child health and tuberculosis prevention early began to apply to the whole local population the methods found to be effective in these fields. During our participation in the World War this development was somewhat retarded, but after the signing of the Armistice the American Red Cross undertook as its post-war program "the establishment of health centers in every community

¹⁶ J. L. Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency* (New York, 1925), p. 411.

where conditions make this desirable and possible.”¹⁷ In addition to these activities, a number of States added bureaus of child hygiene to their health departments. The establishment of health centers of various sorts and under various captions is a function of such bureaus. By 1920 not less than 105 health centers had been organized in some seventy-seven communities. While no definite information is available it is probable that “several hundreds of these have (now) been established, some of them giving extensive medical and educational service and others giving only health information.”¹⁸ According to the United States Public Health Service, 616 counties, or comparable local governmental units, which are wholly or in large part rural, were under the jurisdiction of whole-time county health units. These county health units are analogous to the urban health centers for their chief function is the prevention of disease.

THE HEALTH CENTER DEFINED

The term *health center* has been applied to various child welfare clinics, to community hospitals for small towns and rural areas, and to comprehensive programs for the community organization of both curative and preventive medicine. In the latter the organization usually centers about a hospital and a group of medical men, health officers and laymen, who provide institutional facilities and serve a whole population.¹⁹ In some cities, however, the health center is established in a building built or equipped for the purpose of coördinating medical and social service, especially in their preventive aspects. It is with this latter meaning that the term is most appropriately used.

*The health center, then, may be defined as “an organization which provides and coördinates medical service and related social service for a specified district.”*²⁰ The health center cannot be defined in terms of any specific set of activities, or by its form of organization or its physical plant, since these always vary with local conditions. Two characteristics, it appears, sets the health center apart from similar agencies; “first, the selection of a definite population, or district unit, with the aim of reaching all therein who need the services; and second, coördination of services within this area embracing both its own facilities or services and those of other agencies whether for health or for general social welfare.”²¹

¹⁷ L. Farrand, *Health Centers, a Field for Red Cross Activity* (Washington, 1919), pp. 5-6

¹⁸ Gillin, Dittmer and Colbert, *Social Problems* (New York, 1932), p. 400.

¹⁹ M. M. Davis, *Clinics, Hospitals and Health Centers* (New York, 1927), p. 341.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 357.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 357.

During the past twenty years, each of the organized health movements mentioned above has become a specialized activity with its own specialized staff and especial techniques. As the services of these agencies developed beyond the experimental stage, however, much needless confusion resulted from their separate application to the population of a small area. By coördinating these specialized medical and health programs, the health center eliminates unnecessary duplication and increases the effectiveness of the constituent agencies. Thus the techniques found to be effective in one field of service are standardized and applied in other fields so as to reach the largest number possible. The health center, therefore, is not an agency for experimentation or research but of extended application of the results of experimentation and research.

The health center, then, is an institution for the conservation of health through the dissemination of health information. It is not an agency for the treatment of disease, but for its early discovery and prevention. It aims not so much to cure as to forestall ill-health. To achieve these ends, it brings together, under a single roof, if possible, all public and private health agencies together with all welfare and relief organizations working in a given district. Health activities are thus combined and correlated so that an effective and aggressive attack can be made upon disease and ill-health, especially from the standpoint of prevention. In other words, the health center is a sort of "department store of health."²² According to the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, health councils of this sort have been founded in eleven cities during the past fifteen years, and others are in the process of formation.²³

The specific objectives of the health center, thus organized, are first, the creation of a district small enough for effective service; second, joint planning of the various health agencies functioning within this area; third, encouragement of the people within the area to undergo thorough physical examination at stated intervals for the early detection of physical defects; fourth, the correction of such defects as these examinations disclose by reference to the proper media; fifth, the utilization of all such contacts for promotion of preventive health lessons; and sixth, the education of the people of the district in proper habits of diet, exercise, rest, cleanliness and general hygiene. The American health center differs from the English type in that the latter is an agency toward which disease gravitates, while the former is an institution from which health radiates.²⁴

²² C. F. Wilinsky, "The Health Center," *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. XVII (July, 1927), p. 677.

²³ H. W. Green, *Health Councils* (Washington, 1931).

²⁴ C. W. Saleeby, *The Eugenic Prospect* (London, 1921), p. 234.

SERVICES OF THE HEALTH CENTER

The types of health service provided by any center are, of course, based upon the *needs* of the community and the *desires* of its residents for such service. The former must be determined by a competent specialist; the latter is evidenced by the readiness of the community to receive the services offered. Obviously, no institution can serve a people unconvinced of its need. The services which are provided by other agencies at work in the community need only to be correlated. Additional services are developed to supplement these existing resources. In general, however, the social services of the health center may be designated as those of health conservation, health supervision, disease prevention and health education.

In *conserving* the health of its selected area, the health center provides curative service to the indigent sick and the dependent poor including emergency hospital and clinical work; periodic examinations with complete diagnosis and reference to specialists or special clinics if the findings warrant; laboratory service for more accurate examination; follow-up service to patients from hospital, asylum, or sanitarium in order to escape unfortunate sequelæ, to prevent relapse, and to facilitate return to usual mode of life; recovery rooms, dressing stations and bedside nursing for those who cannot afford hospital service; psychiatric service for neurological patients whose attitudes require reconstruction; treatment of venereal diseases for those who cannot pay for private care; consultation service for those who are seeking to maintain health; and social service that the total situation may be brought under control.

Next, the health center may perform certain services which are primarily *supervisory*, such as the control of communicable and infectious diseases; the medical and dental inspection of schools; oversight of local sanitation; promotion of school hygiene; protection of the community against the spread of venereal disease by means of effective case-control even where treatment is private; inspection of conditions of industrial employment, especially where accident and poisoning are factors; and the coördination of social, medical, relief and preventive services of the coöperating agencies.

Again, the health center renders other services which are mainly *preventive* in character. These preventive measures are prenatal service to prospective mothers; well-baby clinics, habit clinics for children; pediatric clinics; posture and nutrition work; preventive dentistry and instruction as to care of teeth; examination of other members of the family in cases of venereal disease; prophylaxis for syphilis and gonorrhea; immunization against contagious diseases; mental hygiene clinics to conserve normal mental and nervous functioning; social hygiene clinics to promote wholesome sex and family relations;

anti-tuberculosis clinics for early detection and treatment of incipient consumption; and preventive medicine for any who need it.

Finally, health centers offer significant services of an *educational* nature, namely, instruction in diet, rest, exercise and personal hygiene; distribution of pamphlets and other health literature; exhibitions of health materials; lectures and moving pictures on health subjects; and health information to any who may request it.

At the present stage of development, only the most completely equipped centers will offer all of the services listed above. Moreover, some will stress one group of services more than another. Centers will also differ widely in the amount of coöperation which they develop with other social agencies.²⁵

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF HEALTH CENTERS

Since the coördination of existing health agencies is the primary objective of the health center, its organization is essentially federative. The agencies for which the health center provides coöperative opportunities are the local units of such organizations as the American Red Cross, the Association for the Prevention and Relief of Heart Disease, the Anti-Tuberculosis Association, and similar groups interested in preventive work. To these are added provisions for the local Family Welfare Society, the Visiting Nurse Association, the Department of Health, the Public Health Nurse, Health Laboratories, Baby Health Clinic, Dental Clinic, Psychiatric Clinic, Nutrition Clinic, Eye Clinic, and other socio-medical agencies. To eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort and to increase the effectiveness of medical service are the dominant purposes of this coördination of activity.

In correlating the services of these various health agencies, two types of organization are employed, namely: the *centralized* or simple administrative center which brings the scattered community health activities together in one building and under one governing board (Des Moines Health Center); and the *decentralized*, or federated, center which coördinates the services of its constituent units or branches through a central organization, but without a single location (East Harlem, New York, Health Center). In some cities (Boston, Buffalo and Cleveland, for instance) the urban area is divided into districts, each of which has its health center. This type of organization is intermediate between the centralized and decentralized forms. Local conditions determine which type is best suited to the particular community. But whatever the form of organization employed, the work of the coöperating agencies is coördinated by means of a central filing of case-records, a central clearing house, adapta-

²⁵ C. F. Wilinsky, "Health Centers," *Social Work Year Book*, 1929, p. 180

tions of the confidential exchange, or staff meetings of all the agencies interested in a given case.

Health centers may be organized on a county as well as a municipal basis. In one State, at least, county health centers are organized with a headquarters in a large urban community and branches or affiliated centers in the smaller cities.²⁶ These centers operate under the County Board of Supervisors, or under governing boards chosen by local, public and private organizations. In such county organization, the headquarters is likely to be the center of diagnostic and preventive health work, while affiliated centers confine their activities to curative and emergency treatment.

Again, rural health centers have been organized in some States, notably in Wisconsin. These centers are maintained by the State board of health usually with funds provided by the federal government. The health services rendered by these centers is limited usually to maternity and infancy work. Examinations are given only to very young children. But even this service is not continuous, for the center is only open for one or two days each month, and once a year the center is moved from one locality to another.²⁷

Health centers are financed in various ways. If they are conducted under municipal auspices, the necessary funds are secured through taxation, for they are financed directly by the county or as a division of the local health department. If they are supported by private agencies their funds will be raised as a part of those of the supporting organization. Gifts, are, of course, received; and often fees are charged patients in proportion to their ability to pay. Financial policies, however, are always devised with the intention of providing for more effective medical service than either physicians or patients separately could provide. Control of policies and finance always rests with those who provide the funds. So far most urban health centers have been established through the initiative of private agencies. Of the 616 county health units, sixteen are entirely financed by private agencies for demonstration purposes. The remainder, in addition to local official appropriations, are receiving financial assistance from one or more of the following agencies: State board of health, United States Public Health Service, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Rosenwald Fund, the Commonwealth Fund, the Couzens Fund and the Women's Hospital Fund.

The personnel of the health center is, for the most part, identical with that of the organizations which coöperate in its work. To coördinate the activities of these agencies, however, requires the services of a *director* who will organize

²⁶ Consult *Reports* of County Board of Supervisors for Alameda and Los Angeles Counties, California.

²⁷ H. H. Moore, *American Medicine* (New York, 1927), pp. 242-243.

the work, centralize its administration, and execute the policies of the governing board. A number of secretaries is also needed for the clerical work involved in keeping adequate case records and in putting the patrons through the necessary routine. The physicians who serve the health center directly are usually unsalaried. Nurses may be employed on the salaried staff, but otherwise the personnel of the center is composed of those who are responsible for the activities of the constituent organizations.

TRENDS IN THE HEALTH CENTER MOVEMENT

The methods of treating disease have necessarily changed with our conceptions of its nature and causes. The modern scientific approach to the problems of health, therefore, has led (a) to the development of corps of highly trained physicians and surgeons who have access to latest and most authoritative medical information; (b) to the standardization of hospitals, nursing and midwifery; (c) to the establishment of numerous dispensaries, specialized clinics, sanatoria, and convalescent homes; and (d) to the institution of medical social service. But throughout, the modern approach is primarily curative; relatively little attention is given to preventive measures. This is due, in part, to the emphasis which medical schools place upon specialization, and in part, to the larger economic returns of the specialist.

In its preventive approach, therefore, the health center does not appropriate the field of curative medicine so splendidly developed by the medical profession. It undertakes an important field of service, at present relatively undeveloped. And since the individual tends always to give greater consideration to the present than to the future, preventive health measures will not, for some time, seriously decrease the number of patients needing curative treatment. At any rate, a profession which makes the interests of its clientèle paramount cannot consistently object to the development of preventive activities. In fact, while the treatment of disease is still primarily on an economic basis, the economic approach cannot be pushed to a logical conclusion without developing into a cogent argument for preventive medicine.

Moreover, the early achievements of the health center in this field fully justify it as a social institution providing preventive facilities, and coördinating existing health agencies. Hospitals and dispensaries have developed in a haphazard manner. Unnecessary overlapping, and serious financial difficulties have resulted. These medical agencies have also multiplied without conscious planning, and their administration has varied greatly. Nursing, likewise, has developed independently of medical facilities. Nurses pursue their careers separately and from an economic point of view. Until recently,

these agencies have been quite self-sufficient especially as regards social service agencies. Medical social service, moreover, is being utilized only in isolated institutions to supplement individual service. The health center performs a necessary, as well as a unique function, therefore, in correlating and coördinating these medical services, especially in the preventive field.

The future of the health center is assured by virtue of its significant educational services. Since "health is no longer the mere absence of acute disease,"²⁸ improved health conditions are increasingly an educational problem, notably in their social aspects. Health education, as it proceeds from the health center, requires not only that the individual be taught to recognize and to practise the laws of hygiene, but also that he be imbued with a genuine regard for the health of others. Otherwise school health programs, programs for adequate sanitation, campaigns against patent medicine and medical quackery, and programs for the prevention of epidemics are ineffective, probably futile. Upon the health center primarily rests the responsibility for the community's knowledge of and approach to its health problems, and its full utilization of its health resources. "There is no question," says Wilinsky,²⁹ "but that the health center movement has resulted in greater efficiency and economy in the conduct of public health work."

It has been noted that, throughout the world, sickness is still handled on an economic basis, that is, the services of the physician, the surgeon and the nurse are forthcoming (with some exceptions) only on the payment, by the individual, of fees fixed by these professional groups. It has been noted, by way of contrast, that the services of the specialist in education are rendered on the basis of a salary paid by the group out of funds secured through taxation. Since the educational need is no more imperious than health, it has been concluded that medical service should be placed upon the same democratic basis. Indeed, some claim that it is as logical to charge tolls for the use of roads, and fees for the use of schools, playgrounds, and social centers, as it is to make healing a private business transaction.³⁰ Others contend that "medicine is in a different category than education, recreation, and transportation," in each of which service is now rendered on a group basis. It is also pointed out that, in each of these fields, service can be secured, if desired, as the result of an individual bargain. Whatever the merits of this question may be, it appears desirable, for obvious reasons, that the curative treatment of disease be left upon its present economic basis, except, perhaps, for more adequate provision for those who cannot, at present, afford the necessary medical care. For

²⁸ Groves, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

²⁹ Wilinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

³⁰ G. B. Mangold, *Social Pathology* (New York, 1932), pp. 310-311.

similar reasons it seems expedient that the group assume full responsibility for the adequate provision of preventive measures and agencies, for disease prevention in the present social *milieu* is patently a collective matter, rather than an individual concern.

The health center, therefore, appears to be the logical agency to which the state may turn for the development of facilities to meet this fundamental human need. As such, the health center possesses certain unique advantages; it makes adequate health and social services immediately accessible to those in need of such services; it reduces costs of medical care by centering all health and social service activities in a single location; it develops coöperative activity among health and social workers; it improves health standards through intensive health education in a restricted area; it facilitates the complete rehabilitation of the patient by provision for the coördination of the efforts of the physician, the social worker and the health official.⁸¹

To summarize: since disease prevention is increasingly desirable socially; since it would be inexpedient, as well as impossible, to shift the interest of the medical profession from the curative to the preventive treatment of disease; and since the health center has already developed unique facility in this field, it is likely that, socially, this incipient institution will be increasingly significant.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. What is *health*?
2. Why is the health of the individual becoming increasingly a social matter (Binder)?
3. Why is so much more done for the health of babies than of adults?
4. How does congestion affect health (Binder)?
5. In what ways is poor health a social waste?
6. Name five social problems that are affected by sickness and death (Gillin, Dittmer and Colbert). Show how in each case.
7. Illustrate the social aspects of disease from a clothing industry where most of the work was done in homes of the workers? (See Binder, *Major Social Problems*, Ch. 7.)
8. Distinguish the health center from the clinic. From the dispensary.
9. What would a socio-medical examination include? (Consult Cabot, p. 109.)
10. Why could every physician's office not be made a health center? (Consult Moore's *American Medicine*, pp. 243-244.)
11. Draw the floor plans for an ideal health center housed in a three-story building.

⁸¹ Mangold, *op. cit.*, pp. 360-361.

12. Describe the work of the United States Public Health Service. What might its relation to local health centers become?
13. Enumerate all possible obstacles to health promotion.
14. Present arguments for and against the socialization of medicine.
15. Is the health center a device for socializing medicine? Explain.
16. Why should the curative treatment of disease be left upon its present economic basis?
17. Why should there be collective provision for preventive facilities?
18. Evaluate provisions for group hospitalization. (Consult, C. R. Rorem, *Reprints of Julius Rosenwald Fund, 1932-1933.*)

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CHAPTER XXIII

SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RECREATION

IN 1890 only one third of the people of the United States lived in cities; at present, from 55 to 57 per cent are urban residents. In the decade 1920-1930 no less than six and one-half millions shifted from the country to the city. As a result, recreation has become a fundamental human need, provision for which is essential to social, as well as to individual, well-being. Like others, this need is the product of an increasingly complex social order in which the older basic institutions are forced because of incompetence, to divest themselves of certain more specialized functions. Hence the development of the recreational center as a sanctioned institution to organize and administer an activity no longer adequately provided for either by the family or the school.

SOCIAL NATURE OF RECREATION

Play has been variously defined,¹ and many theories regarding it have been advanced.² Recreation has also been very carefully distinguished from play, amusement, sport and work.³ For present purposes, however, it will be sufficient to consider as recreation any activity which freshens physical and mental faculties, voluntarily undertaken for no conscious purpose beyond the activity itself, and which is pursued for its own sake and not as a means to an end.

Play and recreation, of course, are not identical, but they have many essential attributes in common. Both are self-sufficient activities, both provide for the pleasurable exercise of some faculty or for relaxation from the strains of work, both are undertaken primarily in response to inner drives rather than to outer stimuli, both activities are engaged in upon the individual's volition; neither can be regimented, in both satisfaction is found primarily, not in the end achieved, but in the stimulation of accomplishment. From the sociological standpoint, therefore, it is not necessary to insist upon the distinction between play and recreation, namely, that the former is creative while the latter is recreative. Both freshen physical and mental faculties.

¹ W. P. Bowen and E. D. Mitchell, *The Theory of Organized Play* (New York, 1928), pp. 194-195.

² F. E. Lumley, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1928), pp. 362-366.

³ J. R. Fulk, *The Municipalization of Play and Recreation* (University Place, Nebraska, 1922), pp. 3-4.

Essentially, therefore, recreation is *an activity in which the individual engages because of an interest so absorbing that it carries him into enthusiastic and persistent participation*. The individual's attitude toward the activity in which he engages is hence important. In this respect, recreation differs from "loafing" and dawdling. It should also be noted that recreation is not limited to any particular activity forms; it may be neuro-muscular, sensory or mental. In fact, it is often, if not usually, a combination of these. But whatever its form, recreative activity is engaged in without specific aim other than the satisfaction inherent in the activity itself.

Recreation *freshens physical and mental faculties* because (a) pleasure is derived from the exercise of unused muscles and nerves; (b) stimulation results from the opportunity to make a variety of adaptations to an environmental situation; (c) restful emotional response is induced by activities which reenact old or familiar racial experience; (d) intenser reaction to novel activities provides a new range of satisfactions; (e) the presence of others augments the desire for their approval and the fear of their disapproval;⁴ and (f) interest is heightened by the excitement of the rivalry which usually characterizes recreational activities. The channels of physical and mental response are thus cleared of fatigue toxins and restored to normal capacity.

Recreation, then, *provides organized exercise both for the individual and the group*. In fact, recreation is primarily a social activity since it is usually associative in form. While it is true that there are "some highly pleasant employments" which the individual may pursue by himself, for the most part the activities which involve interaction afford the greater pleasure especially where rivalry is involved. For this reason, recreation in the form of games is more keenly enjoyed by most than reading. Recreative activities of a competitive sort are more highly pleasurable because emotional desire and response are more deeply stirred, not only by rivalry, but also by rhythmic calls and yells, by applause, by stirring music, by gay banners expressing group hopes, and by concerted marching and dancing. These add zest and increase stimulation; they create an emotional dynamic which lonely effort could not possibly produce.

The objectives of recreative activity are also social as well as individual—social, not only in that the group participates in their realization, but also in that their realization has social significance. These objectives appear at three different levels of interest, namely, the immediate, the intermediate and the remote.⁵ On the immediate level of interest recreative activities are pursued

⁴ J. L. Gillin and F. W. Blackmar, *Outlines of Sociology* (New York, 1930), pp. 360-361.

⁵ J. B. Nash, *The Organisation and Administration of Playgrounds and Recreation* (New York, 1931), p. 35.

for the pleasure they afford at the moment. On the intermediate levels of interest they are undertaken for the sake of certain habits, attitudes and skills which they develop. It is on this level that leadership is achieved. On the remote level of interest, health and "the full life" are the objectives sought. It is on this level that well-being becomes the end in view. In general, all recreative objectives proceed simultaneously irrespective of levels of interest, the age of the participant or the sort of overt behavior involved.

To realize these objectives it is, of course, necessary (a) that recreative activities have clear-cut form, definite organization, and established rules; (b) that no one desirable element such as rhythm, risk, or repetition, be emphasized at the expense of others equally desirable, such as improvisation, adventure, or originality; (c) that intense and varied delight be given in a dynamic form, that is, one which will facilitate a rebound into work or constructive thought; (d) that all play be "drenched with symbolism and ritual,"⁶ for play in which the individual takes the rôle of a mere observer rather than an exploring participant is all but still-born; and (e) that all recreative activity be full of give-and-take, of face-to-face relations and of constructive interaction.

Finally, recreative diversions may be designated as either *natural* or *artificial*.⁷ *Natural* diversions are such antiquated occupations as fishing, hunting, collecting, or such ancient activity patterns as bathing, camping, or canoeing. To some extent the growing of things, the taming of animals, and the following of a handicraft by city-dwellers are similar natural diversions. In these, recreation is secured by reversion to activities so old and familiar that they induce a restful emotional response. The *artificial* diversions, on the other hand, are activities specifically designed to afford pleasure such as games of all kinds, plays and dances. In these, stimulating social interaction freshens physical and mental facilities.

RECREATION A SOCIAL NEED

Recreative exercise is necessary to the normal growth of the young. In the rural and semi-rural environments, work in the home, in the shop or on the farm, develops children physically, calls forth habits of industry, and equips them with occupational skills. In the urban environment, however, child labor laws, labor-saving devices, and communal or specialized provisions for water, fuel and refuse disposal have largely eliminated children's work, and even children's chores. Nothing constructive has taken their place. The school, of course, consumes an increasing amount of children's time but for work rather

⁶ R. C. Cabot, *"What Men Live By"* (Boston, 1914), p. 142.

⁷ N. L. Sims, *Elements of Rural Sociology* (New York, 1928), p. 368.

than recreation. Then too, the absence of lawns and yards in large sections of the city soon made the streets the chief playground; later they were driven off the thoroughfares by fast moving traffic and by vehicles loading or unloading goods in process of shipment. As a result, city children are without natural recreational facilities.

Recreative exercise is also necessary to the proper functioning of adults. The cityward migration of the population has increased the congestion in urban centers and caused a steady rise in land values. Where ground space is at a premium, dozens of families are crowded into a single apartment building or tenement house. In most of these there is no provision for either outdoor or indoor recreation. This situation is further complicated by urban working conditions. Most city dwellers work indoors, often in dust-laden, over-heated air amidst speed and noise. Since machines do all the heavy work, the industrial worker secures little physical exercise, and the office worker none at all.

The need for recreative activity in the present scheme of things is indicated by the development of labor-saving machinery. It is estimated that the engines now installed in American industries have a capacity of one billion horse-power. The output of these engines, if operated continuously, would be equivalent to that of a labor force fifty times as large as the number of adult workers now living on the earth. For, expressed in terms of a modern energy-transversion-unit, the machine has multiplied the output rate of the original human engine by nine million. Thirty-seven thirty-eighths of this advance has come within the last thirty years. Such labor-saving machinery has, obviously, reduced working hours and greatly increased the leisure of the working classes. In 1909 7 per cent, in 1914 11 per cent, in 1919 50 per cent, and in 1930 88 per cent of the workers in manufacturing, as an example, had a working week of forty-eight hours or less.⁸

Under modern urban conditions, however, "the nervous system is constantly overtaxed and the muscular system undertaxed . . . (because) free and spontaneous bodily activity is almost unknown among the gainfully employed."⁹ Even when it is prescribed by the physician, people are likely to turn exercise and recreation into something like toil. The city-dweller leads a mechanized life lived by the clock. "On the job he sells his time by the hour, and the recreation he buys is ticked off by the minute. Getting his money's worth is, in the final analysis, a matter of the duration of the pastime"¹⁰ rather than its content. Yet as "daily occupations become more specialized,

⁸ E. A. Ross, *Civic Sociology* (New York, 1932), p. 53.

⁹ R. M. Binder, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1928), p. 582.

¹⁰ N. Anderson and E. C. Lindeman, *Urban Sociology* (New York, 1930), p. 158.

more methodical, more routinary"¹¹ the need for re-creative catharsis for the strain of modern life becomes urgent, indeed, imperious.

Play, then, is essential, not only to normal childhood, but also to normal adulthood. Play and recreation are the complements of work. If the work be physical, the appropriate recreation is mental or intellectual, and vice versa. More complete relaxation, greater relief, richer refreshment is thus secured. The idea that the craving for recreation can be repressed, or even thwarted, is not only unscientific but it is productive of numerous social ills.

SOCIAL IMPORTANCE OF RECREATION

The social significance of recreation is quantitatively indicated by figures showing the demand for such activities. From the survey of *commercial* recreation¹² by the Cleveland Foundation it appears that 85 per cent of the nearly 3 million volumes drawn from the Cleveland Public Library in 1918 were taken out for recreational purposes; that 26 million attended the movies in Cleveland every year, 1½ millions the dance halls, 2¼ millions the amusement parks, and ½ million professional baseball games. 170,000 patronized the lake excursion boats in that same year. In Cleveland at the time there were also in operation 443 billiard rooms, 160 bowling alleys, and fifty coffee houses. This is probably a fair cross-section of the commercial recreation provided in the typical American city.

ACTIVITY	FACILITIES	NUMBER OF CITIES REPORTING THEM
Playgrounds	7,681	763
Community recreation centers, indoor	34	255
Recreation buildings	678	214
Athletic fields	1,709	544
Baseball diamonds	4,024	654
Public bathing beaches	409	220
Golf courses (9 or 18 hole)	299	230
Stadiums	81	71
Swimming pools, indoor	310	122
Swimming pools, outdoor	700	308
Summer camps	115	74
Public tennis courts	7,960	569
Recreation areas and other types of facilities	3,343	297

¹¹ E. A. Ross, "Adult Recreation as a Social Problem," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 23 (January, 1918), p. 526.

¹² R. Moley, *Commercial Recreation* (Cleveland, 1920).

The extent to which cities are providing their people with *non-commercial* recreation is shown by the table on page 391.¹³

The total number of cities reporting public provision of recreation facilities was 890; their total expenditure for the year was \$33,539,805.79.

In 1927 it cost \$32,191,763 to maintain public recreation in America (20 Canadian cities included). In that year 1½ million persons used the public recreation fields daily at a cost (in the United States) of twenty-five cents per capita. In the United States 7 million acres of land have been set aside as national parks; 161,648,000 additional acres (an area equal to that of the States of Wisconsin and Iowa combined) are reserved as national forests. In 1927 all but five of our States had established State parks with a total area of 6½ million acres; in 1926, 1,681 municipalities reported a quarter of a million acres of land in city parks. At that time there was one auto to every 5.13 persons, or nearly one to every family in the United States; and upwards of 17 million radios now serve more than 18 million homes.

Accurate recreation totals for 123 million people are, of course, impossible, but some interesting estimates have been made;¹⁴ namely, that 30 million people listen to radios every night; that motion-picture houses sell 50 million admissions a week; that 35 million copies of newspapers and tabloids are purchased every day and 15 million popular magazines every month; and that \$5,000,000,000 is spent annually for pleasure motoring. The total cost of leisure-time activities is said to be at least \$21,000,000,000 or about one fourth of the national income. About one half of this sum is expended for forms of recreation introduced since the Industrial Revolution and requiring more or less complicated machinery for their enjoyment.

These changes in the amount of leisure and in the machinery for its use indicate the emergence of a new type of civilized life—one depending not upon the surpluses of a leisured class, but one arising directly from the greatly increased leisure of those who work for a living. For leisure is no longer the worthless by-product of wealth-getting; it is now a dynamic factor in a scheme of things in which traditionalism, localism and class distinctions are being uprooted as the whole industrial system is transformed. It appears certain that, in the future, less time and energy will be spent in production activities and more in consumption activities. The social importance of the proper use of this increased leisure is obvious; the necessity for increased public provision for recreation, particularly of the type that is more generally shared, is equally patent.¹⁵

¹³ National Recreation Association, *Year Book for 1929*.

¹⁴ S. Chase, "Play," C. A. Beard (ed.), *Whither Mankind* (New York, 1928), pp. 336-339.

¹⁵ C. D. Burns, *Leisure in the Modern World* (New York, 1932).

SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF RECREATION

Irrespective of their accuracy, the figures just cited indicate that great value is attached to recreative activities—a value determined, for most persons, by the amount of pleasure derived from such activities. Recreation relieves ennui, boredom and the monotony of existence; it “rests the wearied attention”; it supplies “joyous abandon” and wholesome “emotional sprees”; it provides pleasant and stimulating social intercourse. These values accrue to the individual who is relaxed or refreshed as he observes, or participates in, recreative activities.

Further analysis, however, shows that recreation serves other, and more significant, social ends.

1. *It provides for expressive behavior.* Play, like other activities pursued for their own sake, is filled with ritual, that is, with symbolic and ceremonial procedures. These constitute forms of expression for the self-realization of those who participate. Through these, as through other modes of experience, the individual builds his patterns of personal interest. These are, of course, conditioned by the prevalent culture (through tabus, et cetera) and by the conscious control of others (parents, teachers); they are elaborated by imagination, fictions, impersonations, and day-dreams. Individuality thus becomes a product of the freedom which expressive behavior affords, the variety of situations which give it experience, and the wise guidance of those who direct it.

Since the child, on the average, spends eight or nine hours in play to every two in school, it follows that play rather than education constitutes his chief medium of expressive behavior. Indeed, the child is really himself only at play, for it is in spontaneous activity that he expresses himself most completely.¹⁶ Herein also lies the value of the hobbies of the adult. They supply him with opportunities for an expressive behavior that completes and gives balance to life. In such behavior the pleasure reflexes are so fixed that self-expression rather than victory over others brings recreative satisfactions.

2. *It prepares for life.* Play does more than supply the child with modes of expressive behavior; it prepares him for successful participation in social relations, broadly conceived. Play can only develop the child's predispositions; it cannot go beyond the organism's physical and mental equipment for particular forms of activity. Herein lies the meaning of infancy—that its length varies with the complexity of the adult life to which it is a prelude. Play, then, like education, leads naturally into adult relationships.¹⁷ Indeed, children

¹⁶ P. H. Furfey, *The Gang Age; a Study of the Pre-Adolescent Boy and His Recreational Needs* (New York, 1928), pp. v-vi.

¹⁷ F. Froebel, *Education of Man* (New York, 1889), pp. 54-60

commonly play at adult occupations thus familiarizing themselves with work-techniques. Such play, although spontaneous, gives the child a full set of muscular coördinations and a versatile organization of neurons which will later increase his social effectiveness. The situations characteristic of the play of the child are similar to those surrounding the work of the adult. Teamwork is learned in competitive group games; it must be practised in politics and business. The essentials of fair play are inculcated through sports; they should be exemplified in legislative hall and market-place. Recreation does not yield its full returns unless it proceeds by rules enforced by officials; and unless courts lay penalties upon law-breakers, all social relations become fruitless. Play, therefore, is more than satisfaction of a hunger; it is the expression of the impulse to achievement. "Play is to the boy what work is to the man—the fullest expression of what he is and the effective means of becoming more."¹⁸ In play, the child is taught to coördinate his behavior with that of others; in play he learns conformity to standards without which law and order are impossible.

Recreation is educative since it prepares, incidentally, for successful participation in other social relations. Such education is, of course, unconscious and informal. It is effective, however, since recreation develops such organic powers as vitality, endurance, and the ability suddenly to put forth great effort. It stimulates menti-motor development by bringing out latent powers in the neuro-muscular mechanism such as coördination, accuracy, and quick response. Through guidance it directs the impulses into approved channels, develops judgment, the ability to think through situations and to will immediate reactions. Thus standards of behavior are set up and personality positively, rather than negatively, conditioned.¹⁹

3. *It releases surplus energies.*²⁰ The exhausted and the ill desire neither play nor recreation; they crave rest and sleep; but persons who have been engaged exclusively in specific and routinary employments, as in office work particularly, often need to release unused energies. Even in the industrial occupations, especially the more highly mechanized, where operations are easily mastered and almost automatically performed thereafter, the day's work calls forth only a fraction of the energies of the healthy and intelligent worker. In fact, under the monotony of work and the strain of responsibility some energies expand to the breaking point. Something is needed to drain away this surplus in wholesome, yet restful, activities. Recreation relocates the

¹⁸ J. Lee, *Play in Education* (New York, 1916), p. viii.

¹⁹ Nash, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

²⁰ K. Groos, *The Play of Man* (New York, 1901), and *The Play of Animals* (New York, 1898).

attention, "purges the individual of his rebellious impulses" and "feeds the famishing instincts" with "simple and racially familiar things." Play, especially in the open, thus serves as an antidote to occupational strains and drains. To the unemployed, as well as to the employed, recreation provides for the release of surplus energies. Unemployment gives men and women large amounts of unwanted leisure—empty leisure, leisure without purpose or facilities. As L. P. Jacks has so well said, "Man is a skill-hungry animal, hungry for skills in his body, hungry for skills in his mind, never satisfied until that skill-hunger is satisfied." Unemployment leaves man with no opportunity to relieve this hunger through creative effort. Desultory amusements which divert for the moment, break the monotony of his uninterrupted leisure but bring him no enduring satisfaction. In such a situation, organized recreation provides the opportunity and the facilities for constructive expressive behavior and thus maintains personal morale.

Lack of such recreational opportunities drives people, especially those who cannot provide themselves with recreative facilities, to the cheap theatrical performance, the unsupervised dance hall, the gambling den, the speakeasy, and the brothel for entertainment. Recognizing that such amusements do not stiffen morale, but, instead, relax it, and hence encourage vice (and perhaps crime), cities are now providing, at public expense, facilities for recreation that is wholesome and constructive. Such recreation gives healthful expression to motor restlessness, develops new interests, and turns the gang spirit into helpful channels.

For similar reasons, wholesome recreation is believed to be an effective means of preventing and of correcting juvenile delinquency. It has been claimed, for example, that "lying, stealing, vagrancy and immorality have a very distinct and unquestioned relation to the misuse of spare time";²¹ that a great majority of gangs engage in delinquent behavior which develops, in the participants, demoralizing personal habits, familiarity with the technique of crime, and an organization of attitudes which facilitates further delinquency of a more serious type;²² and, that "juvenile delinquency was decreased nearly 50 per cent in the stockyards district of Chicago by the introduction of public playgrounds";²³ Travis holds that "it is the adventurous, the lawless, the idle, the truant who naturally form gangs."²⁴ It has been demonstrated that the energies of any normal, active child may be directed into unwholesome

²¹ Cleveland Recreation Survey, Vol. 1, *Delinquency and Spare Time*, 1920, p. 57.

²² F. M. Thrasher, *The Gang* (Chicago, 1927), pp. 385-387.

²³ O. T. Mallory, "The Social Significance of Play," *Annals of American Academy*, Vol. xxxv (January, 1910), pp. 368-373.

²⁴ T. Travis, *The Young Malefactor, a Study in Juvenile Delinquency, its Causes and Treatment* (New York, 1908), p. 142.

channels through unnecessary thwarting, lack of guidance, or absence of opportunity for wholesome behavior.²⁵ If varied play and healthful recreation are not provided, therefore, it is obvious that the surplus energies of the child, as well as of the adult, tend to be released in destructive activity.

Wholesome recreation has hence become a means for the social treatment of juvenile delinquency. It is recognized that stealing bases without getting caught will give Johnny the same satisfaction as stealing apples without getting caught.²⁶ The juvenile court, hence, often prescribes play for the delinquent child who lacks the opportunity for spontaneous and creative activity; it may also specify which play-groups he may join and which he must avoid; or he may be instructed as to when and where he may play. The work of juvenile courts, it is claimed,²⁷ has clearly shown that "vicious neighborhoods and 'gangs' are among the most prolific causes of youthful misconduct" and that "organized and supervised recreation keeps down juvenile delinquency." Lacking occupational function, it would seem that the urban child is especially prone to the misdirection of surplus energies.

Nevertheless, it is possible to exaggerate the connection between inadequate recreation and anti-social behavior. When various cities claimed reductions in juvenile delinquency of 50 per cent (one city of 96 per cent) with the introduction of public recreation facilities, doubt was expressed as to whether these gains could be attributed to a single cause.²⁸ Certainly account must also be taken of such factors as unsatisfactory home conditions, insufficient parental care, inability to provide the necessities of life, housing congestion and the quality of commercial recreation centers.²⁹ Cantor³⁰ agrees with Thurston,³¹ that the smaller number of juvenile delinquents in districts having parks and playgrounds may be due, not so much to the presence of these recreational facilities as to the greater economic security and to the "social" and educational standards of the families living in such districts. Truxal³² found a correlation of $+ .44$ between the amount of juvenile delinquency in certain districts on Manhattan and the inadequacy of play spaces in those districts. Skeptical of the assumption that recreation spaces alone are the pre-

²⁵ W. Healy and A. Bronner, *Delinquents and Criminals* (New York, 1926), p. 181.

²⁶ G. T. Lies, "Juvenile Delinquency and Recreation," *Playground*, Vol. 18 (November, 1924), p. 459.

²⁷ P. A. Parsons, *Crime and the Criminal* (New York, 1926), p. 371.

²⁸ L. F. Hammer, "The Relation of Public Recreation to Delinquency," *American City*, Vol. 40 (January, 1929), pp. 119-120.

²⁹ C. B. Raitt, *Survey of Recreational Facilities in Rochester*, 1929.

³⁰ N. F. Cantor, *Crime, Criminals and Criminal Justice* (New York, 1932), p. 96.

³¹ Cleveland Recreation Survey, Vol. I, *Delinquency and Spare Time*, pp. 143-145.

³² A. G. Truxal, *Outdoor Recreation Organization and its Effectiveness* (New York, 1929), pp. 165-166.

dominating factor in the control of delinquency, he concludes, nevertheless, that there is a "moderate association between the presence of recreation areas and the absence of juvenile delinquency, providing we have taken into account a sufficient number of environmental influences."

4. *It socializes.* Sports stimulate the "we-feeling" through pleasurable co-operation in activities involving face-to-face relations. Play produces an excitement in which men cast off the reserve that separates them from each other. Thus recreation allays and destroys hatreds and antagonisms and "levels the barriers between nationalities and confessions, Americanizes the foreign-born and begets a neighborhood consciousness."³³ Modern sports, like the jousts and tournaments of earlier times, require the practising of socially useful habits, otherwise rarely used, strengthens the solidarity and promotes the friendliness of groups. Through vicarious functioning the observers, as well as the participants, are socialized.

In play groups, the youth and the adult alike participate wholeheartedly in a common purpose, lose their conscious individuality in a sense of membership, and share in a public consciousness that becomes a potent control. The team is, in fact, the embodiment of a common purpose, and in team play the participants experience intimately the processes by which such a purpose is organized and made effective and through which leadership and followership emerge. As a result, the team becomes "not only an extension of the player's consciousness but a part of his personality" when participation in its activities has "deepened from coöperation to membership."³⁴ Thus the participant not only learns to do team work but to enjoy it, for a close mental association is established between coöperative effort and fun.

Recreative activities also socialize because they furnish an outlet for impulses repressed by the modern factory system and by other conditions which "balk original outgoings" and produce discontent. Recreation releases pent-up emotions, stimulates age-long impulses to spontaneous physical and mental activity, relieves frustration by opening other channels of self-expression, and unstops the fountains of human nature. Failures are forgotten in the successes of the game; balance is restored. Recreation thus becomes the means by which the adjustment of original nature to culture is facilitated;³⁵ for "only socialized men play games involving other people, the non-socialized play solitaire and imitate themselves"³⁶

Again, the organization of recreational activities provides for a wider so-

³³ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1930), p. 376.

³⁴ J. Lee, "Play as a School of the Citizen," *Charities and the Commons*, Aug. 3, 1907, cited by C. H. Cooley in *Social Organization* (New York, 1911), pp. 34-35.

³⁵ W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (New York, 1928), Part V.

³⁶ Binder, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

cialization than work-relations afford. When neighborhood and community organizations for the development of recreational programs were formed, those interested found themselves discussing other community problems as well and coöperating, not only in the provisions for recreation, but in the promotion of public health, education, public safety, and similar civic enterprises. Positive social interaction necessarily resulted from this interchange of ideas, points of view, and attitudes in the discussion of local needs and resources. In this manner recreational organization develops the facilities of a social center.

5. *It increases social efficiency.* If recreative activity develops physical vigor, induces fuller and better coördinations, increases resistance to disease, facilitates the elimination of toxic poisons and relieves fatigue, it necessarily increases the physical effectiveness with which persons participate in social relations.³⁷ Recreation also quickens thinking, renders the mind alert, increases variety, flexibility, and sensitiveness of disposition (John Dewey), gives resourcefulness, develops nervous stability, unifies the mind, fosters originality, initiative, and the ability to render quick and accurate judgments. By thus toning up the physical and mental faculties, recreative activities augment social efficiency.

6. *It disciplines.* At first, organized and supervised recreation was developed as a substitute for the street activities of children. To-day, it is recognized as a potent disciplinary agent because it builds up valuable personal and social qualities. Competitive games, played according to established rules, canalize conduct, induce self-control and formulate in the minds of participants correct moral codes. These are likely to be carried over into non-recreative behavior; at least they set up wholesome attitudes for "the rules of clean sport are the precepts of right living."³⁸

Play groups tend to become self-governing; the members of such groups will, therefore, need to exemplify the principles of self-government. In the interminable discussions of the group's activities, the players participate in the organization of the group's will; in the execution of its program they develop the ability to hold themselves to the will of the group, thus organized, irrespective of personal preferences or opinions; in abiding by the rules of the game, they learn to accept defeat under these rules, rather than to win through violating them. The courtesy, the loyalty, the courage, the justice, the unselfishness, the generosity, the honesty, the perseverance, and the tolerance thus inculcated by good sportsmanship are qualities indispensable to good citizenship.

³⁷ P. Goldmark, et. al., *Fatigue and Efficiency* (New York, 1913), Chs. 4, 5, 6.

³⁸ C. H. Keene, *The Physical Welfare of the School Child* (Boston, 1929), p. 242.

Recreation, then, is not only a fundamental human need, but it is also a type of significant social behavior.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. Distinguish between *play*, *amusement*, *sport*, and *recreation*; between *play* and *work*.
2. Contrast the European and the American concepts of recreation.
3. Characterize "good" recreation and "bad" recreation from the sociological standpoint.
4. Discuss the psychological and the cultural views of age as related to play. Which do you hold? Why?
5. Analyze the physiology of recreation.
6. Describe more fully the mechanized life of the city-dweller, especially as it reveals his need of recreation.
7. Is too much spent for recreation in the United States? Reasons.
8. Explain: "The boy without a playground is father to the man without a job." (Lee); "the girl without a playground is mother to the scandalmonger of the future." (Curtis)
9. Develop the sociology of hobbies.
10. Compare and contrast recreation and education as processes preparing the individual for successful participation in social relations.
11. In what respects is playing games similar to "playing politics"? In what respects different? What about "the game of business"?
12. "What ails the slave of the desk and clock, of client and customer, is what ails the horse pawing in his stall, the wolf restlessly pacing his cage." (Ross) What is this ailment?
13. Justify the maintenance of the so-called "character-building" agencies in times of depression and unemployment.
14. Show that gangs are not inherently bad.
15. Present the case for and against recreation as a preventive of juvenile delinquency and adult crime.
16. Why is it that "only socialized men play games involving other people" (Binder)?
17. Is it true that "cheating leaves us aware that in fact we did not win at all"? (Cabot) Reasons.
18. Show how wholesome recreation increases industrial efficiency.
19. What is meant when it is said that play has "moral" values?

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CHAPTER XXIV

THE RECREATION CENTER

THE recreation center is the institution which provides for the constructive use of the leisure of people, young and old, through re-creative activity. Such a center exists wherever a group gathers to pursue activities of a re-creative nature in an organized manner. Such groups are found, not only in the established playgrounds and recreation centers, but also in schools, settlements and churches. To the extent to which their play is organized and supervised, these latter institutions function as recreation centers for limited groups. The public recreation center, supported by taxation, serves any and all, and in large numbers.

PLAY IN EARLY TIMES

In general, play has always been regarded as something frivolous, aimless, and childish, except where it was shaped to military, æsthetic or religious ends. Originally play consisted so largely of make-believe, of imitations of real occupations and achievements, that it is easy to account for this attitude. Among primitive peoples it is often difficult to distinguish work activities from play activities, for it is in a sort of play that these people domesticate animals and develop technical skills. In the primitive social order all activity had first to contribute to subsistence or to safety, yet the dance always precedes or follows such projects as war, the hunt, seed-time and harvest. Probably, therefore, primitive man "played at his work, or worked at his play indifferently. Recreation was fortuitous."¹

Recreation, as such, is a comparatively modern concept. Primitive festivals and initiations were anything but playful; serious business was on hand. In fact, it was not until Greek civilization developed that play assumes aspects which differentiate it from work—and then not completely. The formal education of the ancient Greeks consisted largely of training for, and participation in, a system of organized games supposed to develop manhood. The teachers of early Athens, hence, were notably play leaders, and the final examinations taken by the Greek youth at the end of his schooling were tests of athletic

¹J. R. Fulk, *The Municipalization of Play and Recreation* (University Place, Nebraska, 1922), p. 5.

proWess. The Spartans, and later the Romans, took a military attitude toward play. Their youth played at hunting, riding, scouting, cruelty, and blood-shed. During the age of Pericles, however, play was regarded as having æsthetic values, and manhood became a matter of physical perfection. From Constantine to the Renaissance, play was considered at best a senseless and unnecessary waste of time. Asceticism exalted the mind, and looked with contempt upon the physical. Later, scholasticism stressed the intellect and taught repression of the instincts and emotions. Finally, Puritanism, with its worship of the serious, deprecated and feared play.² During the Renaissance the body was deemed, by some, worthy of consideration; but monastics, everywhere, thought all play, even that of children, sinful. Wherever the conditions of life were hard, work was glorified and idleness frowned upon. Under such conditions play, of course, was regarded as idleness. Among many, this conception of play and recreation still persists. Exception is made only of play that definitely prepares for or issues directly in work.

THE DE-DOMESTICATION OF PLAY

Early play centered largely in the home for it was the home that circumscribed the activities of the child. There he functioned as a factor in the family economy; and there he employed the free hours left to him when his chores were finished. But so irrepressible is the child's zest for play that he turned much of his serious work into pleasure. Nevertheless, he was continuously meeting situations and tackling problems. The recreation of adults in these early days also developed for the most part from the work activities of the home. Barn-raisings, quilting and husking bees, and even fairs, were intimately connected with such activities.

Today, however, recreation is increasingly cared for outside of the home. While it is impossible "to imagine a social situation in which play and recreation are not, at least in part, cared for by the home,"³ yet there is a marked tendency, at present, to de-domesticate play. Motion pictures, scouting, baseball, football, tennis, golf and the like, of course, cannot be carried on in the home. The school, moreover, has claimed many recreational home activities as an integral part of its educational program. The church is also developing play and recreation as aids to religious training; industry is providing its employees with recreation because it increases their efficiency; and private enterprise has discovered that the public's demand for recreation is so large and so insistent that commercial provision is highly lucrative.

Separate play facilities, it seems, were unnecessary as long as the family

² R. M. Binder, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1928), p. 579.

³ Fulk, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

was an economic and recreational unit, for then its members played and worked together. When industrial cities arose, the home could no longer meet the imperious need for wholesome recreation, especially as labor-saving machinery and urban development have increased the amount of leisure both for children and adults. In ever larger measure, therefore, the facilities for re-creative activity are to be found in the school, the club, the playground and other organized centers.

DEVELOPMENT OF ORGANIZED RECREATION

Organized recreation, then, is the logical consequence of a changed social situation in which play spaces and play activities were further and still further restricted as the home moved from the farm to the village and from the village to the congested city. When large populations were crowded into urban areas, the lack of play space and of recreational facilities necessitated the development of parks and playgrounds at public expense, and the organization and supervision of recreational opportunities therein as a community project. Rainwater ⁴ has described the earlier periods of this development in detail. These may be more briefly summarized in the following four stages: ⁵

1. *The Charity Stage, 1890-1900.* Organized recreation began with establishment of sand-gardens, small play spaces, and model playgrounds for the children of the tenement districts of large industrial centers. These facilities were a philanthropy designed to keep children off the streets, improve the health of the poor, and prevent juvenile delinquency. Such charitable provision soon proved to be inadequate even when supplemented by funds raised by tag-days and food-sales.

2. *The Park Stage, 1900-1910.* This period is characterized by the establishment of small parks at public expense, and under the supervision of some municipal department. Play facilities were provided for adults, as well as children, by setting aside a portion of the park as "sport fields" on which games were allowed. Later field-houses were built to furnish facilities for indoor activities thus making it possible to continue the recreational program throughout the year. In this period also the Playground and Recreation Association of America was formed to give national scope to the movement. The parks established at this time, however, were not properly located. They were inaccessible to large numbers who needed them, and their full utilization was impossible because of the "keep-off-the-grass" policy so generally employed.

3. *The Playground Stage, 1910-1920.* During these years the playground,

⁴ C. E. Rainwater, *The Play Movement in the United States* (Chicago, 1921).

⁵ J. B. Nash, *The Organization and Administration of Playgrounds and Recreation* (New York, 1931), pp. 20-23.

completely equipped for indoor and outdoor activities, was developed. Trained supervision was also provided, but largely on a part-time basis while the children were in school. The recreational program was enriched by the addition of art, music, drama, and dancing. Participation as a means of self-expression rather than mere amusement was stressed. Neighborhood groups, clubs, community councils and associations were organized upon a basis of self-government and self-support. Recreation thus received a social emphasis. Separate playground commissions were formed to administer these recreational facilities, but their effectiveness was impaired by inadequate play space, and by the irregular attendance of children during the school months.

4. *School Center and Recreation Center Stage, 1920-* . Two developments characterize this period. (a) The school became the primary recreational center for children. Since it was already in contact with them, and since physical education was an integral part of the modern educational program, it was logical that the school should be equipped with its own recreational facilities and assume full responsibility for the play of its children. (b) The public recreation center became an institution which provided for similar facilities for adults and for those whom the school did not serve. During this period also the importance of recreation was recognized by the National Education Association; Community Service, Incorporated; the National Municipal League; the League of American Municipalities; and other similar organizations. Organized recreation is now conceded to be a public responsibility by municipal, State and federal governments.

SOURCES OF THE RECREATION MOVEMENT

The recreation movement in the United States began with the recognition of the fact that the urban environment afforded no adequate outlet for the play impulses of children, and that wholesome energies were therefore likely to be diverted into channels of non-constructive behavior. Youth was thus penalized unwarrantedly. Of course, it was the new psychology which turned attention from the consideration of academic subject matter to the study of the child himself, and led to the re-discovery of the rôle of play in the development of the child. And it was the new humanitarianism which developed a sense of social responsibility sufficient to assure a program of organized recreation.

Underlying these immediate causes are other causes more remote, but nevertheless, important. Among these, the Industrial Revolution is outstanding because it not only enormously increased the productivity of American industry, but it also brought reduced working hours and higher wages. Moreover, it greatly increased the amount of leisure of the working classes and provided the means with which to enjoy it. These classes now own homes, pianos, radios,

and automobiles. While the city shuts in large populations, the radio supplies it with varied entertainment. The city's open spaces are gone, but the automobile gives the city-dweller access to mountains, lakes, and sea. The Industrial Revolution, hence, has not only created a pathological social situation; it has also developed some means for its correction.

Recognizing that the social requirements of a complex social order compel a rigid division of time between work and leisure, and that the social organization has made inadequate provision for the constructive utilization of free time, the democratic philosophy of life has insisted upon public provision of recreational facilities for those who, through no fault of their own, are denied recreational opportunity. This philosophy holds that protection from moral injury through the misuse of leisure is as valid socially as protection from physical injury due to unguarded machinery. As a result organized and supervised recreation has been democratized in order that a fundamental human need may neither go unmet nor be exploited commercially.

Again, since pioneering days a sporting tradition has characterized American life. In the city "a distinct cult of play has become one of the bases of urban existence."⁶ The extensive systems of supervised and publicly financed recreation so characteristic of American cities is a by-product of this tradition; it also explains the gigantic systems of commercialized and professionalized play and sport which have become wide-spread in the country.

Finally, the World War also gave great impetus to the recreation movement in the United States. During the war, recreation was developed in army camps, naval training stations, and camp-cities as a means of maintaining *esprit-de-corps* and preventing immorality. Elsewhere recreation programs were utilized in urban centers as a means of maintaining morale and of relieving the emotional tensions developed by the war. The American people were thus convinced both of the need for and the value of organized recreation. The recreational programs of such organizations as Community Service, Incorporated; the Red Cross; the Knights of Columbus; the Young Men's Christian Association and Young Women's Christian Association appear, at least, to indicate an increased interest in such recreation.⁷

RECREATION IN THE UNITED STATES

The present status of organized recreation in the United States is indicated by the fact that in 1927 at least 5,121 playgrounds were providing supervised activities for some 5 million of the 15 million children then attending city

⁶ N. Anderson and E. C. Lindeman, *Urban Sociology* (New York, 1928), p. 159

⁷ J. L. Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency* (New York, 1925), pp. 600-601.

consolidated schools. This means that in another twenty years, at the present rate of growth, recreation facilities will be provided for most of the remainder.⁸ This estimate, of course, does not include the vast amount of recreation supplied by private or by commercial agencies. It should also be noted that at least twenty-one states have passed definite playground laws and that a large number of the remaining states have permissive enactments which make local, coöperative provision possible.⁹

Because the play movement developed out of the changing functions of the home, certain trends have characterized the development of recreation in the United States, namely: (a) a tendency to increased public support and direction; (b) the democratization of facilities formerly available only to the rich; (c) improved and increased facilities offering a greater variety of recreational opportunity; (d) provision for both sexes, all ages, and all classes of persons; (e) more refined and better techniques; (f) more clearly defined objectives such as naturalness and sincerity in self-expression, full release, freedom, self-discipline, individuality, wholesomeness; (g) better leadership and supervision; (h) facilities made available for longer periods of time; (i) substitution of participation for "spectatorism"; (j) increased emphasis upon group and community interests through neighborhood organization; (k) the development of organization and facilities for rural recreation; and (l) more interest in research in the recreational field.

The tendency toward the municipal organization and direction of recreation marks the definite removal of play activities from the sphere of the older institutions which are no longer able to make adequate provision for them in the new social situation. In passing over into the recognized channels of city government recreation is recognized as a social need and a social responsibility. This is unmistakable evidence of the birth of an institution. Although hindered by prejudice, by social conservatism and by the rivalry of commercial agencies, the public organization and administration of recreation promises to parallel that of the public school system.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF RECREATION

In addition to the individual's voluntary efforts to supply himself with recreational opportunity through reading, hiking, motoring, and the pursuit of hobbies, various agencies have been organized to provide recreational facilities on a larger scale. Certain types of such agencies may be distinguished.

⁸ H. S. Curtis, "The Scope and Tendencies of the Play Movement," *Social Forces*, Vol. V (March, 1927), p. 430.

⁹ H. S. Braucher, "Recreation," *Social Work Year Book, 1929* (New York, 1930), p. 381.

1. *Those owned and operated for profit.* These commercial agencies are the largest and most popular form. They include amusement parks, bathing beaches, bowling alleys and pool rooms, dance halls, gambling houses, moving pictures, cabarets, skating-rinks, theaters, professional athletics, and "speakeasies." On the whole, such agencies offer recreation in the form of amusement or entertainment, that is, those attending are usually observers, rather than participants. These agencies operate with a minimum of social control—rarely more than is exercised through licensing.

2. *Those supported by private funds and operated primarily to serve specific and limited groups.* These include country clubs; Young Men's Christian Associations; Young Women's Christian Associations; Boy Scouts; Girl Scouts; Girl Reserves; private playground associations; private athletic clubs; and such recreational facilities as are provided by settlements, churches and industrial concerns. Private agencies serve either an independent group making coöperative provision for its own recreation, or a disadvantaged group needing social service.

3. *Those maintained, wholly or partly, at public expense for the promotion of public welfare.* These are playgrounds, recreation centers, amateur athletics in the public school, national, state, county and municipal parks, recreation piers, public camping grounds, municipal swimming pools, forest preserves, promenades, stadia, public bath-houses, outdoor ice-skating ponds, and social centers. Of course, museums, art galleries, and public libraries also offer recreational service. Most of these facilities are established and maintained by municipal governments but under permissive State laws which delegate the necessary powers. State-wide recreational movements have sought, through the creation of State agencies, to administer, develop and coördinate State parks and reservations for recreational purposes, but recreation on an extensive scale has not yet been undertaken except in the larger cities where more or less skilled leadership can be provided. In 1930 more than 38½ million dollars was spent for public recreation of this type.¹⁰

The agencies which provide public recreation have been nationally organized. The National Recreation Association (originally the Playground and Recreation Association of America) has, since 1906, sought for every child in America a chance to play and for everybody in America, young or old, an opportunity to find the best and most satisfying use of leisure. Under its auspices an International Recreation Congress was held at Los Angeles in connection with the Olympic Games in 1932. The purposes of this Congress were "to provide for an international exchange of information and experience

¹⁰ "A Summary of Community Recreation in 1930," *Recreation Magazine* (June, 1931), pp. 116 ff.

with respect to play, recreation, and the recreational use of leisure; to build interest and support for the recreational movements in all countries; and to provide means for developing international good-will."

The organization of the work of a recreation center provides, as far as possible, for the following types of activity: ¹¹ those which satisfy the desire for exercise, such as amateur athletics of all sorts; especially those in which large numbers can participate; those which satisfy the desire for conflict and mastery such as professional baseball and basketball, boxing contests, and similar events; those which satisfy the desire for sociability, such as dance-halls, café and club rooms, pool halls, and refreshment parlors; and those which satisfy the desire for new experience, such as dramatics, and moving pictures.

For the most part, play activities have been first organized by private groups interested in specific activities. When these groups have demonstrated the value of specific activities, they have been taken over, in whole or in part, by city governments which support them from the public treasury. These activities then become the responsibility either of park boards because they control the city's open spaces, or of boards of education when play is considered an integral part of the system of public education, or of recreation commissions created for the purpose of administering recreational activities. In 1929 play activities were administered by park boards in 218 cities, by school boards in 152 cities, and by recreation boards or departments in 210 cities. Where cities do not make public provision for recreation, such activities are sometimes taken over by playground associations. These include business and professional men, women's clubs, ministers—in fact, all who are interested in the improvement of the community and in giving children every possible advantage.

But, whatever its form, the functions of recreational organization are first, to widen the recreational knowledge and interests of those whose leisure life is unnecessarily restricted; second, to foster play attitudes through agreeable recreational experience; third, to stimulate recreational interests by means of pleasant rivalries; and fourth, to develop fashions in recreation which will spread contagiously.¹²

RÔLES OF THE RECREATION WORKER

The effectiveness of the recreation center is determined, not only by the adequacy of its facilities, but particularly by the competence of its personnel. This holds both for the play of children and the recreation of adults. Lacking

¹¹ Davis, Barnes, and others, *Introduction to Sociology* (New York, 1927), pp. 768-769

¹² J. K. Folsom, *Culture and Social Progress* (New York, 1928), pp. 416-618.

skilled leadership, neither can secure what they should from recreational activities. To function effectively, therefore, the recreation center requires trained workers as well as specialized equipment, *especially* when the development of personality through spontaneous, but disciplined self-expression is the chief objective of the recreational program. In the end, the social utility of the recreation center will be measured by the extent to which large numbers of people use play areas and recreational facilities for the constructive employment of leisure time.

The recreation worker functions first of all as a *play teacher*. Children do not develop a sustained interest in recreative efforts which lack dynamic or direction. The play teacher supplies the organization, variety and technique by means of which spasmodic effort becomes purposive play. The play leader is also an authority who forces the child to play by the rules or leave the game. Through the organization of effort and the regulation of competition the play teacher administers a discipline which links the play activities of children with significant social values.

Secondly, the recreation worker functions as an *organizer* and *supervisor* of adult recreative activities. A game of baseball, for example, requires that someone bring together at least eighteen interested persons, and secure the necessary facilities. If baseball is to be a sustained activity, programs must be planned and schedules arranged. It is also the function of the recreation worker to organize special recreational groups, and to supervise special recreational activities such as music, dramatics, folk-dancing and the like. Moreover, under his leadership the work of the public recreation center will be coördinated with that of private agencies, the school and the home, thus affording a balanced recreational program for all participants.

Thirdly, the recreation director may function as an *executive*. In this capacity he plays the rôle of a social engineer or a social promoter who stimulates his community to formulate its recreational needs and desires, educates it with respect to the social, as well as personal, values in play, interprets his public and its desires, develops recreational programs, secures the necessary recreational set-up for his community, trains and supervises the work of his subordinates, organizes interested community groups, and coöperates with other community organizations.

At present much recreational work is carried on by seasonal workers (in the summer especially) and by part-time workers (in the winter, particularly). But standards of employment are being steadily improved along with standards of service and training schools are being developed to prepare qualified persons for recreational service.

SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF RECREATION

To demonstrate the social values inherent in play does not provide for the constructive use of leisure time. This is the unique task of the recreation center, especially in times of wide-spread unemployment when leisure is thrust upon people, beyond their desire for it or their ability to use it constructively. Moreover, the modern industrial system, as it is increasingly mechanized, curtails more and more the pursuit of creative interests in work. While commercialized recreation tends to substitute entertainment for participation in its provision for the leisure time of its patrons. If the recreational objective, then, is activity that not only gives pleasure but also re-creates the physical and mental powers and increases the capacity for enjoyment, the specific social problems of recreation appear to be:

Provision for Adequate and Appropriate Facilities

This is especially important in rural communities where recreation is so largely an individual or a small-group affair, where farm work consumes so much time and energy, and where the cultural patterns give so little place to play or recreation. Rural people need leisure time and programs for its constructive utilization in the development of personality quite as much as urban dwellers. In fact, the lack of recreational opportunity in rural areas has been a significant factor in the cityward trend of recent years. If rural recreation is to be effective, it should, of course, be adapted to the rural situation.

To place opportunities for healthful recreation and wholesome pleasure within the reach of all is the crux of the play problem of urban communities. Lack of such opportunity forces the children to use streets and alleys as playgrounds, which means that play is attended by danger and strain. The children who play under such conditions engage in activities of questionable value. To provide adequate space for wholesome play in urban centers it is estimated that at least one acre of play space is required for every 500 persons in the community.¹³ These should be scattered throughout the city so as to be as accessible as possible. They should be equipped with facilities for a variety of recreational activities.

Over-Commercialization of Recreation

To participate in commercialized recreation requires the payment of a fee since the activity is organized and promoted for gain. Such recreation, of course, has a distinct and permanent place in the recreational set-up of any

¹³ G. D. Butler, "How Much Play Space Does a City Need?" *The American City* (January 1932), p. 97.

urban community, for privately endowed and publicly supported agencies could not possibly supply the volume of recreational service needed in, or demanded by, the community. Moreover, within the field of commercialized recreation, standards of recreational service are being constantly developed; these are adopted later by the private and the public agencies. While it is true that there is nothing inherently objectionable in the so-called commercialization of recreation, nevertheless the subjection of recreational activities to the profits motive, especially in lieu of their increasing social significance, has resulted in certain undesirable trends which cannot be overlooked if social values are to be safeguarded, namely:

1. *A cheapening of the product purchased by the consumer.* In commercial recreation the objective is the maximum profit (at the least expense) rather than the best possible type of service. The result is recreational activities that make the crude appeals to sex, to love of power, to adventure.

2. *The substitution of artificial for spontaneous activity.* Such artificial activities as gaming, drinking, usually involve late hours, bad air, passive enjoyment. There is thus created a constant disproportion between neural and muscular expenditures with attendant neuroses. Recreative self-expression is exchanged for a mechanized process regulated by the up-to-date business methods of large-scale production.

3. *The substitution of observation for participation.* Commercial recreation emphasizes the place of the spectator and minimizes the place of the participant when professionals take exercise for the entertainment of others. Yet the social values of recreation vary directly with the numbers actually participating. Commercial recreation gives little opportunity for re-creative self-expression; in fact, it frequently thwarts the release of surplus energies.

4. *The inculcation of unwholesome social attitudes.* The normal desire for recreative activity is not only being exploited for private gain, but it is also often satisfied in such a manner as to develop unwholesome social attitudes. The activities of gangsters, for example, are so thrillingly presented in the moving picture that eager youth is stimulated to improve upon the techniques so openly exemplified. Again, the moving picture so greatly over-emphasizes sex that youngsters who attend regularly become precocious on sex matters and insensitive to tested moral standards. The modern dance hall and pleasure resort, with their taudry trappings and their sensual appeals, establish an unfortunate linkage between sex and recreation. The salacious magazines which so universally portray life in its artificial, theatrical, and licentious aspects divert into pernicious channels reading that might otherwise be re-creative.

5. *The development of irrelevant objectives.* It has been demonstrated that

recreational activities become desultory unless directed toward wholesome and constructive ends. The commercial agencies which seek to capitalize the public's leisure time, represent a haphazard and unorganized development of recreational facilities in the pursuit of profits. Consequently such recreation lacks coördination and direction toward socially significant objectives.

Sufficient Breadth of Leisure and Culture

Hoffer asserts that the amount and quality of a group's recreational activities are important indications of its level of living and its social efficiency.¹⁴ Folsom makes provision for a greater variety of opportunity for the enjoyment of leisure a prime objective in cultural reshaping.¹⁵ This requires that our minds be freed from the traditional culture patterns of recreation, namely, that it is necessarily competitive, gregarious, specialized for age and sex and controlled by fashion. Succeeding generations should be prepared for a constructive use of leisure time that transcends the limitations of wealth, material equipment and social organization, and provides for richer functioning on an ever-expanding scale.

To hold recreational activity to social purposes and to direct it toward wholesome objectives it will be necessary (a) to devise appropriate forms of recreation for rural communities; (b) to acquire, at the earliest possible moment, waterfronts and recreation areas in urban centers and large public reservations in rural areas for recreational purposes; (c) to regulate commercial recreation wherever children or non-competents are concerned and promiscuous social contacts are possible; (d) to insist that wholesome standards be maintained by all recreational agencies, public or private; (e) to eliminate politics from the administration of public parks and playgrounds; (f) to coöperate with the home, the church and the school that a varied yet balanced recreational program may be developed in every community; (g) to study the facts and relationships involved in play and recreation lest enthusiasts regiment them into rigid culture patterns.

The type of recreation developed by any people is, of course, determined by its customs, its manners, its traditions—in fact, by its total culture. Trends in recreation will, therefore, represent trends in the people's life. It is notable, for example, that "decadent nations find enjoyment in watching play of a degenerate type such as bull-fights, cock-fights, professional boxing and wrestling; autocratic nations specialize in disciplined, machine-like and systematic gymnastics; and democratic nations produce amateur sports."¹⁶ Indeed,

¹⁴ C. R. Hoffer, *Introduction to Rural Sociology* (New York, 1930), p. 121.

¹⁵ Folsom, *op. cit.*, pp. 427-428.

¹⁶ W. P. Bowen and E. D. Mitchell, *The Theory of Organized Play* (New York, 1923), p. 9.

Barnett maintained that "a people's play is a fair test of a people's character. Their recreation more than their business or their conquests settles the nation's place in history."¹⁷ Culture, then, not only determines the type of recreation developed by any people; it also reflects the trend of its national life. Here perhaps lies the import of the emergence of the recreation center as a unit in American institutional organization.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. To what extent will the radio check the de-domestication of play? Reasons. What other factors are working in the same direction?
2. Curtis (*The Play Movement and its Significance*, pp. 18-21) mentions five play movements, namely:
 - a. the play movement proper
 - b. the regular play program
 - c. outdoor life and play
 - d. public recreation
 - e. the reaction to over-materialization
 Distinguish between each of these movements.
3. Show how recreation is related to social situation.
4. Compare and contrast *rural* and *urban* recreation with respect to (a) characteristics, (b) typical activities, (c) problems.
5. What are the essential differences between recreation of adults and play of children?
6. Gillin (*Cleveland Recreation Survey*, Vol. 3, pp. 35-36) enumerates the following recreational life periods:
 - a. school life
 - b. school to marriage
 - c. from marriage on
 Differentiate these periods recreationally. Can you suggest a better division?
7. Why is there need for recreation in prisons, reformatories, asylums and similar institutions?
8. Outline a recreational program for
 - a. the girls in an industrial school
 - b. the inmates of an insane hospital
 - c. an institution for the feeble-minded
 - d. a school for crippled children
9. List the personal qualifications of the successful recreation worker.
10. Evaluate the city street as a playground.
11. What constitutes *wholesome* recreation?
12. Present the case for and against commercialized recreation.
13. What has been the effect of the machine upon recreation? (See Stuart Chase, "Play," in Beard's *Whither Civilization* pp. 343-353.)

¹⁷ S. A. Barnett, *Towards Social Reform* (New York, 1909), p. 289.

14. How has the automobile influenced recreation?
15. Enumerate the limitations of public playgrounds and recreation centers.
16. What specific regulations would you propose for commercial recreation centers?
17. Delimit the recreational field of the home, the church, and the school.
18. Outline a program of socialized recreation for your community.
19. Comment: "the boy who uses the streets for play is no more unsocial than the community which fails to give him a wholesome means of expression" (Ettinger).
20. How may the recreation center meet the following problems:
 - a. "Most recreation is not as exciting as delinquency."
 - b. "Many children prefer to play on the streets and in vacant lots than on playgrounds or in recreation centers."

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CHAPTER XXV

RELIGION: A SOCIAL PROCESS

THE social institutions discussed in the preceding chapters are those which organize interaction arising from adjustments to the physical and social aspects of environment. The social relationships involved are, hence, primarily objective in character. For the most part, tested knowledge provides a comprehension of the factors involved in each social situation. To bring relationships under control, therefore, this knowledge has only to be applied to tangible problems. Throughout human history, however, man has believed that he was dealing with environmental factors which were intangible, incomprehensible and, therefore, beyond his control. Lacking the knowledge necessary to effective control of these aspects of his environment, man resorted to certain working hypotheses which he hoped would bring the desired results. Although the validity of these hypotheses could not be scientifically demonstrated, they were *believed* to indicate the relationships involved. Extensive rationalization was often necessary to support such hypotheses but they functioned, for belief can be as potent as fact. These beliefs had to be abandoned, of course, when knowledge provided a more substantial basis for control. As man has struggled to bring his universe within his comprehension, religion has given him a set of working hypotheses which became a basis of action when he lacked the knowledge necessary to effective adjustment to his total environment.

Such sets of working hypotheses have both a personal and a group aspect. In its *personal* aspect, religion implies a particular set of beliefs, namely, those which satisfy the individual concerned. Since the subjective reactions of the individual are unique, probably no two persons rely upon precisely the same constellation of beliefs. Each holds to the hypotheses that function for him. The particular adjustments which the individual makes to the uncomprehended factors in his environment have limited social significance because there is no objective test of the validity of the particular constellation upon which those adjustments are based. In its *social* aspect, religion represents a set of working hypotheses held by a group of persons who thus pool their "resources" to promote more adequate adjustment to the intangible and uncomprehended factors in their social situation. Such beliefs, it is obvious, are the basis of collective

action/Objective tests can be applied to the adaptations which are thus made to unknown social forces.

THE MYSTERY IN THINGS

Mystery is a fact, a demonstrable fact, for it can be experienced as definitively as knowledge. Ignorance is a synonym for mystery only when knowledge of phenomena is actually available or emergent. Under all other conditions the unknown is genuinely mysterious because man's mind does not, perhaps cannot, comprehend it. That "existence is (and always has been) filled with inscrutable mystery" is an accepted fact. For primitive man, most of the processes of nature were mysterious. He lacked scientific explanations of fire, lightning, thunder, sickness, drought, storm, infections or eclipses. Such events, particularly when they brought suffering, hardship and destruction, paralyzed early man with dread and anxiety. In fact, he lived "in ever-present fear of fateful happenings." Impotent and fear-driven in the presence of such events, he sought hypotheses that might enable him to control natural phenomena and hence conquer his fears. These crude hypotheses constitute the religion of primitive man.

✓ As man slowly uncovered the laws which governed the processes of nature, his control of his physical environment brought him increased satisfaction in living and greater confidence in his own powers. He no longer stood in fear-some awe of natural phenomena; rather, because of insight, he could manipulate the processes of nature to his own benefit. Later discovery of the laws operating in social environment gave him insight into social relationships and thus extended the field of his control. So extensive has his knowledge become in more recent years that he has in large measure discarded the belief in supernatural forces which must be revered and managed. As man's environment has been interpreted to him in terms of scientific law, the need for sets of working hypotheses has steadily diminished—diminished to a point, in fact, where many believe that science will eventually explain the universe in every significant detail.

Science, however, has not as yet completely comprehended the Unknown. With increasing knowledge of the more external phases of the total environment, the mysterious has taken on subtler and more baffling aspects. Geology, for example, has uncovered facts which force a re-interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis, but it has found nothing which explains the origin of the earth or man. Similarly astronomy has acquired demonstrable knowledge of the solar and planetary systems and of the movements of sun, stars and planets, but it has not rendered comprehensible either the dimensions or the administra-

¹ E. D. Martin, *The Meaning of a Liberal Education* (New York, 1926), p. 91

tion of the universe or the series of universes of which it is a part. The biological sciences, likewise, have developed an impressive body of laws which explain the processes operative in the plant and animal kingdoms, yet life remains as much, if not more of a mystery than death. Physics has discovered the immutable laws which govern the structure of matter, but the atom and the electron are still as intangible and undemonstrable as God. Psychology has acquired a significant understanding of the structure and functions of personality but it has no answer for childhood's simple question: Who am I? And if the individual cannot explain himself except in terms which ask the question of an antecedent generation, it is obvious that he is limited in his knowledge of his fellows. The social sciences are able to describe in detail the collective behavior of countless generations of all sorts and conditions of men, but they supply no knowledge which makes possible the control of human motivation. The failure of science to give insight into these significant aspects of the social situation leaves man necessarily dependent upon working hypotheses, that is, upon religion, as means of social control.

Notwithstanding the impressive array of scientific data, therefore, man must still admit that he does not comprehend the administration of the universe, the essence of matter, the source of energy, the meaning of life or the nature of human nature. With scientific laws, formulas, postulates, axioms and assumptions, he can describe, but he cannot explain, such dynamic factors in his environment as gravity, energy, consciousness, personality, temperament, capacity or motivation. These constitute the imponderables of the modern mind. The situational problems which vex man now, namely, war, greed, exploitation, domestic discord, and political corruption, appear to be precisely those whose solution involves the control of these uncomprehended factors. Lacking demonstrable knowledge of these, man is left with no alternatives but the use of working hypotheses in bringing his total environment under further control. Indeed, it is possible that further social progress awaits either a wider acceptance of existing hypotheses, or the development of more fruitful hypotheses, with respect to these mysterious factors.

Man is no longer fear-driven as he faces the mysterious factors in his environment. Access to the scientific knowledge and techniques, which have brought him so far on his rough road, have given him a confidence in himself and a sense of security in his world, which seems to place him in command of his social situation. Nevertheless, man is now confronted with a collapse of his costly economic system, the destruction of vast quantities of hard-earned wealth, the prevalence of wide-spread unemployment, loss of personal morale, the growth of indulgent self-centeredness, the degradation of statute law and the imperialism of powerful national states. To assert that science will eventu-

ceremonies, or even the rendering of "service" to one's fellows. Religion, sociologically conceived, must so organize the emotional life and its related activities as to give a sense of security when men are confronted with factors or situations beyond their knowledge or control. Without such organization, adherence to creeds, regular church attendance and interest in welfare of others are mere defense mechanisms. ³

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

It has been a common opinion that religious experience was unique, if not peculiar; that is, it was held to involve different psychical elements, different conscious states and, hence, to have a different content and different qualities from other human experience. This conception of the nature of religious experience, of course, developed naturally from the belief that religion is other-worldly, supernaturally sensitized, divinely ordained and directed. From the sociological standpoint, however, religion is essentially earthly, man-made and humanly administered. Man, of course, did not create the universe, nor call into being the unseen forces which permeate his social situation. For these he has no responsibility. Man has, however, devised methods of and techniques for adjusting himself to the Unknown, as well as to the known, factors in his total environment. In other words, *he* has developed the working hypotheses which bring within his control, practicably, both the tangible and the intangible aspects of his social situation.

Religion, then, does not call forth a unique order of experience. Religious experience is neither mysterious nor unusual. It employs no exclusive techniques; it sets up no peculiar emotional patterns; it requires no singular attitudes; it appears in no separate conscious states. Religious responses to stimuli can be observed, named and classified as readily as any other form of experience. In common with all types of experience, it seeks the satisfaction of felt needs such as security in social relationships, compensation for failure and control of obscure situational factors. In other words, religious experience, like economic or political experience, is an aspect of "the quest for the satisfaction of human needs in the presence of a partly helpful, partly hostile and partly indifferent environment." ⁴ It differs from other forms of experience in that it is concerned primarily with factors that are unknown, intangible and incomprehensible. Religious experience is unique also in that it attempts an ordered synthesis of the major life possibilities, that is, it seeks "to bring together all aspects of life in one complete experience." ⁵

To secure this synthesis of experience, religious behavior is focused upon

³ A. E. Haydon, *The Quest of the Ages* (New York, 1929), pp 149-150

⁴ O Vogt, "Religion as Complete Experience," *Christian Century*, October 7, 1931.

objectives concerned with the worth of man and with the final values of life. The realization of these objectives implies a higher order of satisfactions than those secured through other types of behavior. Religious experience, hence, seeks to give ecstasy, to satisfy curiosity, to quell fears, to assure safety, to guarantee prosperity, to inculcate love and gratitude, to intensify social pleasure, to deliver from temptation, to provide answers, to enlist ambition and to promote social justice.⁷ In this manner the finer inner compulsions are liberated and the various aspects of life synthesized. Individuals are then prepared for behavior that rewards with satisfactions of an intangible sort. Since religious experience thus induces behavior above the minimum required by statute law, it may be regarded as a higher order of experience.

The religious experience of primitive man was directed toward *self-preservation* in an environment that was truly "awe-ful." By means of spells, charms, dances, magic-words and phrases early man tried to manipulate or appease the "spirits" which he saw in every animate and inanimate thing. Such religious experience was designed to dispel fear by providing men with techniques for keeping alive. Later the Greeks and the Romans were moved, not so much by the desire for self-preservation as by the "high human yearning for *self-pacification*." Religious experience was then designed to remove despair by giving reasons for living. In those days adjustments to the Unknown were made through philosophy, asceticism and mysticism. In modern times, self-pacification was at first sought through other-worldliness. A life beyond the grave was to compensate for lack of self-expression, release and satisfaction in life on earth. More recently, however, a religious experience which yielded self-pacification in the earthly life was demanded by those who no longer fear or dread an after-world and who are no longer interested in heaven or immortality.⁸ For these, religious experience becomes "a quest for the good life" in which there is an attempt to transcend partiality and to obtain complete experience. If man is able to cope successfully with Unseen Powers because his working hypotheses with respect to life, love, matter and energy bring the desired results, then life yields full satisfaction.

BASIC ELEMENTS IN RELIGION

Historically, religion has taken on a variety of forms because of differences in the social situation confronting various peoples. Groups developed unique religious beliefs and practices to secure adjustment to the peculiar aspects of their particular environment. Diversity in religion, therefore, is explained by differences in climate, topography, economic development, social and political

⁷ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1930), p. 75.

⁸ L. Browne, *This Believing World* (New York, 1926), Bk. II.

organization, interaction in war, migration or commerce and the influence of significant religious leaders.⁹ In spite of this diversity, however, certain elements appear to be more or less common to all religions.

1. *Religious feeling.* Although religion has significant intellectual aspects, the religious interest is deeply rooted in the emotions. From the uncouth savage to the cultural modern, religious experience is believed to involve certain emotional states in which the individual experiences ecstasy, thrill, exhilaration and awe. These states are characterized positively by a more or less complete absorption in internal sensations and negatively by a more or less complete abeyance of external impressions.¹⁰ Religious feeling is peculiarly sensitive to the beliefs, conceptions, or behavior which induce fervor or inspiration. These emotional states, of course, cannot be continuous. Repeated contacts with the appropriate stimuli must be sought by the individual who desires religious experience. Religious feeling is not unlike other feeling except that it is called forth by different causes, namely, the situational factors which the individual is able neither to understand or to control but upon which he must depend. Adjustment to such factors must be made through feeling rather than intellect. Religion, therefore, is basically an emotional experience.

2. *Beliefs.* Religion is frequently described as a group of cult practices. These practices, it should be noted, are the outgrowth of certain conceptions or explanations which have been accepted by the group as workable hypotheses in dealing with the Unknown. In other words, religious beliefs are the product of man's efforts to understand the universe in which he lives, especially those aspects of his total environment for which he has no demonstrable knowledge. Beliefs as such, of course, contain no essentially religious element, for they may be mere folk-lore passively accepted by the individual or the group. Beliefs become religious when they are associated with religious feeling. Together they constitute the subjective aspects of religion. Religious beliefs are frequently set forth in, or derived from, interpretations of "holy" books and "sacred" writings believed to be divinely inspired. Such beliefs are especially potent because they escape the constant reexamination to which other mental concepts are subjected. When associated with feeling, therefore, "belief, though erroneous, can be as powerful a social force as truth."¹¹

Religious conceptions and beliefs reveal the level of intellectual culture attained by the group. Such beliefs must necessarily be revised when knowledge reduces the Unknown to the known. In the absence of knowledge, religious

⁹ G. A. Coe, *The Psychology of Religion* (Chicago, 1910), pp. 107-118; F. A. Bushee, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1923), pp. 541-548.

¹⁰ P. Radin, *Social Anthropology* (New York, 1932), pp. 243-244.

¹¹ F. H. Hankins, *Introduction to Study of Society* (New York, 1928), p. 570.

beliefs provide man with an explanation of the mysteries which surround him and set forth the significant and permanent life values which have developed out of the group's experience with the Unknown. In advanced cultures elaborate theologies describe in detail the nature of these unseen factors. Religious concepts are usually specific adaptations of secular conceptions which describe adjustments to the known. To illustrate: *salvation* is a religious conception which describes a phase of the well-known process of conservation; the *Kingdom of God* is a religious term indicating a perfect social order; *conversion* is the religious notion of a readjustment of attention which facilitates the integration of personality; a *miracle* is a religious name for an unexplained event; and *good* and *evil* are religious designations for factors that either facilitate or thwart functioning in desirable ways. Because their truth or falsity cannot be *proved*, religious conceptions and beliefs are usually more tenacious than knowledge. When knowledge is lacking and working hypotheses are needed, religious belief provides a basis for action.

3. *Values*. All religious behavior is directed toward certain ends, objectives or compensations. Salvation, security, success in undertakings, long life and happiness are values commonly recognized by the various religions. These values are similar to those resulting from adaptations to the known and controllable factors in the environment. Religious values, like other values developed out of group experience, are *practical* because they deal with actual situations; they are *social* because they emerge from an associated life; they are *inclusive* because "religion is potentially responsive to every possible kind of event in human affairs"; they are *cosmic* because religion is concerned "with infinite causes and forces"; and they are *intimate* because they are based upon a recognition and evaluation of personality.¹² Religious values also reflect the cultural development of the group.

4. *Specific behavior patterns*. Religion always involves a certain set of cult practices such as tabus, sacrifice, self-abnegation, worship, baptism, sacraments and service. These practices represent attempts to draw near to, to escape, to manage or to forecast the behavior of unseen powers.¹³ Religious behavior thus expresses man's fear of or reverence for the Unknown, however conceived, and his devotion to what he believes to be good. Tabus, of course, relate to practices which are regarded as inimical to welfare. Religious practices are supposed to induce or enhance religious feeling and to bring the conduct of the individual into harmony with unknown factors, just as approved behavior patterns of the non-religious type are supposed to place the individual in adjustment to the known factors of his environment.

¹² E. S. Ames, *Religion* (New York, 1929), Ch. 3.

¹³ Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society* (New Haven, 1927), Vol. II, p. 1427.

5. *Religious attitudes.* North maintains that, "as distinguished from other social attitudes, the religious attitude may be defined as the outreach of the personality for harmony with that which is more complete than the realized self."¹⁴ Religious attitudes, hence, derive from "the sense of incompleteness or insufficiency" experienced especially in coping with the mysterious factors in the social situation. Because these factors are believed to have special significance for welfare they, too, are held to be sacred and the activities relating thereto are carefully distinguished from the secular. "What is sacred, therefore, constitutes the most precious part of the social tradition and the social possessions."¹⁵ Religious attitudes have a special character and value, then, in that they supply the inner urge which gives religion its power over the conduct of the individual.¹⁶ It is man's traditional feeling of inferiority that gives potency to his attitudes toward the group, toward the good, the true and the beautiful or toward some Supreme Personality which embodies these other values.

6. *Mediation.* Because religion deals with the intangible and the mysterious, timid and fearful people, uncertain of their own ability, have always depended upon the offices of certain individuals who are believed to have exceptional insight into or influence with Unseen Powers and who are hence able to facilitate adaptation to the Unknown. Shamen, medicine men, priests, nuns and clergymen function thus as mediators between men and the mysterious factors of their social situation. Such persons constitute the specialized personnel of religious organizations.

7. *Structure.* Religion may, of course, involve practices which do not require material equipment or paraphernalia. Earlier religions reduced these elements to a minimum. Most religions, however, acquire more or less extensive properties, such as shrines, tabernacles, church buildings, temples, and cathedrals equipped with images, altars, baptismal fonts, organs, pulpits and parish halls, in which and with which they carry on their religious practices. In fact, all religious organization and most religious practices call for such material equipment.

8. *Organization.* From prehistoric to modern times religion has been characterized by rather elaborate forms of organization. The *laity* have been organized into *congregations* made up of people whose attitudes were favorable to certain religious responses. Collective adaptations to the Unknown are thus made. The *priesthood* has also been organized into holy orders for the effective pursuit of professional interests. Presbyteries, Synods, Dioceses, Conventions

¹⁴ C. C. North, *Social Problems and Social Planning* (New York, 1932), p. 345.

¹⁵ F. H. Hankins, *op. cit.*, p. 563.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 534

and Conferences include both laymen and clergymen in administrative units of various proportions and with various purposes. In this manner the effort of religious groups has been organized for effective religious practices. The will of religious groups has been organized in the programs, religious and social, which have been developed by these organized groups. The thought of religious groups, of course, is definitely organized in their creeds. Such organization of effort, will and thought has established the church as the social institution which canalizes religious behavior.

9. *Techniques*. Religion everywhere employs techniques. None of these are peculiar to religious behavior; rather, they are specific adaptations of techniques used in other types of collective behavior. The list of such techniques include the dance, incantation, symbolism, ornamentation of priests, "sacred" music, ritual, hymns, liturgy and prayer (isolating techniques). These techniques are employed to develop rapport, to secure emotional unity and to increase the intensity of religious feeling.

10. *Messiahs*. Every religion has had its great teachers. Many modern religions have their origin in the sayings and teachings of "an expected deliverer or savior"—an outstanding personality believed to have unusual insight into the mysteries of life. Moses, Confucius, Guatama, Mohammed, Zoroaster and Jesus were such personalities. Often these messiahs are believed to have been immaculately conceived; always they are held to be divinely inspired and directed, fully endowed with miraculous power to heal disease, to cast out demons, to conquer enemies and to overcome obstacles. Because they are believed to have immediate and intimate access to a Supreme Being who embodies all mystery, deliverance from fear, from enemies, from evil, from disaster and disease are expected to result either from the activities of the gifted leaders or from the acceptance of their teachings.

While these basic elements are more or less common to all religions, it should be noted that religion cannot be identified with any peculiar emotional states, any given set of beliefs, any aggregate of social values, any specific constellation of behavior patterns, any unique attitudes, any single type of mediation, any specific kind or number of structural elements, any given form of religious organization, any particular collection of techniques or any single messiah. Every religion is a unique compound of elements put together to meet the specific emotional needs of its adherents. The validity of a given religion, therefore, is found, sociologically speaking, not in the particular elements which compose it, but in the effectiveness with which it meets those specific needs.

SOCIAL NATURE OF RELIGION

The term "social" is used with a great variety of meanings. Technically, the word implies inter-individual phenomena characterized by mutuality and coöperation among like-minded participants. The term is applicable, therefore to "all phenomena of, or pertaining to, *associated human beings* as distinguished from phenomena of, or pertaining to, the *single human being* which by contrast may be designated as *individual*."¹⁷ As thus defined, the term "social" describes religion even in its personal aspects, for it is obvious that much if not all of the particular religious beliefs and practices of the individual are acquired from the social environment and the social heritage to which he has been exposed from early childhood. Such variations as appear in given instances are likely to have developed out of contact with persons or groups in different social situations. It is rare, indeed, that individuals devise original adaptations to the Unknown. Personal religion is, for the most part, merely a particular aggregation of current religious elements.

Now the elements which comprise the personal religion of the individual are transmitted through association within the primary groups, especially the family. Religious attitudes are readily acquired by the child because, as he constructs his world through these associations, he is especially conscious of forces and factors which he does not comprehend and cannot control. Wonder and reverence are normal experiences for the young. Moreover, the child develops an attitude of unhesitating acceptance of the mysterious with its traditional background. Subsequently, religious feeling is linked up with specific beliefs but not until the young have been taught the socio-economic importance of religion. The individual's religious background is thus fully established during an emotionally formative period and so endeared to him through family ties and affection that his fundamental religious attitudes usually persist and survive revisions of intellectual concepts forced by later experience.¹⁸ Personal religion is, hence, a social product.

Group adaptations to the mysterious are obviously social phenomena of the first order. To the religious philosopher, "these adaptations represent the manifold ways in which social groups have made more or less successful adjustment to the surrounding natural world in an effort to live safely, adequately and with assurance. Among all the patterns of behavior in which human hungers and wishes have been channeled, religions, in their ideals, have held before men a synthesis of the values involved in the good life; in their programs they have indicated the socially approved methods of achieving the

¹⁷ E. E. Eubank, *Concepts of Sociology* (Boston, 1932), p. 24.

¹⁸ Radin, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-247.

values and in their thought forms, they have related the quest of the ideal life to the ever-growing knowledge of the universe." ¹⁶ To the sociologist, also, religious practices are as truly social as economic or political behavior.

Investigators have found no stable society, present or past, without religion. In some form or other it is the cultural property of all social groups. And whatever their supernatural ingredients the forms of religious beliefs and the rituals of religious observances are in large measure the product of the group and are passed down the generations as a part of the social heritage. When men worship together or hold beliefs in common with other members of the group, not only the individual but also the group is conceived of as standing in special relation to the supernatural. Therefore the matter of religious belief, and especially the manner in which it is translated into action affecting society, are social affairs." ²⁰

Religion, then, is a form of social interaction organized to secure a unity of group behavior by means of practices which are designed to create or reinstate the emotional attitudes which appear to harmonize human activities to situational mysteries. Religion becomes a going concern "when the cultus procedures come in time to be more or less definitely formulated in practice and (when) a body of rationalization grows in explanation, support and justification of the attitudes, emotions and practices." ²¹

Further evidence of the social nature of religion is found in the fact that the religious group is a typical *social* group. Collective adaptations the Unknown imply, in the first place, contact between the members of the group with a consequent interchange of ideas or an expression of common emotions. In the second place, the activities of the religious group center about some place identified with it and adjusted to its needs for location, space and communication. Again, the religious group has unity. Because its members are likely to have similar interests, a common social tradition and common ideas, they tend to react in the same way to the same stimuli. This homogeneity of the group is cultivated, as in other social groups, by emphasizing differences from other groups, by the exclusion of individuals not readily assimilated and the expulsion of non-conformists, and by identifying the interests of its members with those of the group. In the fourth place, the religious group acquires a structure which centers about persons, places, creeds, symbols, social machinery, organization, methods of recruiting membership and protective devices. Finally, the religious group, like other social groups,

¹⁹ Haydon, *op. cit.*, p. 51. By permission of Harper & Brothers, publishers.

²⁰ Gillin, Dittmer and Colbert, *Social Problems* (New York, 1932), p. 465.

²¹ Reuter and Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

secures its dynamics through ideals, common purposes and programs put into action by an experienced leadership.²²

It should also be noted that religion is not only social in nature but also social in purpose. House defines religion as a form of social interaction designed "to secure unity of group action by molding to a common pattern the personal attitudes and wishes of its members."²³ From this viewpoint, religion is essentially anthropocentric rather than theocentric. In religion, that is, "*God is not known, he is not understood, he is used.*"²⁴ This means that the important religious questions are not those concerned with the existence and nature of the Unknown and the mysterious, but those concerned with the existence and nature of man whose vital and essential purposes are to be realized by adjustment to the unseen. Such adjustment is secured through "an organized body of cult-practices, based on the conviction that nature is moral, which are designed to bring the individual into proper relations with nature so conceived and to induce him to accept the socially approved values of his group by setting them apart as sacred and investing them with such emotional accompaniments as submission, awe, pity, optimism and an enhanced sense of personal well-being and restored peace and contentment."²⁵

From earliest times religion has been a group concern in much the same way as family relationships, economic activity or education.²⁶ Associated individuals, faced with critical situations, have made sacred the "most precious part of their social tradition and their social possessions"—the values which have developed out of experience with uncontrolled forces. While "it is literally true that every people creates its own divinities and then makes itself, in turn, the chosen people of its Gods,"²⁷ nevertheless religion has supported the group by means of working hypotheses which have increased the satisfactions of life in the presence of impenetrable forces which threatened to disintegrate completely both the individual and the group with disease, enemies, drought, flood, famine, pestilence and death.

As thus conceived, religion is not identical with morality. "Morality," says Ames, "is concerned merely with the rules which are believed to be necessary to satisfactory group life and personal life."²⁸ All such norms of conduct, of

²² W. Brown, *Social Groups* (Chicago, 1926).

²³ F. N. House, *The Range of Social Theory* (New York, 1929), pp. 244-245.

²⁴ Leuba quoted by W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York, 1923), p. 506.

²⁵ C. C. Josey, *The Psychology of Religion* (New York, 1927), p. 59.

²⁶ Ames, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

²⁷ Hankins, *op. cit.*, p. 573.

²⁸ ———, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

course, have the sanction and support of religion. But religion develops working hypotheses with respect to a wider range of situational factors than those involved in social interaction. It seeks, in fact, to make the whole universe and man's relationship to it intelligible and controllable. Morality, in other words, lays down the rules of the game (social interaction), religion tries to discover the significance of that game (social interaction) and others to the entire scheme of things. Religion, that is, comprehends cosmic, as well as group and personal relationships. It is expressed not only in morality, in creeds, but also "in devotion to education, in political ideals, in the service of art and science and in many other ways. . . . It is more particularly seen in efforts to improve social conditions . . . especially in times of peace."²⁴

From the sociological standpoint, then, the essence of the religious life appears "to be primarily ritual, that is, conduct accompanied by deep feeling. It has been (and is) something lived rather than something thought out; in simpler groups, something danced out, or performed. Such ritual is, naturally, concerned with what seems the important acts and crises of a people's life." "It is an organization of the feelings and activities of men around those elements in their experience that have seemed emotionally significant."²⁵ This organization has passed into the social heritage and become a part of the lore of the race passed on from generation to generation.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. What peculiar difficulties are involved in the sociological analysis of religion?
2. Evaluate the following definitions of religion:
 - (a) Man's response to the supernatural (Koons).
 - (b) Absolute devotion to what is recognized as highest and most valuable (Mackenzie, Schmidt).
 - (c) A series of adjustments to the chance-element in life as represented by the spirit-environment (Keller).
 - (d) An attitude of dependence upon or communion with the Higher Power or Powers upon which the highest human values depend (MacIntosh).
 - (e) The shared quest of the good life (Haydon).
 - (f) Personal adventure on a way of living (Fosdick).
 - (g) Comprehensive experience.
 - (h) Spiritual mindedness (Holmes).
 - (i) Recognition on part of man of some unseen, higher power as having control of his destiny and as being entitled to obedience, reverence and worship (Oxford Dictionary).
 - (j) The celebration of life.

²⁰ J. S. Mackenzie, *Outlines of Social Philosophy* (London, 1927), pp. 216-217.

²⁰ J. H. Randall, *Religion and the Modern World* (New York, 1929), p. 70.

- (k) An organized body of cult-practices (Josey).
 - (l) Speculation about God.
 - (m) Endeavor to get into right relations with God.
 - (n) Worship of personal spiritual beings believed to guide individual and social destiny (Hankins).
3. What specific influence has environment upon religion?
 4. Comment: "Religion is not concerned with truth."
 5. What, specifically, distinguishes religion from (a) science, (b) education, and (c) social service?
 6. (a) Explain what is meant when it is said that "religion is man-made."
(b) Does this conception secularize religion? Give your reasons.
 7. In what respects is religious experience unique?
 8. (a) Classify the basic elements of religion into
(a) subjective aspects and (b) objective aspects.
(b) Indicate the relationship between these aspects.
 9. Develop further the statement "religious conceptions are usually specific adaptations of secular conceptions which describe adjustments to the known."
 10. Should the list of messiahs include Luther, Calvin, Wesley, the Pope, Mrs. Eddy, Brigham Young, Gandhi? Why or why not?
 11. Why are the children of Methodists usually also Methodists, of Catholics, Catholic, of Quakers, Quaker, etc?
 12. What should children be taught about religion?
 13. Cite instances of peoples who have created their own divinities and then made themselves the chosen people of their gods. Explain.
 14. Explain: "All the great Gods have a biography written in terms of the social experience of the people to whom they belong." (Haydon)
 15. "The mental ability of the population is such that the religion of the average person will always necessarily contain a certain amount of superstition." Do you agree? Give reasons.
 16. Give a number of specific illustrations of the difference between morality and religion.
 17. Of what value is a study of the religious practices of primitive peoples?
 18. Show precisely how each of the following secured adaptations to the Unknown:
(a) animism, (b) totemism, (c) ancestor-worship, (d) idolatry, (e) pantheism.
 19. Discuss each of the great modern religions as an "expression of the desire on the part of man to come into more perfect relations with the unknown powers of the universe."

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CHAPTER XXVI

THE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF RELIGION

If, as Leuba maintains, the end of religion is not to be found in its answers to questions concerning the existence and nature of God but in its power to expand and enrich living, then the truth or the falsity of the intellectual content of religion is not a primary social concern. Whether a given organization of emotions and activities around values *believed* to be significant results in a larger and a more satisfying life is the important issue. This was clearly recognized by Jesus when he said, "I am come that they might have life and that they might have it more abundantly."¹ The intellectual content of religion may, of course, contribute materially to such ends, but the significant social functions of religion are essentially non-intellectual services.

Religion Affords Emotional Release

Social interaction necessarily develops tension. When personalities seek to function on an expanding scale, they inevitably come into conflict with each other because the environment affords limited facilities for such expansion. Conflict results. Tension and strain always accompany conflict. These produce emotional excitement which, in turn, creates new centers of personal energy. Or, the situation may be such as to develop conflict between incompatible elements within the personality. Again, the changing social *milieu* may place individuals in new and unfamiliar circumstances with the result that the ordinary and the expected are replaced by the extraordinary and unexpected. Confusion and uncertainty as to the proper course of action will then generate additional pent-up energy and increase tension. In such situations, religion may resolve the strain and release the pent-up emotions by suggesting a solution of the problem and a course of action which is sanctioned and sustained by the experience of the organized groups of which he is a member. Religion is thus a mode of relaxation of significant social value.²

Groups, as well as individuals, are frequently, in fact continuously, confronted with critical situations which involve decisions of serious consequence to the welfare of its members. Faced with mysterious and apparently uncon-

¹ John 10 10

² G. T. W. Patrick, *The Psychology of Relaxation* (Boston, 1916), pp. 85-86.

trollable forces, emotional reactions are held in suspense because the group is perplexed as to what course to pursue. Tension is developed when the group is thus projected into the realm of the unknown. Religion provides an outlet for such highly charged emotional states through rituals and ceremonies which *open channels of action for restrained feelings*. Traditional religious beliefs supply the group with working hypotheses which explain the unexpected and the mysterious. Such hypotheses furnish a basis of action, give men assurance, and thus offset the disorganizing effects of occult powers. "Psychologically regarded, the function of religion therefore is to restore men's confidence when it is shaken by the unknown."²

Religion also offers socially handicapped persons a means of escape from the drabness and monotony of life. Religion renders such individuals and groups a two-fold service—first, it affords catharsis for a restricted emotional life by providing a normal avenue of release; and secondly, it gives opportunity for self-expression through approved behavior patterns. Starved, thwarted and disorganized personalities are thus supplied with fellowship, freedom and purpose. Those whose lives are pinched, pauperized, oppressed or inglorious in this life are offered the rewards of a richer, fuller future life. This is a valuable social function because it renders a present environment tolerable until a more favorable one can be provided. The moral or ethical nature of this service is a secondary consideration.

Religion Provides Social Motivation

Religion not only gives expression to man's high desires but it also sets up important social objectives for human behavior. It seeks to develop insight into the final values in human experience and to describe the perfect conditions in which the human struggle should be carried on. Religion then imposes imperative demands for achievement along the lines thus laid down. It insists that "its rewards are secured only after struggle and effort; its satisfactions are gained not by retreat but by attack."⁴ Religion impels to conduct through beliefs which supply an understanding of environment, through feelings and emotions which center about the values emerging from human experience and through a conscience which gives direction and control to behavior. Religion thus becomes a manner of living rather than a preparation for death.

Religion not only sets standards for human conduct but it stimulates behavior consistent with those standards. Attitudes toward the common good, toward ideal values, toward socially desirable ends are cultivated. Sympathy, love of justice, devotion to human welfare are encouraged; greed, passion,

² R. R. Marett, *Anthropology* (New York, 1912), pp. 211-212.

⁴ S. N. Stevens, *Religion in Life Adjustments* (New York, 1930), p. 35.

selfishness are condemned. Religion objectifies such social ideals as are current in the thought and mores of the day. It seeks control of man's inner life in which it comes to grips with ignorance, prejudice, bitterness, pessimism, instability, "waywardness" and "sin." States of mind that bring consolation, satisfaction and peace are induced when effort is exerted toward realization of established values, and fear, self-condemnation and unrest, when conduct runs counter to social ideals.

Religion Socializes

To the extent to which religion inculcates values which have developed out of significant group experience, religion socializes the individual and the group because conduct is canalized toward ends which are "more-than-individual." In such conduct the individual "embraces as his own the needs and the interests on which his group has put the stamp of approval."⁵ Religion thus impresses upon the individual the socially approved ideals of his age, and helps him to curb his purely selfish interests when these conflict with group-values; that is, the individual may be induced to find his personal satisfactions in the pursuit of social interests through socially approved channels. "When religion looks with indifference upon hunger, poverty, suffering, sorrow, injustice, it is obvious that it does not socialize. If, however, it lifts its followers above such feelings as suspicion, jealousy, anger, hate and greed, its social rôle cannot be called into question."⁶ The religious doctrine of the brotherhood of man has been especially potent in modifying such feelings and the conduct which they stimulate. Religion socializes, then, when it gives the individual the behavior patterns which facilitate constructive social interaction.

Religion Facilitates Adjustment

Religion is both a means of escape from the maladjustments of modern life and an agency for facilitating accommodation to existing situations. Religion eases adaptation (a) by harmonizing interests of the individual with those of the larger life of which he is a part, that is, with the community and ultimately with the universe; (b) by so motivating the individual that his personal activity does not conflict with group achievement but promotes it; (c) by calling to the attention of significant individuals and groups existing conditions and relationships characterized by injustice, suffering and unnecessary hardship; (d) by seeking the modification of environment and of culture so as to provoke a fuller, richer social interaction; (e) by conserving for human

⁵ C. C. Josey, *Psychology of Religion* (New York, 1927), p. 57.

⁶ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1930), p. 383.

purposes and practice the values that seem to embody significant experience; (f) by resolving mental conflicts and releasing pent-up energy; (g) by developing working hypotheses with respect to the Unknown which supply a basis for action; and (h) by giving men confidence and hope in the presence of hostile or uncontrolled forces.

Religion Is a Therapeutic Agent

Belief in God and in a hereafter have been found to be valuable and efficient clinical aids especially in the treatment of mental and nervous disorders. Dr. Sadler, for example, holds that "outside of surgical disorders, contagious diseases and accidents, nine tenths of all the sickness and suffering that comes to a doctor is directly or indirectly the result of mental states and the nervous attitude of the patient. They belong to the domain of mental medicine, and it is in this realm that religion functions as a master mind-cure."⁷ According to this physician, religion can also function for those afflicted with organic disorders, especially of the incurable type, by minimizing suffering and externalizing thought. In such cases religion is not a curative agent. "It ministers to incurables, however, by promoting fortitude, patience which helps the individual to pass through the ordeal of suffering attendant upon incurable disease."⁸

The psychologist and psychiatrist also find a therapeutic value in religion as an experience which may be either creative or repressive in nature. "Religious devotion may become the basis for an effective re-integration and reorganization of the emotional life of the individual" who has suffered emotional disaster or who needs a sufficiently broad perspective upon which to build a life history.⁹ Emotional instability and inadequacy develop from conflicts between the rational and the emotional factors especially where compulsive desires are forcefully repressed. Religion may correct the disintegrating physical and mental effects of worry, fear and anxiety upon the delicate machinery of the autonomic system which controls such involuntary processes as digestion, circulation of the blood and other bio-chemical functions. Religious faith produces joyous types of emotion, it energizes rather than inhibits, it relaxes rather than strains. It may thus be an important factor in maintaining or restoring the basic equilibrium of the body. Prayer has also been found to have therapeutic value in that it assists in the reorganization of the emotional and thought life of the individual by re-focusing attention. Religion

⁷ "Religion as a Remedy for Personal and Social Maladjustments," Betts, Eiselen and Coe, *Religion and Conduct* (New York, 1930), p. 165.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

⁹ Stevens, "Method of Applying Religion as a Therapeutic Agent," Betts, Eiselen and Coe, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

has significant limitations as a therapeutic agent, but nevertheless it may render a valuable service wherever the emotional life is disturbed.

Religion Stabilizes Social Relationships

Because it can organize personality around approved emotional and behavior patterns, religion tends to stabilize the relationships of the individual, especially those about which the great emotions center. Rapid changes in these relationships often bring imperfect adjustments or introduce strain into adjustments already made. Religion may render a service in such situations by establishing "in the individual's mind a new conception of the nature of institutions and personalities."¹⁰ By thus helping the individual to interpret his social environment and its changes religion gives him a feeling of security. With its "ultimate truths," "immutable laws" and "eternal verities," religion provides individuals and groups with a support upon which they may rely in a world of change and maladjustment. Whenever experience is precarious or unsatisfactory, a degree of stability may be secured by giving recognition and status through the doctrines that men are the children of God and that they possess personalities that should be revered. Chaotic social relationships and a meaningless cosmos also take on purpose and significance through promises of an immortality which transcends the shifts of time and circumstance.

Religion Is a Means of Social Control

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Since religion seeks to conserve the significant values that have developed from human experience by the inculcation of standards of behavior and insistence upon their practice, religion is an effective means of social control. It stirs those inner compulsions necessary to satisfying social relationships because it places the individual in a frame of mind where he desires to do what the group desires him to do. "Humility, reverence for, and obedience to, established powers" are the virtues it exalts. Belief that political authority is divinely constituted, that the officials of the state are "the servants of God," that the mores are sacred, and that laws are written by the hand of God, secures "an inner acquiescence and voluntary conformity" to group standards which greatly enhances the cohesion of the social group and renders coercion unnecessary. The religious have always been law-abiding.

In canalizing conduct toward socially desirable ends religion has employed various means. Supernatural beings were believed to keep account of the good and the evil deeds of individuals and to call for reckonings. Souls were thought

¹⁰ J. L. Gillin, *Social Pathology* (New York, 1933), p. 152.

to go through a series of incarnations, each successive experience on a higher or lower plane depending upon the righteousness of their conduct in the preceding incarnation. A heaven was created in which the good were to be recompensed for their godliness and a hell in which the wicked were to be punished for their sins. Deceased loved ones were believed to be gladdened by, or distressed with, the conduct of the living. Punishment for those who transgressed "the higher law of the group" was not reserved solely for an after-life. Penances, fasts, pilgrimages, alms and vigils were believed to be means of immediate atonement for misdeeds. Such expiation was thought to guarantee the penitent a future life as satisfying as that of the godly.¹¹

Throughout the ages, therefore, religion has imposed a discipline which taught men to control themselves in their social relations. The limitations of the human regulative organization were overcome by conceptions of omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent spirits or beings from whom the individual could not escape. Religion thus constructed "a framework of disciplinary habit, education, symbol and usage, the most powerful teachers mankind has ever known."¹² Christianity, in more recent times, has substituted control through love for the control through fear which characterized most earlier religions. Whatever its emotional appeal, however, religion, and religion alone, supplies the inner compulsions to any behavior that is above the minimum prescribed by law. For the most part, the law sets forth what *may not* be done if satisfactory group life is to be maintained; religion describes what *should* be done if a fuller, richer life is to be experienced either by the individual or the group.

Religion Integrates Experience

Man has always been haunted by the sense of incompleteness. Economic, political, educational, recreational and esthetic activities bring satisfactions in the form of wealth, power, knowledge and beauty. Since each activity is partial, it never fully satisfies. In fact, participation in a variety of functional processes brings satisfactions of different sorts but they remain more or less disparate and unassimilated. Wealth brings desire for more wealth, power the hunger for more power, knowledge the thirst for more knowledge, beauty an increased sensitivity to ugliness. In spite of these satisfactions, therefore, the individual is unsatisfied. The sense of completeness is secured only when these satisfactions are related to each other and given unity. When the basic urges, which may have been over-expressed or under-expressed, are brought into balance and given final meaning, a sense of completion, of fulfillment is secured. This is

¹¹ E. A. Ross, *Social Control* (New York, 1901), pp. 127-136

¹² A. G. Keller, *Man's Rough Road* (New Haven, 1932), p. 316.

the unique function of religion in all ages and among all sorts and conditions of men.

As a social process, then, religion has certain more or less unique functions, which develop from the organization of emotions and activities around values believed to be socially significant. As a personal experience religion may render other important services. Such services may have great value for the individual but they usually have only indirect social significance. A belief in God, for example, may have important social consequences; belief that He is a Person, or the embodiment of Principle, or Love has meaning chiefly for the individual. This illustrates the essential difference between the sociological and the theological approach to religious experience.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. (a) Religion has been said to be "a defense mechanism by means of which men compensate for their own inadequacy." (Stevens) Do you agree?
(b) Is religion ever legitimately used as a defense mechanism? Explain.
2. What religious function is served by "a sense of the Divine Presence"?
3. Should religion make the individual content with his lot? Why or why not?
4. Does religion heal? Explain.
5. Explain: "Suicide rates vary with religion."
6. Religion, it is said, is opposed to revolution. Do you agree? Explain.
7. Interpret the Ten Commandments (Exodus 20) sociologically. Are these Commandments socially valid? Give reasons.
8. It has been claimed that periods of economic depression are usually accompanied by increased interest in religion. Why might such a claim be valid?
9. "Religion is needed to provide purpose, unity and coherence to life." (North) Do you agree? Why or why not?
10. Show how faith may be therapeutic? Illustrate.
11. What are the limitations of religious therapeutics?
12. Why does the religionist resent the statement of a certain scientist that man is merely "a tiny lump of impure carbon and water in a meaningless cosmos of blind and brutal force"?
13. Should religion restrain or liberate? Explain.
14. Discuss the validity of supernatural sanctions.
15. "Religion is the only complete experience." Do you agree? Give reasons.
16. What additional illustrations can you give between *personal* religion and *social* religion?

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CHAPTER XXVII

THE CHURCH: A SOCIAL INSTITUTION

WHILE the school is the institution especially devised and equipped to carry on the process of formal education, it is easily demonstrated that education is by no means confined to the school. Participation in the educative process is possible without actual enrollment in an educational institution. Because of its specialized functioning, however, the school greatly facilitates the transmission of the social heritage. Similarly, the church facilitates the religious process for those who participate in its organized activities, but much vivid religious experience may be had outside of religious organization. Some persons do not make their adaptations to the Unknown directly through the church. For the most part, however, individuals find that the church greatly facilitates such adaptations.

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION

The church may be defined as *a set of human relationships organized to facilitate adaptation to the Unknown*. As such it is, of course, a man-made institution. Man did not create the Unknown but he did devise hypotheses, techniques and organization in order to establish working relations with Unseen Powers. His religion represents an organization of his emotions with respect to the Unknown; the church organizes the overt activities believed to secure satisfactory adjustments to the Unknown. It is to be noted in this connection that few, if any, of the inspired originators of the great modern religions organized churches. It was their disciples who developed religious organization that they might more effectively promulgate the teachings of their inspired leaders. The sacredness of the church, therefore, is not a question of its source, but of the attitudes of its members.

The church, like other social institutions, is not an end in itself but a means to an end. "As an institution," says Keller, "it is the framework of customs, rites, symbols, phrases, scriptures, apparatus, altars, costumes and various other details."¹ Through the coöperative employment of these devices the church assists the individual to set up working relations with his spiritual

¹ Sumner and Keller, *The Science of Society* (New Haven, 1927), Vol. II, p. 429

environment. The church thus becomes "the institutionalized form of a certain system of beliefs in the supernatural"² put into practice to promote adjustment to significant, but uncomprehended, situational factors. Religious organization does not bring about such adjustment; it provides the social machinery which facilitates adaptation to the Unknown. What the individual accomplishes by the use of religious mechanisms, he, in large part, determines. The church no more adjusts than the school educates.

Soares asserts that the church is "a fellowship in which people help one another to believe the things they must believe to carry on certain practices which they conceive to be important, to achieve moralities which seem to them of value, to conserve loyalties which they regard as the highest in life."³ The church, that is, seeks an exemplification of values believed to be significant. If such values are to be made permanently and continuously serviceable to the group, it is obvious that they must be institutionalized. Values not so organized are soon lost in the maze of subsequent human experience. Collective effort to exemplify such values, however, not only conserves an important part of the social heritage but also enriches the living of those who participate. Unless religious organization possesses communal aspects, therefore, it fails, in so far, of being a social institution. The church may induce, but it can not force, the canalization of conduct toward group ideals.

"Religious congregations," it has been said, "are, in general, controlled and manipulated groups."⁴ Crowd phenomena are, for the most part, lacking. Religious groups usually have both a past and a future; their activity is "guided by a body of memories and behavior patterns." They are groups "that have met before and reassemble to repeat an experience that gave pleasurable, inspired feelings at previous times." Religious groups, for the most part, escape the spontaneity, the impermanence and the irresponsibility of the crowd. The revival meeting is an exception which, perhaps, proves the rule. Orgiastic crowd behavior is not characteristic of most established churches. In fact, many church congregations are "virtually only sympathetic audiences" whose religious exercises are routinary and non-stimulating. "From this point of view the church is an agency that has been developed, and itself has developed machinery, for reinstating the pleasurable emotional feeling of inspiration that comes from participation"⁵ in a type of collective behavior directed toward approved ends.

To accomplish these objectives religious groups develop organizations, plan

² Gillin, Dittmer, Colbert, *Social Problems* (New York, 1932), p. 365.

³ T. G. Soares, *Religious Education* (Chicago, 1928), pp. 57-58.

⁴ Reuter and Hart, *Introduction to Sociology* (New York, 1933), p. 485.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *ad. lib.*

structures and devise techniques which inculcate religious beliefs and recover religious feeling. The behavior of the religious group is hence essentially ritualistic. Religious feeling is experienced through worship—an activity which aims at a “collective emotionalizing of ideals” by making the values of the group “so precious that the worshipper cannot be content until those ideals are attained.”⁶ Through meetings at regular intervals church assemblies not only afford opportunity to renew the feelings of elation and security which the worshipper so highly prizes, but they also rekindle the inner compulsions to conduct of a higher order. Observances, such as the Lord’s Supper, emotionally strengthen the religious group by establishing vicarious contact with the Great Master or by recalling significant incidents in His career. The celebration of such festivals as the Passover, Christmas, Easter and Pentecost maintains feelings of unity, continues the assurance of divine guidance and leadership and restores confidence among “the chosen people.” Temples and cathedrals are visible symbols of the Deity’s presence—in these the worshipper may come into direct contact with the Unknown. Synagogues, church edifices and parish halls house the activities of the group which is making its adjustments to uncomprehended factors in the human situation. Through pulpit and church school, the religious group acquires the traditional heritage which gives the members common ideals, common beliefs, common behavior patterns. By means of such symbolic devices and ritualistic procedures, the religious congregation acquires unity and solidarity.

The organization of religious congregations, however, not only canalizes religious behavior through ritual and discipline, but it also includes a more or less elaborate grouping of the laity and the clergy. The religious group early discovered that “religion tends to lose itself in shallows unless the local congregation is knit up with others into a general church.”⁷ Such organization provides the church with a system of polity that gives it prestige and status on a broader social base than the local community affords. Beliefs are also organized into creeds, and bodies of doctrine or dogma which standardize the mental patterns of religious organizations. These give a common basis of interpretation of, and common approaches to relationships with, the Unknown. Authority is then accorded the current organization of personnel, activity and belief by the ascription of “divine” origins and attributes to the separate aspects of the organization. The authority of the church derives its potency, therefore, from the attitudes of the group toward its own creations. Such authority is genuine in so far as it sanctions values which have developed out of the experience of the race.

⁶ E. E. Aubrey, *Religion and the Next Generation* (New York, 1931), p. 170.

⁷ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1930), p. 285.

THE ORIGIN OF THE CHURCH

Institutionalized religion is a product of Western civilization. In Far Eastern countries religious devotees support a shrine or patronize a priest much as occidentals support a hospital or patronize a physician. In fact, persons worshipping different gods often seek the services of the same priest and the same shrine. Denominational specialization was unknown to Eastern civilizations until it was introduced by the Western missionary movement. Orientals, in the main, regard religion as a private affair; group organization for adaptation to the mysterious environmental factors is not characteristic of Oriental religions, many of which ante-date Western civilization.

The organized church was unknown among the early Greeks. Religion served them by making men feel "at home in world." To the Greek mind nature was at times benign, at times malign, depending upon the mood of the spirits which were thought to "haunt every cave, fountain, ocean, mountain, wood, grave, marsh, pasture and stream." All phenomena of nature were thus "transformed into divine and conscious agents to be propitiated by prayer, interpreted by divination and comprehended by passions and desires identical with those which stir and control mankind."⁸ Greek religion interpreted the passions within man by converting them into beings like himself whom he could therefore understand. He could thus dispense with fear and doubt, because no ethical teachings, no moral precepts, no authoritative behavior patterns were laid down by his gods who themselves were often confused, uncertain and in conflict with one another. The gods of the early Greek were "superior to him not in spiritual or even moral attributes, but in outward gifts such as, strength, beauty, and immortality." His relation to them was "not inward and spiritual but external and mechanical."⁹

Religion was not separately institutionalized by the Greeks. In its social aspects Greek religion was an essential aspect of the state which was conceived to have "a special protecting deity to whom its origin and continuance were due." Since the gods "summed up the ideals of Greek corporate life," religion was "the spiritual side of their political life." Yet there was no priesthood and little routinary ceremony. Sacrifices were offered to the gods, not as spiritual service, but as presents "for which they were bound to an equivalent return." Atonement in Greek religious thought was merely the discharge of a debt owed to the gods. Furies were believed to punish the guilty. Bargain rather than worship characterized the relations of gods and men. Temples were erected by the state as expressions of the beautiful which might please the gods and thus

⁸ G. L. Dickinson, *The Greek View of Life* (New York, 1906), p. 7.

⁹ *Ibid*, Ch 1, *ad lib*.

win their favor. These temples were supported by funds from the public treasury and not by groups of adherents to a particular creed organized to pursue the teachings of an inspired religious leader.

The religious experience of the Romans centered about (a) the gods of the household which were worshipped in the home, each family having its separate and peculiar deities, and (b) the national gods to whom temples were erected by the state. In these a numerous priesthood functioned ceremonially. Roman religion, on the whole, was, like the Greek, a "religion of signs, portents, omens, auguries, visions and dreams." It was a religion of material sacrifice in which men bargained with the gods for material benefit and made a material payment. It was a religion devoid of spiritual value, aspiration and communion. Roman religion, like the Greek, was formally a function of the state, not of independent religious groups. In its social aspects Roman religion differed from that of the Greeks in its elaborate organization of a numerous priesthood ranging through quindecimvirs, augurs and flamens to the College of Pontifices presided over by the Pontifex Maximus. These functionaries were invested with authority over observances, interpretations and decisions regarding prayers and sacrifices.¹⁰ Such organization provided patterns for later church polity, but Roman religion never developed the churchly form of religious organization.

The religious function does not take on the aspects of an independent social institution until it develops a structure of its own; that is, until, in addition to "a body of beliefs, sentiments and practices," there is an organization that "integrates, administers and perpetuates them" for specific groups.¹¹ Religious organization seems first to have assumed such aspects in the synagogues established by the Jews after their return from the captivity in Babylon. In these synagogues, supported by a limited constituency, a given body of people met for stated religious services in which an ancient and "sacred" literature was read and interpreted. The folk-lore of the Jewish people was thus transmitted to successive generations through traditional and symbolic practices. These early synagogues were, in fact, community centers, for they served not only as a church in which religious meetings were held but also as a city hall where justice was administered and as a public school in which elementary educational activities were carried on. The synagogue, therefore, became an effective means for controlling social attitudes and insuring the perpetuation of traditional values. As a result, the early Jewish communities acquired unusual stability in spite of their contacts with surrounding peoples. So stable did they become,

¹⁰ W. W. Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People from Earliest Times to the Age of Augustus* (New York, 1911).

¹¹ Reuter and Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

indeed, that eventually their social procedures hardened into inflexible forms. In the meantime, however, religious organization was separated from the family and the state as a specialized institution with a unique structure.¹²

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHURCH

Unlike the Greeks and the Romans, the Jews worshipped *one* God,—a God of judgment and righteousness who exercised an especial guardianship over his “chosen people.” During centuries of uninterrupted devotion to such a God, Judaism developed an impressive body of fixed doctrine, an elaborate system of prescribed ceremonies and a deadening formalism in religious practice that mechanicalized its religious experience. The advent of Jesus of Nazareth with his religion of love and service into this tradition-hardened social order marked the beginning of a new epoch in the history of religious organization. Repudiated by his own people, the Jews, put to death as a dangerous political revolutionist, the religion of Jesus nevertheless persisted because its content afforded so effective an interpretation of man’s relations with the Unknown. In the Pauline communities established first among the Jews of the Dispersion and then, more significantly, among certain Gentile peoples, Christianity developed a unity of purpose, a simplicity and spontaneity of structure and a loyalty to common interests that the mystery religions, so prevalent at the time, lacked. Religious functions were so fully integrated in these early groups and religious procedure so carefully adapted to the needs of particular communities that the Christian religion steadily won out in competition with its early rivals.

During the post-Apostolic period Christianity organized for a more definite impact upon its environment. Because of the political and social status of the Jewish and Gentile peoples then under Roman authority, Christianity, from the beginning, promised its adherents a new social order—a Kingdom of God—in which the wrongs of their present situation would be removed. A program for attaining such an objective became essential to the maintenance of a movement which was losing its initial momentum. Christianity had advanced the doctrine that each individual was Spirit-directed. Such a doctrine, it is obvious, might easily become divisive, especially as the movement prospered. During the post-Apostolic period, therefore, Christians devised ways and means for controlling contentious inclinations. The early Christian communities were consolidated, unified and integrated by means of a common Apostolic official, a common Apostolic Book and a common Apostolic faith. Christianity was henceforth represented as a divinely ordered society, whose history

¹² S. M. Case, *Social Origins of Christianity* (Chicago, 1923), pp. 42–43.

came down from ancient times through orderly and institutionalized procedures organized by a central church, whose government was under the careful supervision of a stated leadership.¹³ By such means the early Christians checked the disintegration which might develop from internal conflict and rendered their position in their contemporary social order more permanent and also more attractive.

Thus strengthened, Christianity was apparently able to meet the religious needs of the Gentile community more completely than its rivals.

Whether one desired protection from dreaded powers of evil, or a sense of personal satisfaction through participation in sacraments, or instructions from a divine book that had been handed down from a remote antiquity, or assurances of union with a Savior-God, truly human in his sympathies and truly divine in his character, or a feeling of social security realized through membership in a select company of one's fellows, all cherishing like interests and like purposes, or even a more material good in the economic advantages resulting from patronage secured through membership in the society—whether it was one or all of these things that one desired the Christian movement by the last quarter of the second century was in a position to meet fully the demands made upon its power. By a process of gradual growth, it had come to include a wide variety of interests within the range of its activities, its whole social system was now regarded as specifically authenticated by deity, and hence was thought to be capable of furnishing mortals perfect guidance in their quest for safety amid all the supernatural forces resident in their environment.¹⁴

Christianity eventually drew into its membership men of talent and culture and built up a numerous following, in spite of the persecutions decreed by the Roman emperors because of its non-conformity to the religious policies of the state. By the end of the fourth century Christianity had attained a political and social strength that commanded the recognition of Roman political authorities. As a strategic political move, Christianity was made the legal religion of the Roman state while all its rivals were proscribed.

For twelve centuries thereafter, the church was closely linked with the state. During this time the church gradually assumed a dominant rôle in the social organization of the time. Not content to confine its functioning to spiritual matters, it secured control of familial affairs by declaring marriage a sacrament. Since the church alone possessed the facilities for training the young, education also became a function of the church. Ecclesiastical courts, with powers commensurate to those of secular courts, administered justice in

¹³ Case, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-191.

¹⁴ Case, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-197 By permission of the University of Chicago Press.

competition with a temporal judiciary. With such prerogatives the church eventually became superior to the state. Kings received their crowns from the hands of the Pope and lesser public officials often held their offices at the pleasure of the ecclesiastics. The church also became the great landlord of all times. During the Middle Ages churchmen acquired from one fifth to one third of all landed property in Europe and held it free from taxation. Of necessity the church employed an extensive personnel in the discharge of its many functions. By the fifteenth century the dominion of the church in political and economic, as well as spiritual affairs, was complete. It was united, wealthy, highly organized, powerful and aggressive.

The same forces which gave the church supremacy, however, also brought about its decline. The alliance of the Papacy with temporal authorities gave the church important political powers, but it also stamped the head of the church as worldly; the commercialization of religious functions filled the coffers of the church treasury, but it sapped the clergy of its spiritual power; the expansion of ecclesiastical organization to a point where it threatened public welfare brought recognition to the church as a secular power, but, in the end, it cost the church its status as the champion of human liberty. When the deterioration of the monasteries, through the worldliness of the monks, had stripped from the church much of its sanctity, its degradation was profound. Reformation became inevitable.

The Eastern Church had separated itself from the Western Church after Constantine. This separation was not officially recognized, however, until 1054. The Reformation (1517) split the Western Church into Protestant and Catholic branches. The Catholic Church, purged of its dross by the relentless attacks of Luther, Wycliffe and other protestants, persisted because of its compact organization, its creedal homogeneity, its absolute authority, its dominant sacerdotal caste, the primacy of the Bishop of Rome and its capacity for inner regeneration. Since the Council of Trent in 1564, however, the Western Catholic Church was forced to recognize territorial and national churches which were bound to Rome only by theoretical ties. Especially under the influence of Puritanism, Protestantism, on the other hand, was riven into numerous denominations. Protestantism became "a religion of the Book"—a book which has been, and is, variously interpreted. Since Protestantism recognized no hierarchical authority, one interpretation of the Book became as valid as any other, with the result that more than 200 separate denominations are now listed by the United States Census Bureau. It must also be noted that these denominations have been further subdivided by the struggle between Fundamentalism and Modernism.

PRESENT STATUS OF THE CHURCH

In spite of sectarianism, however, "institutionalized religion as represented by the church," asserts Gillin, "is far from insignificant either materially or spiritually."¹⁵ Statistics confirm this assertion. According to the census tabulations for 1926, the churches of the United States listed 54,624,976 members divided among some 213 denominations and 231,983 organizations, as compared with 200 denominations and 226,718 organizations reporting 41,926,854 members in 1916.¹⁶ Adjusting these figures for changes in the definition of "a member," Fry finds that the increase in church membership for the period 1906 to 1926 has almost exactly kept pace with the growth in population.¹⁷ Some evidence has been presented to show that, since 1930, the growth in church membership has steadily outstripped growth in the country's population.¹⁸ Fry's adjusted figures show that fifty-five out of every one hundred of the adult population are church members—the ratio of men to women being as four is to five. Weber, however, finds only 47.6 per cent of the population members of a church in 1930.¹⁹

In 1926 the churches in the United States possessed property valued at several billions of dollars; namely, church buildings, \$3,840,000,000; parsonages, \$500,000,000 and other property such as educational buildings, hospitals, homes for the aged, missions, printing plants, office buildings, et cetera, \$7,000,000,000.²⁰ Some 21,000,000 children were enrolled in the various church schools in 1926. The public school enrollment for the same year was 24,740,000. Enrollment in church and Sunday Schools, therefore, was only 15 per cent less than that of the public schools. These schools are administered by some 2,168,000 officers and teachers.²¹ The annual expenditures of all denominational churches in the United States for the same year totaled \$817,000,000 or about 1 per cent of the national income. These expenditures increased 149 per cent in the decade 1916–1926. The per capital church expenditure was \$18.44 in 1926—an increase of 50 per cent over 1916. During this period the national income increased only two thirds as rapidly as the increase in annual church expenditures.²²

¹⁵ Gillin, Dittmer, Colbert, *op. cit.*, p. 465.

¹⁶ M. Phelan, *New Handbook for all Denominations* (Nashville, 1930), p. 307.

¹⁷ C. L. Fry, *The United States Looks at Its Churches* (New York, 1930), p. 7.

¹⁸ G. L. Kieffer, "Annual Report on Church Statistics," *Christian Herald*; cited in *Literary Digest*, July 8, 1933.

¹⁹ H. C. Weber, *Yearbook of American Churches* (New York, 1933), p. 299.

²⁰ Fry, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 56 ff.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 90 ff.

It is to be noted, of course, that these figures cover a period characterized by unprecedented economic prosperity for all institutions. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that economic depression is one of the crisis situations which usually brings greater numbers to the pews. When account is taken of all factors in the situation, however, it is doubtful if the evidence supports the sophisticated attitudes toward the church so frequently taken by certain modern groups. The church may be functioning badly in the present social situation; but this must also be said of the state. The presence of pathological conditions does not necessarily indicate institutional decadence; such conditions may only reveal the need for readjustment.

SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE CHURCH

The church institutionalizes religion. Such institutionalization serves a two-fold purpose: (a) conserve the significant social and moral values which have developed out of generations of human experience, and (b) render personal religion more effective by the use of collective resources. Group as well as personal adaptations to the mysterious forces of the environment are frequently frustrated by a social situation which only collective effort can correct. By association with others such situations may be changed so as to facilitate a fuller, richer experience for larger numbers of people. Viewed as a specialized social institution, then, the church performs the following social functions:

1. *The transmission of ethical codes.* For centuries now the Church has been the chief conservator of the mores. It has standardized the religious beliefs, emotions and practices which appeared to have social value. To these codes it has given other-worldly sanctions because they embodied the highest ideals that men conceived. But the church has not only conserved these codes; it has also propagated them through successive generations. During the plastic period of life it implants standards of behavior and inculcates habits and attitudes of mind appropriate to these standards; during adulthood it keeps these ideas alive by focusing the attention of its members upon the ethical aspects of behavior and by organizing activities for achieving moral objectives. In fact, the church is the source of moral patterns for domestic relations, political life and industry; it supplies standard of conduct for every social relation. Note in this connection the Ten Commandments given to the Israelites by Moses.

2. *Creation of a spiritually helpful environment.* According to its vision, the church seeks to create "an environment in which the ideas and sentiments which ennoble life are communicated and heightened by social suggestion and sympathetic radiation."²³ Through the creative interaction of personalities

²³ E. C. Hayes, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology* (New York, 1925), p. 686.

the Church gives social support to the otherwise morally and religiously insufficient individual in his higher life. The Church is thus an agency for moral and spiritual aspiration. Association with others is placed on a plane which is freed from hatred, bitterness and greed, by participation in "objective and organized meditation," worship and other religious ritual. On appropriate occasions, too, the church functions as "a giver of comfort and courage" to those in trouble. It may also reestablish wholesome mental states in those suffering personal disorganization. In various ways, then, the Church offers escape from demoralization, sordidness and frustration.

3. *Application of religion to life.* All sorts and conditions of men, at all times and in all places, need to relate their working hypotheses with respect to the Unknown to the vital issues of life. "Happiness," says Gillin, "still consists in the adjustment of the individual to his material environment and to his fellows. While science may help solve the former, there is a place for the enlightened idealism of religion in the solution of the latter problem that no individual questing for happiness can afford to overlook."²⁴ Men and women generally need to have "the good life" interpreted to them in terms they can understand and in ways appropriate to their particular social situation. New standards and new ideals are not so much needed as new techniques for applying them to the problems at hand, especially when these transcend scientific knowledge. When science has discovered facts, religion, through the church, indicates how they may be utilized most satisfactorily to meet human needs. Unless scientific laws and religious dogmas can be translated into action patterns they are, in fact, merely bits of intellectualism. The church should vitalize such laws and concepts.

4. *Direction of behavior toward socially approved objectives.* Hayes holds that "Society needs one organization with no commercial ends to seek, no axes to grind, in order to direct, foster and focus the ethical opinions and sentiments of the community upon every question which has ethical significance as well as organize practical activities in the promotion of ethical aims."²⁵ Representing an impressive collectivity the church has power to impel desired social behavior by sanctioning "right" social arrangements. This power is derived from the ability of the church to stir the social emotions and to direct them upon social objectives. These socially approved ends lie beyond the prescription of the law-maker and the courts who express and enforce the will of the group only with respect to minimum standards of behavior. It is the province of the church to set goals and standards beyond those laid down in the law and to urge their approximation. In its pulpit the church has a plat-

²⁴ Gillin, Dittmer and Colbert, *op. cit.*, pp. 472-473.

²⁵ Hayes, *op. cit.*, p. 687.

form of discussion the like of which no other institution or organization can command. In securing plus-behavior, therefore, the church has no peer.

5. *A center of social interaction.* Until recent times the church has always served as a center of social life for specific groups of people. In fact, a very significant part of the social life of the early community developed about the Sunday and mid-week religious services of the Church. Here friends and neighbors gathered not only for religious activities, but to discuss common problems, to exchange political views, to "visit" and to court. The development of improved means of transportation and communication and the rapid increase of specialized social organizations has greatly modified this function. But, for large numbers of people in remote rural communities and in the limited income groups of every community, the church continues to serve as a social and often a community center of significance.

6. *Education for family life.* Since the family produces the human material for which, and with which, the church functions, it is logical that it should give especial attention to familial relationships. A steadily increasing number of Churches, especially in the larger cities, are providing for pre-marital instruction, child and parenthood classes and family counseling, for the purpose of improving the family experience. The requisites for successful familial relationships are thus brought definitely to the attention of those who are actually participating in or who are about to enter upon such relationships. The church does important preventive work of much social value when it thus attempts to eliminate the personal misconceptions, the collective ignorance and the social conditions which jeopardize successful marriage and family relationships. Provided the professional training of clergymen permits, this function may become an important service of the church in a social order that places domestic interaction under increasing strain. Numerous national church bodies have recognized the importance of this function; the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America employs at least one full-time person for the promotion of its family service.

7. *Improvement of the social order.* Since the Church is the conservator and the interpreter of the significant social values that have emerged from the experience of the race, it is under obligation to define and defend necessary social procedure. Obviously the church cannot fulfill and enrich the experience of its members if the social environment blocks its efforts to bring about justice, fair-dealing, brotherly love, honesty, truth-telling and service in human relationships. If the Church cannot socialize selfish individualism and exploitive industrialism, religion fails. With its permanent machinery, division of labor, central administration of resources, trained personnel, the church may organize effectively to bring in "the Kingdom of God"—a social order char-

acterized by social security and normal living for the maximum number of persons. The church has done much—it can do more—to eliminate disease, poverty and incompetence and to increase health, wealth and efficiency. In rendering this service to groups the church may employ either, or both, of the following methods: (a) it may secure improvement of the social order “by cultivating and sensitizing the social conscience,” or (b) it may resort to the more direct tactics of social reform.

Various national church organizations have framed significant programs of social action directed toward the realization of certain social ideals for the existing order. Such programs usually include the subordination of speculation and the profit motive to the creative and coöperative spirit; social planning, control of economic processes for the common good; right of all to the opportunity for self-maintenance; elimination of harmful conditions of labor; social insurance against sickness, accident, want in old age, unemployment; safeguarding work of women; recognition of the right of workers to organize for collective bargaining and social action; abolition of child labor; protection of the family and educational preparation for marriage; economic justice for the farmer; extension of cultural opportunities and social services to rural populations; protection of individual and society from the social, economic and moral waste of traffic in intoxicants and habit-forming drugs; reform of criminal court procedure and of correctional methods and institutions; goodwill and coöperation of all racial, economic and religious groups; repudiation of war, reduction in armaments, and participation in international agencies for peaceable settlement of all controversies; recognition and maintenance of rights and responsibilities of free speech, free assembly and free press.²⁸ Such statements clearly reveal what the church conceives to be its service to the social order.

8. *Provision for a larger social unity.* Social conflict between groups which do not recognize larger loyalties inevitably becomes intense. The church can provide the motives which make men willing to use reason and scientific methods in solving their economic and social problems. The church can bring diverse peoples and traditions into contact with those ideas and principles of thought which furnish a basis of coöperation for common interests. The church can mercilessly attack the selfish passions of men; it can insist upon the worth and the dignity of human personality; and it can supply a spiritual conception of national life. The church cannot eliminate narrowness or bigotry, but it can bear constant witness to the moral unity of the race and the necessity for conduct motivated by sympathetic understanding and good-will. The church can promote international friendship.

²⁸ Weber, *op. cit.*, pp. 319–320.

The social functions described above are those which the modern church may now perform as a specialized institution which conserves and propagates tested ethical values. In spite of its own moral lapses, the church of the past has contributed notably to the improved social arrangements of the present. In various historical periods the church has championed religious tolerance, personal liberty and political justice; in more recent times it has elevated womanhood, supported democratic movements and promoted education. Since the beginning it has rendered social service to the unfortunate. For the most part these functions have now been taken over by specialized social organizations. To the church, however, belongs the credit for the initiation of such important social services.

RÔLES OF THE CLERGYMAN

Beginning with the Pauline Communities the Church has always organized a diversity of talent for its institutional functions. "God has set some in the church," said Paul, "first apostles, secondly prophets, thirdly teachers, then miracles, then gifts of healing, helps, governments, divers kinds of tongues." ²⁷ Some of these functionaries have disappeared from the personnel of religious organizations; some have merely taken on other designations such as bishops, vestrymen, trustees, elders or deacons. The rôles assumed by these persons are primarily administrative; as such they have no particular social significance. In the rôles assumed by the priest, minister, rector or pastor, however, the church actually enters the field of its special service. These rôles are:

1. *An authority.* Churches differ in the authority they accord their clergy. The Roman Catholic holds that his Pope derives his authority directly from Deity. Any official utterance of his is regarded as the voice of God. Priests are the interpreters of religious doctrine thus divinely transmitted. It is the duty of laymen to obey. The Lutheran believes that each clergyman is an authority by right of his calling and his insight. Laymen are enjoined to be obedient. The dissenting churches, however, maintain that each individual is an authority because he is Spirit-guided; the clergyman is regarded as "a servant" trained for religious service to the layman. In all churches, however, it is obvious that the clergyman possesses the authority of a specialist in his field. Because of fitness for his duties, because of his professional training and experience he qualifies as an expert in religious matters. "Thus saith the Lord" may be the expression of a personal opinion, but it is at least a professional judgment. Whatever his church may believe to be his relationship to Deity, the clergyman knows more about religion than most laymen.

²⁷ I *Corinthians* 12:38.

2. *A professional interpreter.* Every traditional religious group reverences a sacred literature. This literature is usually ancient—written in times very different from those which confront the present congregation. As new problems arise and the group acquires new experiences in a changed social situation the specific content of its sacred literature becomes antiquated. It is the function of the clergy to interpret these ancient documents in terms of present needs. Such a service is “indispensable in spanning the otherwise impassable gulf that lies between an ancient body of literature representing conditions no longer existent and a present status of society in which new conditions prevail.”²⁸ Unless believers can feel that their sacred books furnish “infallible direction for all time,” religion does not bring the sense of security and fulfillment which they so earnestly desire.

3. *A priest.* The clergyman assumes the rôle of a priest whenever he leads his congregation through various exercises which stir the religious feeling; that is, he “conducts worship”—a procedure by which a reëxperience of religious emotions is secured. By means of processions, chants, responsive readings, antiphonals, candle light, gorgeous robes, prayers, postures, incense, anthems and meditations, the clergyman induces an emotional experience that subdues his congregation, then isolates and re-motivates them. This reinstatement of religious feeling is a prime purpose of the observances of sacraments and of services of worship. In every aspect this rôle of the clergyman is represented as other-worldly.

4. *A preacher.* To inculcate religious belief, and to secure behavior consistent with church creeds, the clergyman delivers sermons in which he castigates, admonishes and exhorts his congregation. By public discourse, prophecy and warning, he develops a religious conscience sensitized to conduct inconsistent with religious objectives. As a preacher, the clergyman inveighs against commercial-mindedness, egotism and skepticism; he denounces vice, sin and greed; he flays exploitation, corruption and injustice; he reproaches selfishness, hatred and prejudice. But this rôle has constructive as well as denunciatory aspects. As a preacher the clergyman implants more human attitudes, instills loftier motives, urges the higher, social virtues and demands the correction of existing evils by challenges to “good deeds.” The preacher, in other words, is a reformer both of men and conditions.

5. *A teacher.* The clergyman also functions as a leader in religious thought. He explains the intellectual aspects of religion, resolves conflicting ideas and applies religion to life. He translates the teachings of great religious leaders, enlightens the religiously uninformed, corrects religious misconceptions and shapes moral sentiment. In some religious groups he assists each individual to

²⁸ Case, *op. cit.*, p. 43-44.

find his own religious truth; in others, he merely expounds established doctrines. Wherever he functions, however, he makes his congregation aware of religious phenomena by information, instruction and experience, he imparts knowledge of religious "truth," he instructs in religious principles, procedures and practices.

6. *A social worker.* In times of personal crisis church members are likely to turn to the clergyman for assistance. When death stalks he is present to comfort and to encourage; when disaster overtakes his "flock," he secures relief; when domestic relations are strained to the breaking point, he tries to reestablish rapport; when sons or daughters disgrace parents, he attempts to return the wayward to approved paths; when men and women are discouraged, defeated or fearful, he strives to reorganize emotional patterns. He ministers to the physically and mentally ill, he befriends the fatherless, the friendless, the widow. He succors the poor, the needy, the disadvantaged. In short, he stands with the members of his parish at all the wind-swept corners of experience where suffering, loneliness and fear lay siege to humankind.

The ideal clergyman, therefore, combines in one personality the scholar, the seer, the saint, the priest, the prophet, the teacher and the social physician. As he plays his rôles the Church and religion become thought and action. To function effectively as the key man in the religious institution requires abundant talent, thorough training and a deep understanding of human nature and human needs. Clergymen lacking in these qualifications will inevitably throw the church into wrong relations with its environment.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. "Membership in the church is the symbolic wish of the childish ego—the wish to return to the mother." (Martin.) Do you agree? Give reasons.
2. Analyze the revival meeting as an institutional technique.
3. The religious group has been called "an egoistic crowd." Comment.
4. Distinguish sociologically between *a church* and *a sect*.
5. Present a social interpretation of the persecution of early Christians by the Roman authorities. (Case, pp. 227 ff.)
6. Account for Christianity's rise to dominance in the Roman Empire. (Case, pp. 219–242.)
7. The cathedral has been called "a pattern church." Explain.
8. What were the social causes of the Reformation? (Consult any good history of the period.)
9. It has been held that the church has always reflected the dominant thought of the times; that is, in the past its thinking was first absolutistic, then feudal, later chivalrous, now democratic. What evidence is there to support this thesis?

Does this mean that the thinking of the church in the future will be socialistic? Explain.

10. Evaluate statistical evidence as a means of indicating the condition or position of the church.
11. Should the church provide recreation for its members, especially the younger? Reasons.
12. Present arguments for and against the parochial school.
13. Should the church secure improvements in the social order directly through social reform or indirectly through cultivating social conscience? Give your reasons.
14. What techniques may the church utilize in molding and sensitizing the social conscience?
15. "The church dare not be subservient either to the state or to the economic order." (J. Davis.) Do you agree? Why or why not?
16. What functions of the church, if any, could be dispensed with or given to other institutions? Would such action result in social gain or social loss? Explain.
17. (a) Which of the clergyman's rôles is most important, sociologically speaking? Give reasons.
(b) Which is most resented? Why?
18. (a) What percentage of the clergyman's sermons should be devoted to current social questions? (Ross.) Give reasons.
(b) Some doubt the clergyman's qualifications for discussing current social questions. Do you share this doubt? Explain.

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CHAPTER XXVIII

SOCIAL EVALUATION OF THE CHURCH

WHEN the church was identified with the state it was, from one point of view, completely socialized, since it was both publicly sanctioned and publicly financed as an authoritative institution. Since the church has been separated from the state, it is obvious that it no longer receives either funds or authority from the political institution. The church was first disestablished by the American colonies. Since then, most countries have divorced religious and political institutions. The withdrawal of authority and financial support from the church by the state has been effected with the consent of religious bodies. Such separation, however, does not exclude the church from the institutional category any more than it excludes the privately endowed educational institution or the social settlement. The church, as well as the settlement and the privately endowed school, remains a set of organized human relationships purposively established and publicly recognized.

The contentment of religious people with the separation of church and state is an evidence of a fundamental change in attitudes. As education has developed extensive bodies of scientific knowledge which greatly facilitate adaptation to and control of environment, dependence upon religious doctrines has diminished. Reliance upon the school with its demonstrable knowledge has displaced confidence in church with its unproved hypotheses. Obviously, it is the function of the state to disseminate bodies of knowledge with technologies that serve common ends. Theology has no such technology but only dogma which may or may not serve such ends. When such knowledge is available, it is obvious that the state should refrain from support of any given set of religious beliefs. Such beliefs are uncertain and the state should not propagate uncertainty. In China, for example, an eclipse of the moon will cause great concern. Elaborate ceremonies are held to prevent the dragon from swallowing the moon. Where astronomers predict eclipses months and years in advance, no such behavior results.

Among the more advanced peoples, therefore, scientific explanations of natural phenomena have taken from religion an important traditional function. In the western world most churches make no attempt to offer supernatural interpretations of natural phenomena. In fact, some religious organ-

izations have practically abandoned belief in supernatural causation; in others, the emphasis has been shifted "to the cultivation of an ethical idealism."¹ Developments in science, especially in the natural and the medical sciences, have removed significant domains from the church. Changes in attitudes and in the manner of life which have come with the developments of machine industry and increased control over natural forces have undermined religious beliefs and weakened ecclesiastical authority. As a result, the power and the influence of institutionalized religion have declined until, among certain intellectual groups, there is complete indifference, if not open hostility to the church. In fact, modern scientific thought perceives two serious dangers in institutionalized religion: (a) that religion tends to become isolated, formal, regimented, external, authoritative and doctrinaire when it is identified with special times, places, acts, ideas and persons regarded as sacred, as set apart from the secular, and hence from normal social interaction; and (b) that religion thus tends to become, not an agency of personal organization and collective adaptation, but a factor in personal and social disintegration since it is likely to render persons and groups harsh, legalistic, formal, casuistic and even cruel. A religion learned by rote and institutionalized into inflexible forms ceases to be socially vital because it is insensitive to human needs.

As a social institution, then, the church has developed certain pathologies which impair the effectiveness of its social functioning.

Lag in Adaptation

American religious organization was developed to meet the needs of those living in simple, and usually rural, social situations. In these the church was a center of community interest. Church membership was, comparatively speaking, homogeneous; at least there was an absence of diverse social and economic stratification in these earlier congregations. These rural folk lived in close contact with nature and the Unknown; they experienced much solitude. Their religious concepts and attitudes reflected the rural situation. In the modern city to which these earlier organizations were transferred in the course of time, church membership must include many and diverse social and economic groups each having different, and often conflicting, interests. Heterogeneity of occupation, education, status, points of view, attitudes and values characterizes the constituency of urban churches. Urban folk seldom come in direct contact with nature; they live in groups always. They are occupied with many activities which have no element of the incomprehensible in them. In the city, too, the church is not a center of community life; on the contrary, it must compete with a variety of organizations for the time and attention of

¹ Reuter and Hart, *Introduction to Sociology* (New York, 1933), p. 197.

its members. A rural religion, Puritanic in quality, highly emotional in content, and ultra-conservative in point of view, will, therefore, be ill-adapted to the cosmopolitan center.² Although efforts have been made to adjust rural religion to the urban situation, the church is still largely unadapted to the needs, attitudes and relationships of the city.

When the church adheres to traditional religious beliefs and moral sanctions evolved in the simpler environment, it inevitably loses touch with a modern life which has moved beyond the boundaries of the social situation of even a half-century ago. A changing social order has thrown men into new relationships; humans are now confronted with situations undreamed when earlier beliefs and sanctions were established. When the church clings to long established doctrines with respect to population, birth control, war (sanctions extended to contestants), sex, divorce and the blessedness of poverty, it takes its stand on issues to which recent social developments have given new meanings. When the church frowns upon dancing, card-playing and leisure *as such*, regardless of the purposes involved, it inveighs against behavior which can be fully justified. Standards and values are not immutable, but relative. Changed conditions require changed norms. "The current mores and the orthodox religion," asserts North, "reflect a type of life that is past. The observance of conventional mores" may not, therefore, represent "an adequate harmonization of the individual with group needs."³

Such a conclusion is inevitable if it is remembered that orthodox religious beliefs were established when man's knowledge of the universe was meager and when he was quite ignorant of the nature of human nature. This is especially significant since "religions were made by man for man." Not only were the thought structures and programs of religion built upon "a naïve understanding of the nature of self,"⁴ but the whole institutional structure was reared upon non-scientific explanations of natural and social phenomena. To hold to traditional beliefs and interpretations is, therefore, a deliberate rejection of the vast body of scientific truth which has been painfully acquired by the social and the natural sciences. That many religious thinkers are exceptions does not disprove the fact that religious thought has lagged behind scientific thought especially during the last half-century in which the latter has progressed unprecedentedly.

If it be true that "the content of the mores and of religious belief and practice is derived from the impact of the group upon its life needs,"⁵ then it fol-

² N. L. Sims, *Elements of Rural Sociology* (New York, 1934), Ch. 21.

³ C. C. North, *Social Problems and Social Planning* (New York, 1932), p. 40.

⁴ E. A. Haydon, *The Quest of the Ages* (New York, 1929), p. 52.

⁵ North, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

lows that the church now finds its effectiveness impaired because it has not adjusted itself to certain significant changes in the group's life needs which have resulted from changes in the group's social situation. Under such conditions the church, and the religion it institutionalizes, will fail to meet those needs and thus become dissociated from actual daily experience. Much truth is relative to the time and the generation involved. When different "times" fall upon "new" generations, a vital religion and a socialized church will adapt its service to the new situation. Only by the continuous elimination of cultural lag can any institution keep abreast of changing social needs.

Religious Dogmatism

When the church insists that its members hold certain specific beliefs with respect to miracles, heaven, hell, creation, immaculate conception, immortality and the like, it is obvious that it attempts to strait-jacket religious thought. When scientific knowledge has revealed the invalidity or fallibility of certain religious beliefs, the church frequently requires that its adherents believe "just the same" or "what remains." Where the teachings of the church are based upon *ipse dixit* authority, and where children are taught doctrines which they must abandon when they grow older, especially when they come in contact with scientific knowledge and scientific methods which are at variance with religious teachings, it is obvious that the church places itself in a position where its authority is unsupported. When puerile religious notions have to be abandoned because they run counter to demonstrable facts, the whole framework of belief as well as membership in the church is likely to be discarded with them. Even when substitutes are at hand, intelligent persons are prone to feel that they have been misled by a crowd psychology which does not seek to verify hypotheses but to vindicate "principles."⁶

Dogmatic intellectualism, of course, often places the church in a position where it is not only assailable but also dishonest. When the church insists upon the acceptance of doctrine which its leaders *know* to be false, when it has one set of beliefs for its disadvantaged and untutored members and another for its wealthy and educated adherents, the church deliberately deceives. When its leaders are "found out," no assertion of divine commission or of special intimacy with "the Lord" will redeem the prestige either of the church or of its clergy. To claim that such doctrines came "by revelation" or "by spiritual inspiration" will not save the day. In fact, resort to such obscurantism only further undermines confidence in churchly procedures. The church jeopardizes its position when it demands that its doctrines must be accepted without ques-

⁶ E. D. Martin, *The Mystery of Religion, A Study in Social Psychology* (New York, 1924), p. 269

tion if the individual is to be religious. To paraphrase an old adage: religion *is* as religion *does*, not as it believes.

Another form of pernicious ecclesiastical dualism which brings the church into disrepute is that of the religious persons who are intellectually liberal but socially reactionary. Such leaders approach religion and its teachings with professed openness of mind, but they regard the practice of such teachings with extreme distrust. Intellectual assent is given to ideals of justice, truthfulness, brotherliness and charity, but it is held that men cannot be expected to exemplify such virtues "human nature being what it is." Such a religion has no vital meaning for those who face unfriendly and critical situations. When institutionalized, such a religion inevitably becomes unsocial because devoutness, strict observance, regular church attendance and support are accepted as the full measure of religious practice. The church mistakes when verbal profession is accepted in lieu of social practice. Unless religion actually functions in human relationships, the church has lost its social significance.

Halting and Mediocre Leadership

Confronted with a changing social situation requiring much reëvaluation and doctrinal adjustment, the church needs an intelligent and vigorous leadership if it is to function vitally in human affairs. Such leadership the church has not had, and does not now have, in sufficient measure. The clergymen of two hundred years ago were often the intellectual and cultural centers of the communities they served. They alone had the education, the books and the current journals with which to form opinions on political and social questions as well as on religious matters. With the spread of education, with the development of the press, with increased wealth and travel, there is now as much, and frequently more, intelligence and culture in the pew than in the pulpit. In fact, most modern congregations are so well informed that they chafe under the preaching of those less intelligent, less informed and less experienced than they. Laymen now turn, not to the clergyman, but to specialists for opinions and judgments on economic and social questions. Although specialists differ in their judgments, the layman knows that they are based upon evidence more or less carefully sifted. Such knowledge has led many laymen to question not only the clergyman's judgment upon public issues but also upon religious matters. For the modern mind inspiration is no substitute for profound thought based upon factual information.

To compensate for intellectual poverty clergymen resort to scolding, moralizing, cajoling and loud berating of sin, the devil and, more particularly, their congregations. They hold forth at length on the benefits of "the good life" or the need for personal "salvation." They rhapsodize about "following the

gleam"; they find in religion (never defined in comprehensible terms) a solution for all personal and social ills. Yet clergymen are frequently unable to demonstrate in their own living the content of religion or "the good life" or to bring them within grasp of those seeking adjustment to difficult situations. The result is either a shallow and deceptive emotionalism on the one hand, or discouragement and resentment on the other when church members attempt to exemplify the religious life under such leadership.

The causes for such mediocrity in religious leadership are not difficult to uncover. In Fry's analysis of the census figures he found that in 1926 not less than three eighths of the white ministers in the United States and more than three fourths of the colored ministers graduated neither from a college nor from a seminary. When account is taken of the fact that the Roman Catholic clergy has a far lower proportion of untrained men than the Protestant denominations, the figure for the latter drops below 50 per cent.⁷ When the average annual salary of the American clergyman does not exceed that of the average semi-skilled artisan, it is obvious that men of outstanding qualifications will not be attracted to a field so pauperizing. Many churches, in addition, ask their ministers to accept a substantial part of their compensation in the form of skim-milk, second-rate garden produce and an unmodernized parsonage. No matter how great may be the other-worldly rewards, significant leadership does not develop under such conditions.

It was to be expected, then, that Hoyt's study of the influence of the pulpit in American life showed (a) that the modern pulpit, as a whole, has no overmastering or compelling sense of message; (b) that undue importance is given in the pulpit to the discussion of public matters by those who, in spite of insufficient thought, believe they can speak with authority; (c) that no general recognition is given of essential catholic truth—the unique message of Christianity; and (d) that the American pulpit is excessively individualistic in its entire approach to religious behavior.⁸ Moreover, when mediocre leadership believes that it has been "called" to service in the religious field, that it possesses special insight into incomprehensible situations and that it can therefore speak with unquestioned authority, it is inevitable that an institution administered by such a personnel should find itself in wrong relations with its changing environment.

When extensive bodies of scientific knowledge are generally available, it is obvious that the clergy should speak only upon those matters in which they have special understanding. Cosmology, for example, should be left to the scientist; human behavior to the social scientist. In neither of these fields can

⁷ C. L. Fry, *The United States Looks at Its Churches* (New York, 1930), Ch. 7.

⁸ A. S. Hoyt, *The Pulpit in American Life* (New York, 1921), Ch. 10.

the minister speak with authority. He may, and should, use the "all the knowledge which any science may contribute" as he works with social ideals, human motives and group sanctions. Religious leadership should know where knowledge ends and faith begins, for the working hypotheses of religion must be intelligent and comprehensible if they are to be workable. Significant religious leaders recognize that their function is two-fold—to make knowledge serviceable to the rank and file of men and women as they face the Unknown, and, to develop working hypotheses for those critical situations in which knowledge is lacking. Mediocre leadership, of course, is incompetent for either of these functions. The institution they direct is therefore necessarily maladjusted.

Confusion with Respect to Objectives

Some religious leaders hold that the task of the church is to prepare its members for a future life; others maintain that it is the duty of religious people to bring the Kingdom of God into the present order of things. The efforts of many churches, however, seem to be directed toward neither of these objectives but rather toward a substantiation of their claim to have "the true faith" and to be "the chosen people." Efforts to prove the rightness or the superiority of particular sets of religious doctrines, rather than to discover what beliefs are most serviceable, indicates confusion with respect to, if not actual loss of, significant religious objectives. As increased knowledge has made it possible for people to live longer, healthier and happier, church members have been more and more interested in the affairs of this world, rather than in preparation for another. The objectives of religious leaders and those of their congregations are hence often in conflict. It is to be noted also that, because of its concern with other-worldliness rather than the critical maladjustments of an existing order, labor organization and organized social service has been more or less dissociated from the church.

Again, many churches give the appearance of being primarily money-raising organizations. Members are organized into various groups whose function it is to "give suppers," "roast peanuts," hold bazaars, conduct rummage sales, "put on plays" in order to secure the funds with which to buy new and better kitchen equipment, redecorate the church, purchase vestments for the choir and otherwise improve the material equipment of the church. Participation in such activities is apparently regarded as a substitute for the religious services of the church. Such activities are, however, wholly economic in character; at best they can only facilitate the special functions of the church. Worship is the unique religious activity—through it, and it alone, the church organizes the emotions about significant values.

Confusion with respect to objectives is also revealed in many of the edu-

cational activities of the church. As an educative institution, the church should develop working hypotheses with respect to the Unknown and transmit the ethical codes of the social heritage. But much religious education attempts instead to indoctrinate, to instill religious prejudice and to substantiate specific ecclesiastical interpretations. Little, if any, effort is made to harmonize religious beliefs with the findings of modern science, to enlarge religious concepts or to evaluate specific ethical codes as they function in a changing order. Such tasks, obviously, cannot be accomplished by the untrained and voluntary personnel which now staffs most church schools. Lack of systematized curricula, irregular attendance and inadequate equipment also penalize the processes of religious training. The child reared in such church schools usually must unlearn most of what has been taught him under such conditions.

Loss of Institutional Status

With the development of new avenues of expression and interaction, the church has declined as a center of social life. The church, to be sure, is still a place to see friends, hear the neighborhood gossip, meet strangers, carry on flirtations and courtship. Politicians, merchants and professional men continue to "depend upon church membership, attendance and activity to extend their acquaintance and increase their prestige."⁹ But the newspaper and the telephone now spread local information; social clubs, fraternal orders and service organizations afford frequent opportunities to see friends and meet strangers. Membership in such organizations also widens social contacts and gives political and professional prestige. Such facilities for intercommunication reduce the importance of the church as a social center.

The church has attempted to meet the competition of these new facilities for social interaction by denouncing the fraternal order, commercialized amusements, dancing, card-playing and even the "movie." Or, conversely, in constrained adaptation the church has set up its own cinema and organized recreational programs for its members—programs which include dancing, card-playing, athletics and theatricals—in competition with similar outside interests. Neither line of attack, however, has strengthened the position of the church. For a marginal group, the ban only intensifies the lure of forbidden activities. The church, on the other hand, lacks the facilities necessary for effective competition with specialized recreational interests. The theater is always more attractive than the parish house; church dances always appeal less than those given at the country club, the lodge or the public hall. Church gymnasiums can rarely compete with those of non-churchly organizations.

⁹ Reuter and Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

The religious atmosphere appears, in fact, to militate against satisfying recreative activities carried on in buildings designed for religious purposes.

Without legal authority from the state, dependent for support upon the voluntary contributions of an unconstrained membership, challenged in its spiritual province by an imposing body of scientific thought, discredited in its methods by the development of scientific procedures, curtailed as a social center, the modern church retains only a vestige of its earlier status and prestige. Among certain types of people the church is still an institution with authority. Succeeding generations, however, are increasingly unimpressed by its traditional position. The power and influence of the church now depend upon the service it actually renders men and women as they face difficult life situations. Higher education is so widely diffused at present that few clergymen can be the intellectual masters of their congregations. The pulpit is no longer the chief agent of culture or the voice of public opinion. Preaching, formerly the exclusive prerogative of clergymen, is now a recognized function of reformers, social workers, teachers and journalists. The church has ceased to command because it has neither the status nor the prestige requisite to the exercise of authority.

Questionable Competitive Tactics

Competition among churches is a glaring anachronism. Religion organizes and institutionalizes collective behavior in order to accomplish, by coöperative effort, a series of adaptations to unseen and incomprehensible factors beyond the ken of ordinary individuals. Competition between religious organizations, therefore, is an evidence of secular ambitions rather than of the religious spirit. Indeed, churchly rivalries exhibit the same faults as competition between two shops. It is cut-throat in its methods; that is, it seeks to destroy its competitors by banning its pulpit to those of other faiths, by prohibiting its members to enter other church buildings and by persecution whenever possible. It proselytes for members just as merchants inveigle customers away from rival concerns. It resorts to shows, displays, advertising, window-dressing, back-biting, appeals to feelings of superiority and propaganda to advance the interests of "the true church" and embarrass all other churches. Suppression, distortion, diversion and fabrication are employed against all faiths which menace its prestige.¹⁰

Desire for temporal power, worldly influence and secular prestige are, in fact, the bases of religious competition. Claims "to divine commissions to disseminate the true faith" are obvious and deliberate rationalizations. By no such means can churches justify their use of the competitive tactics they con-

¹⁰ F. E. Lumley, *The Propaganda Menace* (New York, 1934), pp. 340-350.

demn in economic organizations. Nor can they decry the political manipulations of the affairs of government by bosses and demagogues yet similarly effect the selection of Popes, the election of bishops or the appointment of pastors. Such procedures do not impress intelligent laymen. Recourse to competitive tactics only further impairs the prestige of the church.

Subversion to Worldly Interests

Throughout its history the church has repeatedly been apostate. The Great Teacher condemned war, yet churches have always blessed their country's soldiers and prayed for their success. Jesus insisted upon love even of enemies. "By this," he said, "shall all men know that ye are my disciples." The Inquisition, heresy-baiting, sectarian strife and hatred belie such discipleship. Jesus taught that men should be known "by their fruits" rather than by their professions, yet churches have accepted lip-service to creed in the place of socialized behavior as the requisite of membership. Provided they attend regularly, and contribute liberally, churches allow those who exploit their fellowmen during the week to assume the rôle of a saint on Sunday. Jesus inveighed against the Pharisees who strained at gnats and swallowed camels yet churches have always wasted much valuable energy in futile doctrinal controversies. In each instance churches have deliberately departed from the principles upon which they based their institutional patterns to pursue specific worldly interests.

Subversion to non-religious interests is revealed also when a congregation requires its clergyman to preach the sort of "gospel" it wishes to hear and disciplines him until he submits. Since most of our churches "minister to a single social stratum" and since parishioners "foot the bills," they believe they are entitled to specify the type of service they will pay for. Similarly churches are made to serve specific interests when worldly clerics regard the pulpit as "an opportunity for easy living or a chance to rise." When "the ambitious wire-puller without a spark of religion in his heart but adept in tones, phrases and postures schemes his way up to the miter while the real saint toils unnoticed in his parish,"¹¹ it is obvious that religious organization has been perverted. Profession of moral principles will not conceal the true state of affairs.

Sectarianism

The most ominous ailment of the church is its irrational sectarianism, for in it all other pathological factors combine to produce a condition which may be fatal to the religious spirit. Let it be granted that no *one* creed, no single

¹¹ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1930), p. 546.

set of religious practices, no given form of institutional organization, however elaborate, will meet the religious needs of all sorts of people. Different social elements will require different types of religious ceremony, different intellectual hypotheses and different forms of church polity. However, the division and subdivision of religious organization into many weak and warring denominations and sects on the basis of meaningless differences in belief leading to petty religious loyalties, narrow partisanship and rigid intolerance sentences the church to ineffectiveness and futility. When Protestantism has thus been broken up into more than 200 denominations, it is obvious that the Protestant church is no longer a basic social institution but an emasculated, if not ridiculous, aggregation of religious organizations. Who, indeed, can restrain a smile when there is separated from "The Church of God," first, "The True Church of God" and then "The Only True Church of God"? Intelligent men and women do not take such churches seriously. Because sectarianism involves a senseless waste of energy, unnecessary duplication of church buildings and equipment, pathetic but hopeless struggles to survive in a complex social situation, extreme denominationalization becomes the symptom of a fatal institutional malady, namely, the loss of significant social objectives.

That worldly religious leaders have deluded, defrauded and degraded religious people; that innumerable crimes have been committed in the name of religion and the church, that both have been used as a cloak for greed, ambition and lust; that human progress has not only been delayed, but blocked by those who claim divine authority, cannot be denied by any unbiased student of church history. Such admissions, moreover, cannot be confined to events of the past. Notwithstanding its other-worldliness the church is beset with maladies and perversions. But such admissions must also be made with respect to other social institutions, especially the political. There is no evidence that the church has been, or is, more subject to social disease than the state. The presence of such conditions in any basic social institution does not necessarily indicate obsolescence. So long as the fundamental human need which gave rise to the institution exists, place for the institution remains. Wise social policy prescribes corrective rather than surgical treatment.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. Why have religious bodies been content with the separation of church and state?
2. What position should the Chinese government take with respect to eclipses of the moon?
3. Construct a descriptive classification of the causes for cultural lag in religion and the church. State the three most important causes.

4. Precisely what function does a creed or a body of church doctrine serve?
5. (a) What are the proper objectives of the church, sociologically speaking?
(b) Show how improper objectives develop in religious organization.
6. Should there be *no* rivalry between churches? Explain.
7. Are congregations not entitled to the sort of preaching they desire especially since they finance the church? Why or why not?
8. Upon what subjects may the clergymen speak with authority?
9. Is the church equal to the task of "saving the world"? Explain.
10. (a) Can religion be taught? to all? Explain.
(b) What should the child be taught in Sunday School?
11. What methods may churches employ to increase their effectiveness?
12. Is there any "litmus paper for testing spiritually" (Ross)?
13. Why has the decline of ecclesiastical influence been so slow and so painful?
14. Show how the philosophy of individualism has affected the church as a social institution.
15. How may the adherents of a religion prove that they are "the chosen people"?
16. Which is "the true faith"?
17. It has been said that a faith adequate for one people may not meet the needs of another. Do you agree? Give reasons.
18. "Religion is tending to degenerate into a decent formula wherewith to embellish a comfortable life." (Whitehead) Do you agree? Give reasons.

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CHAPTER XXIX

RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION AND THE CHURCH

AN increasing number of religious leaders in every denomination are aware of the pathological conditions which now characterize most religious organizations and an increasing number of churches, especially in the larger cities, are grappling with the task of adjustment to the changed social situation. In some instances these churches have found it necessary to withdraw from denominational affiliation; in every instance they have broken away from traditional church patterns. Some of the more liberal denominations have also undertaken adaptations to the new order; indeed, the leaven is at work even in the more conservative religious bodies. Evidences of such reorganization appears in revisions of prayer-books, the development of social programs, official statements of the church's position on pressing social problems, movements toward church federation, and the like.

REQUISITES OF RELIGIOUS RECONSTRUCTION

Such efforts assume that present religious organization can be adapted to the changed social situation. Some authorities regard this assumption as unwarranted. Leuba, for example, maintains that religion will soon become as obsolete as magic and that its socially valuable services will be taken over by the school, ethical societies and science.¹ Ross holds that while "there is need for a religion of brotherhood to prepare man for the larger social life opening before him" such a religion "is too fine and too sensitive to be propagated by society and worked out as a social institution."² Eucken, on the other hand, admits that Catholicism and Protestantism alike have hardened into such narrow and specific stereotypes, for the most part, that no world religion could be built upon existing religious organization. Eucken believes, however, that unfathomed resources are still resident in Christianity, and that, if these forces could be released from the encrustations which have accumulated during the past centuries, religion through the church might again drive human life into new channels.³

¹ J. H. Leuba, *God or Man? A Study of the Value of God to Man* (New York, 1933), Ch. 19.

² E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1930), p. 524.

³ R. Eucken, *Can We Still Be Christians?* (London, 1914), pp. 196-212.

Admitting a future for the church, religious leaders differ in opinion as to what direction adaptation should take. Some urge a return to orthodoxy with its insistence upon established creeds, its elimination of dissenting beliefs and its assumption of undivided authority. Such reorganization would unify and strengthen religious organization, but it ignores the temper of the modern mind. Other leaders urge a compromise between the dogma of the past and the scientific thought of the present by means of a reinterpretation of religious concepts. This position, of course, overlooks the obvious and important fact that the new social situation may require new religious concepts. Still others advocate a gospel of beauty in which religion becomes a symbolic interpretation of experience, imaginative, artistic and broadly cultured. Such an interpretation of religion, it is patent, will function only for those fitted for artistic appreciation; it will not satisfy those who desire a religion which copes with difficult and critical experiences or facilitates adjustment to hard and inexplicable situations. A fourth group of religious leaders believe that the church should abandon other-worldliness and become an active agent of social idealism. These hold that the church should not only lay down the essential principles of a new and better social order, but also attack present social evils. A program of social action, however, does not provide men and women with the content of a personal religion or facilitate their emotional adjustments to the world about them.

In adapting itself to a changed social *milieu*, therefore, the church faces a complex situation, for the adjustments undertaken must meet the needs of the religious conservative, the scientist, the liberal, the élite, "the common man," the mystic and the socially minded. No single religious pattern will satisfy all; neither is it possible to win all to one type of religious organization. Various temperaments and inclinations require different formulations of religious beliefs and different modes of religious expression. The reconstructed church, hence, should provide a content for both personal and social religion; it should take account of scientific knowledge as well as of religious belief; it should not lose itself in idle speculation about the mysterious, it should function for those seeking adjustment to the world of affairs; it should employ the beautiful as well as the plain and unadorned. Indeed, no element or factor that will vivify or enrich religious experience should be omitted from the institutional set-up.

If the adjustment of religion to the social situation is to be more than temporary, its reorganization should not only perfect an adaptation to the present social setting, but it should also develop techniques for readaptation as the social order continues to change. The church, in other words, should be plastic, that is, responsive to changing conditions. It should have a note of

authority for the conservative yet it should give freedom to the liberal. It should be able to build into its structure the new organizations of knowledge and the new philosophies as they emerge, yet it should not depend upon "particularized appeals" or "passing phases of thought." It should be ever alert to the enduring values which human experience uncovers.⁴

ASPECTS OF RELIGIOUS RECONSTRUCTION

The experience of outstanding churches, as well as the conclusions of social analysis, seem to indicate that the reconstruction of religion and the church calls for the following adaptations:

1. *Control of man's inner life.* The development of a higher type of personality among its members is a prime requisite of a socially reconstructed church. Unless subjective religion expresses itself in stimulating group relationships, membership in the church profits nothing. Vital religion will, first of all, strive to remove ignorance, prejudice, bitterness, intolerance, hatred, greed, inhumanity, pessimism and instability from the individual personality. This it should accomplish not so much through a series of prohibitions as through a constructive and affirmative program for both individual and social living. By releasing creative purposes and powers in a friendly environment, religion and the church assume a directive rather than a merely contemplative rôle in human interaction. Control of man's inner life, especially of his motivation, is essential to any reconstruction of religious organization. Without internal qualities the rearrangement of external factors accomplishes nothing in the long run.

2. *Emphasis upon behavior rather than belief.* Supernaturalism in religion should be replaced by a naturalism in which man is recognized as a part of nature. Biblical cosmology has been destroyed by modern science; Biblical criticism has cut away the grounds for many ancient beliefs. Doctrines with respect to inspiration, atonement, incarnation, salvation and judgment are no longer socially significant. The theological and metaphysical aspects of religion are important only to a few; for most men justice, fair-dealing, an adequate income and opportunities for self-development are vastly more important. Humanism, rather than transcendentalism, is required of reorganized religion. The theology which cannot be dispensed with should be harmonized with modern scientific thought. Religious belief should be frankly recognized as working hypotheses, the validity of which is found in works-results. Doctrinal authoritarianism in religion should be boldly labeled as wishful thinking, as defense mechanism, or as a power-technique.

⁴ G. G. Atkins, *Modern Religious Cults* (New York, 1923), pp. 341-342.

Religion and the church should deal with the reality of actual social situations. Conceptions of "cosmic substance" and "ultimate reality" are, for the most part, a resort to obscurantism. Such ideas do not really clarify; they confuse religious thought. To the average layman they are often impressive, but usually meaningless. When the ideal is set up as a projection of actual situations, genuinely experienced, then religion becomes comprehensible to all manner of men. When religion becomes a matter of "the Ultimate" or "the Absolute," it ceases to serve the rank and file. Indeed, it becomes a confusion not only for laymen but for the clergyman himself. Religion is of little value unless it gives men confidence and aspiration.

If religion and the church are to serve our times, room must also be made for those who are content to allow the mysterious to remain so. Working hypotheses with respect to the nature of the Unknown, or the why of the inexplicable, may serve the needs of those who require a theoretical basis for faith. Others find no satisfaction in such speculation but demand working hypotheses with respect to tangible human values and relationships—hypotheses, in other words, which will support their better judgments with respect to the here and now. To illustrate: some require that religion provide a faith in immortality, an assurance of an after-life. Others ask that religion abstain from such assurances because it cannot penetrate the Unknown. These require that the church support the practice of ethical idealism in an existent world by working hypotheses with respect to the value of goodness, the worth of virtue and the reward of just-dealing.

3. *Retention of a variety of religious forms.* No single form of worship will satisfy a people with varied attitudes and temperaments. Some desire simple orders of service, unadorned clergymen and a plain church building; Others delight in elaborate ceremonials, ornate church architecture, a profusion of lights, colored vestments, incense, processions and rich music. Since no one type of service can be designated as the *only* correct form of worship, the reconstructed church should retain a variety of religious forms sufficient to fit the inclinations of a varied membership. Similarly, the reconstructed church should develop such auxiliary and adjunctive activities as the social situation of its membership requires. These will necessarily vary from one congregation to another.

4. *Linkage of the religious quest with the modern quest for a better social order.* Ellwood has described the present social order as paganistic, that is, one "in which power and pleasure are frankly avowed as the ends of individual and group action."⁵ Such purposes obviously conflict with those of religious

⁵ C. A. Ellwood, *Reconstruction of Religion* (New York, 1922), p. 96.

organization, since they create an environment which favors a few at the expense of the many. To meet the changed social *milieu*, therefore, religion should be concretely ethical; it should emphasize the relations of men to one another as well as to God: it should be collective rather than individualistic in its objectives. Reorganized religion will not neglect the individual, but it will insist that the individual cannot be redeemed except as the community improves. Without environmental opportunity men and women are helpless; repressive conditions preclude personal development. "The Kingdom of God" should become an imminent project. This can be accomplished only when religion is identified with morality and when the church supplants doctrinal motivation with social motivation.

Various national church bodies have declared themselves very specifically on social questions, notably the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, comprising nearly thirty denominations (1908), the Episcopal Church (1910), the Catholic Church (1919), the Jewish Church (1920), the Congregational Church (1925). Such declarations do not imply that the church has "the specific knowledge necessary to the solution of each and every social problem."⁶ Such declarations insist that certain fundamental ethical principles apply to the fields of economic, racial and international, as well as to personal, relations. It is the function of the church to expound these principles and to urge their practice in *every* relationship. The church should recognize that it is the province of the social scientist to devise the techniques for putting these ethical principles into effect. Unemployment, international conflict and racial antagonisms present problems of disorganization which challenge all the resources which civilization can command. The churches may contribute most fruitfully to the solution of these problems by setting forth the ideals which are to be realized and by developing in the individual the social attitudes favorable to the attainment of those ideals.

The identification of the religious quest with the quest for a better social order at least implies that religion and the church are elements in the cultural complex of the social group. If the social order is bounded by the territorial limits of the state, then the relationship of the church to political organization again becomes significant, for no national culture can be an integrated unit unless every cultural element has been carefully interwoven into a cultural fabric. The ideal social order has been described as one in which social relationships are characterized by "justice, equality of rights, service to the common life of the group, bearing one's part in a life that is highly organic, the utilization of economic resources for the welfare of all, the substitution of good-

⁶ Gillin, Dittmer and Colbert, *Social Problems* (New York, 1932), p. 472.

will, mutual understanding, frank discussion between nations, races and classes for exploitation and war."⁷

5. *Church federation and coöperation.* No social justification can be advanced for the wholly unnecessary duplication of resources and energy now incurred in modern sectarianism. Multiplication of denominations on a purely creedal basis does not strengthen but enfeebles religious organization. Recognition of the fact that the church is a means to an end, and not an end itself, should make it possible for the people of a given area to unite in the expression of religious ideals and purposes and to stress common social objectives instead of divisive religious dogmas. Men should find it possible to differ from each other on doctrinal matters and yet coöperate with one another in all significant religious activities. "The union or effective coöperation of sects," asserts Hayes, "will never come about by the triumph of the speculative doctrines of one over the others. . . . The only basis for a practicable union or efficient coöperation is not a creed but a purpose."⁸ With decreased emphasis upon theology, reorganized churches should find it feasible to strengthen religious organization through federation and coöperation.

Recent surveys, in fact, disclose an increasing desire and preference for church union.⁹ Such unions make the terms of church membership broad enough to include all persons who desire church affiliation because of its value for human life. This movement toward unity has taken several forms, namely, denominational federation, church mergers, organization of community churches and church unions. Struggling organizations are thus united into more vigorous units or established organizations are broadened into more effective institutions. In addition to the movement toward unity, of course, the field of interdenominational coöperation is being constantly widened with the recognition of common purposes and identical objectives.¹⁰ The basis of such association is, of course, practical and empirical, rather than doctrinal.

6. *Development of a specialized staff of religious leaders.* Since most people are compelled by the exigencies of life to depend upon others for direction in specialized fields, the reorganized church will increase its emphasis upon trained leadership. Its adaptation to the changed social situation cannot be significantly served by halting and mediocre clergymen. The church needs qualified leadership desperately; this, indeed, is its most important problem. With qualified leadership, adequately compensated, the church should have little difficulty in regaining its status and prestige.

⁷ C. C. North, *Social Problems and Social Planning* (New York, 1931), p. 350.

⁸ E. C. Hayes, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology* (New York, 1918), p. 690.

⁹ H. P. Douglass, *Church Unity Movements in the United States* (New York, 1934).

¹⁰ ———, *Protestant Coöperation in American Cities* (New York, 1930).

If the church is to function actively in human affairs, there are semi-religious fields in which it can render significant service. In addition to a clergyman trained in preaching and in the performance of ritual, the reconstructed church in most communities might well link with its work such services as education for marriage and parenthood, social work among needy families, recreational programs for disadvantaged groups and family consultation. If the church cannot finance such services under the direction of those trained in specialized techniques, the clergyman should prepare himself for the simpler forms of social and psychiatric work, that is, those which do not involve institutional treatment or the services of specialists. Because of the tension of modern life, personal and group disorganization is increasing in every community. Those lacking the services of specialists may well be served by the local church and its leaders, provided they make adequate preparation for such service. Divinity schools might well make room for a training which would prepare ministers to render the simpler services of mental hygiene to unadjusted and maladjusted persons. Every congregation of moderate size includes lonesome folk, aged persons out of touch with life, unadjusted youth, the vocationally misplaced, social misfits, people handicapped by poverty and physical disabilities, the chronically ill, materialistically minded persons, egotists, skeptics, timid, fearful souls, and those facing financial ruin or death. No clergyman, of course, may take the place of a trained psychiatrist, but he may render valuable preventive service to those who might otherwise eventually require the services of an expert. "Here is a field for the minister who takes his task seriously to assist in the development of personality and in the saving of souls here and now."¹¹

PERMANENCE OF RELIGION AND THE CHURCH

Notwithstanding its conservatism, its faith in ultimates and its insistence upon "absolute" values, religion, and the church which institutionalizes it, has again and again adapted itself to the changing needs of people. Such adaptations were always slow and tedious. In successive historical periods the church has adjusted itself to a social order which was at first imperialistic, then feudalistic and later democratic. During the Middle Ages the church became the sole source of art, education and charity; in pioneer America it functioned as the center of social and community life. At times it has staunchly supported the state in its political activities; at other times it has been its severest critic. Because the church becomes adapted to "the patterns of thought and relation-

¹¹ S. N. Stevens, *Religion in Life Adjustments* (New York, 1928), pp. 140-143.

ship of a bygone age, periods of general social change have occasioned what appeared to be a decay of religion. Subsequent periods, however, have always witnessed a revival of religion and a regeneration of the church. Historically, at least, religion appears to have been an adjustment with high survival-value."¹²

That churches and religious leaders are aware of the present maladjustment of religious organization is evidenced by its heroic efforts to break away from the war system, to place loyalty to God and human interests above those of a narrow nationalism, to increase interdenominational coöperation, to reconcile and integrate religious doctrine with scientific knowledge, to adopt experimental methods and to test religious belief and practice by their works-results. Religious formalism, opportunism, dogmatism, materialism and schism are now recognized as symptoms of maladjustment and, perhaps, decadence. The traditional encrustations have been sufficiently loosened to permit of the readjustment and the regeneration of religious institutions.

The permanence of the religious interest, it seems, can be taken for granted.¹³ "As a scientific explanation of the Universe," says Gillin, "religion has lost its old dominion. As a philosophy giving meaning to the Universe and to social relations it has only begun to come into its own."¹⁴ The growth of the school and the developments of education have reduced, but not displaced, the functions of the church and religion. Science, it appears, will never be able to explain why the innocent suffer, why the wicked prosper or why right so seldom wins. As long as mystery remains, religion will continue; as long as ethical ideals are unattained, churches will be necessary. Significant social needs are served when man is provided with working hypotheses which facilitate his adjustment to the universe and his social situation.

The reconstruction of religion and the church is a task which will require the insight of the intellectual as well as the enthusiasm of the dullard. Such reconstruction calls for (a) a thorough and impartial investigation of organized religion to discover just how it is functioning in the present social situation; (b) a thorough understanding of how people feel about their religious creeds and practices; and (c) a re-determination of religious objectives and of more effective means of achieving them. If those who are qualified for such tasks withdraw from the church, its doom is as effectively sealed as when qualified persons withhold their services from a state afflicted with political diseases. In either case, untold social loss will result.

¹² A. G. Keller, *Man's Rough Road* (New Haven, 1932), p. 312.

¹³ F. E. Lumley, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1935), p. 276-277.

¹⁴ Gillin and Blackmar, *Outlines of Sociology* (New York, 1930), p. 326.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. "It would be of assistance toward a better practice if the plural term *churches* were used instead of the expression *the church*." (Ames) Explain.
2. Do you agree with Ross that "religion is too fine and too sensitive to be propagated by society and worked out as a social institution"? What are your reasons?
3. Can churches provide a variety of forms of worship without increasing the number of denominations? Explain.
4. Why can there be no common faith?
5. Can the church renounce authoritarianism and yet have authority? Why or why not?
6. "Modernism merely substitutes arid liberalism for acrid literalism." Do you agree? Explain.
7. Is there any way in which Fundamentalism and Modernism can be reconciled?
8. It has been noted that the more liberal churches have suffered greater decline than the more arbitrary and orthodox churches. What explanation can be offered? What significance has such a situation?
9. (a) Should the church actively participate in social reform? Give reasons.
(b) If so what techniques should it employ?
10. What arguments can be presented against church federation? How valid are such arguments?
11. What arguments can be presented against the inclusion of social service functions in church programs? Are these arguments valid?
12. Some Biblical scholar concluded that creation took place in the year 4004 B. C. on October 23rd at nine o'clock in the morning. Comment. How important are such statements?
13. List the advantages and disadvantages of a modern state religion and a modern state church.
14. What contributions can the modern church make
 - (a) to international relations,
 - (b) to relations of capital and labor,
 - (c) to race relations?
15. Is there any evidence of the impermanence of religion? How significant is such evidence?

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CHAPTER XXX

EMERGENT SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

THE process of institutional evolution appears to have been one in which specialized agencies are developed to take over activities which have outgrown the more inclusive institutions. When political, educational, economic, religious and recreational activities became too complex and too extensive for familial control and administration, the state, the school, industry, the church and the recreation center assumed functions which the family had previously performed.¹ Some of these more specialized institutions may in turn find it necessary to set up still other specialized institutions for certain activities which are getting out of hand (the administration of justice, for example), or auxiliary institutions may be developed to take over functions common to various major institutions, (the research organization, for instance). The institutions now emergent fall into one or the other of these groups.

THE COURT OF JUSTICE

The modern state has become so vast and so complicated that it performs certain of its functions with increasing ineffectiveness. It is possible, therefore, that the political institution, like the patriarchal family of earlier times, may eventually divest itself of functions which more specialized institutions can perform with greater efficiency. The administration of justice appears to constitute such a function. As a matter of fact, courts of justice have never been fully incorporated into the state. The persistent efforts which all modern peoples exert to maintain the independence of the judiciary indicate a deep-seated desire to set the courts apart from other political agencies. At election time judges always run as non-partisan candidates; often judges are chosen at separate elections so that their selection may escape party politics. Such procedure is quite the antithesis of the accepted methods of selecting other political officials. In the popular mind, hence, the judiciary is not an integral part of the state—at least, not completely so. The judge is not classed with the congressman, senator, governor or mayor. Politically speaking, his status is a *detached* one. This is illustrated by the fact that, although the President of the

¹ *Infra.*, Ch. II, pp. 19–20.

United States may issue orders to his Cabinet and approach Congress in the attempt to have his will carried out, he may not offer a single suggestion to the humblest court in the land.

In earlier times, the administration of justice was the practice of private agencies. Like the physician, the lawyer set himself up as a specialist dispensing a service, namely, the settlement of differences which arose between persons. Fees were paid by those who utilized this service. In more recent times, the functions of the lawyer have gradually taken on a very different aspect. Lawyers still frequently settle cases out of court, but for the most part their services are concerned with securing the maximum for their client in their disputes with others. The lawyer thus becomes a professional pleader, an expert retained for the purpose of rendering a specialized service. As such, he summons every possible aid to the cause of his client; he may even attempt to circumvent the law in the interest of those who employ him. Originally the lawyer attempted to discover a basis upon which contending parties might settle their differences; now he appears in defense of one of the parties to a dispute.

Although the lawyer and the judge are both trained in the law, it is obvious that their functions now differ radically. The judge serves as an impartial tribunal concerned primarily with the enforcement of law and in the adjudication of differences. The lawyer, on the other hand, is not concerned with justice or the application of law; he is primarily interested in winning his case. Neither the judge nor the lawyer, as such, participates in law-making—the political process by means of which the will of the body-politic is organized with respect to matters of common concern. While judicial decisions and interpretations do, perhaps, make statute law specific, such results are incidental to the judicial process through which law is applied to given cases. The judicial process, hence, is not so closely related to the political process that they necessarily constitute integral parts of the political institution.

It follows, therefore, that the judicial organ of government is more or less independent of the executive, administrative and legislative organs, indeed of most political procedures. It is not unlikely, then, that the court of justice will continue to insist upon its detached status, perhaps to augment its independence. When the question of constitutionality may be raised with respect to any law passed by any legislative body, when all such questions are settled by the courts and when this question is more and more frequently raised, it is inevitable that the courts should be further and further removed from the political process. It should also be noted that the courts alone may snatch men out of their usual routine and command their time and services without consultation or consideration (in jury duty, for example). No such power over persons is possessed by any other political or social organ. Finally, it is significant

that judges and lawyers alike hold statute law in low regard. Whenever possible, both appeal to the common law which transcends legislative enactment. Potentially, therefore, the court of justice is an emergent social institution. Whether it will eventually be separated from the state depends, of course, upon many factors now unpredictable.

THE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

As men have struggled to bring order out of the chaos created by the World War, research organization has taken on new aspects. Because of the magnitude of post-war problems the limited and unrelated individual investigations of earlier research were wholly inadequate to the tasks at hand. The situation called for the immediate integration of numbers of specialized studies and for extensive research pursued coöperatively. Since American universities lacked both the equipment and the resources for such large-scale investigations, it was inevitable that non-academic research organizations should be developed to meet the new situation. Since the World War, especially, detached research organizations with generous funds and with large staffs of trained investigators have been established by industry, by the government and by interested persons who endowed foundations.

Non-academic research possesses certain advantages which give it impetus particularly in times of crisis. First, such research is more expeditious and effective because it need not compete with teaching or administrative functions. Secondly, non-academic research can choose its location; it can set up its organization near the problem it proposes to investigate. Thirdly, it need not consider the political or economic complications which often embarrass research at the universities. Detached research, of course, lacks the stimulus which teaching and the close association of scholars in allied fields provides.² But teaching has no stimulus for many persons interested in research; the professional spirit which develops in a sizable group of trained persons, however, is likely to induce vigorous emulation. With large funds at its disposal, therefore, detached research is not only taking over a function which has hitherto been largely academic, but it is also meeting a need which has recently become fundamental.

Extensive research organizations have been developed by most of the major industries in the United States, notably by those producing telephones, radios, electrical appliances, rubber goods, photographic equipment and supplies, farm machinery, automobiles and munitions. While these research organizations serve the interests of particular industries, it should be noted that the

² F. A. Ogg, *Research in the Humanistic and Social Sciences* (New York, 1928), pp. 159-161

results of their investigations are available to a number of constituent, but more or less separate, corporations for which a holding company functions as a sort of central financing agency. Together these companies control a substantial fraction of their field of production. Their research organization, therefore, has general, rather than specific, significance.³

Non-academic research has also been recognized as a legitimate function of modern government. Some of the larger cities have established municipal research bureaus which function as fact-finding agencies for all departments of city government. Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City and Philadelphia have established such bureaus. Significant research organizations are also maintained by the national government, notably, the Bureau of Standards, the Bureau of Chemistry and Soils, the Forest Products Laboratories and, with the coöperation of State governments, the Agricultural Experiment Stations. If such fact-finding can be made independent of political manipulations, research organizations of this sort can render invaluable service to the public as well as to those administering political institutions. •

Especially significant as emergent social institutions, however, are the research organizations which have been established by various American foundations and placed under the administration of self-perpetuating boards. More than 130 of these foundations with a combined capital of \$1,000,000,000 expend annually almost \$60,000,000, about one sixth of which is devoted to research in medicine, public health, education and the various physical and social sciences.⁴ The specific fields in which investigations are carried on include surgery, cancer, heart disease, infantile paralysis, meningitis, social hygiene, mental hygiene, medical education, evolution, botany, economics, sociology, social service, geophysics, marine biology, oceanography, astronomy, history, nutrition, eugenics, seismology, chemistry, bacteriology, pathology, land economics, public utilities and exploration. Typical of the various foundations which endow non-academic research are the Carnegie Institution (various fields), the Rockefeller Foundation (medical research, public health), Smithsonian Institution (science, exploration), Institute for Research in Land Economics and Public Utilities, the National Industrial Conference Board, National Bureau of Economic Research, Brookings Institution (economics, government), Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation (social science), the Russell Sage Foundation (social service), the American Foundation (political science), the Commonwealth Fund (government), the World Peace Foundation (international relations), the Institute for Social and Religious Research,

³ Z. C. Dickinson, *Industrial and Commercial Research; Functions, Finances, Organizations*. Michigan Business Studies, Vol. I, No. 9 (Ann Arbor, 1928).

⁴ Twentieth Century Fund, *American Foundations and Their Fields* (New York, 1932).

the National Geographic Society (exploration), Woods Hole Oceanographical Laboratory and Woods Hole Marine Biological Laboratory, Boyce-Thompson Institute for Plant Research (botany), Mellon Institute for Industrial Research (chemistry), Bartol Research Foundation (iron and steel), National Cannery Institute, Legge Foundation for Agricultural Research, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, and the American Medical Association Laboratories. Such foundations maintain their own research staffs and provide for the publication of the results of their research. "Some foundations also finance the investigations of individuals who are not members of their staffs.

The research activities thus organized have no direct institutional connections. They are undertaken for the general welfare as it emerges in various fields of study. Studies of an international character, research that is costly, uncertain as to results, or of remote and general significance are sponsored by the foundations. Obviously neither the state nor industry will be interested in such investigations, nor in those which test such new social techniques as mental hygiene or adult education—techniques still in an experimental stage. Foundations also place the support of research beyond the control of capricious individuals and changing legislatures. The foundations have been criticized on the grounds (a) that they sponsor only such research as fits into the existing scheme of things, (b) that they are extravagant, and (c) that their activity is based upon an unwarranted concentration of wealth in the hands of a few and motivated by the desire to salve conscience or to build a personal prestige.³

Whatever the merits and demerits of the independent organization of research, it is clear that research activities are assuming new institutional aspects. Research has now become so extensive that it is necessary to organize clearing houses to prevent duplication and overlapping in the academic and the non-academic fields. The National Research Council (physical sciences), the American Council of Learned Societies (humanities) and the Social Science Research Council (social sciences) now function as such clearing houses. When the research field has been fully differentiated, it is possible that non-academic research organization will eventually qualify as an independent social institution.

THE MUSEUM

The museum is an organized expression of the collecting propensities of the community. As such, it has had a long history—one which does not, however, ante-date modern times. The origin of the modern museum may be traced to the Renaissance—the period which witnessed a revival of interest in the

³ H. Laski, "Foundations, Universities and Research," *Harper's*, Vol. 157 (1928), pp. 295-303.

classics. A natural curiosity in the relics of classical antiquity was also stirred. Later, collections of scientific objects, as well as of natural history, were frequently made. These earlier collections were the hobbies of wealthy and princely persons and were usually dispersed upon their death. In the eighteenth century, however, collecting became methodical. When princes began to vie with each other in the ornamentation of their courts, substantial art collections appeared in all the capital cities of Europe. As a result of political changes, these royal and princely collections, in the course of time, became the property of the state. In the United States the outstanding collections were at first accumulated by persons of wealth, then either transferred to the state or to an endowed foundation. During this period, municipalities, both in Europe and in America, also developed museums as community projects.

The development of the museum has been closely linked with the spread of education. The use of collections as adjuncts to the work of certain departments of the larger universities early gave the museum an institutional aspect. The organization of museums by scientific societies provided the museum with recognized purposes and scientific direction. The systematization of the materials in outstanding collections established the museum as a valuable aid to education. In the United States, 600 of the 1,400 museums are connected with educational institutions; 781 of the 1,400 are public museums—167 of art, 125 of science, 415 of history, 24 of industry and 50 general. These represent a total investment of some \$115,000,000; their annual revenues total \$16 000,000. In 1932 new museums were being established at the rate of one each fortnight; new buildings and new wings are erected at the rate of one every fifteen days.⁶

Modern museums are of three major types: (1) *art galleries*, such as the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York City, the Art Institute in Chicago and Boston Museum of Fine Arts; (2) *museums of science and history*, such as the American Museum of Natural History of New York, the Field Museum in Chicago, the Museum of the American Indian in New York City, Mayo Medical Museum in Rochester, Minnesota, the Hispanic Society of America; (3) *museums of industry*, such as the Museum of Science and Industry in Chicago. The United States National Museum connected with the Smithsonian Institution in Washington combines all three major types in a collection of more than 10,000,000 subjects. In this connection it should be noted that botanical and zoölogical gardens maintain collections of living materials for precisely the same purposes as museums collect inanimate objects. Botanical gardens arrange plants, both out-of-doors and under glass, according to some system of botanical classification which facilitates scientific research and

⁶ L. V. Coleman, *Handbook of American Museums* (New York, 1932), pp. iii-iv.

stimulates popular interest. The Missouri Botanical Gardens at St. Louis and the Arnold Arboretum at Forest Hills, Massachusetts, are typical of such gardens. Similarly, zoological gardens maintain collections of wild animals which afford opportunities for study and visual education. Such gardens are found in many of the larger cities in the United States.

The social services of the museum may be described as follows: *first*, they broaden man's conception of the race by stimulating curiosity with respect to the flora, fauna, craftsmanship and art of remote ages, regions and peoples; *second*, they multiply interests by increasing man's knowledge of various times and places and of the materials of the world in which he lives; *third*, they minister to the sense of beauty by exhibiting beautiful products of nature and of art; *fourth*, they stir the creative sense by revealing the possibilities of clay, stone and pigment; *fifth*, they provide a means of intellectual and æsthetic recreation. As an auxiliary educational institution, the museum functions; *sixth*, as a laboratory for research in art, archeology, history and science, and *seventh*, as an instrument of popular and formal education. As an example of this latter service, the American Museum of Natural History in 1927 made 9,900,000 contacts with the school children in New York City. Wherever museums exist, they are recognized as valuable and active educational agencies. Knowledge of past and present cultures is transmitted by visual processes.

In rendering these services the museum is no longer merely concerned with the collection, housing and storage of valuable materials. The modern museum, like the modern library, endeavors to attract and interest the public in the objects it has collected. Labels, guide-books, catalogues, special exhibitions, lectures in the museum galleries, articles in the press, peripatetic lecturers, circulating collections, and the like, are employed as special techniques for publicizing and popularizing the resources of museums. Because of the peculiar nature of their materials, however, museums are maintained as separate institutions since they require specialized equipment and a trained personnel distinct from that of the schools or the recreation center. The museum is emerging, therefore, not as an independent institution, but as an auxiliary to educational and recreational institutions.

THE MOTION PICTURE

The development of the motion picture has been phenomenal. "From a little peep-show in the back room of a bad smelling store, the movie has graduated in twenty years into one of the largest industries in the world." At the present time, 300,000 persons are employed in the annual production of some 700 feature pictures. These films are shown in some 22,500 places in the United States. Each week 100,000,000 persons attend motion pictures; they spend

50,000,000 each year for admissions. In the United States some 130 production companies have invested \$1,500,000,000 in the industry; they spend some \$1,000,000 annually in the production of some 150,000 miles of film.⁷ At present the industry exports 47,000 miles of film each year. These films are translated into thirty-seven languages and shown in seventy foreign countries.⁸ Until recently the motion picture was regarded merely as a recreational agency of increasing popularity. When it became apparent that the motion picture was in fact a sort of universal language, a species of informational and æsthetic Esperanto giving expression not only to emotions of love, hate, despair, joy, desolation, ecstasy, defeat and triumph, but to ideas, prejudices, and attitudes that upset accepted behavior patterns and disturbs world culture, the social significance of the cinema took on new aspects. The influence of the motion picture upon the attitudes, values and standards particularly of the younger generation is revealed in the personality stereotypes, the ego ideals and the fashions in dress, dancing and behavior which can be traced directly to the film stars. Recognition of this influence has led, on the one hand, to a demand for a rigid censorship of films, and, on the other, to provisions for thoroughgoing studies of its effects upon behavior.⁹ Motion picture councils have been organized in many communities to deal constructively with the motion picture as a community influence of unusual vitality.

Because of its social potentialities, its economic aspects and its educational value the motion picture therefore represents "a problem of bewildering complexity."¹⁰ When exploited by purely commercial interests the motion picture often contributes significantly to delinquency, crime, personal disorganization and the general relaxation of moral standards.¹¹ In fact, the motion picture is a potent agency of informal education. If it is socially uncontrolled and wholly unsupervised, socially desirable effects are incidental to the pursuit of gain. If socially controlled and adequately supervised, it may deter from misconduct and induce socially desirable behavior. Because of their natural inclination to imitate and their more or less uninhibited response to emotional stimuli, children are especially influenced by motion pictures. "The screen," says Forman, "is an open book, a school, a system of education" which often effectively molds "the characters of the young."¹² It is possible, there-

⁷ In 1895 only 21,600 feet of film were used in the production of new pictures.

⁸ *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 11, pp. 58-65.

⁹ The National Committee for Study of Social Values in Motion Pictures has published a series of extensive studies in this field.

¹⁰ M. M. Willey and S. A. Rice, *Communication Agencies and Social Life* (New York, 1933), pp. 181-184.

¹¹ H. Blumer, *Movies, Delinquency and Crime* (New York, 1933); C. C. Peters, *Motion Pictures and Standards of Morality* (New York, 1933).

¹² H. J. Forman, *Our Movie-Made Children* (New York, 1933), p. 280.

fore, that the cinema has sufficient social import to warrant recognition as a social institution auxiliary to the school and the recreation center.

RADIO BROADCASTING

Like the motion picture, the radio is an effective agency for securing "concerted response to common stimuli." With radio sets in more than 17,000,000 American homes the people of the entire country can be reached by a single broadcast. "The radio," therefore "is an agency of mass impression."¹³ It provides a vast audience for any organization or group whose functions require extensive public contacts. Since the number of transmitting stations which can operate simultaneously in a given area is necessarily limited if interference is to be avoided, the channels of radio communication must be restricted to those services which are of greatest value to the public. Social control of broadcasting is, hence, required by the nature of the service rendered.

In European countries, radio broadcasting is considered a public utility subject to governmental control. Some states have assigned the service to governmental departments in charge of postal and wire facilities; others have organized governmental corporations to administer the new utility. Such corporations are financed by license fees collected annually for each receiving set. Radio broadcasting in these countries is a function of the state. Advertising is excluded from the air in Europe. In the United States, however, broadcasting is, for the most part, a private commercial project financed by revenues procured from firms which seek this means of advertising their products nationally. Income from these advertisers finances not only the expense of broadcasting but also the cost of the programs thus sponsored. Governmental regulation in the United States is concerned only with the licensing of stations and the determination of wave-lengths. No control is exercised over the programs which are broadcast.

It is obvious, nevertheless, that radio broadcasting has far-reaching effects upon social attitudes and behavior.¹⁴ Studies of listeners' preferences among the programs presented over the air are significant, not only to advertisers, but also to those who must evaluate its services from the social point of view. It is admitted that radio broadcasting will also have important consequences in social levelling and in bringing isolated groups into contact with unfamiliar cultures.¹⁵ The importance of these consequences is more fully appreciated when it is remembered that the radio industry in 1930 had invested \$235,000,-

¹³ Willey and Rice, *op. cit.*, p. 189

¹⁴ E. R. Rankin, *Radio Control and Operation* (Chapel Hill, 1933).

¹⁵ Willey and Rice, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-205.

000 in broadcasting stations, factories and distributing quarters; it was paying \$220,000,000 annually in salaries to its 110,000 employees. The receiving sets it had sold to more than 17,000,000 homes had cost the purchasers \$1,500,000,000; they were spending \$200,000,000 annually on upkeep.¹⁶ Whether such an agency of mass impression is motivated by commercial interest or public welfare is a matter of grave social concern.

This concern is accentuated by certain trends which have recently appeared in American broadcasting, namely, a marked decline in the number of broadcasting stations, especially in those operated by electrical shops, radio stores and service stations; change from an unorganized and supplementary enterprise to a highly organized and independent enterprise; a shift in the base of economic support from the sale of radio sets to the sale of advertising with the result that it has become primarily an advertising industry; a decrease in the number of stations controlled by non-profit organizations; a replacement of small stations by larger, higher-powered units; an extension of the range of the average station; and the development of chain-broadcasting with national coverage for sponsored programs.¹⁷ The Federal Radio Commission, apparently, has either overlooked or avoided the social import of these developments, for it has approached radio broadcasting as a commercial enterprise rather than as an agency of mass impression. When the political and social importance of this new medium of communication is fully appreciated, therefore, the enterprise will have been extensively commercialized. Because of the magnitude of its activities, the socialization of radio broadcasting is likely to result in its establishment as an auxiliary institution whose services are utilized by less specialized agencies.

Present trends, then, it would seem, point to the possibility of an institutional status for the non-academic research organization, the court of justice, the museum, the motion picture and radio broadcasting. The extent to which the social potentialities of these agencies will be developed cannot be predicted. It is certain, however, that full recognition of the social import of these agencies will precede any significant social institutionalization of them.

THE NEWSPAPER

In welfare-states especially, the newspaper and the periodical are powerful agencies of mass impression. Because of the general reverence for the printed word, journals are potent means of access to the popular mind. Democratic

¹⁶ *World Almanac*, 1935, p. 389.

¹⁷ President's Committee on Social Trends, *Recent Social Trends in the United States* (New York, 1933), pp. 211-215.

states, more than power states, depend upon the press to enlighten and mold public opinion through news materials widely disseminated. Upon the information thus supplied the average citizen evaluates his government.

The pamphlet, issued irregularly, was the forerunner of all modern periodicals. In America John Campbell's *The Boston News* (1704) was the first newspaper with a consecutive publication. During the struggle between the colonies and England (1750-1783) the press took on political aspects; in the early 1800's, it affiliated with the political parties. The penny newspaper, however, did not appear until the second quarter of the nineteenth century. The significant developments in newspaper publication thereafter were the result of various mechanical inventions. The linotype, the autotype and the high-speed processes made it possible to produce newspapers rapidly and in large quantities. The telephone, wireless communication and the printing telegraph speeded up the transmission of news. Motor trucks provided quick distribution of papers to great numbers of readers. As a consequence the newspaper has become a machine product of the first order. Bücher recognized this three decades ago when he wrote: "every number of a great journal which appears to-day is a marvel of economic division of labor, capitalistic organization and mechanical technique."¹⁸ By 1900 the newspaper and the periodical were unrivalled agencies of mass impression.

In 1932 there were 2,288 daily, 64 tri-weekly, 435 semi-weekly, 12,321 weekly, 378 semi-monthly, 3,477 monthly, 168 bi-monthly, 435 quarterly and 140 miscellaneous publications in the United States.¹⁹ In other words, a total of some 40,300 newspapers and periodicals were, at that time, playing upon the opinions and attitudes of the American people. These journals draw news materials from every country on the globe; in fact, the supply of such materials comes from ever-broadening sources. Three national agencies gather non-local news for the papers of the country—the Associated Press, the United Press and the International News Service. A study of the traffic of one of these agencies for one week in 1929 showed "that, excluding financial and stock exchange tables, it transmitted 2,562,715 words, in 17,323 items, with date lines from 1,850 different communities."²⁰ Through such agencies news materials are brought from ever-widening areas at increased speed. No corner of the earth is left unobserved; no section of the country is shut off from access to such materials.

As thus organized, the newspaper is an agency of great social import. In a

¹⁸ C. Bücher, *Industrial Evolution*, translated by S. M. Wickett (New York, 1907), pp. 242-243.

¹⁹ Willey and Rice, *Communication Agencies and Social Life* (New York, 1933), p. 187.

²⁰ President's Committee on Social Trends, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

democratic state the significance of the press is indicated by the following facts: (a) the newspaper is the principal source of information and stereotypes with respect to current domestic and foreign affairs; (b) it is a potent factor in the formation of public opinion and social attitudes on every public issue; (c) it is a source of entertainment to those who find relaxation in reading materials presented in attractive, condensed and dramatic form; (d) it widens the market for goods through advertising; indeed, it has been estimated that in 1930 more than \$200,000,000 was spent in national magazine advertising alone;²¹ and (e) it is a record of current history. By virtue of these services, it is obvious that the newspaper and the periodical extend and multiply contacts on so large a scale as to involve important social values.

Recent trends in the development of these means of mass impression further indicate the social significance of the press. The following should be noted: (a) the steady concentration of control through newspaper syndicates together with an increase in circulation—of the fifty-six significant major chains some control as many as twenty properties, mostly the large city dailies; (b) the consequent centralization in the number of opinion-forming agencies—one fourth of the total daily newspaper circulation is controlled by the eleven largest chains;²² (c) an increase in the number of cities having only one newspaper from 353 in 1900 to 913 in 1930—such a situation limits the reader to the information and points of view represented by the news and the editorial policy of a single paper; (d) a growth in the number of papers published in foreign languages—this represents the attempts of alien groups to maintain their cultural identity in the face of cultural absorption; (f) a general decline in newspapers with a straight party designation—this growth in stated political independence may indicate either that the newspaper is regarded as less important than formerly as an adjunct of party organization, that newspapers are appealing to all political elements in the population, or that journals are seeking greater editorial freedom; (f) the approach of newspaper circulation in general to a saturation point—competition with the radio and other agencies of communication has doubtless hastened this development; (g) an increasing dependence of both the newspaper and the periodical upon advertising as a means of support—in 1927, 74.1 per cent of the income of newspapers and 63.4 per cent of the income of periodicals was received from advertisers;²³ (h) increased standardization of news materials as a result of the types of press organization employed in its gathering, selection and distribution; and

²¹ Willey and Rice, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

²² W. P. Beazell, "Tomorrow's Newspaper," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 146 (July, 1930), pp. 24-30.

²³ President's Committee on Social Trends, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

(i) increased superficiality in the treatment of significant economic and political events due to the reader's demand for news in a condensed and entertaining form.

Since the publication of journals is a highly competitive enterprise involving large investments of capital, it has been inevitable that sharp business practices should creep into the management of the newspaper. To correct such practices the movement for higher ethical standards has taken various forms, namely: agitation against dishonest and objectionable advertising, the creation of audit bureaus to verify circulation figures, the development of codes of professional ethics by various press associations, and the establishment of schools or departments of journalism in universities and colleges for the professional training of newspaper men. By these means the poor white brother of literature, a despised relative,²⁴ is seeking to acquire social status.

It is apparent, therefore, that the newspaper has many institutional aspects—it has ideation, structure, purpose, authority, relative permanence and personnel. Significantly, however, it lacks social control. Although the press, because it has been, and is, so closely bound up with the democratic idea, is practically admitted into government, nevertheless, it has steadily and staunchly resisted every effort toward regulation as an intolerable violation of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and the press. The newspaper, therefore, has been frequently, if not continuously, in conflict with those in authority.²⁵ While it is true that no political advance has ever been made without the help of the press, it is also true that the newspaper has been guilty of the suppression of news harmful to its owners and advertisers, of unfairness in reporting news materials, of political advertising, of editorial prostitution, of inaccuracy, exaggeration and perversion in presenting issues, and of arrogance toward minority opinion. That the press is a public service corporation reflecting and affecting the life of all no one questions. Whether it will eventually emerge as a social institution, however, depends upon its acquiescence in a measure of social control sufficient to safeguard public opinion.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. Distinguish between a *basic* and an *auxiliary* social institution.
2. The following have been discussed as emergent social institutions:
 - (a) The real estate board
 - (b) The auto or tourist camp
 - (c) The little theater
 - (d) Men's service clubs

²⁴ G. H. Payne, *History of Journalism* (New York, 1920), p. xvi.

²⁵ L. M. Salmon, *The Newspaper and Authority* (New York, 1923).

Do you agree that these are emergent social institutions? Give your reasons.

3. How will the development of non-academic research organizations effect the universities?
4. Present the arguments for and against endowed research organization.
5. Since they are concerned with problems of general welfare should non-academic research organizations be state-financed? state-controlled? What are your reasons?
6. What would be gained socially by the establishment of the court as an independent social institution? What would be lost?
7. What factors would oppose the separation of the judicial organ of government from the executive and legislative organs?
8. Why is it unlikely that the museum will ever be established as an independent social institution?
9. Account for the dominance of art in the museum field.
10. Distinguish between a botanical garden and a park.
11. Discuss the motion picture as a means of molding mass behavior. How does the motion picture differ from the legitimate theater in this respect?
12. Should the motion picture industry be nationalized? Give reasons.
13. (a) What are the advantages and disadvantages of chain-broadcasting?
(b) Discuss the social significance of such chains.
14. Should the English system of radio control be adopted in the United States? Give reasons.
15. What emergent social institutions do you find other than those discussed in this chapter?
16. "The bulk of its (the newspaper's) material is best described by the phrase organized gossip." (Cooley) Do you agree? Give your reasons.
17. What measures for the socialization of the press do you propose?

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CHAPTER XXXI

INSTITUTIONAL EVALUATION: A RECAPITULATION

SINCE social institutions constitute the bulwark of the social order, an impartial evaluation of them seems especially desirable when social organization is undergoing fundamental change. Viewed realistically, the analysis of these basic forms of social organization appears to lead necessarily to the following conclusions.

Social Institutions Are Indispensable

As social interaction grows more and more complex, more elaborate and more vigorous social control is required if order is to be maintained in human relationships. Logically, it is possible to relax external controls as humans develop the capacity for self-control and voluntarily seek the ends which social control requires. Practically, such relaxation is feasible only when socialization has outstripped individualization. Social order is maintained, for the most part, because institutions provide the sustained controls necessary to orderliness in human behavior by insistence upon social norms. The breakdown of informal controls so characteristic of modern social interaction has, in fact, unsettled standards and increased social disorder. Speed, change and heterogeneity lead to situations with which the individual cannot successfully cope. Social order now calls for collective and cooperative effort.

✓ Because of their intimate interrelations social institutions give unity, coherence and stability to social interaction. An unstable social order, of course, involves uncertainty, insecurity, social paralysis and social loss. Achievement, well-being and happiness are impossible under such conditions. Stability of the social order, however, is not to be desired for its own sake—a static order is produced when stability becomes an end rather than a means to an end—but for what it makes possible, namely, greater achievement and increased well-being. Such a social order is both stable and dynamic. It is probable, therefore, that while “change and progress dominated the minds of men during the generation that is passing, stabilization and control may of necessity concern them in this generation.”¹

¹ Reuter and Hart, *Introduction to Sociology* (New York, 1933), p. 396.

Social Institutions Serve Group Ends

Social institutions are developed to meet the *vital* human needs experienced by large and significant social groups. This means that social institutions are not designed to meet the specific and peculiar needs of individuals. To be institutionalized needs must be so common and so fundamental that coöperative effort is necessary to their satisfaction. By assuming a variety of forms, institutions are able to meet a limited number of variations in human needs but account cannot be taken of individual differences. The values embodied in social institutions are collective, not specific; they have emerged from the experience of the group, not of the individual. The worth of the institution is tested, therefore, by the effectiveness with which it serves *group*, rather than *personal*, ends.

J The process of individualization has now proceeded to a point where the whole relationship of the individual to the group, especially the relationship of the individual to institutions, is quite undefined. The type of individualism which has developed within the last century is so vigorous that it demands the elimination of every social institution which hampers or restrains any individual in the development or the expression of his personality. No consideration is given the question of the worth of the personalities seeking such expression. The result is an effort to bend the institution to favor the individual rather than to bring the individual up to the group standards embodied in the institution. It is not unlikely, then, that "the present chaotic condition of public sentiment and our disconcerting inability to cope with problems" may be due "to the lack of moral and intellectual molds for giving definite shape to the loyalties of men."²

/ Social institutions are designed to serve people—they are means to group ends. As such, they are never of greater importance than the groups they serve. But while institutions are never more important than people or welfare, they are more important than *some* people and some people's *personal happiness*. Social institutions should always consider the interests of *all* whom they serve, but the welfare of the larger number over long periods of time should always be paramount to the immediate happiness of the individual. Authorities do not agree, of course, as to what best promotes the welfare of the group. The long ages of human experience throw much light upon this problem. But again the authorities differ in their interpretations of this experience and in their conclusions with respect to its implications for present action. Sociologically speaking, however, no more reliable source exists. Its wider utilization must await the further developments of the social sciences.

² J. M. Mecklin, *Introduction to Social Ethics* (New York, 1920), pp. 203–204.

Social Institutions Inevitably Lag

✓ Before customary procedures can be institutionalized they must be more or less generally sanctioned by the larger part of the population. This requires time. In a dynamic social order, the social situation is likely to have changed in the meantime. It is impossible to avoid cultural lag under such conditions. Institutions, then, "are almost certainly representative of the best experience of the past but seldom, if ever, representative of the best experiences or experiments of the present."³ "To keep itself alive to the best thought of its time, to adjust its program, enlarge its vision, develop human values and deepen and enlighten men's convictions concerning those things by which men should measure life's activities and by means of which they can attain the ultimate purposes of life" is the continuous task of every social institution.⁴ The nature of social institutions is such, therefore, that they are necessarily subject to lag.

✓ Since "institutions do not grow by accretion but by segregation and specialization,"⁵ it is obvious that different institutions will be in different stages of development and adaptation among a given people regardless of the state of their culture. Some institutions will be emergent and uncertain, others will be mature and vigorous, and still others will have passed their prime. Different social elements, moreover, will be functioning in different ways through the same institution which may be vital and effective for one stratum and pathological for another. The evaluation of social institutions, hence, cannot be made in general terms applicable to every social group and to all social situations. The patriarchal family, the power state and the fundamentalist church may meet the needs of certain social groups, but certainly no social reformer "with his feet on the ground" would propose the emancipated family, democratic government and rationalistic religion for all sorts and conditions of men.

✓ Any impartial evaluation of social institutions, then, will take account of the needs of specific groups, the environment in which they work, and the objectives toward which they direct their collective efforts. There is no single formula which can be employed in every social situation. Moreover, social institutions must be changed, even though tardily, with fundamental changes in the social situation. No community should regard its institutions as unchangeable, but should subject them continuously to the test of service to the common weal.⁶ The solution of the institutional problem lies not so much in

³ C. C. Taylor, *Rural Sociology* (New York, 1933), p. 375.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

⁵ E. C. Lindeman, *The Community; an Introduction to Community Leadership and Organization* (New York, 1921), Ch. 7.

⁶ R. M. MacIver, *Community* (London, 1924), pp. 163-164.

scrapping the institutions which lag as in their continuous readaptation to changing social needs.

Social Institutions Necessarily Restrain

Because social institutions tend to become mechanistic and because they employ cultural compulsives in enforcing standards, many revolt against the discipline which they impose. It must be granted that in recent times groups have been so much concerned with the mechanics of social action that they have lost sight of its objectives. Men have been so engrossed with the social machine that they have neglected the social product. It must also be admitted that present social institutions have developed by the trial-and-error method over long periods of time. Each social institution has come to "its present form in the presence of other developing institutions and is, in part, an adaptation to them."⁷ Institutions and institutional procedures, therefore, cannot always be defended upon rational grounds.

"In the individual the institution exists as a habit of mind and action, largely unconscious because largely common to all the group," but as an external agency the institution is "a mature, specialized and comparatively rigid part of the social structure."⁸ It is natural, therefore, that in times of fundamental social change many individuals are irked and irritated by the inflexibility which institutions inevitably display, especially when men find themselves involved in an ever finer mesh of social control as social interaction grows more complex. This revolt against institutional regulation usually takes the form of a demand for the relaxation of traditional restraints. The catharsis which is thus secured is believed to forestall release through anti-social conduct. It should be noted, in this connection, that the development of recreational opportunities provides other effective outlets for institutionally inhibited energies without the relaxation of important social controls.

Revolt against the discipline imposed by social institutions, then, may be due to other factors than institutional obsolescence. It may be due to (1) failure to appreciate the necessarily conservative nature of social institutions; (2) lack of insight into the collective aspect of all social institutions; (3) unwillingness to undertake the discipline necessary to secure institutional rewards; and (4) failure to distinguish between the results of inadequate social machinery and those of incompetent direction. Social institutions are admittedly imperfect, but their failure to function as desired may be due not so much to their imperfections as to the manner in which they are handled. An improved automobile gives unsatisfactory service when driven by an unskilled

⁷ Reuter and Hart, *op cit*, p. 174.

⁸ Cooley, Angell and Carr, *Introductory Sociology* (New York, 1933), p. 404

chauffeur. The anarchist is wrong because he assumes that all the fault lies with the institution. Social institutions are not only man-made, they are also administered by imperfect human beings. The scientific evaluator of social institutions will carefully weigh these facts.

Social Institutions Are Unmoral

✓ The goodness or badness of an institution is not a question of its nature or structure but of the ends it serves. Social institutions "do not exist in their own right, to overpower men but only to serve them and when they cease to serve no antiquity and no sanctity can save them from condemnation."⁹ Like other types of machinery, social institutions have no moral attributes. Ethical implications attach only to the behavior of the persons who administer or participate in the collective activities canalized by institutions. It follows, therefore, that the worth of a present institution is rarely indicated by an unfavorable comparison of it with some primitive form (the modern monogamic family with the Samoan, as an example). Such comparisons may not show how far moderns have drifted, but rather, how far they have come. The scientific evaluation of social institutions, it would seem, is not made by reference to the norms of earlier cultures, or of abstract moral codes, but by measurement of the adequacy and the quality of the service rendered.

Social Institutions Are Humanly Conditioned

✓ Social institutions are the products of man's collective effort to meet certain fundamental needs. Once created they become causal factors in subsequent social interaction and any modification of the behavior patterns they conserve, will, of course, modify the social process. Social institutions become controlling factors in social interaction, however, not because they are powerful entities *per se*; but because men acquiesce in their control of human behavior. Social institutions are composed of human beings; they are utilized, manipulated and administered by human beings. Man, and man alone, is responsible for his social institutions. God is not the cause of their original organization, their effective or ineffective functioning, their disturbing maladies, their recurrent disorganization or their repeated regeneration. Social institutions are, in fact, precisely what humans make them.

It should be evident, therefore, that social institutions do not enslave. A mechanism can be made an end in itself—it may be exalted at the expense of the human life it should serve. But if men become the bond-servants of their mechanical devices of wood, iron or thought, it is *they*, not machines, who

⁹ MacIver, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-163.

enslave. When men allow an institution to play the rôle of master instead of servant, they forge their own shackles or allow others to do so. Men may "contrive to live in a world of abstract conceptions—conceptions drawn from forgotten realities, institutions created by forgotten needs." When this happens, however, it is not the fault of the institution, but of the men who use it.

Social Institutions Belong to the Living Generation

Institutions are distillations of the experience of the past; they conserve the significant values that have emerged from the struggles of innumerable generations. As such, social institutions become the heritage of the living, not the dead. They are the tools with which the present generations achieve more significantly than their forefathers. Social institutions, to be sure, not only discipline, they also thwart—but only those whose behavior runs counter to the tested standards of the group. Social institutions, on the other hand, facilitate the achievement of those whose conduct squares with collective norms. Because succeeding generations are in a position to profit by all the experience of the past, social institutions provide such persons with improved devices for the enrichment of social interaction.

To conclude: the *basic* social institutions serve fundamental human needs—order, wholesome family life, preparation for successful participation in social relations broadly conceived, health, recreation and adaptation to the Unknown. The *sanctioned* social institutions supplement the functions of the basic institutions at points where significant inadequacies developed as the social order matured. The *emergent* social institutions are experimenting with devices and techniques for increasing the effectiveness of the basic and sanctioned institutions as human interaction is lifted from the lower economic levels. Social institutions are still inadequate. In a changing social order they always will be imperfect, but in the aggregate they provide the basic equipment for all collective achievement.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND FURTHER STUDY

1. Assuming desirability, how could institutional change be speeded up?
2. "Progress is nothing more than the growth of intelligent control." (Cooley) Do you agree? Why or why not?
3. From the sociological point of view, what is the relationship of the individual to his social institutions?
4. (a) Define, illustrate and evaluate *cultural compulsives*. (V. F. Calverton, "Modern Anthropology and the Theory of Cultural Compulsives," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 36 (March, 1931), pp. 689–720.)
(b) Discuss their significance for social institutions.

5. Why are gifted men so often in revolt against institutions? Are they justified in their revolt? What are your reasons?
6. Evaluate the institutional tests described by Hertzler in "The Sociological Uses of History," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 31 (September, 1925), p. 191.
7. "It is especially necessary that institutional inventors distinguish between the valid experience of the race and the mere obsessions of the Zeitgeist." (Finney) Illustrate.
8. Show how social institutions become the products of the social process.
9. Analyze critically the phases of institutional development enumerated by Cooley, Angell and Carr in their *Introductory Sociology*, pp. 406-415.
10. Comment: "Only the breakdown of a principle or an institution makes it possible for its former advocates to view it objectively." (Calverton)
In advocating the limitation of discussion of the worth of social institutions to competent persons, Finney asks, "Why should we make it a special point of encouraging every ass to regard it as his solemn duty to bray in public?" (*A Sociological Philosophy of Education*, p. 466.) How do you answer his question?

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